The Impact of Ownership on ceo compensation: Evidence from Canada Ezzeddine, Abaoub, Faculty of Economics & Management Sciences, University of Economic Sciences, Tunis, Tunisia Lamia, Chourou1, Faculty of Law, Economics & Political Sciences, University of



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6th Global Conference on Business & Economics ISBN : 0-9742114-6-X

The Impact of Ownership on CEO

Compensation: Evidence from Canada
Ezzeddine, Abaoub, Faculty of Economics & Management Sciences, University of Economic Sciences, Tunis, Tunisia

Lamia, Chourou1, Faculty of Law, Economics & Political Sciences, University of Sousse, Tunisia

ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of ownership on CEO compensation in Canada. In particular, two aspects of ownership are investigated: ownership concentration measured by CEO stockholding, and the presence of an institutional investor as the controlling shareholder. Using a panel of firms in the S&P/TSX over the period 2001-2004 our results indicate that, controlling for standard determinants of compensation, the relationship between CEO stockholding and CEO compensation is convex. Relying on a piecewise specification, we find that CEO compensation decreases up to a CEO shareholding of 35%, indicating an alignment of the interests between shareholders and managers, then increases suggesting a CEO entrenchment. In addition, our results indicate that the presence of an institutional as a controlling shareholder is negatively associated with CEO compensation, suggesting that institutional investors reduce managerial opportunism.


  1. INTRODUCTION

Berle and Means (1932) suggest that when managers do not have an ownership interest in the firm, there is potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders since the former may allocate the firms’ resources in their own best interest.

In order to align CEO interests with those of shareholders, some researchers advocate increasing CEO equity ownership. In accordance with this point of view, Allen (1981), Lambert et al (1993), Goldberg and Idson (1995) and Core et al (1999) report a negative relationship between CEO compensation and CEO stock ownership.

Nevertheless, other researchers argue that when CEO stockownership increases, managers become entrenched. Accordingly, they may expropriate shareholders by extracting high compensation. In the present paper, we suggest that the relationship between CEO Stockholding and CEO compensation is convex: at low levels of CEO stockholding, the alignment effect predominates the entrenchment effect, but at high levels, it is the entrenchment effect which predominates.

Besides ownership stake of the CEO in the firm as a mean of interests’ alignment, several studies emphasize the monitoring role played by institutional investors. However, little work has been done with respect to CEO compensation. Hartzell and Starks (2003) examine the effect of institutional ownership concentration on CEO compensation. They find a negative relationship and conclude that institutional investors have a monitoring role. David et al (1998) focus on the nature of the relationship between institutional investors with the firm in which they invest. Their results suggest that the effect of institutional investors on CEO compensation depends on their relationships with the firm. Khan et al (2005) investigate the impact of institutional ownership concentration and dispersion on CEO compensation. They conclude that institutional ownership concentration is negatively associated with compensation, but institutional ownership dispersion is positively related to compensation level.

We propose that the monitoring role of institutional investors is more effective when they are the controlling shareholders. Hence, we investigate the impact of the presence of an institutional shareholder as a controlling shareholder on CEO compensation. We argue that CEO compensation would be lower in this case.

We examine the impact of ownership on CEO compensation in a sample of 196 Canadian firms over the period 2001-2004. The Canadian context seems of great interest given the unique ownership structure of Canadian firms: it is characterised by the prevalence of widely held as well as family controlled firms. The first category of firms is subject to agency problems between owners and managers and the second category of firms is subject to agency problems between majority and minority shareholders. A third category of firms which are also highly present in Canada are institutional-controlled firms. Despite their relative large stake in Canadian firms, to the best of our knowledge, no work has examined their influence on CEO compensation.

As predicted, our results show that the relationship between CEO compensation and CEO stockholding is convex, and that when the controlling shareholder is an institutional investor, CEO compensation is lower. These results hold for two measures of CEO compensation: cash compensation and total compensation, and after controlling for various determinants of executive compensation.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature and develops hypotheses regarding the relations between variables. Section 3 describes the model. Sample and data sources are presented in section 4. In section 5, we discuss our results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
2.1. CEO stockholding:

When CEO equity ownership increases, his interests become more aligned with those of the shareholders, consequently his compensation will be lower. In accordance with this point of view, Allen (1981), Lambert et al (1993), Goldberg and Idson (1995) and Core et al (1999) obtain a negative relationship between CEO compensation and his stake in the firm.

Nevertheless, when CEO stockownership increases significantly, managers become entrenched and their political power increases. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 759) argue that “as ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain nearly full control of the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shred by minority shareholders.” In a sample of 412 Hong Kong firms during 1995-1998, Cheung et al (2005) find a positive relationship between managerial ownership and cash compensation for levels of ownership of up to 35% in small and in family controlled firms and for up to 10% in large firms. They stipulate that entrenched managers may use their ownership rights to extract higher salaries for themselves.

We therefore predict a curvilinear relationship between CEO stockholding and compensation. In particular, we predict that as CEO stockownership increases, his compensation first decreases consistent with the argument of alignment of interests, then increases consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis.



Hypothesis 1. There is a convex relationship between CEO stockholding and CEO compensation
2.2. Institutional investors:

Some researchers suggest that institutional investors influence CEO compensation. In fact, this group of shareholders has the potential to reprimand managerial hegemony. Using a panel of 224 firms over the period 1993-2000, Khan et al (2005) find that institutional ownership concentration is negatively related to compensation and that institutional ownership dispersion is positively related to compensation level. After controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities and performance, Hartzell and Starks (2003) conclude that institutional ownership concentration is negatively related to the level of executive compensation. They find that an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of institutional shareholdings by the top five institutional investors is associated with a drop in salary of 12% of the sample mean and a drop in total compensation equal to 19% of the sample mean (p. 2352). David et al (1998) investigate the influence of institutional investors on CEO compensation. They suggest that some institutions may not play their governance role due to conflicts of interests resulting from business relationship with the firms in which they invest. Consistent with their prediction, they found that institutional investors that have only an investment relationship with the firm reduce the level of CEO compensation. In contrast, institutions that have business relationship with the firm are associated with higher CEO compensation.

In this paper, we suggest that institutional investors are more able to influence CEO compensation when they are the controlling shareholders. Accordingly, we propose to test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. CEO compensation is lower in firms that are controlled by institutional investors.
2.3. Firm size:

It is widely recognized, both in the academic research as well as in practice, that firm size is the most important determinant of executive compensation. The positive relationship between firm size and executive compensation has several explications rooted mainly in the economic theory, and the human capital theory. This relationship is also well documented in the empirical literature (Cordeiro and Viliyath, 2003; Carpenter and Sanders, 2002; Core et al, 1999; Tosi et al, 2000). For instance, in a meta-analysis of the empirical literature, Tosi et al (2000), conclude that firm size explain more than 40% in the variation of total compensation.

Within the Canadian context, Elitzer and Halpern (1995) find a positive relationship between firm size and cash compensation. Their work covers a sample of 180 firms of TSE300 over the period 1993-1994. Likewise, Zhou (2000) examines the executive compensation of 755 Canadian firms in the 1991-1995 time period and concludes that CEO cash compensation increases with firm size. Finally, Jog and Dutta (2004) report a positive association between the two variables in a sample of Canadian firms. Hence, we test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between firm size and CEO compensation.
2.4. Firm performance:

In agency models settings, the optimal compensation contract predicts a positive association between managerial compensation and firm performance. Indeed, managers’ actions are not observable by the principal; therefore the principal offers a contract to the agent that is performance based.

Several empirical studies examine the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. However, the empirical results are inconclusive. In a well cited empirical work, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that executive compensation varies only by 3.25$ subsequent to a change of 1000$ in shareholders wealth. Moreover, Tosi et al (2000) conclude that firm performance explains less than 5% of the variance of compensation. Nevertheless, other studies such as by Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003), Mc Knight and Tomkins (1999) report positive relationship between the two variables.

In the Canadian context, Elitzer and Halpern (1995) did not find a significant relationship. In the contrary, Zhou (2000) concludes that CEO cash compensation increases with firm performance. Jog and Dutta (2003) argue that CEO compensation is greater in high performing firms than in low performing firms. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is as follows:



Hypothesis 4. There is a positive relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation.
2.5. Growth opportunities:

If managers should be compensated for their contributions in the firm, we expect a positive association between growth opportunities and CEO compensation, therefore we test the following hypothesis:



Hypothesis 5. There is a positive relationship between firm growth opportunities and CEO compensation.
2.6. CEO age:

The human capital literature developed by Becker (1975) suggests that employee attributes have important value for the employer, because they reveal their managerial talents. One important attribute is experience, which may be proxied by CEO age. Therefore, by virtue of experience, older CEOs should be more remunerated than younger CEOs. In accordance with this point of view, Ramaswamy et al (2000), Bloom and Milkovich (1998), David et al (1998) among others find a positive relationship between CEO age and compensation. Hence, we propose to test the following hypothesis:



Hypothesis 6. There is a positive relationship between CEO age and CEO compensation.
2.7. CEO tenure:

Tenure reflects the knowledge the CEO accumulates over time. According to the human capital literature, it should be positively related to compensation. While some researchers (Hill and Phan, 1991; David et al, 1998) suggest a linear relationship, some others (Hambrick and finkelstein, 1995; Cordeiro and Veliyath, 2003) propose a curvilinear relationship. Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) report a relation in the shape of a reverted U. Nevertheless, Ramaswamy et al (2000) and Monti-Belkaoui et al (1993) find a negative relationship between CEO tenure and compensation. We suggest testing the following hypothesis:



Hypothesis 7. There is a positive relationship between CEO tenure and CEO compensation.
2.8. CEO duality:

The chief executive officer who is also chairman may use his power in order to influence his compensation level. Core et al (1999) examine a sample composed of 205 firms over 3 years and concludes that CEO compensation is higher when the CEO is also board chairman. Ramaswamy et al (2000) conclude that duality is positively and significantly related to compensation in firms which are not family controlled. Nonetheless, Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) did not find any effect of CEO duality on cash as well as total CEO compensation. In this paper, we propose to test the following hypothesis:



Hypothesis 8. There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and CEO compensation.
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION
3.1. Dependent variables

We use two dependent variables to test the above hypotheses. The first variable measures cash compensation (cash comp) and is equal to the sum of salary and bonus. The second dependent variable measures total compensation (total comp) which is the sum of cash compensation and value of new stock options awards. We employ the Black& Scholes approach for valuing European call options adjusted for dividend payments (see Merton, 1973).



(1)

(2)

where


Φ = cumulative probability function for normal distribution.

E = exercise price.

P = price of underlying stock.

T = time to expiration.

r = risk-free interest rate.

d = expected dividend rate over life of option.

σ = expected stock return volatility over life of option.

3.2. Independent variables:

Independent variables, as well as their measures and expected signs are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Measures of independent variables

Variable

Measure

Expected sign

CEO stockhold

Institutional- controlled firm

Firm size
Firm performance
Growth opportunities
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO duality


common shares owned by the CEO/total common shares outstanding
Dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is controlled by an institutional investor, and 0 otherwise
Total assets in logarithm
Return on assets
(market value of equity + book value of debt)/ total assets
CEO age in years
Number of years the CEO holds this position
Dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise

convex

-

+


+
+
+
+
+



4. SAMPLE AND DATA SOURCES
We examine the determinants of CEO compensation of 196 large Canadian corporations listed on Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 2001 and 2004. Table 2 below presents the distribution of our sample firms by industry, where we can see that 36% of corporations in our sample belong to the manufacturing sector, followed by services (28%), then mining and oil and gas extraction (20%). Financial sector and other industry sectors together form 17% of our sample firms.
Table 2. Distribution of the sample firms by industry




Firm number

Percentage

IND1. Mining and oil and gas extraction (NAICS 21)

IND2. Manufacturing (NAICS 31 to 33)

IND3. Finance and insurance (NAICS 52)

IND4. Services (NAICS 41 to 91 except 52)

IND5. Other industries (NAICS 22, NAICS 23)


40

70

19



54

13


20.41

35.71


9.69

27.55


6.64

NAIC refers to North American Industry Classification.
Since 1993, all publicly traded companies in the province of Ontario are required to disclose top executive compensation. We collect data on CEO compensation (i.e. base salary, bonuses and shares represented by stock option awards) from firm proxy statements available from SEDAR database.

All of the compensation elements are reported in values, except for stock options. We value the stock options using the Black&Scholes approach for valuing European call options adjusted for dividend payments. The strike price, market price and time to expiration for each stock option grant were carefully gathered from proxy statements. We use the interest rate on Canadian government 10-year bond as proxy for interest risk-free rate, which is obtained from the Bank of Canada. The expected dividend rate and the expected stock return volatility are gathered from StockGuide database.

Stock market data were collected from the Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (CFMRC). Governance data (CEO equity ownership, age, tenure, institutionally controlled firms) were hand-collected from proxy statements. Several corporations do not disclose information about their CEOs age and tenure. In that case, we use Financial Post database to collect missing information, and if not available, we look into companies’ websites. Again, if the information needed is not available online, we contact the corporation by email, followed by a reminder for those who do not reply within a week.

In order to identify institutional-controlled firms, we classify companies as widely held or closely held using a 10% cut-off. A company is classified as widely held if no person or company beneficially owns, directly or indirectly, or exercises control or direction over common shares carrying 10% or more of the voting rights of the outstanding common shares of the corporation. We use the 10% cut-off because Canadian companies have to divulgate, in their proxy statements, the name and ownership stake of persons and companies owning 10% or more of the stock. Then, among controlled firms, we distinguish those which are controlled by an institutional investor relying on the voting rights.

We collect the above data for fiscal years lying between January 2001 and December 2004. We define the fiscal year as the year in which lies the final month of the fiscal year chosen by the corporation. Thus, a fiscal year from July 2003 to June 2004 is treated as an observation for 2004.

The executive compensation packages awarded by the corporations in our sample are expressed in Canadian dollars, but some are provided in U.S. dollars. In that case, we convert these compensation elements in Canadian dollars using the average exchange rate over the corresponding fiscal year. Furthermore, we deflated our monetary values using the consumer price index of the last month of the corresponding fiscal year (with 2000 as the year base). Finally, we have excluded observations for which companies changed their fiscal years, observations with partial compensation due to CEO turnover and observations with missing data. The resulting panel is composed of 451 observations in the model using cash compensation as the dependant variable and 434 observations in the model where total compensation is the dependant variable.


5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1. Descriptive statistics:

Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimated models. The median CEO receives a cash compensation of 897,210.9 CAD and a total compensation of 1,374,243 CAD. The mean of cash compensation as well as total compensation are higher than median meaning that these variables are skewed.

The size of the firms in our sample ranges from 4.730 millions to 395,000 millions Canadian dollars, with a mean and a median of 13,200 and 1,526 millions Canadian dollars respectively, indicating that it is positively skewed. The mean and the median of ROA are 1.65 and 3.12, respectively. The descriptive statistics of the market-to-book ratio show that, on average, firms in our sample exhibit high growth opportunities level with a mean of 1.74 and a median equals to 1.25. The medians of CEO age and tenure are 54 and 6, respectively. The CEO is also chairman of the board in 82 cases, representing 23% of observations.

Moreover, Table 3 shows that the average CEOs equity holdings are 3.21% with a median of 0.33%, a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 94.13%. These figures are indicative of the variety of the ownership structure that exists in Canada. Finally, 20.7% of the sample firms are controlled by an institution.

The correlation matrix is presented in Table 4. As indicated, we do not detect any multi-colinearity problem. It is noteworthy that CEO stockholding is positively and significantly associated with CEO age, CEO tenure and CEO duality. Besides, as predicted, institutional controlled firms are negatively associated with CEO cash as well as total compensation.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of dependant and independent variables



Variable

Mean

median

minimum

Maximum

Standard

deviation



Cash comp

Total comp

Total assets (in million $)

ROA


Market to book

CEO age


CEO tenure

CEO duality

CEO stockhold (%)

Institutional-controlled firm



1221117

2120046


13200

1.65


1.73

53.97


8.19

0.23


3.21

0.207


897210.9

1374243


1526

3.12


1.25

54

6



0

0.33


0

60676.67

73694.93


4.07

-92.08


0.04

35

1



0

2.29 10-7

0


1.71 107

4.76 107

3.95 105

46.67


35.56

75

50



1

94.13


1

1224697

2683363


4.73 104

11.45


2.16

7.73


7.50

0.42


10.11

0.40


Table 4. Correlation between variables




Ln (Cash comp)

Ln (Total

comp)


Ln (Total assets)

ROA

Market

to book


CEO

age


CEO

tenure


CEO

duality


CEO

stockhold



Institutional-

controlled firm



Ln (Cash comp)

Ln (Total comp)

Ln (Total assets)

ROA


Market to book

CEO age


CEO tenure

CEO duality

CEO stockhold

Institutional-controlled firm



1

0.8151


0.0000
0.6356

0.0000
0.2076

0.0000
-0.2263

0.0000
0.2240

0.0000
0.0275

0.4892
-0.0518

0.1696
0.0254

0.5207
-0.1530

0.0000

1

0.5314



0.0000
0.1291

0.0007
-0.0523

0.1755

0.1606


0.0002
-0.0336

0.4109
-0.0897

0.0204
-0.0594

0.1412
-0.1217

0.0014


1

0.2141



0.0000
-0.4109

0.0000
0.1512

0.0002
-0.0666

0.0831
0.0183

0.6196
-0.0488

0.2065
-0.1342

0.0003

1

-0.1047



0.0038

0.1688


0.0000
0.0331

0.3888
0.0093

0.8001
0.0269

0.4856
0.0460

0.2023

1

-0.1612



0.0001
-0.0151

0.6953
-0.0631

0.0876
-0.0343

0.3740
0.1087

0.0026

1

0.4045



0.0000
0.1631

0.0001
0.2516

0.0000
-0.0304

0.4599


1

0.2304



0.0000
0.3227

0.0000
-0.1023

0.0074

1

0.2611



0.0000
-0.0700

0.0551

1

-0.1166


0.0023

1


p values are reported below each correlation coefficient

5.2. Results and interpretation:

The first step consists of verifying the existence of heterogeneity in our sample using the Chow test. Under the null hypothesis, there is presence of firm homogeneity. As indicated in Table 5, the Chow test suggests the presence of heterogeneity in the sample for both models (cash compensation and total compensation).

The second step consists of choosing between the fixed effect model and the random effect model by employing the Hausman specification test. The results reported in Table 5, indicate the absence of any endogeneity problem and that the random effect model must be considered.

The estimated random effect models reported in Table 6 below indicate that there is a curvilinear relationship between CEO compensation and CEO stock ownership. In fact, the coefficient on CEO stockholding (CEO stockhold) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient on the square of CEO stockholding (CEO stockhold2) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels when the dependant variable is cash compensation and total compensation, respectively. This result strongly supports the existence of a convex relationship as predicted in hypothesis 1.

As predicted, we find a negative association between CEO compensation and the presence of an institutional investor as the controlling shareholders. This relationship is significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with the monitoring role played by institutional investors.

Furthermore, we find that the remaining variables are statistically significant except for CEO tenure, and this in both models. In unreported regressions, we test the existence of a curvilinear relationship between CEO tenure and CEO compensation, but we fail to find any significant relationship.

Moreover, we find that firm performance measured by ROA is not significant in the model where total compensation is the dependant variable. All the coefficients have the predicted sign, except for CEO duality. While the negative sign obtained on CEO duality is contrary to prediction, it is in line with the findings of Cheung et al (2005).

Table 5. Tests for panel data






Ln (Cash comp)

Ln (Total comp)

Chow test

Hausman specification test




F(134, 307)=5.95

p value=0.000

Chi 2(9)=13.3

p value= 0.1324



F(132, 292)=3.09

p value=0.000

Chi 2(9)=6.67

p value= 0.6714



Table 6. Estimates for random effect model with cash compensation and total compensation as the dependant variables. The p-values are reported in the second row. The sample is composed of an unbalanced panel of 196 Canadian firms over the period 2001-2004.






Ln (Cash comp)

Ln (Total comp)

Intercept

Ln (total assets)

ROA

Market to book



CEO age

CEO tenure

CEO duality

CEO stockhold

CEO stockhold2

Institutional- controlled firm

Number of observations
Number of firms
Wald chi2 (9)

R2 between



9.115***

0.000
0.271***

0.000
0.007***

0.008
0.060**

0.020
0.011**

0.036
0.009

0.116
-0.168**

0.030
-0.018**

0.017
0.031***

0.003


-0.114*

0.078
451


135
199.00

0.000
0.5707



8.883***

0.000
0.310***

0.000
0.005

0.163
0.144***

0.000
0.013**

0.039
0.003

0.567
-0.328***

0.001


-0.023**

0.013
0.035**

0.012
-0.173*

0.052
434


133
175.67

0.000
0.5525



* significant at the 10% level

** significant at the 5% level

*** significant at the 1% level

To further examine the convex relationship that exists between CEO stockholding and CEO compensation, we estimate a piecewise linear regression. We separate ownership into two categories: low levels of CEO ownership and high levels of CEO ownership. Since no tight rules are used in choosing the turning point2, we try different ones: 25%, 30% and 35%. If the breakpoint used is 35%, the ownership variables are as follows:


CEO ownership [0.00, 0.35] ownership if ownership<0.35

0.35 if ownership>= 0.35

CEO ownership [0.35, 1.00] 0 if ownership<0.35

ownership-0.35 if ownership>= 0.35


For instance, when CEO stock ownership is equal to 38%, we would have CEO ownership [0.00, 0.35] = 35%, and CEO ownership [0.35, 1.00] = 3%.

Our results show that the regression, in which the breakpoint used is 35%, is the one which gives the best results in terms of statistical significance. The results corresponding to the 35% breakpoint are reported in Tables 7and 8 below. The Chow test, presented in Table 7, indicates the presence of heterogeneity in the sample and the Hausman specification test suggests the choice of the random effect model.

The results presented in Table 8 indicate that there is a negative relationship between CEO stockownership and CEO compensation for ownership of up to 35%, the result is statistically significant at the 5% level for both models. For each 1% increase in CEO ownership between 0% and 35%, CEO cash and total compensation decline by an average of 1.1% and 1.6%, respectively. However, CEO compensation and CEO stockownership go in tandem when CEO stockownership exceeds 35%. The coefficients are significant at the 1% and 5% level in the first and the second model, respectively. For each 1% increase in CEO ownership beyond 35%, CEO cash and total compensation increase by an average 2.3% and 2.2%, respectively.

These results suggest that at low levels of CEO ownership, the incentive effect dominates, but that at high levels of ownership, CEOs become entrenched and receive a higher compensation. The results regarding the other variables remain unchanged.

To make sure that our results are robust, however, we introduce dummy variables to control for years and industry effects into the regression. The results reported in Table 10, show that after controlling for year and industry effects, CEO compensation first increases and then decreases with CEO ownership, moreover CEO compensation is negatively associated with the presence of an institutional as the controlling shareholder.


6. CONCLUSION
Through a cross section analysis of 196 Canadian firms over the 2001-2004 period, we try to shed light on the impact of ownership on Canadian CEO compensation. Two aspects of ownership are investigated: CEO ownership and the presence of an institutional investor as the controlling shareholder. Our results show that, as CEO stock ownership increases, his compensation decreases then increases, resulting in a U shaped relationship. Using a piecewise specification, we find that CEO compensation is a decreasing function of CEO stockholding up to 35% stake, then it increases, indicating that at levels of ownership greater than 35%, CEOs become entrenched and therefore extract a higher compensation. This result holds for two measures of compensation: cash compensation and total compensation.

Besides, our results suggest that when a firm is controlled by an institutional investor, CEOs receive lower cash compensation as well as lower total compensation. This result indicates that CEO opportunism is reduced in the presence of institutional investors as controlling shareholders which is consisting with the efficient monitoring played by institutional shareholders.

Table 7. Tests for panel data




Ln (Cash comp)

Ln (Total comp)

Chow test

Hausman specification test




F(134, 307)=5.96

p value=0.000

Chi 2(9)=13.88

p value= 0.1268



F(132, 292)=3.09

p value=0.000

Chi 2(9)=6.59

p value= 0.6795



Table 8. Estimates for a piecewise model with cash compensation and total compensation as the dependant variables. The p-values are reported in the second row. The sample is composed of an unbalanced panel of 196 Canadian firms over the period 2001-2004.






Ln (Cash comp)

Ln (Total comp)

Intercept

LN(total assets)

ROA

Market to book



CEO age

CEO tenure

CEO duality

% CEO ownership [0.00, 0.35]

% CEO ownership [0.35, 1]

Institutional- controlled firm

Number of observations
Number of firms
Wald chi2 (9)

R2 between



9.094***

0.000
0.272***

0.000
0.007***

0.009
0.060**

0.020
0.011**

0.034
0.008

0.142
-0.169**

0.029
-0.011**

0.039
0.023***

0.004
-0.115*

0.075
451
135
199.42

0.000
0.5713



8.850***

0.000
0.312***

0.000
0.005

0.170
0.145***

0.000
0.013**

0.036
0.003

0.621
-0.331***

0.001


-0.016**

0.015
0.022**

0.026
-0.175**

0.050
434


133
176.76

0.000
0.5542



* significant at the 10% level

** significant at the 5% level

*** significant at the 1% level
Table 9. Tests for panel data




Ln (Cash comp)

Ln (Total comp)

Chow test

Hausman specification test




F(134, 304)=5.67

p value=0.000


Chi 2(12)=17.46

p value= 0.1331



F(132, 289)=2.65

p value=0.000


Chi 2(12)=8.02

P value= 0.7839


Table 10. Estimates for a piecewise model with cash compensation and total compensation as the dependant variables. Dummy variables are included to control for year and industry effects. The omitted dummy variables are those corresponding to Mining and oil and gas extraction industry and the year 2001. The p-values are reported in the second row. The sample is composed of an unbalanced panel of 196 Canadian firms over the period 2001-2004.






Ln (Cash comp)

Ln (Total comp)

Intercept

Ln (total assets)

ROA

Market to book



CEO age

CEO tenure

CEO duality

% CEO ownership [0.00, 0.35]

% CEO ownership [0.35, 1]

Institutional- controlled firm

D2002

D2003

D2004

IND2

IND3

IND4

IND5

Number of observations

Number of firms

Wald chi2 (16)


R2 between

9.062***

0.000
0.272***

0.000
0.007***

0.009
0.059**

0.023
0.010*

0.059
0.004

0.478
-0.124

0.112
-0.012**

0.027
0.022***

0.004
-0.126**

0.047
-0.006

0.884
0.033

0.481
0.125**

0.013
0.162

0.182
0.001

0.993
0.200

0.107
-0.285

0.106
451

135

226.46


0.000

0.6053


8.361***

0.000
0.346***

0.000
0.005

0.130
0.159***

0.000
0.012**

0.040
0.004

0.468
-0.322***

0.001


-0.022***

0.015
0.024**

0.012
-0.171*

0.051
0.007

0.915
-0.076

0.282
-0.057

0.439
0.158

0.236
-0.241

0.222
0.126

0.355
-0.463

0.015
434

133


211.84

0.000


0.6061

Note: D2002, D2003 and D2004 are year dummy variables for the fiscal years 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively. IND 2: Manufacturing (NAICS 31 to 33), IND 3: Finance and insurance (NAICS 52), IND 4: Services (NAICS 41 to 91 except 52), IND 5: other industries (NAICS 22, NAICS 23)

* significant at the 10% level

** significant at the 5% level

*** significant at the 1% level



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1 Corresponding author. phone: 216 98 650 159;

E mail address : lamiachourou@yahoo.fr.



2 The turning point is the percentage ownership of equity held by the CEO at which CEO compensation reaches its minimum.

OCTOBER 15-17, 2006



GUTMAN CONFERENCE CENTER, USA


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