The Dynamic Lexicon
Because, Soferim Bebel, if it goes to that… every person, place and thing in the chaosmos of Alle anyway connected with the gobblydumbed turkey was moving and changing every part of the time: the traveling inkhorn (possibly pot), the hare and the turtle pen and paper, the continually more or less intermisunderstanding minds of the anticollaborators, the as time went on as it will variously inflected, differently pronounced, otherwise spelled, changeably meaning vocable scriptsigns. No, so help me Petault, it is not a miseffectual whyacinthinous riot of blots and blurs and bars and balls and hoops and wriggles and juxtaposed jottings linked by spurts of speed: it only looks as like it as damn it.
James Joyce, Finnegan’s Wake
Table of Contents
0. Introduction: 5
0.1 The Static Lexicon vs. The Dynamic Lexicon 5
0.2 The Plan 9
Chapter 1: Preliminaries 11
1.1 Background 11
1.2 Core Ideas 18
1.3 Terminology 21
Chapter 2: The Dynamic Lexicon and Lexical Entrainment 25
2.1 Some Features of the Dynamic Lexicon 25
2.2 Automatic Entrainment 31
Chapter 3: Norms of word meaning litigation 47
3.1 Recognizing and engaging meaning mismatch 47
3.2 The case of ‘planet’ 48
3.3 The case of ‘rape’ 56
3.4 The case of ‘person’ 59
3.5 A Note on Scalia’s Original Meaning Thesis 64
Chapter 4: Meaning Underdetermination, Logic, and Vagueness 68
4.1 Meaning Underdetermination and Semantics 68
4.2 Word Meaning Modulation and Logic 81
4.3 Vagueness 88
Chapter 5: Consequences for Analytic Philosophy 93
5.1 Contextualism in Epistemology 93
5.2 Paderewski, Peter, and Pierre 103
5.3 Understanding Indexicals 106
Chapter 6: Metaphor and Beyond 112
6.1 Metaphor 112
6.2 “Language” Instruction and Language Departments 116
This book has been in the works for about a decade and I have many people to thank for valuable suggestions and difficult yet very helpful questions over the years. In particular, I would like to thank Josh Armstrong, David Braun, Susan Brennan, Liz Camp, Herman Cappelen, Patrick Grim, John Hawthorne, Richard Larson, Ernie Lepore, Rebecca Mason, Francois Recanati, Dan Sperber, Jason Stanley, Matthew Stone, Tim Sundell, Paul Teller, Deirdre Wilson, and David Zarefsky for these helpful discussions.
More or less compete versions of this material were presented in minicourses at Beihan University, Beijing China, August, 2011, and the International Summer School in Semantics and Cognitive Science, Pumpula, Latvia, July 2012.
In addition, smaller portions of this work have been presented in various talks over the past decade. Among those places: The Conference on Cognitive Systems as Representational Systems, Nicolaus Copernicus Universiy, Torun, Poland. 2004; The Meaning and Communication Conference. Lisbon, Portugal, 2005; Mental Matters: the Philosophy of Linguistics. Dubrovnik, Croatia, 2005. The University of Toronto, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005; University of Central Oklahoma, 2006; The Context and Communication Conference, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway, 2006. The International conference on Linguistics and Epistemology, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, 2007. American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, 2008; The World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, Korea, 2008; The American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, 2009; Conference on Contextualism and Truth, Arche, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, 2009; University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 2009; Dept. of Philosophy, UNLV. September, 2009; Conference on Contextualism and Compositionality, University of Paris, 2010; Workshop in Semantics and Philosophy of Language, University of Chicago, 2010; Kansas State University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2011; Rutgers AEF Interdisciplinary Meeting on Approaches to Reference. Rutgers University, 2011; International Conference on Language and Value, Beijing Normal University, 2011. I am very grateful to the audiences at those conferences who pushed this work and helped me to develop in profitable ways.
Portions of this work have previously been published in paper form. Parts of section 2.1 appeared in “The Myth of Human Language.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2006. Portions of section 5.1 appeared in “Cheap Contextualism,” Nous. Philosophical Issues 16: Annual Supplement, Sosa and Villanueva (eds.), 2008, and bits of 5.3 appeared in “Understanding Temporal Indexicals,” (with reply by John Perry) in M. O'Rourke and C. Washington, (eds.). Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007.
0.1 The Static Lexicon vs. The Dynamic Lexicon
Quite often people ask me how many books I’ve written. When they do (for example, on airplanes), I pause and say, “well… it depends on what you mean by ‘book’.” I have edited several volumes of previously published work by others. Do these edited volumes count as books? Some people (most non-academics) say yes, and others say no. I have written a couple of eBooks; do they count as books? But wait, one isn’t published yet. And the one that is published is only about 50 pages long. Book? Again the answer I get varies. Was my Columbia University dissertation a book? By the way, it was “published,” with minor revisions, by the University of Indiana Linguistics Club. Book? The same book? What about drafts of books that are sitting on my hard drive? Are they books? Is a co-authored book a “book I wrote?” It takes a few minutes of asking these questions before I can answer and tell my conversational partner whether I have written 2 or 3 or 6 or 10 books.
The story is odd in a way, because ‘book’ is one of the first words we English speakers learn, and it has been with us for a long time. It comes from the old English ‘boc’, which seemed to apply to any written document. The shared meaning has evolved over the past thousand years to be somewhat narrower than that (not every written document is a book) and in some ways broader (think eBook) but even after a millennium of shared usage the meaning is quite open-ended. And there are elements of the meaning that can change radically on a conversation-by-conversation basis.
Far from being the exception, I think this is typical of how things are with the words we use. Even for well-entrenched words their meanings are open ended and can change on the fly as we engage different conversational partners. Consider a word like ‘sport’. Does it include bowling? Mountain Climbing? Darts? Chess? (In Russia it often does.) Or consider words like ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, or (less loftily) ‘snack’ and ‘success’. All of these words have meanings that are underdetermined, and we adjust or modulate their meanings on a conversation-by-conversation basis. Their meanings are dynamic.
These facts seem to fly in the face of the traditional view of language, which is more or less the following: Languages like Urdu, German, Polish and Portuguese are fairly stable abstract systems of communication that are learned (with varying degrees of success) by human beings. Those humans in turn use the languages that they have learned to communicate ideas, perform certain tasks (by giving orders, instructions, etc.), and in some cases as media for artistic expression. It is often supposed that the better one learns a language the better equipped one is to successfully communicate, accomplish complex tasks, etc. Sometimes the standard view uses the metaphor of language as a widely shared common currency that agents use to communicate, with individual words being the common coins of the realm. These common coins are also supposed to be more or less fixed. Of course everyone believes that language undergoes change, but according to the standard view the pace of change is glacial. There is a long slow gradual evolution from Old English to Middle English and on to Contemporary English. Word meanings change slowly, and the change is largely uniform across the population of language users.
In this book I follow recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology that rejects the standard, static picture of language, and instead highlights the extreme context sensitivity of language. From this alternative point of departure I will develop an alternative dynamic theory of the nature of language and the lexicon. This alternative theory will reject the idea that languages are stable abstract objects that we learn and then use; instead, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. We can call these one-off fleeting things microlanguages. I will also reject the idea that words are relatively stable things with fixed meanings that we come to learn. Rather, word meanings themselves are dynamic and massively underdetermined.
What do I mean when I say that word meanings are dynamic and underdetermined? First, when I say that the meaning of a term is dynamic I mean that the meaning of the term can shift between conversations and even within a conversation. As I noted, everyone agrees that word meanings can shift over time, but I will argue that they can shift as we move from context to context on a daily basis.
These shifts of meaning do not just occur between conversations; I think that they also occur within conversations – in fact I believe that conversations are often designed to help this shifting take place. That is, when we engage in conversation, much of what we say does not involve making claims about the world but it involves instructing our communicative partners about how to adjust word meanings for the purposes of our conversation.
For example, the linguist Chris Barker (2002) has observed that many of the utterances we make play the role of shifting the meaning of a predicate. Sometimes when I say “Jones is bald,” I am not trying to tell you something about Jones; I am trying to tell you something about the meaning of ‘bald’ – I am in effect saying that for the purposes of our current conversation, the meaning of ‘bald’ will be such that Jones is a safe case of a bald person (more precisely, that he safely falls in the range of the predicate ‘bald’) and that from now on in the conversation everyone balder than Jones is safely in the range of ‘bald’.1 Barker’s observation generalizes to a broad class of our linguistic practices; even if it appears that we are making assertions of fact, we are often doing something else altogether. Our utterances are metalinguistic – we are using our conversation to make adjustments to the language itself, perhaps to clarify the claims that will only follow later.
We have other strategies for shifting word meanings in a conversation. Sometimes we say things like “Well if Jones is bald then Smith is bald”. I think that what is happening when we do this is that we are trying to persuade our interlocutor that given our agreement that Jones is safely in the range of ‘bald’, Smith ought to be considered safely in the range of ‘bald’ too, or perhaps we are running a reductio argument to persuade our interlocutor that Jones shouldn’t count as in the range of ‘bald’.
Why does the difference between this dynamic theory and the standard (relatively static) theory matter? First, while the static theory is not universally held (as we will see in Chapter 1, a number of contemporary philosophers and linguists have rejected it) it is at least widely held by both academics and non-academics, ranging from philosophers and language instructors, to anthropologists and computational linguists, to politicians and political pundits. Second, even though the standard theory is not universally accepted, the basic assumptions of the standard view have nevertheless crept into the way problems are tackled in all of these domains – sometimes with devastating consequences.
For example, the standard view has led anthropologists and psychologists to think that languages constrain the conceptual space of language users. It has led to wooden approaches to language instruction on the one hand and to failed attempts at human/machine communication on the other. On the political end, it has led to silliness on both the left and the right by way of attempts to clean up or reform or otherwise render standard languages politically correct – a general sentiment that has led to downright discriminatory social policies like English Only laws, and in its extreme form, to attempts at language purification by Fascists like Mussolini.
Finally, I believe that the standard view has led to imbroglios in contemporary analytic philosophy on topics ranging from the theory of sense and reference, to the philosophy of time, skepticism in epistemology, and the problem of vagueness. To see our way out of these imbroglios we need to attend to the more accurate picture of the nature of language as a dynamic object. That is, it is not enough to pay lip service to the idea that language is dynamic; we have to ensure that static assumptions have not crept into our philosophical theorizing. Static assumptions need to be isolated and removed if we want to avoid philosophical conundrums.
For example, as I will argue in section 5.1, the meaning of the term ‘know’ can shift from conversational context to conversational context. Someone might ask me if I know where the car keys are, and I may truly say yes, even though in an epistemology class I might truly say that I can’t be sure that car keys even exist (I could be a brain in a vat, after all). How can I know where the car keys are if I don’t even know they exist? One way of understanding what is going on here is to say that the meaning of ‘knows’ has shifted between its use in the epistemology class and its use in an everyday context. The meaning of ‘knowledge’ in an epistemology philosophy class is much more stringent than the meaning of ‘knowledge’ in everyday contexts. There are countless examples of this sort of thing. Every field has terms that get specialized meanings when people are talking shop. For example, the materials scientist will say that the glass in a window pane is liquid when she is wearing her scientist hat, but presumably will not call it a liquid in everyday conversation.
Word meanings are dynamic, but they are also underdetermined. What this means is that there is no complete answer to what does and doesn’t fall within the range of a predicate like ‘red’ or ‘bald’ or ‘hexagonal’ (yes, even ‘hexagonal’). We may sharpen the meaning and we may get clearer on what falls in the range of these predicates (and we may willingly add or subtract individuals from the range), but we never completely sharpen the meaning and we never completely nail down the extension of a predicate. For example, we might agree that Jones is safely in the range of ‘bald’, but there are still many cases where the meaning of ‘bald’ isn’t fixed. We haven’t fixed the meaning of ‘bald’ for people with more hair than Jones, or for people with about the same amount of hair as Jones but distributed differently, or for people who shave their heads, or for nonhumans etc.
Some theorists think that there is a core meaning for a term that is the absolute sense of the term but that we are pragmatically licensed to use the term loosely. So, for example, ‘bald’ means absolutely bald – not one single hair,2 ‘flat’ means absolutely flat, etc. There are various ways of executing this idea. For example Laserson (1990) has talked of “pragmatic halos” surrounding the core, absolute sense of the terms; Recanati (2004) and Wilson and Carston (2007) have argued that we begin with the absolute meaning and are “pragmatically coerced” to modulate to less precise meanings. I don’t believe this view is correct. In this book I will argue that the “absolute” sense of a term (if it even exists) is not privileged but is simply one modulation among many – there is no core or privileged modulation.
This isn’t just the case for predicates like ‘bald’ but, I will argue, all predicates, ranging from predicates for things like ‘person’ and ‘tree’, predicates for abstract ideas like ‘art’ and ‘freedom’, and predicates for crimes like ‘rape’ and ‘murder’. You may think that there is a fact of the matter about what these predicates refer to, but you would be quite mistaken – even in the legal realm the meanings are not fixed, not by Black’s Law Dictionary, nor by written laws, nor by the intentions of the lawmakers and founding fathers.3 Any suggestion that there is a fact of the matter as to what these terms mean in disputed cases is deceptive – it is appealing to an alleged fact that is simply does not obtain. Indeed, I would argue that this is also the case with mathematical and logical predicates like ‘straight line’ and ‘entailment’. The meanings of all these predicates remain open to some degree or other, and are sharpened as needed when we make advances in mathematics and logic.
You might think that underdetermined meanings are defective or inferior and perhaps things to be avoided, but in my view they can’t be avoided (even in mathematical and logical cases), and in any case there is no point in avoiding them since we reason perfectly well with words having underdetermined meanings. I will attempt to show how this works and in particular how we can have a formal semantics of natural language even though we are admitting massive meaning underdetermination. The received wisdom seems to be that semantics demands precision and fully determinate meanings. Whatever the merits of precision and fully determinate meanings, semantics (paradoxical as it may seem) has no need for them.
Finally, we will see that the static view has infected analytic philosophy, with the result that philosophy has accumulated a number of seemingly intractable puzzles that, I believe, all have their root in a single error – the assumption that the lexicon is static. I’ll give a handful of examples of where this has taken place, but it is my belief that once we pull on these threads many more puzzles in contemporary philosophy will begin to unravel.