The Building Blocks



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Constitutional Law Outline

  1. The Building Blocks



Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall

  • political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans

  • Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered

  • Marbury: would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions

  • Madison: Secretary of State for Jefferson

  • Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution?

Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission?

Q2: Does he have a REMEDY?

Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS?

Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT?



Marshall’s Decision:

  1. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right

  2. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive’s constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them)

  3. Mandamus not allowed

  1. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus

  2. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct.

Congressional statute at odds with Constitution

  1. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it.

  1. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land.

  2. Who interprets: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Not the legislature.

  • to deny the permissibility of judicial review of the constitutionality of a congressional statute would be to say that the “courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.”

CRITICISM:



  1. Who determines constitutionality: Nowhere is C does state that the courts, not Congress, ought to decide whether a statute conflicts

  • 1 reason for courts to decide-judicial independence-not elected. Congress can be seen as responding to majority’s will, and since one of the key foundations of C is to protect the rights of minorities, the relatively apolitical judiciary may interpret C in a way more sensitive to this minority-protection goal




  1. Marshall forces collision: It would be possible to read Act as giving appellate jurisdiction to issue writs, not just original. Today, always read statutes as not violating C, if possible

  2. Maybe could have added to original jurisdiction-no collision p. 32

  1. The categories of original and appellate jurisdictions are not mutually exclusive. The C sets up a provisional allocation, which Congress can alter if it wishes. Power to alter is recognized in the “exceptions” clause. Constitutional for Congress to grant original over cases in which it had appellate jurisdiction.

  2. C defines irreducible minimum of o.j. but permits Congress to expand

MODES OF INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (and Justification of Judicial Review):



  1. Textual:

  1. Judicial Oath Art. VI clause 3: Judges take an oath to uphold C supports idea that judges have power to say what C means. BUT Congress takes the same oath, nothing distinctive about judges

  2. Supremacy Clause Art V1 clause 2: Power of federal courts to invalidate state legislatures and courts never questioned, state courts always have power to invalidate state legislature, so JR in this case seems consistent. BUT clause really seems to be concerned with C taking supremacy over state law. Sure, C is supreme BUT what is C? Still left with Q: Who gets to say what C means? Van Alstyne p.34

  3. Art III: “Arising under”: I f we have power to hear cases that arise out of C, must have power to decide what C means in these cases BUT there are cases which arise under and do not require the Court to pass on constitutionality of congressional legislation (Bickel p. 35); only jurisdictional provision (Currie p.35)

TEXT IS SILENT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW-Looking for any textual support


  1. Structural: Even if text silent, infer out of basic structural arrangement

  • fact of written C, defining powers and scope leads to inference or logic that the right answer is S.Ct has right to say what C means

  • whole premise of having written C and setting up courts is to do this sort of review

  • no point to writing unless there is a court to enforce terms of written document

  • this is what courts do, view of C as supreme, ordinary law

  • BUT in France, enforce written C through democratic process, many countries have written Cs and no judicial review (Van Alstyne p. 34)



  1. Original Intent: Doesn’t actually look to debates or cite specifics

Whose intent do we look at? Ratifiers, Framers

United States v. Butler: View of judicial review as mechanical



  • Judicial review and democracy: Ackerman we should reconsider seeing court as countermajoritarian difficulty

  • When Court invokes Constitution appeals to legal enactments approved by majorities


Kramer Article:

  • Shows how much indeterminacy and ambiguity remains around issue of judicial review

  • Different actors, ratifiers vs. framers, whose intent is relevant?

  • Very little was said about judicial review

  • Was not offered as a major defense of the Constitution

  • Never considered a body which holds authority over legislature (only had Parliamentary example) or those who did had a very different conception

  • Shows how much constitutional law is post-ratification interpretation and evolution



Federalist Papers:

  • Propaganda pieces meant to persuade--how much do they say about original intent?

 faction

 society

 role of self-interest in politics

 political representation



  • tension between basic principle that C reposes sovereign authority in the people, who elect representatives, and competing principle that, in interpreting C under doctrine of judicial review, courts have final say over political process countermajoritarian difficulty


Federalist No. 10 (Madison)

difference between democracy & republic = 1) direct mass-voting vs. delegation of government to elected officials, 2) local communities vs. large country.

advantages of republic = filtering of ideas through wise and patriotic, harder for cabals to gain control in large, diverse country

Federalist No. 51 (Madison)

ambition must be made to counteract ambition--enable government to control government and to control itself--multiplicity of interests and sects preserve the freedoms of each.

downside--may protect status quo incl. distribution of wealth.

Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton)

courts may act as intermediary between the legislature and the people, restraining the former within the limits of its authority




  • Federalists (No. 10) think worst kind of faction = majority faction

  • Anti-Feds think they can create the conditions under which factions will not arise by means of distribution of property, small communities, homogeneity of interests and opinions--afraid of aristocratic class of representatives wealthy enough to run and win--want people to be able to enact binding instructions to reps

  • Feds find this oppressive and perhaps impossible--must set up institutions and structures that allow for diversity but restrain the evil of factions--want deliberative democracy--representatives should stand above the political fray and deliberate what’s best for the country

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) Marshall

  1. Whether specifically enumerated powers (Art. I), properly interpreted, permit Congress to charter and incorporate national bank of U.S.?

(Madison: major national institution: commercial elite, centralized power/ Hamilton: quintessential need if U.S. is to become major world player)

  1. Can a state tax the assets of a national institution like Bank of U.S.?

Issue 1: Congress can create national bank

How Marshall Reasons for the Court:


  1. Appeal to Sovereignty: Constitution not ratified by state legislatures, by people

  • Marshall first disposed of Maryland’s argument that C is an instrument not emanating from people, but from sovereign states, and therefore, powers must be exercised in subordination to States, who alone possess supreme dominion

  • Concludes that powers come directly from the people, not from the states qua states




  1. Appeal to Precedent

  • appeal to precedent of past political practices- bank was thought unconstitutional but has been accepted and been around for years

  • long established practice is not sufficient. Qualifications of this appeal:

 Congress debated and thought about constitutionality of this; interpretive powers of

Congress


 Would not use this approach in cases dealing with individual liberties; only for cases dealing with distribution of powers


  1. Structural Argument: Grant of power need not be explicit, implied powers

  1. Articles of Confederation included words “if not expressly delegated then-> states” but in C word “expressly” is absent, which means Founders wanted to leave it open. Constitution was not a treaty among states. Art. I § 10

  2. Art. I § 8, § 9 Enumerated powers to collect taxes, borrow money, and regulate commerce. Would have said something about not giving a power (e.g., to create a national bank) if had not wanted to give such a power

  3. Marshall (following Madison): in order to get around originalism, should interpret C in your time: “it is a constitution that we are expounding”




  1. Textual: “necessary and proper” clause- debate about meaning of necessary

  • nature of constitutional language

  • look at context of clause, in a section granting powers, not limiting powers

  • does not have to be absolutely necessary

  • Congress can create reasonable means to an end

  • At time of Founders, “necessary” meant useful, allow for legislative rationality to accommodate circumstances, learn from experience what is necessary and proper

  • As long as means is rationally related to a constitutionally, specified object, means is also constitutional (Assuming it doesn’t violate any specific provision)

 almost as if clause is only discussed because Maryland brought it up

 how much of choice of method of interpretation driven by desire to find a uniform method or for a method that will have a determinative answer?





  1. Separation of Powers Rationale

  • an examination by the judicial branch into the “degree of necessity” justifying a staute would be an invasion of Congress’s domain

  • Court should strike down law as beyond powers of Congress only where it was quite clear that no constitutionally specified was being pursued, final decision left to Congress, not courts

ISSUE 2: State cannot tax bank



  1. Democratic Theory of Constitution

  • power to tax is power to destroy

  • if state taxation were permitted to destroy or harm bank, the federal government’s exercise of its powers under C (especially “necessary and proper” and spending clauses would be thwarted

  • federal C must be preserved against such state interference

  • power of tax can always be abused but count on people to vote out

  • here, state has no stake in watching out for Bank’s interests not a citizen of state taxation without representation

**Concurrent powers of taxation


  1. Structural Issues: The Powers of Congress

  • background of C made it clear to framers that the primary defect in the Articles of Confederation was its failure to give sufficient power to the national government

  • Framers wanted to increase power but 2 problems:

  1. The framers believed that states ought to remain as significant units of government. The national government ought to exercise its power only on distinctively national subjects, while states would exercise control over most matters of general government

  2. Power granted to national gov’t might be improvidently used , so as to suppress liberty and choke economic development

 Enumerated Powers


  1. The Commerce Clause Doctrine

Art 1. § 8[3]: Gives Congress the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”

INTERNAL LIMITS-Imposed to protect the values of federalism

 Regulate: Does it include ban, prohibit…?

 Commerce: Can it only regulate activities that are commercial in nature

 Among the several states: Gibbons Bright Line Rule: Commerce that concerns or affects

more than 1 state

EXTERNAL LIMITS-Clause gives Congress plenary power, but other provisons of C, might bar exercise of power concededly granted



  1. Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) First Commerce Clause Case Marshall

  • Ogden’s monopoly rights from NY violated by Gibbons, whose boats were licensed under a federal statute

  • HOLDING: Monopoly invalid, conflicted with federal statute Supremacy clause

  • Issue: Whether statute that Gibbons relies on is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Art. I.

  • Broad view of Congress’ power under Commerce Clause:

 Congress could legislate with respect to all “commerce which concerns more States

than one”

 Commerce includes not only buying and selling, but all “commercial intercourse”

 Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce includes the ability to affect



matters occurring within a state, so long as activity had commercial connection with

another state

 no area of interstate commerce is reserved for state control, mere existence of states

does not by itself act as a limit upon Congress’ power-“power may be exercised to its

utmost extent”

- 10th Amendment no bar, does not act as independent limit on Congress’ power




  1. Late Nineteenth Century to the New Deal

- 2 examples of greater assertion of Congressional power

 Interstate Commerce Act (1887)



 Sherman Antitrust Act (1890)

  • between 1880-1937 Court reviewed and struck down 2 types of legislation premised on commerce power: (1) economic regulatory laws; (2) “police power” regulation




  1. Economic Regulatory Laws

  • characterized by dual federalism approach- areas of economic life for state and federal non-overlapping

  1. Manufacture vs. Commerce: Formalist Approach

U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. (1895) Fuller

  • Federal government sued under Sherman Act to force a major sugar refinery to divest itself of other recently acquired refineries

  • H: Congress could not, under Commerce Clause, forbid a monopoly in “manufacture”

  • Manufacture left to state control

  • As a practical matter, affects other states and commerce but if federal commerce power extended to “all contracts and combinations in manufacture , agriculture, mining and other productive industries, whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for state control.” no limits

  • Required a direct, logical relationship with commerce

  • Formal, categorical test, not a practical economic test




  1. “Substantial economic effects”: Realist Approach

The Shreveport Rate Case (1914) Hughes

  • wanted to regulate rates within Texas, as well as La Texas, because competed LATX competed with those routes

  • right to regulate upheld, commerce power necessarily included the right to regulate “all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic…”

  • fact that activity regulated is intrastate did not matter, ultimate object was protection of interstate commerce



  1. “Current of commerce” Theory

  • Holmes: Activity could be regulated under commerce power not because it had an effect on commerce, but rather, because the activity itself could be viewed as being in commerce, or part of current of commerce Swift & Co. v. U.S. (1905)

Stafford v. Wallace (1922) Taft

  • regulate transactions between middlemen and purchasers

  • local K, could be classified as activity that precedes interstate commerce BUT with metaphor of stream power to regulate

  • questions of degree which court may not be equipped to answer (formalist approach offers questions of principle, not degree)




  1. “Police Power” Regulation- Directed at moral or general welfare, trying to shut down channels of interstate commerce for this purpose

Champion v. Ames THE LOTTERY CASE (1903) Harlan

5-4: Congress can regulate interstate shipment of lottery tickets



  • Congress does not have power to regulate morals

  • Tension: Quintessential Congressional control of channels BUT if reason they are banning is moral then using commerce power to have power over things they are not supposed to have

  • Congress can do end run around E.C. Knight “Guardian power” of commerce clause


Hammer v. Dagenhart THE CHILD LABOR CASE (1918) Day

5-4: Strike down federal statute which prohibited the interstate transport of articles produced by cos. which employed child labor



  • distinguished from other cases by saying that in those cases the interstate transportation being prohibited was part of the very evil sought to be prohibited

  • here, goods themselves are harmless

  • if prohibition permitted, all manufacturing intended for interstate shipment would be under federal control, encroaching unconstitutionally on authority of states

  • HOLMES DISSENT: So long as the congressional regulation falls within power specifically given to Congress, the fact that it has a collateral effect upon local activities otherwise left to state control does not render the statute unconstitutional

  • Holmes rejected 10th Am. as a source of limitations on federal authority

  • If action valid doesn’t matter how substantially it impairs states’ ability to regulate local affairs

  • Highly restrictive view of 10th Am. becomes majority view in 1937




  1. New Deal Transition

  • FDR runs on platform of using federal power to get out of depression

  • Knight rationale running court and congressional regulation of any area which court felt was reserved by 10th Am. to state control was struck down

Schechter Poultry Corp v. U.S. THE SICK CHICKEN CASE (1935) Hughes

  • validity of NIRA (National Industry Recovery Act) and codes of fair competition

  • Schechter bold and sold exclusively within NY

  • Gov’t argued stream of commerce (Shift) and affected commerce (Shreveport)

  • H: Act unconstitutional

 Not in current: Interstate transaction ended when shipment reached Schechter

 Not affecting commerce: Indirect, not direct, effect on commerce



  • if wage policies were direct, all other cost components too, no facet for state control

  • recognizes interactive effects-moves away from crude categories, question of degrees


Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) Sutherland

  • 6:3 deeply divisive

  • H: Coal Conservation Act (max hours and min wages) unconstitutional

  • Returned to Knight distinction: production/commerce

  • Production purely local, no direct logical relationship to interstate commerce

  • Different than Schechter: Congress provides detailed findings of fact

  • Court responds to facts by saying findings undermine constitutionality; proves that act is about general interest and public health

  • Cardozo Dissent: Radically different theoretical approach-pay attention to facts, not formal classifications Legal Realist

  • Price rules valid (majority did not give separate consideration) intrastate prices direct impact of coal for interstate sale that regulation of later could not be successful without regulation of former (price issue 5:4)

 decision is a blow to the New Deal, FDR’s Court-packing plandefeated but by 1937 Court “reformed” itself


  1. The Modern Trend

  • Court shows greater willingness to defer to legislative decisions

  • Under present doctrine, Court will uphold commerce-based laws if Court is convinced that activity being regulated “substantially affects” interstate commerce

 expanded substantial economic effect theory

 cumulative effect theory

 expanded commerce-prohibiting protective technique


  1. Expanded “substantial economic effect”

NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) Hughes

  • before insisted upon “direct” and “logical” relationship

  • here, Court substantially loosened the nexus required between intrastate activity being regulated and interstate commerce

  • National Labor Relations Act attempt to prevent large, integrated steel producer from engaging in unfair labor practices by discriminatory firing for union activities

  • Upheld-multi-state network of operations, labor stoppage of intrastate manufacturing operations would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (co. itself is interstate lens power to decision, but nothing in holding that limits to businesses organized like this)

  • Substantiality requirement emphasized in Lopez

  • Court expressly declined to rely on current of commerce theory

  • Rejected manufacture/commerce distinction of E.C. Knight

  • Implied 10th Am. would no longer act as independent limitation on federal commerce-clause power

  • Purport to maintain continuity with other cases, but significant shift in application of principles



  1. The “cumulative effect” theory

  • regulate an entire class of activities, if class has a substantial economic effect

Wickard v. Filburn (1942) Jackson

  • furthest Court has ever gone in sustaining Commerce-Clause powers

  • quotas on wheat would be consumed on the very farm where it was raised

  • 9:0 upheld:

 Consumption has market effect (more wheat at home, less bought in commerce)

 Cumulative effect- if everybody did the same thing



  • regulation of home grown wheat is reasonably related to protecting interstate commercial trade in wheat

  • flavor of opinion is Cardozian practical economic analysis

  • language dramatically rejects formulaic approach of Carter Coal

  • political process should make its own judgements




  1. The commerce-prohibiting technique (police power regulations)

U.S. v. Darby (1941) Stone

  • REVERSES Hammer

  • Fair Labor Standards Act: 2 prongs

  1. cannot ship goods in interstate commerce if don’t meet wage/hour standards (Guardian Power)

  • it is clear Congress can regulate channels of trade

  • purports to be maintaining fidelity with Lottery case and Gibbons

  • “power of Congress over interstate commerce can neither be enlarged or diminished by exercise or non-exercise of state power”

  • 10th Am. dos not limit Congress’ commerce power

  • motive of Congress is irrelevant

  1. directly regulates production of goods-federal crime to employ people in production for interstate commerce at other than prescribed rates and hours

  • upheld as reasonable means to achieve end

  • same approach as Harlan’s dissent in E.C. Knight- real world interdependent economic realities

  • turns guardian power into even more leverage

Bootstrap suggestion- Congress can attack any problem, even one of overwhelmingly local concern, by prohibiting all interstate activity associated in any way with it


  1. Limits

U.S. v. Lopez (1995) Rehnquist

  • 5:4 struck down statute

  • for the first time in 60 years, Court invalidated a federal statute on grounds that it was beyond Congress’ Commerce power

  • Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990

  • statute clearly had less explicit connection to interstate commerce

  • no explicit findings by Congress that activity being regulated affected commerce

  • no jurisdictional nexus: banned possession of a gun that had never traveled in, or even affected, interstate commerce

  • activity must substantially affect interstate commerce

  • requisite affect not present

  • not commercial activity (Wickard involved economic activity) and not part of larger regulation of economic activity, in which regulatory scheme could be undercut unless intrastate activity were regulated-distinguished from Wickard

  • Government: Does have substantial affect: possession of gun violent crime affects functioning of national economy in several ways

  1. costs of crime are insured against, spread across state lines because of interstate nature of insurance market

  2. violent crimes reduce willingness to travel to unsafe areas

  3. violent crime in schools reduces schools’ ability to educate students, they become less economically-productive

  • argument proved too much, no limits on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement and education where States have historically been sovereign

  • parade of horrors (e.g., federal curriculum)

  • to uphold would mean to pile inference upon inference, Congressional Commerce Clause general police power

  • Kennedy Concurrence (with O’Connor): less eager to cut back Court’s prior Commerce Clause interpretations, “necessary though limited holding” (emphasis on non-commercial in nature and traditionally left to states)

  • Tentative feel of opinion

  • Content based categories have consistently failed

  • Thomas Concurrence: Narrowly defines commerce, we should go back to understanding Commerce Clause as in E.C. Knight, this is how it was meant to be understood originally

  • Breyer Dissent: Rational basis test- whether Congress could have found rational basis for substantial connection between gun-related school violence and interstate commerceYES, uphold statute

  • Hyper-realist, extremely empirical approach

  • Majority’s approach contrary to case law (Katzenbach- no greater connection with interstate commerce)

  • Rejected commercial/noncommercial distinction-line would be hard to prove

  • And majority drew line in wrong place here-Congress could conclude education is commercial

  • State decisis: Unwise to “threaten…legal uncertainty in an area of law that…seemed reasonably well settled”

  • Souter Dissent: We need to learn the lessons of history, when Court tries to limit Congress’ power it is attacked, tremendous deference to Congress

  • Statement that judicial role in Commerce Clause review has been a failure-question should be left to be debated in political institutions

THEORY OF CONGRESS’ POWER UNDER COMMERCE CLAUSE:



  1. Act when some genuine national interest is at stake (national defense, interstate commerce and transport)

  2. Act when states cannot as a practical matter address certain issues, because of integrated national market or where there is a need for a national, rather than local, solution

 Would have permitted Congress to have enacted New Deal Statutes and antitrust statutes, what about civil rights cases?, harder to see why states couldn’t have acted



  1. The Civil Rights Cases

  • Congress using commerce power in a different way-not to regulate economy, to promote civil rights objectives, to protect individual rights

  • Why turn to Commerce Clause to uphold Civil Rights Act of 1964?

  • Court invalidates civil rights cases of 1883 under Civil Rights Act of 1874

  • 14th Am. interpreted as not covering private conduct, only state

  • Tremendous scope of power through New Deal cases (Wickard: aggregate effects and Darby: purpose irrelevant)


Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. (1964) Clark

  • Motel refused to rent to blacks

  • Motel solicited business through national media, 75% customers from out-of-state

  • Hotel sought declaratory judgement that Title II of 1964 Act is unconstitutional

  • Court upheld statute as valid exercise of power to regulate interstate commerce

  • Activity of hotel considered to affect interstate commerce, keeps black people from travelling

  • Court not troubled by fact that motive was not purely economic, but principally moral and social (police-powers motive is fine)

  • Douglas Concurrence: “A decision based on the 14th Am. would have a more settling effect, making unnecessary litigation over whether a particular restaurant…Under my construction, the Act would apply to all customers in all the enumerated places of public accommodation. And that construction would put an end to all obstructionist strategies and finally close one door on a bitter chapter in American history.”


Katzenbach v. McClung (1964) OLLIE’S BBQ Clark

  • refused to serve blacks, no evidence of big business from out-of-staters, not near interstate highway

  • food purchased from supplier who had bought it from out of state

  • harder case

  • Court upheld Title II of Act as to restaurant

  • unavailability of accommodations dissuaded travel in interstate commerce

  • return to Wickard rationale: even though Ollie’s is small, discriminatory conduct in the aggregate clearly had effect on interstate commerce, therefore, Congress entitled to regulate individual case

  • bill contained no findings, no de novo scrutinization of facts

  • “where we find that legislators, in light of facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.”




  1. Treaty Power

  • Treaty power divided between 2 branches of federal government

  • President may make a treaty but it must be ratified by 2/3 of Senate Art. II § 2

  • Validly-ratified treaty is equivalent of federal statute. If there is a conflict, whichever was enacted later controls

  • Power to ratify treaties is an enumerated legislative power

  • Even though a subject area might not otherwise be within congressional authority, if it falls within scope of an otherwise valid treaty, it will be valid as “necessary and proper” means of exercising treaty power

  • A treaty may not violate any distinct constitutional prohibitions or guarantees

  • Supremacy clause mentions treaties

  • Would legislation enacted pursuant to a treaty be constitutional even though it would not be if not enacted this way?


Missouri v. Holland (1920) Holmes

  • State claims treaty invades rights guaranteed by 10th Am

  • H: Treaty is valid and does not violate any state’s rights of 10th Am

  • Treaty power explicitly given to Congress

  • National problem need national solution, no 10th Am rights of individual states will be allowed to stand in the way of such a solution

  • The way 10th Am is phrased is reserving powers NOT GRANTED, so must determine the scope of the treaty power granted to federal government

  • 2/3 majority protection for minority state representation provides structural explanation for Framers giving such a broad power to national government

  • Bricker: limits treaty-legislative power to that which the federal government would have under only the Constitution




  1. Implied Limits on Congress’ Power

National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) Rehnquist

  • Fair Labor Standards Act Am. extending hour and wage provisions to local and state employees

  • H: 5-4 10th Am. barred

  • Unquestionable constitutional for private employees, affected commerce, but when applied to state employees, violated independent requirement of 10th Am., that “Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in the federal system.”

  • Rules violate this requirement in 2 ways:

  1. Cost: Impaired states’ ability to function effectively as matter of cost

  2. Removal of Discretion: Stripped states of discretion of how to allocate fixed funds

  • Would be little left of states’ separate and independent existence

  • Blackmun Concurrence (5th Vote): Troubled by certain implications


Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Association (1981)

  • upheld constitutionality of federal statute regulating operation of strip mines

  • 4 conditions that must be satisfied before a state activity may be deemed immune from a particular federal regulation under Commerce Clause

  1. Federal statute must regulate States as States

  2. Statute addresses matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty

  3. State compliance must directly impair state’s ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions

  4. Nature of the federal interest justifies state submission to federal standards


Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) Blackmun

(joins 4 dissenters Brennan, Marshall, White, Stevens in National League



  • OVERRULES National League of Cities

  • Whether wage provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act applies to municipally owned and operated MTA

  • State is not arguing it is outside stream of interstate commerce BUT C should be understood to embody additional principles which protect autonomy of states

  • Distinct insulation for states from what would otherwise be legitimate use of Commerce power

  • Not question of Congress’ legitimacy in area beyond scope of enumerated powers

  • Islands of special state immunity

  • Court: Difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle that would distinguish between traditional governmental functions

  • Unintelligble in theory; unimplementable in practice

  • National League approach inevitably led to judicial subjectivity

  • Does not mean no limitations upon federal government’s right to use delegated powers to impair state sovereignty

  • State sovereign interests protected by “procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system,” not by “judicially created limitations on federal power”

  • Structural Protection Ex: Each state has 2 senators…

  • Courts don’t have anything to contribute to defining boundaries

  • Powell Dissent: Effectively reduces 10th Am. to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause”

  • National League correctly decided, workable standard, Garcia no standard at all

  • Federal political officials are sole judges of the limits of their own power

  • Inconsistent with Marbury that it is up to federal judiciary to say what the law is

 later cases cut back, place limits on the extent to which Congress can force state or local governments to make or enforce laws


USE OF STATE’S LAWMAKING MECHANISMS

  • 1 aspect of state sovereignty is a state’s ability to make and apply law, through legislative, judicial, and administrative functions

  • even after Garcia, there are limits to Congress’ right to interfere, violates 10th Am. if does




  1. Federal government may not compel a state to enact or enforce a particular law or type of law or to regulate in a certain manner

New York v. United States (1992) O’Connor

  • Low-Level Radioactive Waster Policy Amendment Act attempted to force each state to make its own arrangements for disposing of waste generated in that state

  • 3 incentives

  1. Monetary: Money returned if dispose of waste by 1993

  2. Access: Surcharges for access to disposal sites escalate, and access could be denied

  3. “Take title” provision: Any state which did not arrange for disposal would be required to “take title” to waste, obligated to take possession, liable for damages in connection with disposal of waste

  • NY sued federal government-“take title” violates 10th Am. by forcing state to regulate in a particular area

  • Congress may not “commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program”

  • NY was being put to choice of 2 unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques (choose to regulate on its own by making arrangements for disposal or forced to indemnify waste-generators against tort damages)

  • Congress could not employ either method alone, cannot escape through choice

  • White Dissent (Blackmun and Stevens): Congress not forcing will upon the states, responding to request by states to ratify a compromise worked out amongst themselves (Art. I says states cannot enter into contracts with other states without Congressional approval)

  • Refusal to force NY to accept responsibility impinges on other State’s sovereignty

  • “I do not understand federalism to impede the National government from acting as a referee among the States to prohibit one from bullying another.”




  1. Federal government may not compel state/local officials to perform federally-specified administrative tasks

Printz v. U.S. (1997) Scalia

  • Brady Bill: As temporary 5 yr. Measure law ordered local law enforcement officials to conduct a background check for hand gun purchases until nationalized system phased in

  • 5:4

  • rejected distinction between compelling state to make policy and to perform ministerial tasks

  • seemed to rely on general, non-textual principle of state sovereignty rather than any specific clause

  • 2 concurring opinions: specifically said it violated 10th Am.

  • Stevens Dissent: federal commerce power gave Congress authority to regulate handguns

  • “necessary and proper” clause gave Congress the right to implement its regulation by requiring locals to take this ministerial step

  • especially true since Congress could have required private citizens to help with identification; “10th Am. provides no support for a rule that immunizes local officials from obligations that might be imposed on ordinary citizens.”




  • Printz and N.Y. v. U.S. stand for new constitutional principle that national Congress does not have the power to commandeer state officials (does not apply to judges)

  • N.Y. v. U.S.: No commandeering of legislative processes; Printz: no commandeering of executive branch

  • Congress could get around by controlling the purse strings

  • Distinguished from Garcia: holds where Congress passes generally applicable law, 10th Am. does not entitle state to exemption just because it is a state being regulate along with all other private entities

  • Where Congress tries to force a state to enact legislation or regulation, or force officials, not part of general scheme and is directed specifically at state’s basic exercise of sovereignty




  1. Courts fall outside the anticommandeering principle

  • Testa v. Katt (1947): State commissions can be required to enforce federal standards, still good law

  • State judges and legislatures cannot shut down state courts to federal law

ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE



  • Commandeering restraints (Art. I) do not apply when Congress acts under 14th Am. because it was specifically designed to subordinate states to federal government to protect certain individual liberties

  • Justifications for Doctrine:

 Historical: Understood that Congress could not commandeer state officials in this way

Articles of Confederation Constitution



  • but C was trying to enhance powers of Congress so even if true under Articles…

  • in the past judges may have performed executive duties so there was a conception of being able to use federal actors in this way

 Historical argument indeterminative
 Functional: Political Accountability

  • states can excuse accountability: “Feds made me do it”

  • but accountability concern still raised when federal government offers incentives to states and they accept

  • Court seems concerned about confusion-public won’t know

  • BUT there is an aspect of accountability of state with cooperative federalism

 Pildes’ Functional Account



  • Instead of thinking of doctrine as banning Congress from using state officials so that anti-commandeering will result in expansion in federal government, maybe Congress can enter into contracts with states that are willing to enact Act

  • Make a liability rule so that federal government could take and interfere with state policy but must compensate; if property rule states would hold out

  • Souter in Printz “Pay fair value for it.”

  • Why should states and local government be treated dramatically different from private actors

  • Majority seems to be protecting anti-commandeering with property rule




  1. Structural Issues: State-State Relations and National Citizenship

  • Traditional view: Federal government and states have mutually exclusive spheres of power

  • Modern view: States can have concurrent powers to regulate same area unless something specific in C; granting of power does not necessarily oust states

  • Express limits on state power: Some limitations are explicitly set forth in C (Art. I. § 9)

  • Implied limits




  1. The Dormant Commerce Clause-Regulation

  • mere existence of federal commerce power restricts states from discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce

  • does the mere fact that C gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce prevent a state from taking action which affects interstate commerce, assuming that Congress has not exercised its power in area?

  • S.Ct has concluded that the reason behind giving Congress commerce power was to make certain state laws invalid without Congress affirmatively blessing them

  • BUT could have understood as Congress has power to regulate interstate commerce and therefore, can invalidate any law it doesn’t like (puts affirmative burden on commerce to act)

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) Marshall

  • first S.Ct case interpreting meaning of congressional silence in commerce context

  • found conflict between state regulation and act of Congress Supremacy clause

  • assumed without deciding that states could regulate commerce if there was no actual conflict




  1. Doctrines Designed to Limit Exclusive Power of Congress




  1. Purpose: Distinguish between state statutes designed to serve commercial goals and those for police powers (state allowed to regulate to promote health and safety of citizens)


Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1829) Marshall

  • state could sometimes affect interstate commerce as an incidental consequence of its exercise of police powers

  • Delaware’s action was also nondiscriminatory- affected vessels intrastate and interstate




  1. Inherently local/national: Whether the subject matter being regulated was local or national


Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens (1851) Fuller

  • states free to regulate aspects of interstate commerce that were of such a local nature as to require different treatment from state to state

  • could not regulate aspects of interstate commerce which required a uniform national treatment

  • 2 major shortcomings:

  1. not easy to distinguish between subjects that needed uniform national regulation and those that needed diverse local regulation

  2. looked solely at subject, did not consider how extensively states’ regulation impacted interstate commerce




  1. Direct/Indirect: Actual impact state of state regulation


DiSanto v. Pennsylvania (1927)

  • statutes which directly interfere or burden interstate commerce invalid, regardless of purpose with which it was passed

Stone Dissent: Test too mechanical


  1. Modern Approach: Rests on at least 3 theories

  1. A purely political theory: Some state statutes are incompatible with the ideal of a unified nation

  • “protectionist” statutes-those that aim at the promotion of in-state interests- demonstrate that the enacting of the statute does not take seriously the proposition that all states are partners in a single national enterprise




  1. A purely economic theory: Protectionist legislation, and some other laws, interfere with the efficient disposition of resources throughout the country




  1. A mixed political and economic theory: Protectionist legislation, and some other laws, result from operation of a political process that can be understood as “distorted”


3 PART TEST: A state regulation which affects interstate commerce must satisfy each requirement in order to avoid violating the dormant Commerce Clause

  1. The regulation must pursue a legitimate state end

  2. The regulation must be rationally related to that legitimate state end

  3. The regulatory burden imposed by the state on interstate commerce must be outweighed by state’s interest in enforcing its regulation




  1. Protection Against Discrimination

  1. Rule Against Protectionism

  • problem with protectionism is that the interests being burdened are not participating in democratic process of state that makes the law (e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland)

  • Constitutional law as a response to situations of political pathology-where democracy cannot be trusted


City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey (1978) Stewart

  • NJ statute prohibiting importing waste into state-Discriminatory on its face

  • Ct: law is protectionist (attempting to hold natural resources for own benefit), rather than way of resolving legitimate local concerns

  • State could shut down disposal sites completely-not discriminatory

  • These laws are almost per se invalid

  • Rule of STRICT SCRUTINY: Heavy burden to justify

  • Burden: Extremely compelling justification for policy apart from any economic interest of discrimination and must show there is no less restrictive or discriminating means available

  • Distinguished from quarantine laws: those materials were hazardous at moment of importation, solid waste only endangers once buried no reason to distinguish between in state and out-of-state, out-of-state waste is not distinct source of problem

  • Rehnquist Dissent: Quarantine laws support statute


C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown (1994) Kennedy

  • town enacted a flow control ordinance

  • enters into contract with private company-construct facility and you can own and operate and charge user fee, all town garbage will come here

  • out-of-staters (and in staters) deprived of opportunity to do processing

  • Ct: Same as Dean Milk and no less discriminatory against out-of-staters and interstate commerce, ordinance virtually per se invalid

  • Souter Dissent: This is a different problem (Pildes agrees)

  • Doesn’t create geographic classifications, creates an economic monopoly

  • People in town are worse off but this is not economic protectionism




  1. Exception: Maine v. Taylor (1986) Distinct parasites, too hard to apply a more restrictive law, one of the few cases upholding a facially discriminatory law


  1. Subsidies As An Alternative To Regulation

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy (1994) Stevens

  • tax on all milk produced in and out of state, subsidy fund from taxes distributed to in state producers

  • both parts, nondiscriminatory tax and subsidies to in state are constitutional but by cojoining creates a program more dangerous to interstate commerce than either part alone

  • when tax coupled with subsidy to 1 group hurt by tax, state’s political processes cannot be relied on to prevent legislative abuse Unconstitutional



  1. Laws With Geographic Classifications
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