Brazil wants consultation – recent talks prove and the framework for consultation already exists
CFR 2011 – Council on Foreign Relations (Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs Julia E. Sweig, Project Director, “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations,” Independent Task Force Report No. 66)
The Obama-Rousseff meetings in Brazil earlier this year were a signal that both countries are willing to forge closer ties on bilateral, regional, and global issues. Obama’s trip, at a time of heightened tensions in the Middle East and military action in Libya, underscored the U.S. desire to put relations on a more positive track. The Task Force welcomes the ten new bilateral agreements that the two presidents signed, which include accords on biofuels, use of space, educational exchange, promotion of decent work in third countries, and—significantly—a framework to negotiate new commercial and economic agreements.44 Still, the Task 64
Force is concerned that no mechanism exists in the U.S. government to coordinate these initiatives and drive policy toward Brazil.
Empirics prove Brazil would say yes to the plan
BUSBC, 2012 no date 2012, Brazil-US business council, Bolstering Security, Growth, and JobCreation,http://www.brazilcouncil.org/sites/default/files/Brazil_EnergyReport.pdf
Cooperation between the United States and Brazil on energy and energy-related issues has traditionally focused on information exchange, technical assistance, and capacity building. Much of this activity has been through regular workshops between both countries’ government officials and private sector representatives. However, as the energy sector moves to the forefront of public policy in both countries because of its powerful growth and job-creating potential, additional dimensions have been incorporated into the bilateral energy agenda. These new dimensions include trilateral cooperation in Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa; multilateral cooperation on standards development and clean energy promotion; joint research and development; diplomatic coordination in multilateral fora; regulatory cooperation; and trade and investment promotion. Public policy reform and harmonization, as well as business development, are additional areas in which to further this partnership.
Brazil is seeking to cooperate now – they would say yes
Meyer 2013 (Brazil-U.S. Relations Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs February 27, 2013 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf
As Brazil’s economy has grown to be the seventh largest in the world, the country has utilized its growing economic clout to assert Brazilian influence on a range of global matters. On global trade and financial issues, where Brazil’s economic weight ensures the country a principal role in policy discussions, Brazil has sought to coordinate with, and represent, other developing nations. This has coincided with a broader focus on “South-South” cooperation, in which Brazil has expanded diplomatic and commercial ties with countries throughout the developing world. With its increasing international prominence, Brazil has pushed for a democratization of global governance institutions and a greater role for emerging powers in resolving issues of geopolitical importance. Although few analysts deny that Brazil’s international stature has risen significantly over the past decade, many believe that the country must overcome considerable challenges to be considered a world power. These include undertaking reforms to maintain strong economic growth, addressing long-standing domestic security challenges, and modernizing and expanding its military capacity.
Consultation Solves Effective Engagement
Consultation ensures multilateral effectiveness
Haass, 2000 (Richard N. Haass, formerly a senior aide to President George Bush, is Director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer, The International Institute for Strategic Studies)-mikee
There is growing consensus that sanctions, when employed unilaterally, are rarely effective. Not surprisingly, a corollary exists for the provision of incentives; engagement strategies which disregard the international environment in which they are crafted are also likely to fail. Just as a US embargo on a country’s oil sales is ineffective in coercing changes when Europe will buy the barrels America forgoes, incentives are less powerful when their equivalents are being offered elsewhere unconditionally. For example, had China been willing to donate or to sell subsidised fuel oil to North Korea, or to assist Pyongyang in the construction of additional energy sources, the package offered under the Agreed Framework would have carried far less weight. The differing policies of Western countries towards Iran demonstrate how a failure to coordinate policies can diminish the force of either a punitive approach or an engagement strategy. European efforts to influence Iran through substantial economic contacts have all but undermined American attempts to use economic coercion to pressure the Islamic regime into changing its behaviour. Rather than leaving it without export markets and foreign-exchange resources, European and Asian companies quickly filled the gap created by the American withdrawal from Iran. US secondary sanctions mandated under the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act requiring the imposition of penalties on foreign firms that invest in Iran’s oil sector have also proven to be largely feckless; instead of making Iran desperate for investment, the law has stoked not only transatlantic tensions, but also frictions between the US congressional and executive branches.13
Consultation ensures US credibility in the engagement strategy.
O'Sullivan, 2000 (Meghan L. and Richard N. Haass, “Engaging Problem Countries,” Brookings Policy Brief Series, June, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2000/06/sanctions-haass)
Implementation of engagement strategies is a demanding enterprise. U.S. policymakers seeking to engage a recalcitrant regime should consult intensively with American allies; a failure to do so increases the possibility that another country will undermine the U.S. strategy by offering similar benefits without demanding any changes in behavior. Moreover, as the European Union's unsuccessful attempt to engage Iran through its 'critical dialogue' policy demonstrated, the extension of incentives for cooperation should be accompanied by the threat of credible penalties for defiance. It was Europe's reluctance to jeopardize its extensive economic contacts with Iran for political objectives (in addition to believing in the value of diplomatic contacts) that undermined its ability to influence Iranian behavior.
Consultation with Brazil is necessary for successful plan action
Hakim ‘4 (Peter The Reluctant Partner January/February 2004 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59537/peter-hakim/the-reluctant-partner)
The Bush administration has no more important task in the hemisphere than to cultivate a constructive working relationship with Brazil. As Latin America's largest and most influential country, Brazil will determine, to a large extent, whether the United States is able to advance its foreign policy agenda in Latin America, and on some issues it will affect U.S. success outside the region. Although Brazil may not be powerful enough to shape policy in Latin America as much as it might like, it often has enough muscle to substantially help -- or obstruct -- U.S. plans for the region. The main test of the relationship will not be whether Brazil and the United States can find areas of cooperation, but whether they are able to accommodate their divergent interests and goals, tolerate different practical perspectives and, in the end, avoid conflict.