Okinawa Aff 1
1AC - Inherency 2
1AC - Relations Advantage (1/2) 3
1AC - Relations Advantage (2/2) 4
1AC - Modernization Advantage (1/6) 5
1AC - Modernization Advantage (2/6) 7
1AC - Modernization Advantage (3/6) 8
1AC - Modernization Advantage (4/6) 9
1AC - Modernization Advantage (5/6) 10
1AC - Modernization Advantage (6/6) 11
1AC - Economy Advantage (1/3) 12
1AC - Economy Advantage (2/3) 13
1AC - Economy Advantage (3/3) 14
1AC - Plan Text 15
1AC - Solvency (1/2) 16
1AC - Solvency (2/2) 17
INHERENCY - A2: Status Quo Withdrawal Solves 18
INHERENCY - A2: Status Quo Withdrawal Solves 19
RELATIONS - Uniqueness 20
RELATIONS - Uniqueness 21
RELATIONS - Uniqueness 22
RELATIONS - Uniqueness 23
RELATIONS - Relations Good: General 24
RELATIONS - Relations Good: Hegemony 25
RELATIONS - Relations Good: Asian Stability 26
RELATIONS - Relations Good: China War 27
RELATIONS - Solvency 28
ECONOMY - Uniqueness 29
ECONOMY - Uniqueness 30
ECONOMY - Link 31
ECONOMY - Link 32
ECONOMY - Japan k2 Global Economy 33
ECONOMY - Japan k2 US Economy 34
A2: T - Presence = Non-Combat 35
A2: Deterrence/Stability DA 36
A2: Japan Prolif DA 37
NEG - Relations Resilient 38
NEG - Relations Resilient 39
NEG - Relations Alt Causes 40
NEG - No F22 Link 41
NEG - No F22 Link 42
NEG - F22s Impact Defense 43
NEG - F22s to Japan Bad: Competitiveness 44
NEG - F22s Bad: Arms Race 45
NEG - Economy Up 46
NEG - Economy Resilient 47
NEG - Okinawa Good: Stability 48
NEG - Okinawa Good: Stability 49
NEG - Okinawa Good: Deters China 50
NEG - Okinawa Good: Deters China 51
NEG - Politics - Plan Unpopular 52
The 1AC is modular - read whatever advantages you like/have time for.
1AC - Inherency
OBSERVATION 1: INHERENCY
Troop reduction is inevitable in the status quo, but it doesn't go far enough - current agreements will leave thousands of troops in Okinawa
Wall Street Journal July 12th Daisuke Wakabayashi and Yuka Hayashi, "Weakened Kan Faces Deadlines on Okinawa," Wall Street Journal, July 12 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703580104575360660021162180.html
Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan, badly bruised in Sunday's national elections, soon must turn to the issue of a U.S. military base on Okinawa—a politically charged matter that forced the resignation of his predecessor just over a month ago.
The base wasn't a prominent factor in the campaign, but Sunday's results could make it harder for the weakened Mr. Kan to keep the promises the Japanese government made to the Obama administration. The prime minister told the U.S. he would move forward with the plan, aimed at keeping a large Marine presence on the southern island.
The first test comes at the end of August: The previous prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, had promised Washington an agreement with the U.S. on details of the controversial base location plan, including configuration and construction methods, by then. Mr. Kan has pledged to follow Mr. Hatoyama's commitments on Okinawa. In the months following that deadline, local elections in Okinawa could further lock local politicians into opposing Tokyo's attempts to move the American base to a new community.
The Pentagon declined immediate comment on the vote.
The tensions revolve around a 2006 agreement between the two countries to shuffle U.S. troops in Okinawa to make them more politically acceptable to the local population. The agreement calls for the U.S. to move 8,000 Marines to Guam by 2014 and to shift part of an existing Okinawa helicopter facility to a rural part of the island from a densely populated area. The aim is to diminish local hostility to the Marine presence, which has been stoked by a rape case and a helicopter crash.
While the deal reduces the number of Marines on Okinawa, it leaves thousands there, and it doesn't go far enough for many Okinawans, who want the base moved off the island entirely. The ruling Democratic Party of Japan had endorsed that view last year and promised base opponents it would support their cause. But Mr. Hatoyama changed his position under pressure from the U.S.
1AC - Relations Advantage (1/2)
ADVANTAGE (___): Relations
First, disagreement over Okinawa basing threatens the continued strength of the Japan-US alliance - the Futenma base is the most critical issue
Feffer '10 John Feffer, "Okinawa and the new domino effect," Asia Times, March 6 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html
For a country with a pacifist constitution, Japan is bristling with weaponry. Indeed, that Asian land has long functioned as a huge aircraft carrier and naval base for United States military power. We couldn't have fought wars in Korea (1950-1953) and Vietnam (1959-1975) without the nearly 90 military bases scattered around the islands of our major Pacific ally. Even today, Japan remains the anchor of what's left of America's Cold War containment policy when it comes to China and North Korea. From the Yokota and Kadena air bases, the United States can dispatch troops and bombers across Asia, while the Yokosuka base near Tokyo is the largest American naval installation outside the United States. You'd think that, with so many Japanese bases, the United States wouldn't make a big fuss about closing one of them. Think again. The current battle over the US Marine Corps air base at Futenma on Okinawa - an island prefecture almost 1,600 kilometers south of Tokyo that hosts about three dozen US bases and 75% of American forces in Japan - is just revving up. In fact, Washington seems ready to stake its reputation and its relationship with a new Japanese government on the fate of that base alone, which reveals much about US anxieties in the age of President Barack Obama. What makes this so strange, on the surface, is that Futenma is an obsolete base. Under an agreement the George W Bush administration reached with the previous Japanese government, the US was already planning to move most of the Marines now at Futenma to the island of Guam. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is insisting, over the protests of Okinawans and the objections of Tokyo, on completing that agreement by building a new partial replacement base in a less heavily populated part of Okinawa. The current row between Tokyo and Washington is no mere "Pacific squall", as Newsweek dismissively described it. After six decades of saying yes to everything the United States has demanded, Japan finally seems on the verge of saying no to something that matters greatly to Washington, and the relationship that Dwight D Eisenhower once called an "indestructible alliance" is displaying ever more hairline fractures. Worse yet, from the Pentagon's perspective, Japan's resistance might prove infectious - one major reason why the United States is putting its alliance on the line over the closing of a single antiquated military base and the building of another of dubious strategic value.
1AC - Relations Advantage (2/2)
Scenario A is prolif:
Strong relations are key to continued cooperation that solves Asian proliferation
Nye and Armitage '07 Joseph Nye, Professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, "The U.S. Japan Alliance," CSIS, February 2007, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf
To address the growing threat of missile proliferation in the region, the United States and Japan have cooperated to develop missile defense technologies and concepts. The United States and Japan are now in the process of producing and employing a missile defense system, sharing the technological capabilities of the world’s two largest economies. By cooperating on this important venture, Japan will benefit from the synergies resulting from a missile defense command and control system, improving its joint operational systems and our bilateral ability to quickly share critical information. To produce and employ missile defense systems successfully together, Japan changed its prohibition on military exports, allowing such exports to the United States. Through all of these measures, the alliance made rapid progress in defense cooperation to meet challenges imposed by the existing security environment.
And, that's the most probable scenario for global nuclear war
Joseph Circincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund and former director of nonproliferation and international policy programs at the Center for American Progress and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Multilateralism A La Carte," The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
1AC - Modernization Advantage (1/6)
US withdraw causes Japan to purchase F-22’s – they have expressed interest in the status quo and only current US possession changes our decision calculus
Gertler, Military Aviation at CRS, ‘9 (Jeremiah, December 22, “Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issue for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
Japan reportedly would prefer to purchase F-22s as the F-4 replacements, but is considering five other candidate aircraft types as well, particularly if F-22s are not available: the F-35, an F-15 variant designated the F-15FX, the F/A-18E-F Super Hornet (a strike fighter that has been procured for the U.S. Navy since FY1997), the Eurofighter Typhoon (an aircraft built by European consortium), and the French-made Dassault Rafale fighter.37 In addition, Boeing, the manufacturer of the F-15, is offering for sale on the international market an upgraded version of the F-15 called the Silent Eagle, which incorporates some added stealth features and other improvements. 38 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reportedly recommended the F-35 over the F-22 and other candidates in a meeting with Japan’s defense minister on May 1, 2009, but Japan reportedly still prefers to purchase the F-22. A July 1, 2009, article states: Japan’s F-15J force, once top of the line, is now “outclassed by the new generation of Chinese fighters” such as the Su-30MKK, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Richard Myers (ret.), tells Aviation Week. Moreover, China’s air defenses, which include variants of Russian-made, long-range SA-10s and SA-20 (S-300 family) missiles, can only be penetrated by the fast, high-flying, stealthy Raptor. Japan’s Defense Ministry has studied the problem closely and, at least internally, has produced “a very impressive tactical rationale” for buying the F-22 if its sale is approved by the U.S. Congress. Myers predicts that any resistance within the U.S. Air Force to selling Raptor technology to Japan, “an incredibly staunch ally,” will be isolated and not critical. Such considerations are pressing because tensions are growing over Japan’s far-flung island empire, some of it mineral rich, that stretches to within 125-150 miles of China. That distance, interestingly enough, is the range of the Raptor’s advanced radar, compared to 56 miles for the F-15. Japan feels it must be prepared to defend its area of responsibility from a new generation of regional threats – including China’s increasingly sophisticated fighter force, which boasts the J-10 – that can carry its new, small-radar-signature, air-launched cruise missiles. Japan also needs a precision bombing capability if any of its islands are occupied.39 A July 31, 2009, press report states: Japanese military officials continue to maintain that only the F-22 Raptor can meet their country’s pressing defense needs, notwithstanding recent U.S. congressional action and anti- Raptor rhetoric from the White House and Pentagon that indicate the window of opportunity is closing quickly. The nation’s requirements were spelled out in an exclusive interview with Aviation Week by Lt. Gen. Hidetoshi Hirata, the Japan Air Self Defense Force’s (JASDF) Commander, Southwestern Composite Air Division. While U.S. critics worry about exporting the F-22 as a weapons system, the Japanese focus on other advantages the Raptor offers such as its command and control capability—like a miniature AWACS—and its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance role. It also offers higher speed (about half a mach), more altitude (an extra two miles) and better stealth (golf ball vs. marble) than the more exportable F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. “Our next fighters [including the F-X and F-XX] are expected to have a couple of critical capabilities to fulfill their mission,” Hirata says. “Networking and ISR are important in the situations and environments where F-X will be operated. It will need to function ... as a node of the ISR network. That’s why the F-X needs good sensors, radar, electronic surveillance and communications.” Quality over quantity Moreover, since the number of fighters the JASDF can have is limited by the National Defense Posture Outline, they have to seek quality to make up for the lack of numbers as surrounding countries are increasing the number of fourth generation fighters they operate in the region. “Another issue is that this [southwestern area of Japan] is huge, with lots of small islands,” Hirata says. “Currently we don’t have enough airfields. This airbase [on Okinawa] is the only runway that we can operate fighters from. It is difficult to plan how we would use our fighters to defend the nation when many other countries have advanced fighters, air-launched cruise missiles and other advanced weaponry.” “So [supercruise] speed becomes very important, both to fly great distances quickly and to cope with cruise missiles,” Hirata says. “I understand the current discussions and Defense Secretary [Robert] Gates’ announcement regarding the F-22. We still believe we have a chance. It’s not an officially closed option because the Obey Amendment is reviewed every year. We’re still thinking about it and taking measures to extend the F-4’s operational life.” The Japanese do not appear to have any interest in the new, reduced-signature F-15 Silent Eagle that Boeing has designed. “Personally I have no interest in the Silent Eagle because it is only stealthy from the front,” Hirata says, referencing a limitation shared by the Eurofighter Typhoon. “I am afraid that the F-15 Silent Eagle is not stealthy enough to meet our requirements. The F-35 is a very good aircraft. The problem is that it’s still under development [and not ready for operational use]. A fifth generation fighter is a good choice for our F-X. Right now, F-22 is the only operational fifth generation fighter. We have not made a decision, but right now the F-22 is the most attractive.”40 A September 4, 2009, news report states: Tokyo’s new governing Democratic Party of Japan is not expected to distance itself from the U.S. or to strip defense budgets—in fact, Japanese defense officials are looking at 2010 as the year that the U.S. may change its laws about exporting the F-22 Raptor. Meanwhile, any policy changes in Japan would likely be minor and reflect the directions set by previous governments. “We are seeing a transformation in our alliance with the Japanese,” said U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Edward A. Rice, Jr., commander of the 5th Air Force and U.S. Forces Japan, prior to the recent election. “Part of that has to do with their internal discussions of what capabilities they need to defend Japan. It involves working as partners with each accepting some level of risk and each providing capabilities that the other may not have.” That cuts to the thorny issue of Japan’s long-term desire to buy the F-22 so that its speed, altitude, stealth, precision bombing and long-range electronic surveillance capabilities could make up for the dearth of Japanese airbases between Okinawa and China and North Korea. However, the F-22 line may shut down before sales to Japan can be approved. The U.S. is saying it will ensure that U.S. F-22s are available to defend Japan. The stealth fighters, along with F-15s equipped with advanced, long-range, small-target radars, are stationed at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, on a rotating basis. But Japanese military officials tell Aviation Week that they must have positive, immediate control of the F-22 force, which they don’t think will be possible if the aircraft belongs to the U.S.—which would doubtlessly require a complicated approval process—instead of the Japan Air Self Defense Force. “It is very important for Japan to have that capability in practical and tactical terms,” says Lt. Gen. Hidetoshi Hirata, commander of the Southwest Composite Air Division headquartered in Okinawa, in a conversation with Aviation Week Sept. 3. “More importantly, it has great meaning in a strategic [and deterrent] sense. Even the U.S. stationing F-22s in Japan on a regular or permanent basis may not compensate strategically for [the lack] of Japan’s possession of the F-22.” Rice contends that it may require only a reformulation of forces to avoid redundancies and minimize gaps in capability between what each country supplies to the alliance. “The U.S. has invested in F-22 and it is a capability that we can make available to the alliance,” Rice says. “It’s not a capability that Japan must possess. There are various ways to get to an all-5th generation force structure.” “The Japanese have a very clear view of [regional threats] and [unlike the U.S., they] aren’t hampered in ... their analysis by having a low-tech war here-and-now that’s distracting them,” says a senior U.S. intelligence official who has studied Japanese issues for many years. “They’re right to be concerned, although in the long term they have less to worry about in North Korea than they think.
1AC - Modernization Advantage (2/6)
And Japanese complaints of US security guarantees prompt them to sell the F-22
Chanlett-Avery, Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 5/9/08 (Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Congress, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08058CRS.pdf)
U.S. Security Commitment. Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.24 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “...the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”25 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.26 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.27 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence. Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Congressional leaders could face pressure to re-consider allowing the sale of the F-22 Raptor aircraft in order to bolster trust in the alliance.28
1AC - Modernization Advantage (3/6)
F-22s sales can bolster Japanese deterrence to stave off Chinese escalation – solves Asian arms race
Fisher, Senior Fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, 09 (Richard, Why the F-22 Matters for Japan, July 4, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.210/pub_detail.asp)
So, are 40 or so very expensive F-22 fighters worth the additional political costs to Japanese of entering a complex Washington battle that divides the Congress and challenges the Obama Administration’s control of U.S. defense policy? For this analyst the answer is a definite yes. The F-22 is the only combat aircraft built anywhere that can offer Japan the non-nuclear capability sufficient to deter China, and perhaps even North Korea. If Japan cannot get the F-22 that will only accelerate the day Japan must make far more fateful decisions about its security, such as whether to invest in far more powerful offensive weapons, like nuclear submarines or even nuclear weapons. If Japan could reach a quick agreement on a F-22 sale, they would be entering Japanese Air Self Defense Force squadrons at about the same time that China will be starting to test its expected 5th generation fighters. Both of China’s main fighter companies, the Chengdu and Shenyang Aircraft Corporations are competing to build China’s heavy-weight 5th generation fighter, and there remains a good chance that China’s Air Force will buy both models to sustain industrial capacity. In addition, there are indicators that China is also working on a medium-weight 5th generation fighter program, perhaps even similar to the Lockheed Martin F-35. China will also quickly put its 5th generation fighters on its expected conventional and nuclear powered aircraft carriers. Available open sources indicate that China is investing heavily in the advanced stealth, engine, radar and electronic technologies needed for 5th generation fighters. China will surely build more than 187 5th generation fighters. So if Secretary Gates thinks the F-35 would be good for Japan, why should it take the high political risk of seeking the F-22? Simply put, the revolution in high technology aerial combat capabilities is forcing a revival of the air superiority fighter. Since the 1980s the U.S. has led the way in building "networked" air forces in which radar and electronic warfare aircraft vastly increased battlespace awareness leading to a reduced need for the fastest and most maneuverable fighters. Japan has copied the U.S. by investing in expensive aircraft to support its fighters. But advanced missiles and counter-radar capabilities being developed by Russia and China are creating a real threat to the U.S. networked warfare paradigm. Their new and future long-range anti-air missiles could quickly take out U.S. and Japanese long-range sensor aircraft while Chinese anti-satellite weapons threaten vital communication links. This plus the emergence of Russian and Chinese 5th generation fighters all serves to revive the importance of raw fighter capability and pilot skill. The U.S. Air Force intended the F-22 and the less expensive F-35 to complement each other. The F-22 was intended to achieve air superiority so the F-35 could undertake critical attack missions. In terms of raw performance, the F-22 can fly about 25 percent faster, and over 4km higher than the F-35. The F-22 can also "supercruise," meaning it can fly longer at supersonic speeds without using fuel-guzzling engine afterburners, which gives it a major advantage. In an air combat scenario in which you lose your electronic support aircraft and communication satellites, you are then relying on the absolute performance of your combat aircraft, so which one would Japan want its pilots to be flying, the best or the second best? So it is not an exaggeration to observe that for Japan, the F-22 could serve as a decisive non-nuclear deterrent against China. If China cannot be assured of air superiority over the disputed regions of the East China Sea, it will be less tempted to challenge Japan militarily. This is the bottom line: if Japan can prevent future wars with China by buying the F-22, it will have been well worth the price.
1AC - Modernization Advantage (4/6)