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Control room security


Where a control room is critical to the operation of a system, it is recommended that additional physical protection be given to it such as CCTV, exterior fencing and physical protection of the entrance. Careful consideration should be given to who has access rights to this area. It is recommended that a record of those staff who have unescorted access rights be kept, based on a legitimate operational need to access that area. Other staff, contractors and visitors should be allowed access only where they are expected and have been authorised or, preferably, where they are accompanied by a member of staff who has these rights. A visitor record should also be kept.

Security enhancements at times of increased threat


At times of heightened security, consideration should also be given to:

Closing access points other than the main entrance and thereby channelling all staff access via a main gate (other than staff on board trains as part of their duties);

Keeping vehicle gates shut and only opening them to allow legitimate access into and out of the depot, so as to give added protection to the entrance; and

Searching vehicles before permitting them access. Annex G outlines the main areas to be covered by a search.

Carrying out more frequent and more thorough security checks of the facility;

Requiring all visitors to report to the facility manager, or other responsible person, on arrival;

Securing rolling stock when not subject to maintenance work;

Escorting all visitors whilst they are on site;

Deliveries to be by prior appointment only;

Details of supplier, vehicle and driver to be checked and recorded on arrival; and

Increasing efforts to ensure identification passes are worn at all times



Annex A - Bomb / Threat Report Form

Threat Report Form


To be completed by/with the assistance of the information recipient.

To be forwarded immediately to the supervisor

To be retained for 12 months



Please record all calls if possible: Is this call recorded: YES/NO

Is the threat conveyed by email, social media, etc? If so, ensure it is not deleted and available for police.




For spoken threats - i.e., by telephone or face-to-face

Message: exact words

(continue on extra sheet if necessary)


WHERE is the bomb/threat?

Vehicle

Stop


Station

Terminus


Other

Company

Location

Details (e.g. vehicle number, route, destination)

Did the caller seem familiar with the location described? Why?

If it is a bomb WHEN will it explode?

If moved After departure In transit If opened

Date: Time: Day: Other:

WHAT does it look like?

WHO are you?

Name or individual:

Person’s location:



Name of organisation:

Other:


WHY are you doing this?

Characteristics of the threat-maker (if applicable); Please circle as appropriate

Sex:

Male/Female

Age:


Child

Teen

Young Adult

Middle Aged

Old

Unknown

Language spoken:




Command of Language:

Excellent

Good

Fair

Poor

Voice characteristics:

Loud

Rasping


Soft

Pleasant


High pitched

Intoxicated




Deep

Other


Speech:

Fast Slow Clear Slurred

Stutter Nasal Articulate Hesitant

Other:


Accent:

Scottish Irish Welsh Liverpool

London Geordie Birmingham West

Country

Other: Foreign (specify):




Manner:

Calm

Irrational

Deliberate

Laughing


Concerned

Angry

Coherent


Emotional

Obscene


Other:

Rational

Incoherent

Righteous


If a telephone threat:

Background noise-



Transport (cars trains aircraft public announcements)

Domestic (kitchen television/radio music)

Workplace (office machines factory)

Animals


Other voices

Other:


Telephone warning: background details

Mobile Phone

Payphone

Private Phone

Internal Call

External Call

Where automatic caller ID available, record number shown:


Number dialled by caller:

Person usually on that number:



Other details: e.g.

What?

Where found?

Where stored?


Written note

Text message

e-mails

Recipient’s details (must be filled in)

Name:

Phone number:

Threat received at: Time:

Form passed to Supervisor (name):

Signature


Position:

Date:




A completed copy of the form should be sent to the DfT Threats Office at the following address:
Threats, Risk & Intelligence Branch 

Department for Transport

2/24 Great Minster House

33 Horseferry Road

London

SW1P 4DR   


Telephone: +44 (0) 207 944 2870

Email: TICB@dft.gsi.gov.uk


Annex B - Marauding Active Shooter guidance
The attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 involved a co-ordinated shooting, bombing and hostage taking spree across the city by a group of 10 terrorists. The terrorists spread out, targeting a number of locations, including a railway terminus, hotels and cafes. A similar armed attack took place at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in September 2013. We have also seen the effects a lone gunman can have in the attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway in July 2011.

This guidance is intended to complement existing guidance provided on other – more familiar – forms of terrorist attack, by addressing the scenario which emerged in the Mumbai and Nairobi attacks. This document also covers other types of firearms incidents where a gunman is active against multiple targets. This style of attack is potentially attractive to any crowded area, so vigilance by managers and staff everywhere is important.

We are not asking light rail organisations or staff to put themselves in the line of fire, indeed the opposite. The overall message to staff is DO NOT PUT YOURSELF AT RISK. It explains how staff and managers can help keep themselves and passengers safe, whilst assisting the authorities in dealing with the situation as swiftly and effectively as possible.

In briefing staff, or responding to staff concerns, you may like to explain:

“This guidance is not being provided in response to any specific intelligence but the current UK threat level is SUBSTANTIAL18, meaning a terrorist attack is “a strong possibility”. Having seen the new style of attack in Mumbai and Nairobi, and more events in the UK and Norway, it is sensible that we consider the scenario, in the same way that we do with other potential (and more familiar) terrorist threats to the transport system.

An incident of this nature could happen anywhere, particularly if it is a crowded place. A transport system is only one of many possibilities if such an attack were to happen.

The key message is that staying safe and not putting yourself at risk is paramount. By being aware of the sorts of issues that an attack in this form raises, it will help you know the best things to do in the unlikely event of this happening here”.

Police forces in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have been training officers using the “Stay Safe” package in relation to firearms attacks and are providing the following advice to the business community utilising the principles of that package:


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