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Light Rail Security Recommended Best Practice




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The Department for Transport has actively considered the needs of blind and partially sighted people in accessing this document. The text will be made available in full on the Department’s website. The text may be freely downloaded and translated by individuals or organisations for conversion into other accessible formats. If you have other needs in this regard please contact the Department.

Department for Transport
Great Minster House
33 Horseferry Road
London SW1P 4DR
Telephone 0300 330 3000
Website www.gov.uk/dft

General email enquiries FAX9643@dft.gsi.gov.uk

© Crown copyright 2014

Copyright in the typographical arrangement rests with the Crown.

You may re-use this information (not including logos or third-party material) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/2 ogl-symbol-41px-retina-black or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or e-mail: psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk.

Where we have identified any third-party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.



Cover photo acknowledgements


Clockwise from left:

Manchester Metro © Transport for Greater Manchester / TfGM

Safer Travel Team with Centro tram © Centro

Sheffield Supertram © South Yorkshire PTE/SYPTE

Newcastle Metro CCTV monitoring © Nexus

Images reproduced with kind permission of Transport for Greater Manchester / TfGM, South Yorkshire PTE/SYPTE, and Nexus.

Contents


Foreword 4

Executive summary 5

a.Introduction 6

Background 6

How to use this guidance 7

Sources of advice and further guidance 7

DfT contact details 9

DfT Light Rail Security Network 9

b.Organisational security culture 10

Building and embedding a security culture 10

Personnel security 11

Security training 11

Administrative staff 12

Training records 12

Contingency (emergency) plans 13

Security exercises 14

c.Handling threats and incidents 16

Received threats 16

Firearm incidents 17

Response to unattended and suspicious items 17

Response to suspicious behaviour 18

Discovery of 'white powders' 18

Responding to a cyber incident 19

d.Security of light rail carriages and vehicles 22

Rolling stock design 22

Searches and checks 22

Securing vehicles and carriages not in service 23

Control of passengers boarding and leaving 23

Baggage reconciliation 23

Security awareness measures for passengers 23

High visibility clothing 24

On board Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 24

Security enhancements at times of increased threat 26

e.Security of light rail stations, termini and interchanges 27

Security in Design of Stations (SIDOS) and Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) 27

The Safer Tram Stop Award 28

Searches and checks 28

Construction work at a station 29

Links to other public transport systems 30

Control of access to public / non-public areas 31

Visitors and contractors 32

High visibility clothing 32

Areas of concealment 33

Waste management 34

Bicycles 35

Equipment boxes 35

Public toilet facilities 36

Post boxes 36

Tenants and cleaners 36

Security awareness measures for passengers 36

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 37

Left luggage facilities 37

Car parks / park and ride facilities / car rental facilities 38

Commercial developments at stations 38

Security enhancements at times of increased threat 39

f. Security of depots and maintenance facilities 40

Physical protection 40

Control room security 40

Rolling stock on site 41

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 41

Staffing / patrolling 41

Passes: recording and issuing 42

Motor vehicle access and parking arrangements 42

Security awareness measures 43

Security controls 43

Control room security 44

Security enhancements at times of increased threat 44

Annex A - Bomb / Threat Report Form 46

Annex B - Marauding Active Shooter guidance 49

g.How you would communicate with staff, public, neighbouring premises, etc. 51

h.What key messages would you give to them in order to keep them safe? 51

i.Have the ability to secure key parts of the building to hinder free movement of the gunmen. 51

j.Does your location store NHS Medical Bags for use by paramedics to treat casualties of such an incident? Do your staff know the location of these bags? 51

k.Think about incorporating this into your emergency planning and briefings 51

l.Test your plan. 52

Annex C - Suspicious items - using the HOT protocol 53

m.external wiring; 53

n.visible batteries; 53

o.switches; 53

p.timers; 53

q.circuit boards; 53

r.wire passing from one package to another; 53

s.items secured by plastic adhesive tape; 53

t.annotations (e.g., ‘ON’, ‘ARMED’, ‘DET’, reference to the time delay); 53

u.specially modified wooden or plastic boxes; 54

v.unidentified powders or other putty-like substances; or 54

w.carefully wrapped in plastic bags. 54

Annex D - Quick reference security checklist 55

Annex E - General online resources 60

Annex F - Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) specific publications 62

Annex G - Vehicle search routine for entry to depots 63

Annex H - Glossary of terms 64

a.the police are called and: 66

x.police confirm the incident as an attempted or actual attack; or


66

y.any security related incident which attracts media interest, even if it would not be one requiring notification in line with 1 to 3 above; and


66

z.any discovery of firearms, ammunition, or other weapons; and


66

aa.any incidents of unauthorised access, or attempted unauthorised access, to non-public areas; and


66

ab.bomb threats; and


66

ac.any discovery of explosive devices, component parts of explosive devices, or articles having the appearance of such. 66



Foreword

On 18 October 2010 the Government published its National Security Strategy which reiterated that the international terrorist threat to the UK is a tier one risk. This makes it part of a group of the highest priority risks for UK national security looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact. Therefore work in protecting the travelling public will be essential for the foreseeable future.

Terrorists continue to target railway services across the world. The Madrid commuter train attacks on 11th March 2004, London attacks on 7th July 2005 (three of which occurred on the Underground) and suicide attacks in Volgograd railway station on the 29th and 30th December caused death, injury and disruption. These are clearly very rare events, but potentially high impact, hence there is a need to plan, and to remain vigilant. Along with physical attacks, the transport network has also been disrupted by telephone threats, unattended items and hoax devices.

The constantly changing nature of the risks and threats has necessitated a refresh of the original guidance published by the Department for Transport (DfT) in 2007. This 2014 document assembles the latest best practice security measures, and we hope that it helps your operations and staff to run a safe and secure network. This guidance covers the 7 light rail systems (Blackpool Tram, Croydon Tramlink, Manchester Metrolink, Midland Metro, Nottingham Express Transit, Sheffield Supertram and Tyne & Wear Metro) and can be used to help new networks ahead of commencing operations, for example the Edinburgh Tram. We encourage you to make full use of this guide.

Executive summary

An effective protective security regime must take account of the prevailing threat and likelihood of a security incident, the vulnerability of potential targets and the potential consequences of an attack. Together these identify the risk to the operators and infrastructure and to those using them and working on them.

The open nature of the environment around light rail stops and stations presents a greater challenge than some other transport modes where access can be more readily restricted to certain areas and screening and searching regimes are in place. Nonetheless, the opportunity exists to embed systems for effectively managing risk, and this guide shows you how to do that.

Security measures will generally be a proportionate combination of "front line" physical and procedural security measures (e.g. screening, searching, physical barriers, patrolling) and "secondary" measures (e.g. background checks, security vetting and training), depending on the prevailing threat.

A "multi-layered" approach to security is more robust, acknowledging that no single security measure is either fool-proof or capable of mitigating every type of threat. Security measures should therefore be commensurate to the risk, effective, holistic, practicable and sustainable. The aim is to deter would be perpetrators, detect prohibited articles and respond to any potential threats. Your security regime should also provide reassurance to passengers.


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