Pcna review: Phase One Somalia Joint Needs Assessment (jna) “Real-Time” Case Study

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PCNA Review: Phase One

Somalia Joint Needs Assessment (JNA)

Real-Time” Case Study

Reader’s Guide
This case study was prepared during July and August 2006 by a joint team from the UN Development Group Office and the World Bank as part of Phase One of the PCNA Review conducted in 2006. The Post Conflict Needs Assessment is increasingly used as the platform for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning, and the 2006 PCNA Review is a joint effort by the UN and the Bank to capture lessons from past experience and introduce innovations and guidance that support improved and more effective PCNAs. Case studies are available for PCNAs done in Iraq, Haiti, Sudan, Liberia, and ongoing in Somalia; in addition, two case studies for countries whose assessments pre-dated the current PCNA “methodology” are also available (East Timor and Afghanistan).
The objective of the case study is to present a “snapshot” of the post-conflict needs assessment (called the Somali Joint Needs Assessment or JNA) currently being conducted, documenting what has happened so far and, to the extent available, the lessons learned during the assessment. This descriptive real-time case study is based primarily on written materials that documented the preparations for and process of the JNA so far; additional information was solicited from participants in person and e-mail interviews. This case study is expected to be revisited and revised upon completion of the Somali JNA.
This case study is written to serve the needs of many audiences, ranging from those who have no background in or knowledge of PCNAs to country experts who may even have participated in the assessment itself:

If you are interested in . . .

refer to –

the national context in which the assessment was situated

Section I

the process of the needs assessment – who participated, how it was organized and conducted, who paid for it, what documents were produced, and what resources it mobilized

Section II

inclusion of cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, environment, or security

Section III

attention to issues of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity in the process and products of the PCNA

Section III

unique circumstances and lessons that PCNA participants identified

Section IV

Phase Two of the PCNA Review investigates key questions under five themes to provide refined guidance and revised PCNA tools: strategic and programmatic aspects; operational mechanisms; state-building; peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity; security-development nexus. Phase Two ends in November 2006.

I. National context

Formation of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in 2004, together with the resourcefulness and commitment of the Somali people, created a critical opportunity to achieve peace and security, promote governance and the rule of law, begin recovery, reconstruction and development, reverse regression from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and advance sustainable socio-economic development throughout Somalia. 

Transition-to-Peace Process

Following persistent conflict, especially in central and southern parts of Somalia, and successive reconciliation efforts, a Somali National Reconciliation Conference began on 15 October 2002 in Kenya. With the strong and united support of international stakeholders, key faction leaders signed a declaration on 29 January 2004, agreeing on an inclusive constitutional framework for a five-year transition based on federal principles. The agreed Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic provides a foundation for promoting (a) national reconciliation; (b) good governance; and (c) human dignity, rights and fundamental freedoms and the Rule of Law1. This Charter embodies substantial decentralization with National, State Governments, Regional Administrations and District Councils as well as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)2. Since then, 275 parliamentary members have been appointed, President Abdullahi Yusuf has been elected, his selections for Prime Minister and Cabinet have been agreed upon, and the Transitional Federal Institutions have relocated into Somalia.

The significance of these achievements is highlighted by the fact that Somalia has been without a functioning central Government since January 1991. De facto decentralization of political power occurred in the 1990s, with varying degrees of control achieved by militia and clan leaders in some parts of the country, while traditional forms of governance (e.g. councils of clan elders) re-established political stability and functioning administrations in others. Since 1998, security has improved in Puntland, enabling the establishment of a regional administration, investment by the Diaspora, an increase in commerce and an expansion of international assistance. Meanwhile, Somaliland has managed to achieve relative security, re-establish key state structures (e.g., parliament, judiciary and police force), restore basic public services, coupled with a rise in investment by the Diaspora and in international assistance, resulting in significant recovery of the area.

Regional and Development Players

In parallel with Somalia’s efforts to establish the TFG, regional organizations, in particular the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU) and the European Community (EC), and the wider international community became more proactively engaged. The United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) plays a key role in coordinating support for the TFIs so that it would implement agreements reached at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference and establish peace and security. At the October 2004 Stockholm meeting (see Origins section below), a draft Declaration of Principles3 was agreed upon to guide the donor community. The Declaration of Principles was intended to:

  • Implement a Rapid Assistance Programme (RAP) to assist the immediate capacity building needs of the TFIs over the first 12 months;

  • Launch preparations for a longer term Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP);4

  • Collaborate to prepare and convene an international donor conference; and

  • Jointly address humanitarian crisis situations, in coordination with the programming for the RAP and the RDP.

The Somali Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) was intended to complement the RAP by assessing medium term needs and developing a prioritized medium term RDP.

Though many members of the international community play an active role in support to Somalia’s peace process, a number of major donors are more reluctant and do not participate in the Coordination Support Group. This has had, along with the extremely fluid political and security context, an impact on the emthusiasm holding of a donor conference as well as on the lengthening of the timeframe of the JNA process.

Regional organizations continued to play a leading role in the Somali peace and reconstruction processes. Attempts in addressing the security situation in Somalia resulted in the AU Peace and Security Council authorization on 12 May 2005 for the deployment of an IGAD Peace Support Mission (IGASOM) to Somalia (as of August 2006 – yet to be deployed or finalized). From a funding perspective, the Council of Ministers of the Arab League has offered financial support to the TFIs.

II. Process


In response to the opportunity arising out of the creation of the Transitional Federal Institutions following the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter, the Transitional Federal Government and the international community requested the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank (WB) to co-lead and prepare for a Somali JNA.

Members of the international community met in Stockholm on 29 October 20045. The participants discussed and adopted a Declaration containing a set of principles for cooperation between the (not yet established) TFG and the international community; a draft proposal for future structured coordination modalities; and the JNA process leading to an international donor conference6. The Transitional Federal Parliament had been established in August 2004 followed by the Transitional Federal Government in November 20047. A letter was received from the Prime Minister of the TFG in December 2004, requesting the JNA begin.

Between March – May 2005, a series of consultations were held between the Somali authorities, UNCT, WB, NGOs, donors, research groups and the private sector8. These consultations were conducted in Nairobi, Hargeysa, Garowe, and Jowhar. To ensure ownership and participation of Somali stakeholders, workshops were organized in May 2005 in Hargeysa and Nairobi to identify and discuss priority needs and proposed areas of intervention, and the JNA methodology. The JNA Concept Note was prepared in June-July (finalized and adopted 8 September 2005), based on the outcomes of the discussions and workshops between March-May.

The UN and WB Team Leaders were identified in June-July and a Coordination Officer was recruited in July 2005. On 3 August 2005, the Cabinet of the Transitional Federal Government met in Jowhar, Somalia and after lengthy debate, the Cabinet endorsed the Somali JNA Concept Note on the condition that it is considered a ‘living document’ so that future amendments could be made if necessary. The JNA Secretariat was established later that month.

The Preparatory Phase began in July/August to finalize the concept note and set up the organizational support arrangements (including agreement on the oversight body, see below), finalize budget and funding arrangements, set-up of coordination mechanisms and develop information management system (website) and collate information sources.  Terms of reference for the Coordination Support Group (CSG)9 were developed in August/September and the first meeting was held in September 2005.

From August to November Cluster Leaders, technical focal points, national counterparts and eminent experts from the Somali Diaspora were identified and contracted.

The early start up money for the JNA was provided by UNDGO and World Bank to cover the costs of the strategic design missions. UNDGO and UNICEF covered the costs of the recruitment of the UN’s Team Leader and overall JNA Coordination Officer.

The EC, within one week of receiving the JNA project document, agreed to fund an initial 80% of the project costs in the original budget; however, slow contracting meant that the funds were not received until late November. Norway, Italy, Sweden and UK/DFID also provided financial support to kick-start the JNA. UK/DFID were initially hesitant to support the JNA process, but subsequently came forward with funds when the JNA Secretariat requested financial support in October to meet a budget shortfall and a budget extension. Italy negotiated a re-allocation of funds already in the UN system for Somalia resulting in UNICEF and FAO deploying funds to the JNA. The UN managed not only the UN funds, but also funds provided for joint UN and WB costs such as the secretariat, travel and expenses related to participation of national counterparts.
Substantive Purpose

Objectives & Principles:

The objective of the JNA is to help Somalia begin to achieve sustained reconstruction and development and deepen the peace process, ultimately producing a Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Teams of Somali and international technical experts are working together to assess needs and develop prioritized strategies to achieve reconstruction and development and reinforce peace building. The RDP will then provide an instrument for mobilizing, distributing and coordinating international recovery assistance.

While the JNA has to be nested within the current political reality, the methodology and coordination arrangements proposed highlight the technical nature of the exercise and attempt to ensure analytical excellence as well as the full participation of all regions in the country. Guiding the proposed priority areas and the methodology are, first and foremost, the needs identified by the Somali stakeholders and the wide-range of activities already being undertaken by the UN, the WB, the donor community and NGOs in Somalia. The JNA and the RDP would seek to build upon these initiatives, rather than replacing them. The reconstruction and development activities must be prioritized and sequenced, especially as implementation and absorption capacities are limited. In view of the complexity and magnitude of this challenge, it was acknowledged that reconstruction and development would continue beyond 2010 and require resources and planning beyond this initial five year Programme.

Vision Statement10

Based upon the challenges and opportunities present in Somalia, consultations with Somali stakeholders focused on the following key vision statements for the 2006-10 period:

  • To regain Somalia’s full membership in the international community;

  • To establish peace and security;

  • To foster reconciliation and unity at all levels of Somali society;

  • To promote democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights for all Somalis;

  • To develop effective, transparent and accountable institutions at all levels;

  • To establish a rapidly growing free market economy by strengthening the productive sectors, improving infrastructure and developing a macro-economic framework;

  • To provide essential basic services and social protection, and create livelihoods through community driven development; and

  • To reverse the regression in attaining the Millennium Development Goals. 

Based upon these vision statements, the broad guiding principles for this Joint Needs Assessment and RDP are: 

  • Focus is on the whole country as the reconstruction and development effort should benefit all Somalis;

  • Accommodate the existing regional ‘diversity’ and gender disparities within Somalia and reflect it in the development of outcome goals and initiatives within the priority clusters of the JNA;

  • Ensure involvement of Somali counterparts and institutions to guarantee national and regional ownership; 

  • Confirm that capacity building and institutional development receives priority attention;

  • Build on existing private sector, NGO and community-based initiatives wherever possible;

  • Support peace building and reconciliation efforts and prevent the renewed outbreak of conflict (Do No Harm);

  • Be flexible and creative as the persistent lack of security is likely to pose challenges for both the assessment of needs and the subsequent implementation of the RDP ; and

  • Be ambitious yet realistic in focusing on the initial reconstruction and development initiatives, while noting that continued reconstruction and development efforts will be required beyond the envisaged transition period of five years.

Priorities and output:

Following the extensive consultations in the spring of 2005, and drawing on the vision statement, the guiding principles, and experience from other needs assessments, the priority needs were grouped into six clusters and three cross-cutting issues.  This grouping was meant to provide a manageable arrangement while accommodating regional diversity within the clusters. 

The six proposed clusters, with sub-clusters, are: 

i. Governance, safety and the rule of law

  • Safety and rule of law: Implement demobilization and disarmament strategies; Undertake de-mining and Unexploded Ordinance (UXO) removal and regulate arms; Set-up law-enforcement and security institutions, and correctional services; Promote transitional justice; Establish criminal justice; Combat trafficking and organized crime; Promote human rights, including rights-based approaches, and monitoring mechanisms.

  • Governance: Set-up decentralized legislative, executive and judicial institutions; Strengthen community-based and NGOs institutions; Strengthen private sector organizations; Promote participatory strategies in decision-making processes; Develop a strong and independent media; Promote conflict-resolution mechanisms; Assist in the development of a land and property policy.

ii. Macro-economic policy framework and data development

  • Establish macroeconomic stability;

  • Develop a fiscal framework with effective and accountable public finance and expenditure management, together with a system for revenue mobilization;

  • Establish clear fiscal relationships between national, state, regional and district authorities, commensurate with agreed responsibilities;

  • Develop core civil service institutions such as the civil service commission;

  • Set-up a central bank and financial institutions;

  • Set-up statistics, data collection and census;

iii. Infrastructure

  • Develop and implement an energy strategy (electricity plus alternative sources of energy);

  • Rehabilitate and develop transport infrastructure (roads, bridges, airports, seaports);

  • Improve urban and municipal infrastructure – water, sanitation and power;

  • Implement urban renewal and settlement (shelter) plans;

iv. Social services and protection of vulnerable groups

  • Expand basic health services:  develop related community level infrastructure; provide essential drugs; improve primary health care and reproductive and maternal health (including FGM), ensure disease prevention and control;

  • Expand education at all levels:  develop basic education (rural) infrastructure; harmonize curriculum, develop vocational and skills education; ensure gender parity;

  • Improve provision of water and sanitation as a basic social service (outside of municipal infrastructure);

  • Adopt HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB strategies and responses;

  • Develop Khat prevention and coping strategies;

  • Apply protection strategies for vulnerable groups - elderly, disabled, children, and those traumatized by the conflict.

v. Productive sectors and environment

  • Create a conducive, but well regulated, private and foreign investment policy environment;

  • Strengthen rural development - agriculture, livestock, irrigation and water supply;

  • Explore options for developing the fishery/marine sector;

  • Develop an industrial and service sector strategy – e.g. processing of agricultural products, fish, natural resources and livestock;

  • Strengthen and develop telecommunications and ICT infrastructure;

  • Develop and ensure effective natural resources management, including institutions, and environmental protection (including toxic waste removal);

vi. Livelihoods and solutions for the displaced

  • Emphasize livelihood development and job creation through public works, micro-enterprises, and vocational skills training;

  • Implement solutions for displaced persons (returning refugees and internally displaced persons) through local integration and settlement schemes;

In addition to these six priority clusters, there are three cross-cutting issues:

  • Peace building, reconciliation and conflict prevention;

  • Capacity building and institutional development (public and private) plus anti corruption initiatives; and

  • Gender parity and human rights.

In addition, inter-country linkages and regional issues within the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula need to be considered in cluster analyses, as they have an important impact on Somalia’s recovery and future development. Moreover, many of the issues included within specific priority clusters (e.g. environment, HIV/AIDS and khat) will naturally affect other clusters. Efforts are being made to ensure that these linkages are recognized and taken into account by the various clusters, though more needs to be done to strengthen them. At the same time, it is important to focus this assessment and keep the number of priority clusters and cross-cutting issues manageable.

Following the completion of the cluster reports (expected to be finalized by August 2006), a JNA synthesis report (otherwise referred to as the RDP) will be prepared. Through the results-based planning approach, the RDP will provide a programme context based on priority actions and an estimate of all financial resources required to attain the overall objectives in line with the vision statements. It will also incorporate an implementation plan, including the necessary institutional development, and monitoring arrangements. Wherever possible, implementation will draw and build on existing capacity whether it be in government, civil society, NGOs or the private sector.

As the RDP will present the needs and interventions covering the period 2008-10 in broader terms, it is proposed that it be reviewed in late 2007 to reflect on progress achieved in the various priority areas and to develop more detailed interventions for the rest of the five-year period. For each of the priority clusters, agreement should be reached among the key stakeholders on a small number of key progress indicators. The RDP will include a financial resource mobilization and allocation strategy and an implementation plan.


Flexibility in the formulation of the JNA and the RDP was essential, so a four-phase work plan was proposed to permit adjustments as appropriate: 

Preparatory phase (May to October 2005): Finalized Concept Note; Set-up organizational support arrangements; Finalized initial budget and funding arrangements; Hired key JNA coordination staff; Set-up of coordination mechanisms; Identified cluster leaders and advisors and Somali technical counterparts; negotiated the Concept Note with all Somalis authorities, developed information management system (website) and collated information sources. 

Analysis phase (October 2005 to July 2006): Confirmed that the necessary foundations for a successful needs assessment were in place before proceeding; Organized JNA retreat with cluster leaders and key resource people to: define TORs for clusters and cross-cutting issues; identified cross-cluster linkages; develop work plans; and finalized logistical and support arrangements; Organized consultative and planning workshops involving Somali stakeholders and experts; Undertook cluster assessments; and Completed cluster reports, held stakeholder consultation and validation workshops. 

Report finalization and resource mobilization phase (estimated August 2006 to October 2006):  Draft and circulate the RDP; hold validation workshop and review; finalize plans for resource mobilization, management and allocation procedures. Coordination Support Group, under chairmanship of the EC, to discuss preparations for an international donor conference to be held in Rome.

Implementation phase:11 Set up of multi-donor trust fund arrangements; set up and maintain an effective data gathering, evaluation, implementation and monitoring system and management and coordination system.

Link to Country Development Plans

In addition to the CAP, UN agencies working in Somalia developed a short-term transition plan (mid 2005 to mid 2006), focused on the governance, security, livelihoods, reintegration, education, water and sanitation, health, and HIV/AIDS sectors to facilitate financing of activities falling within the context of the RAP, the TFIs relocation plan, and the UN transition plan, the UN established an Interim Support Fund for Somalia (ISFS).

The Somali JNA was intended to complement the RAP (described above) by assessing medium term needs and developing a prioritized medium term RDP. It meant to avoid duplication with recently completed analyses and earlier ones, such as the report of the Somali Committee on Economic Recovery, Institutional Building and Resource Mobilization,12 the CAP, UN Transition Plan, and the Country Economic Report by drawing heavily on them. On the national side, the assessment process took into account Somaliland’s Poverty Reduction Plan and Puntland’s Five-year Development Plan, which is still evolving.


The Somali JNA is co-led by the United Nations and the World Bank working in close cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (through the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation); and with state administrations such as Somaliland and Puntland.

Key partnerships and interagency collaboration

The JNA has so far been truly a multi-institutional arrangement. Experts have been drawn from UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, UNDP, UNIFEM, UNOHCHR, UNEP, WSP, ILO, UNHABITAT, UNAIDS, UNESCO, UNFPA, WFP, WHO, UNDGO, the World Bank, and the private sector. Multilateral collaboration has taken place with the AU, IGAD, donors, UNPOS, UNOCHA, IFAD, NGO’s, and the SACB. Partnerships have been forged with the TFG, and the Somaliland and Puntland authorities. Non-state actors such as professionals, women, IDP’s groups, youth, traditional leaders, religious leaders, business groups, intellectuals, regional administration and parliamentarians, and the Somali local NGO consortium have also been involved.

National participation and consultations:

The Transitional Federal Government, Somaliland and Puntland Authorities have technical experts participating in each of the cluster teams. The JNA has been expanded to ensure a wider and greater Somali participation in the process. (The original plan had some 14 Somali counterpart team members, but under the guidance and authorization of the Coordination Support Group, this increased to 73 Somali Counterparts.)

The JNA team has also reached out to stakeholders and leaders that, in one form or another, could be considered to fall outside of the main Transitional Federal Government leaders. The JNA has held meetings or workshops with Governors from Benadir, Galgadud, Hiran, Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle. In Somaliland, meetings were also held with the leaders of the main opposition party.

Whilst it has been the role of the TFG to keep the other TFI’s informed, the JNA has met several times with the Speaker of the TFP and President Abdullahi to provide periodic updates. The JNA addressed Members of Parliament of Somaliland and the House of Elders (Guurti) at a joint session of the two houses of Parliament in November in Hargeisa, during which they endorsed the JNA process and pledged their commitment and support to the process. The validation workshops in July-August (see below) also included special briefings to regional and federal authorities as well as the three Somali parliaments.

On 25 May 2006, the UN and the WB provided a brief to the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament in Baidoa on the JNA. At that presentation to Parliament, the TFG Minister of Planning and International Cooperation requested that the final document (the Reconstruction and Development Programme) be brought to the Council of Ministers for approval and then to the Parliament for endorsement. After that, the JNA would become a national document that could be presented at a donor conference.

With the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), in July 2006 the UN RC/HC met the leader of the ICU and briefly discussed the JNA. It was agreed that the JNA would send draft cluster reports to the ICU for their perusal and feedback, and that the ICU would be fully consulted on the upcoming JNA workshop in Mogadishu scheduled for August 2006. (The draft documents were shared with the ICU in July; no feedback was received as of yet.)

Whilst the initial composition of JNA teams had limited numbers of women, this issue was addressed through the appointment of Female Zonal Deputy Coordinators, as well as substantial presence at the 21-22 February IGAD “Consultative Gender Experts group Meeting on Priorities of Somali Women on Post Conflict Reconstruction for Somalia”.

To allow for inputs from areas that were not yet accessible to the cluster teams, 7,200 questionnaires were developed and applied widely in the field to obtain cluster information and data on regional issues and priorities. National experts equipped with these cluster questionnaires traveled to many areas where the international community has not visited for many years to ensure that the needs assessment covers the length and breadth of Somalia. These questionnaires were analyzed and turned into a format usable by cluster teams for integration into the draft cluster reports.

International participation:

The UN and WB identified Team Leaders for all Clusters and Cross-Cutting Issues. Sub-Cluster experts numbered some 55, including 12 experts from the Somali Diaspora.

In November 2005 at the JNA Inception Retreat, it was agreed that international Cluster Leaders have a Deputy Cluster Leader drawn from the experts from the Somali Diaspora. These appointments gave more leadership responsibilities to the Somali counterparts.

Consultations were also held with stakeholders through a series of joint field visits by teams of experts and Somali counterparts, through the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) Sectoral Committees and the NGO Consortium, and through institutions such as IGAD, Somali Donor Group, and other organizations and donor countries.

The JNA also began reaching out to external potential stakeholders through various channels. Meetings were held with representatives from the Peoples Republic of China, the League of Arab States and the Russian Federation, USAID and the US Embassy. Presentations were also made to the Somali Donor Group in order to widen the understanding of the JNA process and to generate interest in the RDP.

Outreach and regional consultations:

To launch the assessment and analysis phase, a JNA Inception Retreat was held in Nairobi on 23-28 November 2005, followed by consultation and information sharing workshops in the following locations:

  • Jowhar on 12-15 December 2005

  • Hargeisa on 16-18 January 2006

  • Garowe on 26-28 January 2006

  • Mogadishu on 24 and 30 May 2006

Three Civil Society JNA Workshops led by the War-Torn Society Project (WSP), have been held so far in Garowe (10-11 April), Mogadishu (17-18 May) and Beletweyne (22-23 May). In addition, JNA Consultative Validation workshops13, to present and discuss the cluster priority findings and outcomes, have been held in the following locations:

  • Garowe, Puntland on July 16-17, including special presentations to the Puntland State Ministers and Parliament

  • Baidoa, South West on July 19-20, including special presentations to the TFG Cabinet Ministers and the Chairs of the Transitional Federal Parliamentary

  • Beledweyne, Hiran on July 22-23,

  • Hargeisa, Somaliland on July 26-30, including a special briefing session with the President of Somaliland, the Cabinet of Somaliland, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives of Somaliland Parliament and the Vice Chairman, Council of Elders (Gurti) of the Somaliland Parliament together with Chairs of Standing Committees of the Gurti

  • A final validation workshop on the cluster findings is scheduled to take place in Mogadishu, Banadir and Garbaherey in September.

A Website was developed – www.somali-jna.org that provides key information for the team working on the JNA as well as for a broader audience that is seeking to learn more on efforts to help Somalia recover. Over 55,000 hits have occurred on the website so far (with some 733,000 entries on Google pertaining to the Somali JNA.) In addition to all JNA background and ongoing information, including monthly newsletters, the JNA Secretariat uploaded all relevant sectoral and background reports on Somalia – a task that no other agency or institution has done in the last 10 years. As such, some 400 relevant sectoral, regional and background documents have now been uploaded and can be accessed by all concerned.

A media campaign was also launched for the JNA – the first ever media campaign for a PCNA exercise. Radio stations, chosen for there broad regional and clan coverage, included paid sections on Horn Afrik for south-central Somalia, covering Mogadishu, Kismayo, Merka, Beletweyne, Baidoa and radio coverage for Somali Diaspora; Radio Daljir in Puntland, covering areas such as Galkayo, Burtinle, Boosaaso and Garowe, Radio Baidoa, and Radio Benadir. The JNA has also circulated on a ‘free of charge’ basis, the radio programs to all other Somali radio stations and websites. The title of the 6 radio programs are as follows:-

Programme 1) What is a JNA, Why a JNA and who is in a JNA?

Programme 2) Dispelling the myths of the JNA

Programme 3) The Process - How did JNA start, what are the major milestones and how are they important?

Programme 4) The JNA Partners – interviewing donors, Ministers, UN, WB, religious representatives on the importance of the JNA

Programme 5) Cluster Teams - What have they done, how did their travels go?

Programme 6) Preliminary Findings

In addition to the radio programs and paid public service announcements, the JNA Secretariat produced 10,000 poster-pamphlets which were given to JNA teams within Somalia and UN offices in the first weeks of April, for onward distribution to Somali people in places such as tea houses, mosques, markets, health clinics, and universities.


Overall day-to-day coordination is the responsibility of two technical senior coordinators, one UN and one WB.  These co-leaders receive operational support and guidance from the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG); the UN Resident Coordinator, UNDG, the WB Country Director responsible for Somalia, and the Sector Manager.   Day-to-day coordination on the side of the Transitional Federal Government was handled by three senior Government Focal Points to the JNA. They are supported by a small JNA Secretariat consisting of an experienced coordination officer and three administrative assistants.  The UN RC has supplied the office space and facilities to the JNA coordination team, thus providing an opportunity to reduce operational expenditures. The joint Secretariat covers joint administrative, logistical and operational issues for both the UN and WB, as well as Somali participation in the JNA process. The Secretariat also keeps the wider array of stakeholders – Somali authorities, NGOs, research, private sector and civil society groups, plus donors and international NGOs - informed of developments and progress on a regular basis.

To avoid duplication, and to emphasize the “jointness” of the exercise, it was agreed that each cluster has a single team leader/coordinator from either the UN and the WB and a Somali counterpart. In addition, national experts were included in each cluster team. The UN leads the clusters on governance, safety, and rule of law; social services and protection of vulnerable groups; and livelihood and solutions for the displaced. The WB leads the clusters on macro-economic policy management and data development; infrastructure, and the productive sectors and environment. The UN leads the Cross-Cutting Cluster on Peace-Building Reconciliation and Prevention of Conflict and Human Rights and Gender. The WB leads the cross-cutting on Capacity Building and Institutional Development public and private plus anti-corruption initiatives.

Operational oversight of the JNA is by the Coordination Support Group (CSG) comprising the Somalia Transitional Federal Government, the United Nations and the World Bank, the NGO Consortium, IGAD IFC, Italy, Sweden, Norway, DFID and the European Commission as Chair. As of early August 2006, the CSG has held 10 meetings.14

The Joint Planning Committee (JPC) has strategic oversight of the JNA. The JPC comprises the UN Resident Coordinator and 2 additional UN Agencies, World Bank, European Commission, IGAD, League of Arab States, African Union, INGO, and the Somali Donor Group, as represented by Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom and 12 committee members from the Somali Transitional Federal Government. The UN RC, the Country Director of the World Bank and the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of the TFG co-chair the JPC.

Institutional support

From Headquarters, DGO provides direct support (technical and financial) to the office of the Resident Coordinator and to the JNA Secretariat. DGO also facilitates the UNDG Technical Working Group and an internal monthly Somalia teleconference (with the RC Office, JNA, DGO, BCPR, RBAS, UNICEF, DPA and BRSP). DGO has also provided experienced UN PCNA experts to the JNA to assist with the preparations of the cluster reports and the RDP. In addition, DPA facilitates an Inter-Departmental Working Group. In the World Bank, the JNA is supported by the office of the Country Director in Washington, DC.

In the field, the JNA relies on UN agencies to provide logistical support – primarily from UNDP, UNICEF and OCHA. Additionally, support has been provided by UNICEF, UNDP and WFP in the form of loans of equipment such as computers, radios, and printers.

Other than substantial contribution at the cluster and technical expert level, some UN agencies have provided non-cluster specific support, such as UNHCR during the design of the JNA and drafting of the Concept Note, WFP with the provision of a workshop facilitator, and UNDP and UNICEF with the provision of officers with previous PCNA process experience.

Financing of the PCNA

The JNA has been funded by a combination of UN and WB funds and contributions from donors.  Donor funds financed technical coordination, workshops in Nairobi and in Somalia, mission travel by cluster experts, the costs of Somali participation in consultations and workshops, and the contracting of selected cluster and sub-cluster experts (both international and Somali).  Funding has so far been received from the EC, Italy, Sweden, UK/DFID and Norway.

The original budget requested to donors was $3.575m. By October, there was a shortfall, despite pledges from the EC, Italy, Norway and Sweden. Thus, there was a need to expand the budget; UK/DFID provided the additional budget requirements. However, by April 2006, it was clear that the JNA process would take longer and a subsequent request went out to the donors of the CSG for additional funding. Norway and Sweden partially responded. The total budget for the JNA to date (August 2006) is $4.196m. In addition to the externally funded budget, the UN has, through the provision of technical expertise invested a further contribution of close to $1.5m.

Donors’ Conference

The changing political and security context within Somalia between January–July 2006, including the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union, fighting between the ICU and the Alliance Against Terrorism, and the ICU’s subsequent victory and dominance over many parts of southern Somalia, are all contributing factors of donor uncertainty toward Somalia and toward the timing of a donor conference. On June 2nd, 2006 a meeting was held in Stockholm to review progress towards the needs assessment and the RDP in preparation for the donor conference. The meeting identified some basic premises for a donor conference, but did not set a date due to the fragile conditions on the ground.

III. Substance and Key Issues

NOTE: As of July 2006, final observations on the substance and key issues in the Somalia JNA cannot be made as the process is still very much underway; however, initial comments have been summarized on key topics, below.


In the Somalia JNA, environment was treated as a sub-cluster in the ‘Productive Sectors and Environment’ cluster, as well as a cross-cutting issue, as it affected the work of other clusters, such as agriculture, directly. However, communication between clusters was extremely limited and there was no clarity on the scope of work of other clusters or how to engage them. It was, in addition, difficult to obtain information on the current status and process of the JNA in light of the shifting timelines. Due to the political divisions within the country, it was problematic to identify clear government counterparts. Although human and institutional capacity levels are generally low, greater use could have been made of the NGO network in the country. Some consultation was done with the national government and civil society; however, security constraints limited the geographical area of consultation.


UNIFEM’s approach to the Somalia JNA was based on lessons learned from their experiences in Sudan, Haiti, Liberia and Afghanistan. UNIFEM presented a Methodology note, checklist and monitoring and evaluation framework that enabled UNIFEM to keep track of each cluster’s efforts towards mainstreaming gender. UNIFEM, working closely with OHCHR, produced technical written briefs on gender and human rights for each of the clusters. UNIFEM also invested substantive time and resources towards mobilizing Somali women for their effective participation in the JNA process. Three women-only consultative workshops were organized in Somaliland, Pundtland and South Central Region, together with umbrella women’s organization. As a result, UNIFEM feels that there is positive and fair amount of incorporation of women rights and gender equality perspectives in the current assessment and analysis of the JNA, and is lobbying for the same level in the RDP and that women are included in the donor conference.

Conflict sensitivity and Peacebuilding

A very comprehensive and detailed Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF), with regional reports for Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central, was completed by the World Bank six months before the JNA began, providing a wealth of information for possible use.

Conflict prevention and peace building were included in the inception workshop for the JNA, which took place in November 2005. However, there was not a systematic attempt to build awareness among technical experts on conflict-sensitive programming, although the CAF offered a perfect platform to do so, and the preparatory phase for the JNA offered enough time to organize this type of induction.

The original plan to use the same regional and Somali institutional expertise that wrote the CAF (International Peacebuilding Alliance, formerly War-Torn Societies Project, and their regional Somali affiliates) as the JNA advisors on conflict peace and reconciliation was resisted intensely by the primary JNA counterpart in the Somali Transitional Federal Government. However, one individual from that institution was allowed to come on board, but only mid-way through the process and after cluster teams had already done their fieldwork. Although they joined the JNA several months into the process, their involvement has been very effective especially from the perspective of broadening the participation and ownership of the JNA in Somalia. The UNDP conflict specialist who worked on Haiti ICF assessment was brought in for the JNA Launch Workshop and was able to work with cluster teams during that period.

Final results on the inclusion of conflict-sensitive aspects in the JNA outcome documents is not yet available, as the process is still unfolding.

Security considerations

No expertise on security sector issues was available for the Somalia JNA. The SRSG from UNPOS sits as co-chair of CMC but neither he nor his office have been operationally or technically involved in the JNA.


No explicit definition of state-building or of the core state functions to be performed is given in the JNA Concept Note. One reason was that there was no consensus among the parties of what such a ‘state’ should look like, particularly regarding the contentious issues surrounding Somaliland.

The objectives outlined in the cluster reports on governance and on public financial management do, however, address many state-building related issues (process, institutions, laws as well as core functions), including:

The overall objective of the Governance, Security and Rule of Law Cluster is to support the Somali people to develop a government that, through its credibility, legitimacy and reconciliation of constituencies, can: create institutions to ensure security and establish the rule of law; regulate commerce and enable private sector growth with international investment and trade; enable investment in infrastructure to support growth and recovery from war; enable the recovery of livelihoods; and deliver social services to all Somalis, through local governance with community-led initiatives and partnerships, and thus facilitate the necessary investment in social capital, especially health and education, to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.” (Governance DRAFT report p. 1)

Peace-building and the creation of good governance are two key themes, related but distinct (…).The key processes for building good governance are: developing political legitimacy, including electoral processes; developing the architecture of government, including integrating federal, state, regional and local levels of government; building institutions and their capacity, including the civil service; developing the culture and practice of transparency, accountability and participation; and developing the role of civil society and media, to enable broad-based citizen participation in governance.” (Governance DRAFT report p. 1)

Under very difficult circumstances, the process has been as participatory as possible, although because of the non-cohesive governance and civil society stakeholder structure, the level of national ownership has been hard to assess. The state-building efforts are complicated by the continuous fighting in South/Central Somalia and by the special status of Somaliland and Puntland. Many of the core state functions go to the heart of political power and resource distribution and are difficult to separate from other critical processes, such as re-establishment of security, negotiations about wealth and power sharing or constitutional issues.

In general the cluster reports outline a very ambitious agenda for state-building related issues. However, the scope and prioritization – especially within the governance cluster will have to be–fully adjusted at the RDP stage to the very weak, almost non-existent, institutional capacity, in particular with regard to South/Central Somalia. The report on public financial management addresses the issue of capacity more directly and does, among other things, recommend the use of foreign advisers during the interim period.

Capacity building of national and local institutions is outlined as a key priority. However it may become clearer at the RDP stage, to what extent the JNA has facilitated planning for immediate support for basic public administrative capabilities or been able to integrate the capacity building activities into the sector specific programs.

IV: Unique circumstances, challenges and early best practices identified (so far)

The time frame for the Somali JNA has gone on longer than planned. The reasons for the extended project time, as agreed to by the Coordination Support Group, (1) include an increase in the JNA’s scope resulting in a greater number of workshops and questionnaire field surveys; (2) delays on the part of institutions (WB, TFG and the UN) to nominate or recruit staff and consultants; (3) delays in ensuring increased qualitative and quantitative reports; (4) delays in terms of accessing some areas due to ongoing insecurity within Somalia; (5) lengthy and difficult negotiations with Somali authorities especially Somaliland; (6) suspension of consultative workshops by CSG.

JNA Constraints

  1. The emergence of the Alliance Against Terrorism led to a popular uprising in Mogadishu led by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) resulting in the most intense fighting seen in the last ten years. The ICU dominated, not only in Mogadishu, but also in many parts of southern Somalia, leaving the TFG with effective control and influence over a very small geographical portion of the country. These events, unforeseen by both the international community and the TFG, have resulted in the TFG focusing their efforts on immediate security and political issues and the international community rapidly coming to terms with a fast changing political and security environment.

  2. The security situation in much of Somalia continues to pose challenges to the implementation of the JNA. However, positive developments in security and stability in several regions have resulted in increased JNA access, in particular in Puntland and Somaliland.

  3. The political and security situation in South/Central Somalia has hampered the ability of the JNA to fully engage, except by proxy, in dialogue with most notably Mogadishu stakeholders, but also with other south-central Somalia stakeholders. This constraint has led to the JNA seeking partnership arrangements with organizations such as CRD, FPENS and COGWA to support a consultative process in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Beletweyne and Kismayo.

  4. The capacity of the TFG has also caused some constraints – lack of email or telephone access to the Ministries in Jowhar and Baidoa created some difficulties, however, the JNA arranged to borrow from within the UN family some computer equipment which has been loaned to the ministry of Planning’s Office. Likewise the counterpart team members in many cases do not have access to email and in some cases any access to telephones.

  5. On the political side, the JNA is a technical exercise that has nevertheless touched on the strategic political issues, inevitably creating some constraints. One is the desire by Somaliland to have a separate JNA process and document. To date, the JNA has continuously negotiated and worked with the Somaliland authorities in ensuring that they are kept on board and fully involved at the technical level. The Somaliland authorities have raised additional related issues such as how funding arrangements would be channeled and requested a direct funding window for Somaliland; and have questioned how Somaliland would be represented at the donor conference. The political division between the Transitional Federal Government and the autonomous administrative authorities (such as that of Somaliland), presented practical difficulties in formulating priorities and recommendations for issues, like Environment, that require central government implementation, especially on policy matters. It was not clear how to balance this need for national implementation practically with unofficial regional autonomy.

  6. In the UN’s initial vision of team composition for the JNA, UN staff with existing knowledge of Somalia were to be involved in the JNA Clusters as either Sub-Cluster experts or Cluster Leaders. Donors and the TFG expressed strong concern that this would take these staff members away from their existing duties which donors were already paying for. This resulted in the UN recruiting consultants who, in some cases, whilst being sectorally qualified did not have any country specific knowledge.

  7. There was an expectation by some donors and the TFG that Cluster Leaders and Sub-Cluster experts would be present throughout the process. In some cases, this indeed occurred, but in others, experts came and went. In addition, some experts were recruited in November 2005, yet others were recruited in the first quarter of 2006. These delays meant that many of the teams were working within different time frames and notably, their absence was felt at the JNA Inception Retreat held in Nairobi in November 2005 and as the process moved to the stage of conducting workshops and developing reports.

  8. Whilst the JNA Media campaign was very successful, there was no radio coverage in Somaliland; by the same token, Somalilanders felt the content in the pamphlets was too skewed toward the south and toward the TFI’s. Whilst the JNA has invited Radio Hargeisa to edit/develop a parallel radio program, this has yet to happen and as such information dissemination and interaction with media outlets in Somaliland have not been optimized.

  9. Changing circumstances that have affected the JNA process in terms of content, financial implications and time implications are as follows:

  1. Wariness on the part of the TFG to allow the International Peacebuilding Alliance (formerly War-Torn Society Project) to act as cross-cutting advisor; negotiations to resolve this issue took some five months and the delay resulted in their support to the drafting of the reports as well as holding in-country civil society workshops, but not being present whilst other clusters conducted their field assessments.

  2. The introduction of 7,200 questionnaires was an addition to the assessment process and resulted in the extension of the National expert teams to ensure that the JNA coverage reached all areas of Somalia and to gather information where there were gaps. This component of the assessment added some 2 months onto the process

  3. The number of experts within the national teams was initially envisaged at 14. The TFG pushed for broader and increased representation. The number of national experts increased to 73 to allow for more gender and clan balance – with a resulting substantial impact on the JNA’s budget.

Early identified best practices:

  • Design of JNA and Concept Note done in a consultative, transparent and participatory manner.

  • Throughout the JNA, there has been a strong partnership between the UN and World Bank, including a Joint Secretariat co-located and very positive and collaborative working relationship between UN and World Bank Senior Technical Coordinators.

  • The continued presence of a UN Senior Technical Coordinator throughout the JNA and consistency of the core secretariat.

  • Unprecedented effort to engage Somalis, including through expanded communication strategies.

  • Donor participation has been strong (but not uniform).

V: Resources Used

  • JNA Website

  • CSG summaries

  • TWG summaries

  • JNA Secretariat

  • Ongoing…

1 The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, Chapter 1, Article 4

2 The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, Chapter 4, Article 11

3 The Declaration of Principles was subsequently signed between the TFG and the UN in early 2005, and the Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC) was established consisting of the key national, regional and international stakeholders.

4 The agreement to launch preparations for the RDP provides the background to the subsequent request from the IC and the TFG to the UN and the WB to co-lead the Somali Joint Needs Assessment.

5 Sweden chaired the meeting, with the participation of Canada, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, the UK, USA, AU, EC, IGAD, League of Arab States, UNPOS, UNDP, UNICEF and the World Bank (with Japan as an observer).

6 Chairman’s Summary from the Stockholm Meeting on Somalia, 29 October 2004

7 Stockholm Meeting on Somalia, Declaration of Principles

8 Two joint UNDG-WB missions took place from 19 March to 2 April and from 2 - 19 May 2005, which consulted the following stakeholders regarding the design of the JNA: the TFG and TFIs, Somaliland Authorities, Puntland Authorities, UNCT and UNPOS, WB, Donors (EC, DFID, Italy, Sweden, League of Arab States, Germany, Norway, Denmark, US), Local NGOs (NOVIB, COGWA, ASEP, KISIMA, SOMLINK), International NGOs (OXFAM, CARE, Save the Children, Horn Relief) and the Business Community.

9 The Coordination Support Group (CSG) has operational oversight of the JNA (see more on the CSG under Coordination)

10 Concept Note: Somali Joint Needs Assessment and Reconstruction and Development Programme

11 Actual implementation of recovery initiatives is beyond the scope of the proposed JNA. Hence, though all recovery initiatives will be designed with the feasibility of implementation in mind, donors, national authorities as well as the UN and the WB will jointly finalize implementation arrangements at a later stage.

12 Committee on Economic Recovery, Institutional Building and Resource Mobilization; “Somalia’s Economic Recovery, Institutional Building and Resource Mobilization”, March 2003

13 Each of the workshops included participation from a wide spectrum of Somali society - Regional Administration and Parliamentarians, Traditional and Religious Leaders, Business Community and Professionals, Women Groups, Youth Groups, Civil Society and NGOs as well as national and international experts from the JNA team. Communiqués and other background documentation for each of the Validation Workshops can be found on the JNA website (www.somali-jna.org).

14 Summaries of the CSG meetings are available on the JNA website

October 2006

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