‘Opening up’ Marx. A comparison of Open Marxist and French Regulationist approaches to political economy



Download 218.63 Kb.
Page7/7
Date conversion17.05.2016
Size218.63 Kb.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7

References


Aglietta, M. (2000) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. The US Experience. (London, Verso Classics) 1st published 1979


Baslé, M. (1995) ‘Acknowledged and Unacknowledged Institutionalist Antecedents of Régulation Theory’ in Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard (eds.) Régulation Theory. The State of the Art (London, Routledge)
Bonefeld, W., Gunn, R. and Psychopedis, K. (1992a) ‘Introduction’ in Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis (eds.) Open Marxism. Volume I. (London, Pluto Press)
Bonefeld, W. (1992b) ‘Social Constitution and the Form of the Capitalist State’ in Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis (eds.) Open Marxism. Volume I. (London, Pluto Press)
Bonefeld, W., and Holloway, J. (1996a) ‘Introduction. The Politics of Money’ in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.) Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published 1995
Bonefeld, W. (1996b) ‘Monetarism and Crisis’ in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.) Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published 1995
Bonefeld, W. (1996c) ‘Money, Equality and Exploitation. An Interpretation of Marx’s Treatment of Money’ in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.) Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published 1995
Bonefeld, W., and Holloway, J. (1996d) ‘Conclusion. Money and Class Struggle’ in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.) Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published 1995
Bonefeld, W., and Psychopedis, K. (2000) ‘The Politics of Change. Ideology and Critique’ in Werner Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.) The Politics of Change. Globalization, Ideology and Critique (Basingstoke, Palgrave)
Bonefeld, W. (2000) ‘The Spectre of Globalization. On the Form and Content of the World Market.’ in Werner Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.) The Politics of Change. Globalization, Ideology and Critique (Basingstoke, Palgrave)
Boyer, R. (1990) The Regulation School. A Critical Introduction (New York, Columbia University Press)
Boyer, R. (1995) ‘Introduction’ in Boyer, Robert and Yves Saillard, Y. (eds) Régulation Theory. The State of the Art (London, Routledge)
Burnham, P. (1996) ‘Capital, Crisis and the International State System’ in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.) Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published 1995
Burnham, P. (2000) ‘Globalization, Depoliticization and ‘Modern’ Economic Management’ in Werner Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.) The Politics of Change. Globalization, Ideology and Critique (Basingstoke, Palgrave)
Clarke, S. (1992) ‘The Global Accumulation of Capital and the Periodisation of the Capitalist State Form’ in Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis (eds.) Open Marxism. Volume I. (London, Pluto Press)
Clarke, S. (1994) Marx’s Theory of Crisis (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published in London 1994
Eichengreen, B. (1996) Globalizing Capital. A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press)
Elster, J. (1985) Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
Guttman, R. (1995) ‘Money and Credit in Régulation Theory‘ in Boyer, Robert and Yves Saillard, Y. (eds) Régulation Theory. The State of the Art (London, Routledge)
Holloway, J. (1996a) ‘The Abyss Opens. The Rise and Fall of Keynesianism’ in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.) Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published 1995
Holloway, J. (1996b) ‘Global Capital and the National State’ in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.) Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published 1995
Holloway, J. (2000) ‘Zapata in Wall Street’ in The Politics of Change. Globalization, Ideology and Critique (Basingstoke, Palgrave)
Holloway, J. (2002) Change the World Without Taking Power (London, Pluto Press)
Jessop, B (1988) ‘Regulation Theory, post Fordism and the State. More than a Reply to Werner Bonefeld’ Capital & Class (34)
Jessop, B. (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State (Cambridge, Polity Press)
Kenen, P. (2000) The International Economy (Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press)
Kindleberger, C. (1986) The World in Depression (Berkeley, University of California Press)
Kumar, K. (1995) From post-Industrial to post-Modern Society. New Theories of the Contemporary World (Cambridge, Mass., Blackwell)
Lewis, M. K, and Mizen, P. D (2000) Monetary Economics (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
Mandel, E. (1975) Late Capitalism (London, NLB)
Marazzi, C. (1996) ‘Money in the World Crisis. The New Basis of Capitalist Power’ in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.) Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York, St. Martin’s Press) 1st published 1995
Marx, K. (1967) Capital I (New York, International Publishers)
Marx, K. (1973) Grundrisse (London, Penguin)
Schumpeter, J. (1979) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London, Allen & Unwin) 1st published 1943
Strange, S. (1986) Casino Capitalism (Oxford, Blackwell)
Strange, S. (1994) States and Markets. An Introduction to International Political Economy (London, Continuum)
Tucker, R. C. (1978) Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd Edition (New York, W.W. Norton & Co.)



1 Editors of Open Marxism I-III were Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, Kosmas Psychopedis and John Holloway. Two other authors feature prominently in Open Marxist discussion: Simon Clarke and Peter Burnham.

2 The other targets being ‘Rational Choice Marxism’, ‘New Times’ manifesto and ‘Critical Realism’. Regulation Approach, however, is the only one of these being referred to regularly throughout Open Marxism 1-3, and featuring in some of the other Open Marxist books mentioned in the bibliography of this paper.

3 To distinguish it from the Grenoble group of Destanne de Bernis (Boyer, 1990: 17-19).

4 By implication, since they speak of subterranean tradition of open Marxism (Bonefeld et al, 1992: xii).

5 See, for example, Aglietta, who says that “theoretical analysis of the labour process must thus dispel the illusions spread by bourgoeis ideologists in the supposedly liberating character of the new types of work organization…also dispel a further illusion – that of the liberating character of the technology” (Aglietta 1979: 112). Open Marxists scorn ‘the celebration of new technology’ but when doing so they speak of “the equation of ‘new times’ with the scenarios dubbed post-Fordist“ (Bonefeld et al, 1992: ix), thus making it look as if the Regulation Approach (from where the term post-Fordism comes) was expressing the same hopes in new work organisation as the British Marxists behind the manifesto ‘New Times’. This peculiar way in which Open Marxists present arguments they purport to refute, mixing together disparate approaches or erecting straw men, will be discussed in the section ‘Discussion pragmatics – coherence, logic and ‘straw men’’.

6 This is the view supported by Preface to Critique of Political Economy. As Elster notes, elsewhere Marx implies that is is the optimal development rather than use of productive forces that might be of decisive importance for the change from one form of relations of production to another (e.g. 1985: 259).

7 Although coined by Werner Sombart, of course.

8 Incidentally, this sketchy description of the development of industrial relations is quite close to ‘cultural’ rather than ‘materialist’ accounts, particularly to that of Werner Sombart, who traced origins of capitalist development in the medieval courts, their taste for luxury, and then the development of greed. Also, as Elster notes, this account places heavy burden on a historical coincidence, and is therefore quite distant from standard Marxist explanations (Elster 1985: 23).

9 Save for the notion of workers being given things to consume to take their minds off revolt in their spare time.

10 Of course, it is quite another matter that the notion of comparative advantage forms a basis for a particular policy prescription in neoclassical texts. From Mises to modern textbooks on international economics, comparative advantage connotes the situation of the only rational behaviour in the world of entities esoterically endowed with tastes and production capabilities. Do what you do best, and through exchange both you and your partner (who trades what he does best) will benefit. The world is a variable-sum game. Marx subjected a particular passage in Ricardo to scathing criticism precisely because it was based on the Say-wise notion of independent individuals who somehow produce for their own good and as if ex post realize before every exchange that by exchanging they are better off. This totally misunderstands what modern economy is, namely a commodity economy (Theories of Surplus-Value, from Tucker 1978: 445-6).

11 It is difficult to know what exactly they mean, since the definition of the process that is supposed to get into trouble is usually described fuzzily, in typically occult formulations. “Capital, in order to survive, needed to free itself from the existing relations of exploitation, to spit out some of the workers currently being exploited… Capital takes flight from the inadequacy of its own basis: this flight is expressed in the conversion of capital into money and the movement of that money in search of profitable means of expansion. This process can be described in terms of over-acumulation of capital…Capital assumes the liquid form of money and flows throughout the world…” (Holloway 1996b: 132).

12 Why “a warning” is unclear. The sentence next sentence reads “The hope is that, if capital, for all the intensity of its struggle, has not yet achieved the decomposition of the working class into a profitable labour force, it is because of the enormous power of insubordinate labour”. This is slightly curious. The whole book to which these are closing remarks takes as an assumption that the economic slowdown of late 1960s was due to ‘insubordinate labour’. Now this is implicitly taken into question.

13 There are other problems, related to lack of universality. In a service and especially knowledge economy, the assumption of homogeneity of labour is ever more difficult to substantiate. And, to get completely out of the framework of a Fordist type of economy, it is not unimaginable for commodities to have exchange value even when produced by a fully automated economy; or: how does one value things found by accident? (Elster 1985: 97). But this goes well beyond the scope of our investigation.

14 More than fifty years ago, Joseph Schumpeter wrote: “Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in which price competition was all they saw… in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that kind of competition that counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization… competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives” (1943: 84). This is a very serious statement implying that the law of the tendency for the proft to fall has, if any, a very limited validity. Open Marxists apparently still stick to competition ‘at the margins of the profits’ as the defining feature of capitalism, while Regulationists seem to be inclined to take Schumpeter seriously.

15 Of course, as pointed out elsewhere too, Open Marxists tend to subsume both monetarism in the sense of Friedman’s economic dosctrines and any laissez-faire politics under one heading, but essentially they talk about restraint of credit and/or money supply growth.

16 See, for example, Holloway’s discussion of the role of the Keynesian state (1996: 10-11).

17 Bonefeld apparently understands this as defining money “according to its institutionally specified determinations” (1996c: 179).

18 This should be distinguished from the statement that the full development of the financial system causes problems with reaching full or near full employment, one of the key insights of Keynes (Boyer 1990: 11).

19 The 1987 Crash is described as the same thing as the 1929 one, with crisis this time only postponed thanks to expansion of credit (Holloway and Bonefeld 1996: 224). Other authors argue that it was precisely the hands off approach by governments, which lent freely on the day of crisis, in line with Bagehot’s dictum, to infuse the stock market with liquidity, but chose not to interfere generally, which persuaded many that markets could cope well when left alone, and helped to advance the New Right agenda (Strange 1998: 8).

20 The typical Open Marxist refusal to deal with consumption, stressed in several places of this paper, appears rather graphically even here, as a predilection for the use of ‘overproduction’. Where Aglietta speaks, in neutral and relative terms, of uneven development of departments, Clarke mentions “the uneven development of the various branches of production” is an expression of “the tendency to overproduction” (1994: 283).

21 Interestingly, Marx mentions in Capital I that this process of development of man’s universal powers will be instituted already in later stages of capitliasm “to replace the detail-worker of today, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation… by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs are mut so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers” (Marx 1967: 487-8).

22 Compare this with the Open Marxist insistence that “the way capital tries to embark on a new cycle of development is through an attack on the obstacles posed by worker resistance and insubordination of all forms” (Marazzi 1996: 72).

23 See the statement that we are now in a crisis which ‘capital’ might resolve in blood’ (1996d: 225) quoted also elsewhere in this paper.

24 Formal ownership might anyway be a relatively poor proxy for effective control. We might use the example of bureacratic socialisms, where assets nominally belonging to “the people” are in efffect controlled by buracratic groups. But we can also point at modern corporations, where management boards can often effectively run companies without much input from the shareholders, due to complexity of the management process, for example.

25 Open Marxists tend to reshape this as Keynesianism, and claim that Keynesians, among which they count Regulationists, believe that “overaccumulation and underconsumption are the two sides of the same coin” (Burnham 1996: 107). I believe this equating of the concepts of supply and demand with accumulation and production is not justified.

26 See also Clarke’s argument against ‘intermediate structures’ expressly aimed at the Regulation Theory (1992).

27 Cf. Mandel: “The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even if it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation and conception “ (1972: 13).

28 Bonefeld (1992b) makes a retort to Jessop, who makes a similar statement to Aglietta’s, by theorising structures as “modes of existence of the class antagonism of capital and labour” (1992b: 93).

29 Another Marx quotation on the role of laws would be: “Free competition brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist” (1967: 269-70).

30 Another reading is that men are expressions of the wills of the two manichean entities, ‘capital’ and ‘labour’, which then, completely reverses the relationship and instead of subjection to ‘laws’, men are subjected to some almost animate forces.

31 Cf. the sentence “during the 1920s and 1930s monetarists like Hayek and von Mises” (Bonefeld 1996b: 32).

32 Not to mention that such behaviour on behalf of other central banks – as these were the only players who could convert gold with the Fed – would have been self-defeating (see, for example, Strange 1986). By the way, of course there was some flight into deutschemarks and into gold from dollars (Eichengreen 1996: 123-4), but the fact remains that the dollar demand also remained high.

33 We already said that the Regulation Approach rejects the view that labour power could be viewed as any other commodity, under any circumstances.

34 Of course he was concerned about wages becoming ‘sticky-downwards’ due to perceptions of nominal income, and also by the strength of collective bargaining. This, however, is a different element of his analysis. His refutation of Say’s Law has nothing to do with it.

35 In the end, by abandoning conversion into gold, the US avoided this, at least, maybe, for a time. This is the notion of credit based on the seignorage effect , the “inordinate privilege of the dollar” so reviled by Charles de Gaulle. What Bonefeld could have in mind is the notion of inflation as “expansion of credit”, so often brought up by Mises, Hayek and other radical ‘Austrians’. However, this would entail that the effect was inflationary, which for a long time was not true. If by “as long as the US maintained a large balance” Bonefeld means a surplus, then he is 100 percent wrong, since in this case (in a static model and as a historical fact) the dollar ‘exports’ would not be inflationary.

36 “In the beginning is the scream. We scream. When we write or when we read, it is easy to forget that the beginning is not the word but the scream” (2002: 1).

1   2   3   4   5   6   7


The database is protected by copyright ©essaydocs.org 2016
send message

    Main page