Mansfield and Snyder 95 (Edward, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics – University of Pennsylvania, Jack, PhD in political science and Professor of Political Scienc/Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies – Columbia University, “Democratization and the Danger of War” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), The MIT Press, pp. 31-32, Jstor)
LOGROLLING. In these democratizing states, the power of elite groups was strengthened relative to the weakened autocratic center, yet the power of mass groups was not yet institutionalized as in a mature democracy. This created the incentive to make policy by logrolling among elite interest groups. Elite log- rolling often yielded policies of war, military preparation, and imperial expan- sion, in part because many of the interest groups created in the process of weakening and breaking up the autocratic state were its military-feudal detri- tus: the army, the navy, and the aristocratic elites that staffed them. Similar military interest groups also figure in some of the post-communist cases, especially Yugoslavia and Russia. Militaries do not necessarily favor war, es- pecially when they feel unprepared to win quickly and decisively. However, because of militaries' typically zero-sum view of security, they often recom- mend offensive military strategies that inadvertently lead the state down the path toward war.56 Moreover, logrolling works by giving each group what it wants most, so that even if only some of the groups in the coalition favored policies leading to war and expansion, that would be enough to make their adoption likely. The classic example is the Wilhelmine iron-and-rye logroll, where the navy and heavy industry insisted on a fleet that alienated Britain, the Junkers got grain tariffs that sowed discord with Russia, and the army got the offensive Schlieffen Plan, which threatened all of Germany's neighbors.Another instance is the logroll between the Japanese imperial army and navy, which overtaxed the economy and embroiled Japan with enemies on all azimuths.57
Democratizating states look for war – national prestige
Mansfield and Snyder 95 (Edward, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics – University of Pennsylvania, Jack, PhD in political science and Professor of Political Scienc/Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies – Columbia University, “Democratization and the Danger of War” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), The MIT Press, pp. 6-7, Jstor)
PRESTIGE STRATEGIES. One of the simplest but most risky strategies for a hard-pressed regime in a democratizing country is to shore up its prestige at home by seeking victories abroad. Johannes Miquel, who revitalized the iron- rye coalition at the turn of the century, argued that "successes in foreign policy would make a good impression in the Reichstag debates, and political divisions would thus be moderated.",61 The domestic targets of such strategies often share this view. Cobden, for example, argued that military victories abroad would confer enough prestige on the military-feudal landed elite to allow them to raise food tariffs and snuff out democracy: "Let John Bull have a great military triumph, and we shall have to take off our hats as we pass the Horse Guards for the rest of our lives."62 Prestige strategies make the country hypersensitive to slights to its reputa- tion. As the kaiser found out in the First and Second Moroccan Crises, stiff foreign resistance can produce not cheap victories but embarrassing defeats, which further complicate domestic governance. In another instance, Napoleon III was easily goaded into a fateful declaration of war in 1870 by Bismarck's insulting editorial work on a leaked telegram from the kaiser.63 If the public itself is wary of war, the prestige-enhancing venture may have to be mounted in the face of initial domestic opposition. Nonetheless, the gamble may be worth it. The Crimean victory created the conditions for what is acknowledged to be the high point of Napoleon III's rule, despite the popular reluctance and war-weariness that accompanied it.64 Napoleon learned this lesson well, and tried to recapitulate his success when he saw his popularity waning in January 1859. On the eve of French military intervention in the Italian struggle with Austria, Napoleon told his cabinet, "On the domestic front, the war will at first awaken great fears; traders and speculators of every stripe will shriek, but national sentiment will [banish] this domestic fright; the nation will be put to the test once more in a struggle that will stir many a heart, recall the memory of heroic times and bring together under the mantle of glory the parties that are steadily drifting away from one another day after day "65 Napoleon was trying to lead public opinion to become bellicose, not just to follow opinion, but in order to stir a national feeling that would enhance the state's ability to govern a split and stalemated political arena.
Democratic transitions cause war – weak central authority causes appeal to violent nationalism.
Mansfield and Snyder 95 (Edward, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics – University of Pennsylvania, Jack, PhD in political science and Professor of Political Scienc/Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies – Columbia University, “Democratization and the Danger of War” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), The MIT Press, pp. 30-31, Jstor)
THE WEAKENING OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY. The political impasse and reckless- ness of democratizing states isexacerbated further by the weakening of the state's authority Autocratic power is in decline vis-a'-vis both the elite interest groups and mass groups, but democratic institutions lack the strength to integrate these contending interests and views. Parties are weak and lack mass loyalty.Elections are rigged or intermittent. Institutions of public political participation are distrusted, because they are subject to manipulation by elites and to arbitrary constraints imposed by the state, which fears the outcome of unfettered competition. In each of the historical great-power cases, the problem was not excessive authoritarian power at the center, but the opposite. The Aberdeen coalition that brought Britain into the Crimean War was a makeshift cabinet headed by a weak leader with no substantial constituency Likewise, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, Napoleon III's regime was in the process of caving in to its liberal opponents, who dominated the parliament elected in 1869. As Europe's armies prepared to hurtle from their starting gates in late July 1914, Austrian leaders, perplexed by the contradictions between the German Chan- cellor's policy and that of the German military, asked "Who rules in Berlin?" The 1931 Manchurian Incident was a fait accompli by the local Japanese military; Tokyo was not even informed.54 Today, the return to imperial thinking in Moscow is the result of Yeltsin's weakness, not his strength. As Sergei Kara- ganov has recently argued, the breakdown of the Leninist state "has created an environment where elite interests influence [foreign] policy directly"55 In each of these cases, the weak central political leadership resorts to the same strategies as do the more parochial elite interests, using nationalist ideological appeals and special-interest payoffs to maintain their short-run viability, de- spite the potential long-run risks associated with these strategies.