Trade doesn’t solve conflict. Depends on external variables and the direction of causation is unclear.
Chan 97 (Steve, Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise”, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May, 1997), Blackwell Publishing , p. 76, Jstor)
Research on Kant's second reason for democratic peace indicates that countries with extensive trade ties are, indeed, less likely to go to war (see, for example, Polachek 1980; Gasiorowski and Polachek 1982; Domke 1988; Brawley 1993; Dixon and Moon 1993; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994; Mansfield 1994; Oneal et al. 1996; Oneal and Russett 1996). The cause-effect relationship is not entirely clear, however: do countries trade more because they are already on peaceful terms, or are their peaceful relations caused by extensive trade (Pollins 1989a, 1989b)? Naturally, economic interdependence produces not only incentives for cooperation, but also problems of mutual vulnerability (see, for example, Keohane and Nye 1977). It is a double-edged sword with beneficial as well as costly aspects, and the relationship between interdependence and conflict tends toward nonlinearity (Gasiorowski 1986; de Vries 1990; Barbieri 1996a, 1996b). Interdependence can lead to greater cooperation or more conflict depending on which aspects dominate. Except under certain limiting conditions, international trade does not in itself assure peace (Gowa 1995). Wars have occurred among countries with close economic ties. Thus, Kahler (1979/80:393) has argued that in 1914 an international system "characterized by high economic interdependence, unparalleled prosperity, and relative openness still went to war."
Transitions Bad – 1NC
Democratic transitions are empirically proven to cause wars – nationalist populace and elite remnants.
Mansfield and Snyder 95 (Edward, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics – University of Pennsylvania, Jack, PhD in political science and Professor of Political Scienc/Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies – Columbia University, “Democratization and the Danger of War” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), The MIT Press, pp. 6-7, Jstor)
The contemporary era shows that incipient or partial democratization can be an occasion for the rise of belligerent nationalism and war.3 Two pairs of states-Serbia and Croatia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan-have found them- selves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of partial electoral democracy. Russia's poorly institutionalized, partial democracy has tense rela- tionships with many of its neighbors and has used military force brutally to reassert control in Chechnya; its electorate castnearly a quarter of its votes for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. This contemporary connection between democratization and conflict is no coincidence. Using the same databases that are typically used to study the democratic peace, we find considerable statistical evidence that democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than are mature democracies or stable autocracies. States like contemporary Russia that make the biggest leap in democratization-from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy-are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies. However, reversing the process of democratiza- tion, once it has begun, will not reduce this risk. Regimes that are changing toward autocracy, including states that revert to autocracy after failed experi- ments with democracy, are also more likely to fight wars than are states whose regime is unchanging. Moreover, virtually every great power has gone on the warpath during the initial phase of its entry into the era of mass politics. Mid-Victorian Britain, poised between the partial democracy of the First Reform Bill of 1832 and the full-fledged democracy of the later Gladstone era, was carried into the Crimean War by a groundswell of belligerent public opinion. Napoleon III's France, drifting from plebiscitary toward parliamentary rule, fought a series of wars designed to establish its credentials as a liberal, popular, nationalist type of empire. The ruling elite of Wilhelmine Germany, facing universal suffrage but limited governmental accountability, was pushed toward World War I by its escalating competition with middle-class mass groups for the mantle of Ger- man nationalism. Japan's "Taisho democracy" of the 1920s brought an era of mass politics that led the Japanese army to devise and sell an imperial ideology with broad-based appeal.4 In each case, the combination of incipient democra- tization and the material resources of a great power produced nationalism, truculence abroad, and major war. Why should democratizing states be so belligerent? The pattern of the de- mocratizing great powers suggests that the problem lies in the nature of domestic political competition after the breakup of the autocratic regime. Elite groups left over from the ruling circles of the old regime, many of whom have a particular interest in war and empire, vie for power and survival with each other and with new elites representing rising democratic forces. Both old and new elites use all the resources they can muster to mobilize mass allies, often through nationalist appeals, to defend their threatened positions and to stake out new ones. However, like the sorcerer's apprentice, these elites typically find that their mass allies, once mobilized, are difficult to control. When this hap- pens, war can result from nationalist prestige strategies that hard-pressed leaders use to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions. The problem is not that mass public opinion in democratizing states dem- onstrates an unvarnished, persistent preference for military adventure. On the contrary, public opinion often starts off highly averse to war. Rather, elites exploit their power in the imperfect institutions of partial democracies to create faits accomplis, control political agendas, and shape the content of information media in ways that promote belligerent pressure-group lobbies or upwellings of militancy in the populace as a whole. Once this ideological connection between militant elites and their mass constituents is forged, the state may jettison electoral democracy while retain- ing nationalistic, populist rhetoric. As in the failure of Weimar and Taisho democracy, the adverse effects of democratization on war-proneness may even heighten after democracy collapses. Thus, the aftershock of failed democrati- zation is at least one of the factors explaining the link between autocratization and war.