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10. Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800, trans. Miriam Kochan (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 308.
11. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, p. 358.
12. Ibid., p. 372.
13. Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, ed. Tom Bottomore (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 314.
14. Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (London: Verso, 1998), p. 40.
15. On uneven development and the geographical differences of capitalist expansion, see David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).
16. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, p. 446.
17. "Like the power of which it is the most global expression, imperialism is not a notion that can form the object of any explicit definition that orginates from economic concepts. Imperialism can only be grasped on the basis of a fully developed theory of the state." Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, trans. David Fernbach (London: New Left Books, 1979), p. 30.
18. See primarily V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939), and Notebooks on Imperialism, vol. 39 of Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977).
19. See Hilferding, Finance Capital, in particular pp. 183-235. Hilferding's analysis relies heavily on Marx's theory of the equalization of the general rate of profit through competition; see Capital, 3:273-301.
20. Karl Kautsky, "Zwei Schriften zum Umlernen," Die Neue Zeit, April 30, 1915, p. 144. Excerpts from Kautsky's writings on imperialism are included in Karl Kautsky: Selected Political Writings, ed. and trans. Patrick Goode (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 74-96.
21. V. I. Lenin, "Preface to N. Bukharin's Pamphlet, Imperialism and the World Economy," in Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 22:103-107; quotation p. 106. See also Lenin, Imperialism, pp. 111-122. We should note here that although Lenin is certainly correct in claiming that Kautsky's position is a deviation from Marx's method when he ignores the potential conflicts and practical opportunities of the present situation, Kautsky's reading of the tendency toward a unified world market does indeed find resonance in Marx's work, particularly in his articles on colonialism in India, where he posed a linear tendency of imperialist development toward the formation of a world market. See in particular Karl Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India," in Surveys from Exile, vol. 2 of Political Writings (London: Penguin, 1973), pp. 319-325.
22. Lenin, "Preface to N. Bukharin's Pamphlet, Imperialism and the World Economy," p. 107.
23. See Antonio Negri, La fabbrica della strategia: 33 lezioni su Lenin (Padua: CLEUP, 1976).
24. On Lenin's debt to Hobson, see Giovanni Arrighi, The Geometry of Imperialism: The Limits of Hobson's Paradigm, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 23-27.
25. Cecil Rhodes, cited in Lenin, Imperialism, p. 79.
26. It is particularly important to give credit where credit is due today, when we seem to be confronted with numerous versions of historical revisionism. Poor Gramsci, communist and militant before all else, tortured and killed by fascism and ultimately by the bosses who financed fascism-poor Gramsci was given the gift of being considered the founder of a strange notion of hegemony that leaves no place for a Marxian politics. (See, for example, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics [London: Verso, 1985], especially pp. 65-71.) We have to defend ourselves against such generous gifts!
27. See Roman Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx's "Capital," trans. Peter Burgess (London: Pluto Press, 1977).
28. On the missing volume on the wage, see Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, trans. Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan, and Maurizio Viano (New York: Autonomedia, 1991), pp. 127-150; and Michael Lebowitz, Beyond Capital: Marx's Political Economy of the Working Class (London: Macmillan, 1992). On the question of the existence of a Marxist theory of the state, see the debate between Norberto Bobbio and Antonio Negri in Norberto Bobbio, Which Socialism? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
29. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 408.
30. Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, trans. Patricia Ranum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 64.
1. "I occasionally get just as tired of the slogan 'postmodern' as anyone else, but when I am tempted to regret my complicity with it, to deplore its misuses and its notoriety, and to conclude with some reluctance that it raises more problems than it solves, I find myselfpausing to wonder whether any other concept can dramatize the issues in quite so effective and economical a fashion." Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 418.
2. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (London: Verso, 1994).
3. Ibid., p. 332.
1. See James Devine, "Underconsumption, Over-investment, and the Origins of the Great Depression," Review of Radical Political Economics, 15, no. 2 (Summer 1983), 1-27. On the economic crisis of 1929, see also the classic analysis of John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954), which focuses on speculation as the cause of the crisis; and, more recently, G‚rard Dum‚nil and D. L‚vy, La dynamique du capital: un siŠcle d'‚conomie americaine (Paris: PUF, 1996). More generally, on the theoretical problems that the 1929 crisis bequeathed to twentieth-century political economy, see Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, trans. David Fernbach (London: New Left Books, 1979); and Robert Boyer and Jacques Mistral, Accumulation, inflation, crises (Paris: PUF, 1978).
2. John Maynard Keynes was perhaps the person with the clearest foresight at the Versailles Conference. Already at the conference and then later in his essay "The Economic Consequences of Peace," he denounced the political egotism of the victors which would become one of the contributing factors to the economic crisis of the 1920s.
3. This type of interpretation of the economic and political crisis of 1929 should be contrasted very strongly to "revisionist" historiographical conceptions in the style of Fran‡ois Furet, Ernst Nolte, and Renzo De Felice. It demonstrates the great importance of the economic element in the definition of the political choices of the twentieth century. The revisionist histories, on the contrary, read the developments of the century as a linear progression of ideas that are often posed in dialectical opposition, with fascism and communism occupying the defining poles. See, for example, Fran‡ois Furet, Le pass‚ d'une illusion: essai sur l'id‚e communiste au XXe siŠcle (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), especially the chapter in which he discusses the relationship between communism and fascism (pp. 189-248).
4. See Jon Halliday, A Political History of Japanese Capitalism (New York: Pantheon, 1975), pp. 82-133.
5. It is above all the "liberal" historiography of authors such as Arthur Meier Schlesinger that has insisted on the synthetic characteristics of american progressivism. See his Political and Social Growth of the American People, 1865-1940, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1941). See also Arthur Ekirch, Jr., Progressivism in America: A Study of the Era from Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974).
6. This is the central development traced by Michel Aglietta in A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, and by Benjamin Coriat in L'atelier et le chronomŠtre (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1979). See also Antonio Negri, "Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State," in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), pp. 23-51; and "Crisis of the Planner-State: Communism and Revolutionary Organisation," in Revolution Retrieved (London: Red Notes, 1988), pp. 91-148. A good analysis of the New Deal and Keynesianism is also provided by Suzanne de Brunhoff, The State, Capital, and Economic Policy, trans. Mike Sonenscher (London: Pluto Press, 1978), pp. 61-80.
7. The notion of discipline developed by Michel Foucault certainly has a different focus from the one we employ here, but we are refering to the same practices and the same globality of application. Foucault's primary theoretical concerns are that discipline is deployed through institutional architectures, that the power of discipline is located not in some central source but in the capillary formations at its point of exercise, and that the subjectivities are produced by internalizing discipline and enacting its practices. This is all equally valid for our consideration here. Our primary focus, however, is on how the practices and relationships of disciplinarity that originated in the factory regime came to invest the entire social terrain as a mechanism of both production and government, that is, as a regime of social production.
8. The fundamental text that describes this development and anticipates its results is Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), which was written in the mid-1940s. Numerous other works followed in the description of disciplinary society and its implacable development as a "biopolitical society," works coming out of different cultural and intellectual traditions but completely coherent in defining the tendency. For the two strongest and most intelligent poles of this range of studies, see Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), for what we might call the Anglo-German pole; and Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977), for the Latin pole.
9. Freda Kirchwey, "Program of action," Nation, March 11, 1944, pp. 300-305; cited in Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 103.
10. On the spread of the New Deal model to the other dominant countries after the Second World War, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 347-437; and Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics (New York: Pantheon, 1974).
11. On the history of the decolonization process in general, see Marc Ferro, Histoire des colonisations: des conquˆtes aux ind‚pendences, XIIIe-XXe siŠcle (Paris: Seuil, 1994); Frank Ansprenger, The Dissolution of the Colonial Empires (London: Routledge, 1989); and R. F. Holland, European Decolonization, 1918-1981 (London: Macmillan, 1985).
12. On the effect of U.S. hegemony on decolonization struggles, see Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 69-75; and Fran‡ois Chesnais, La mondialisation du capital, rev. ed. (Paris: Syros, 1997).
13. Harry S. Truman, Public Papers (Washington, Dfic.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 176; cited in Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Schocken, 1971), p. 85. On the rigid bipolar ideological divisions imposed by the cold war, see again Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 373-395; and Schurmann, The Logic of World Power.
14. On the decentering of manufacturing and service production (coupled with the centralization of command), see two books by Saskia Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), especially pp. 127-133; and The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 22-34. More generally, on the mobility of capital and the countervailing or limiting factors, see David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 417-422.
15. See Wladimir Andreff, Les multinationales globales (Paris: La D‚couverte, 1995); and Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 1995).
16. On the resistances of peasants to capitalist discipline, see James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 235 and passim.
17. On the economic projects of modernization in Mao's China, see Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 113-139.
18. Robert Sutcliffe, for example, writes, "No major country has yet become rich without having become industrialized . . . Greater wealth and better living standards under any political system are closely connected with industrialization." Robert Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelopment (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1971).
19. On global and peripheral Fordism, see primarily Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism, trans. David Marcey (London: Verso, 1987); and "Towards a Global Fordism?" New Left Review, no. 132 (1982), 33-47. On the reception of Lipietz's work among Anglo-American economists, see David Ruccio, "Fordism on a World Scale: International Dimensions of Regulation," Review of Radical Political Economics, 21, no. 4 (Winter 1989), 33-53; and Bob Jessop, "Fordism and Post-Fordism: A Critical Reformulation," in Michael Storper and Allen Scott, eds., Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 46-69.
20. See, for example, Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," in Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 11-43; John Saul, "Planning for Socialism in Tanzania," in Uchumi Editorial Board, ed., Towards Socialist Planning (Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), pp. 1-29; and Terence Hopkins, "On Economic Planning in Tropical Africa," Co-existence, 1, no. 1 (May 1964), 77-88. For two appraisals of the failure of economic development strategies and planning in Africa (but which both still imagine the possibility of an "alternative" socialist development), see Samir Amin, Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure (London: Zed Books, 1990), especially pp. 7-74; and Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington, Dfic.: The Brookings Institution, 1996).
21. For an interesting personal account of the Bandung Conference and its significance, see Richard Wright, The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference (New York: World, 1956). The major speeches delivered at the conference are included in George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956). On the nonalignment movement, see Leo Mates, Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade: Institute for International Politics and Economics, 1972); and M. S. Rajan, Nonalignment and Nonalignment Movement (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1990).
22. On nomadism and the constitution of subjectivities, see Gilles Deleuze and F‚lix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), especially pp. 351-423.
23. On the formal and real subsumption in Marx, see primarily Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1976), pp. 1019-38.
1. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1976), p. 918.
2. See primarily Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); and Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).
1. On crisis and the restructuring of capitalist production in the 1960s and 1970s, see Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984). On the financial and economic crisis, see Robert Boyer and Jacques Mistral, Accumulation, inflation, crises (Paris: PUF, 1978).
2. See Antonio Negri, "Marx on Cycle and Crisis," in Revolution Retrieved (London: Red Notes, 1988), pp. 43-90.
3. See the historical essays "Do You Remember Revolution?" written collectively and "Do You Remember Counter-revolution?" by Paolo Virno in Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, eds., Radical Thought in Italy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 225-259. See also Paolo Carpignano, "Note su classe operaia e capitale in America negli anni sessanta," in Sergio Bologna, Paolo Carpignano, and Antonio Negri, Crisi e organizzazione operaia (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), pp. 73-97.
4. On the "welfare explosion of the 1960s," see Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1971), in particular pp. 183-199. See also Piven and Cloward, The New Class War: Reagan's Attack on the Welfare State and Its Consequences (New York: Pantheon, 1982).
5. See Luciano Ferrari Bravo, "Introduzione: vecchie e nuove questioni nella teoria dell'imperialismo," in Luciano Ferrari Bravo, ed., Imperialismo e classe operaia multinazionale (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1975), pp. 7-70.
6. Claude Ake goes so far as to characterize the entire world capitalist system as a conflict between "bourgeois countries" and "proletarian countries" in Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London: Zed Books, 1978), p. 11.
7. This Third Worldist perspective is implicit in much of the writing of Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, and Samir Amin.
8. For a thorough historical account of the events and the protagonists at the Bretton Woods Conference, see Armand Van Dormael, Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System (London: Macmillan, 1978). For a historical account that gives a broader view of the comprehensive U.S. preparation for hegemony in the postwar period by posing the economic planning at Bretton Woods together with the political planning at Dumbarton Oaks, see George Schild, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
9. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 1994), p. 278-279.
10. On the international financial crisis that began in the 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods mechanisms, see Peter Coffey, The World Monetary Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974); and Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 300-324.
11. On Eurodollar finance as an element of the crisis, see Jeffry Frieden, Banking on the World: The Politics of American International Finance (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 79-122.
12. On the convertibility of the dollar and the Nixon maneuver in 1971, see David Calleo and Benjamin Rowland, America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 87-117; and Coffey, The World Monetary Crisis, pp. 25-42.
13. On the limits of Fordism and the need for capital to find a post-Fordist schema of production and accumulaton, see Benjamin Coriat, L'atelier et le robot: essai sur le fordisme et la production de masse … l'a^ge de l'‚lectronique (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1990).
14. Fredric Jameson argues that the social struggles of the 1960s in the First World, particularly in the United States and France, follow in the line of (and even derive from) the powerful decolonization and liberation movements in the Third World during the 1950s and 1960s. See Fredric Jameson, "Periodizing the 60s," in Ideologies of Theory: Essays, 1971-1986 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 2:178-208, especially pp. 180-186.
15. See Giovanni Arrighi, "Marxist Century, American Century: The Making and Remaking of the World Labor Movement," in Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein, Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World System (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990), 54-95.
16. Robin Kelley provides an exemplary account of the dynamics of proletarian refusal and the creation of alternative forms of life in his wonderful U.S. black working-class history, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class (New York: Free Press, 1994).
17. In ecological thought, too, at least in its most productive paradigms, we can see clearly that the "nature" in question is equally human and nonhuman; ecology involves not just the preservation of things, but the production of relationships and the production of subjectivity as well. See F‚lix Guattari, Les trois ‚cologies (Paris: Galil‚e, 1989); and Verena Andermatt Conley, Ecopolitics: The Environment in Poststructuralist Thought (London: Routledge, 1997). Franco Piperno continues this "ecological" line of thought, albeit in a different register, in Elogio dello spirito pubblico meridionale (Rome: Manifestolibri, 1997).
18. In her effort to think the importance and real limits of the "outside," Rosa Luxemburg may have been the first great ecological thinker of the twentieth century. The best examples of Marxist ecological thought in authors such as Andr‚ Gorz and James O'Connor adopt a form of argument similar to Luxemburg's anti-imperialist position (although their work does not derive directly from hers): capitalist production necessarily implies an expansion into and destruction of nature, which not only has tragic consequences for life on the planet but also undermines the future viability of capitalism itself. For Andr‚ Gorz, see Ecology as Politics, trans. Patsy Vigderman and Jonathan Cloud (Boston: South End Press, 1980); for James O'Connor, see "Capitalism, Nature, Socialism: A Theoretical Introduction," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 1, no. 1 (1989), 11-38.
19. "Late capitalism thus appears as the period in which all branches of the economy are fully industrialized for the first time; to which one could further add . . . the increasing mechanization of the superstructure." Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, trans. Joris De Bres (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 190-191.
20. "This purer capitalism of our own time thus eliminated the enclaves of precapitalist organization it had hitherto tolerated and exploited in a tributary way." Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 36.
21. We do not mean to suggest that capital can perpetually through technological advances reconcile its destructive relationship with its (human and nonhuman) environment. What technological advance can do is shift the terrain of conflict and defer the crisis, but limits and antagonisms remain.
22. Stanley Aronowitz offers a useful reassessment of the panoply of U.S. social movements in the 1960s in The Death and Rebirth of American Radicalism (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 57-90.
23. Again see Kelley, Race Rebels, especially pp. 17-100 on the hidden histories of resistance.
24. On the history of the refusals posed by U.S. feminist movements in the 1960s and 1970s, see Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
25. See, for example, Judith Butler, "Merely Cultural," New Left Review, no. 227 (January-February 1998), 33-44. The most influential text for the political interpretation of "new social movements" along these lines is Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985).
26. See Antonio Negri, The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-first Century, trans. James Newell (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989).
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