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Honour. Honour is the fundamental value on which the Navy's and each person's reputation depends. To demonstrate honour demands honesty, courage, integrity and loyalty and to consistently behave in a way that is becoming and worthwhile.

  • Honesty. Honesty is always being truthful, knowing and doing what is right for the Navy and ourselves.

  • Courage. Courage is the strength of character to do what is right in the face of personal adversity, danger or threat.

  • Loyalty. Loyalty is being committed to each other and to our duty of service to Australia.

  • Integrity. Integrity is the display of truth, honesty and fairness that gains respect and trust from others.

    There is a school of thought that says that any values program should confine itself to a small number of values critical to the organisation's long term success.10 From a purely common sense point-of-view this is logical as a large number of values can invite confusion, overlap, and unnecessary values incongruence in personnel. In

    Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

    Issue 131




    Loyalty-Germans warship FGS Braunschweig's crewattheir2008 Commissioning Ceremony-photo by Michael Nitz

    terms of the number of values the RAN has released, five would therefore seem to be a suitable number. In terms of the suitability of each of the existing values, however, the following comments are offered:

    a. There is an obvious and
    unnecessary overlap between the
    values of honesty and integrity. It
    would be perfectly reasonable to
    remove honesty as a stand-alone
    value, sharpening the focus of
    integrity and the overall values
    package.

    b. Honour is certainly a noble ideal
    but it is not a useful value. Integrity
    and courage clearly explain how
    the RAN wants people to think and
    act. Honour is a more nebulous
    concept and indeed it has to draw
    on the other Navy values in order
    to even have a semi-coherent
    explanation. The RAN would


    be better served by removing honour as a discrete value (it can always be talked about in a more general sense when discussing the values as a whole), and replacing it with another, more practical and understandable value.

    c. Loyalty is a divisive and dangerous
    value that is misused and

    misunderstood and it often does more damage than good. As Olsthoorn notes in his paper Loyalty and Professionalisation in the Military (a paper that clearly identifies the danger of using loyalty as a military value) 'the fact that one can coherently speak of 'bad' or 'misplaced' loyalty, whilst it is more or less nonsensical to talk about 'bad' or 'misplaced' justice, might be seen as an indication that it is not a virtue in the first place'.11 In a similar vein Professor Stephen Coleman at the Australian Defence Force Academy notes that during his ethics classes when cadets discuss situations where rules have been broken or the wrong thing done, what should be a simple application of the value of integrity, ie. 'What is the right thing for me to do?' becomes a significant moral dilemma whereby loyalty to their mate/colleagues/division, etc, is in direct conflict with their requirement to display integrity.12 On a broader scale it is argued that this type of moral conflict, brought about by misplaced loyalty, happens far too often within the organisation.

    Given the above comments, it is useful to quickly explore some alternative values that might better serve the needs of the RAN. It should be noted that there are many potential values that the RAN could use and there will always be quite justifiable arguments about which ones should be selected. With that in mind, the following is offered simply as a starting point for discussion.

    First and foremost, 'respect1 as it is defined earlier in this paper is suggested as a vitally important value that should be explicitly stated. Its intent is clear and it is able to be applied both inwards and outwards, making it a particularly powerful value. Secondly, noting that the RAN as attempted to define 'loyalty' as 'being committed to each other and to our duty of service to Australia'13 possible values to replace 'loyalty' might be along the lines of 'dutyj 'service' or 'discipline! Whilst the exact wording of such values is open to debate, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) definition of'discipline' provides a useful example:14

    The essenceofdiscipline isdoing what wehaveto, even when it is difficult and demanding, and doing it to the best of ourabilities. Discipline means inner strength, selfphysical toughness and perseverance. No effective military can function with poor discipline. Itistheglue that holds every member of the SAF together when threatened, giving them thecourageand willtocontinuethe mission under unforgiving situations.'

    Given that it would be unwieldy to explore every possible value and provide detailed explanations, suggestions for new and improved values to replace 'honour! 'honesty' and 'loyalty' will stop here. What is important to take away from the above

    Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

    What's Wrong with the Navy's Values?

    discussion is that the existing values can be significantly improved, and viable alternatives exist that should be seriously considered.

    Australia has been very fortunate to date. Our recent wars have been wars of choice rather than necessity, our personnel commitments have been relatively minor, our casualties very small and our personnel on operations have consistently performed to a high ethical standard. Were we to be faced with the situation of a war of necessity, large and extended personnel commitments and significant combat related deaths, would our people be as well equipped as they need to be to continue to do the right thing'? Are the Navy's values optimised to meet this challenge?

    The organisational values the RAN seeks to inculcate into personnel must have two distinct but related purposes. Firstly, they must guide how personnel behave towards each other and how they go about our day to day business, whether that is in an office in Navy Headquarters, or at sea in a frigate. Secondly they must guide how personnel conduct themselves on operations, most especially in combat. Values that ignore one or the other of these will only produce a semi-developed individual. For example, treating your mates with respect and consideration is a moot point if you then turn around and abuse a detainee or order an NGS mission without regard for civilian casualties.

    The values the Navy chooses will have a huge impact on the culture that the organisation develops. The RANs values need to be clear, unambiguous and relevant. They need to carefully and consciously define the organisation's DNA. Unfortunately the existing Navy values are not optimised for this purpose. They tend to overlap, clash and confuse and as such must be reviewed and rewritten. In particular

    the values of'honour! 'honesty' and 'loyalty' should be removed, the remaining values reviewed and additional values such as 'respect' added as necessary.

    If the RAN choses to invest now in developing a strong and relevant values-based culture, built around more useful values, then not only will the organisation and the individuals within it benefit on a day-to-day basis, but the Navy may just prevent a future Abu Ghraib of its own. iW

    (3

    JL

    Commander Tony Mullan joined the RANin 1991 as a (then) Instructor Officer. During his 18yearcareer, Commander Mullan has undertaken postings to CDSC, HMA ships Cerberus, Albatross, Kanimbla,ADFA, NHQ DNORACSCandtheAustralian Defence College. Commander Mullan is currently the Deputy Director of the Centrefor Defence Leadership Studies attheADC.

    Bibliography

    Anderson, B. Implementing Organisational Values: Bringing Organisational Values off the Paper, into Demonstrable Behaviours, Change Dynamic Ltd, 2004.

    Buchko, A., 'The Effect of Leadership on Values-based Management' in Leadership and Organisation Development Journal, Vol 28, No. 1. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2007.

    Coleman, Stephen. Extract from a presentation given to a military ethics workshop at Melbourne University, Melbourne, 12 August 2008.

    Olsthoorn, P. Loyalty and Professionalisation in the Military, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, 2008.

    Robertson, P. De Lee, N. & Carrick, D (ed),

    Ethics Education in the Military, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2008.

    Royal Australian Navy, http://intranet. defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/SANP/default. asp? Page=71711 viewed 12 Nov 08.

    Royal Australian Navy, http://intranet. defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/SANP/default. asp?Page=715798EKXSEC=l&View=Intranet viewed 12 Nov 08.

    Royal Australian Navy, Serving in Australia's Navy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2004.

    Royal Australian Navy, Plan Green, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2008.

    Royal Australian Navy, http://intranet. defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/SANP/default. asp?Page=715798EKXSEC=l&View=Intranet viewed 12 Nov 08.

    Singapore Armed Forces, SAF Core Values- 2007 Edition, SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore, 2007.

    (Endnotes)

    I Buchko, A., "The Effect of Leadership
    on Values-based Management' in Leadership
    and Organisation Development Journal,
    Vol
    28, No. 1. Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
    2007, pg. 1.

    2

    1. Royal Australian Navy, http://intranet. defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/SANP/default. asp? Page=71711 viewed 12 Nov 08.

    2. Royal Australian Navy, http://intranet. defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/SANP/default. asp?Page=715798oXXSEC=l&View=Intranet viewed 12 Nov 08.

    3. Royal Australian Navy, http://intranet. defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/SANP/default. asp?Page=715798o\XSEC=l&View=Intranet viewed 12 Nov 08.

    4. Royal Australian Navy, Serving in Australia's Navy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2004, pp. un-numbered

    5. Royal Australian Navy, Plan Green, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2008, pp. 21-23.

    6. Robertson, P. De Lee, N.& Carrick, D (ed), Ethics Education in the Military, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2008, p. 6.

    7. Robertson, P. De Lee, N.& Carrick, D (ed), Ethics Education in the Military, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2008, p. 6.

    10 Anderson, B. Implementing
    Organisational Values: Bringing
    Organisational Values off the Paper, into
    Demonstrable Behaviours, Change Dynamic
    Ltd, 2004, p. 2.

    II Olsthoorn, P. Loyalty and
    Professionalisation in the Military,
    Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, 2008,
    p. 3.

    1. Coleman, Stephen. Extract from a presentation given to a military ethics workshop at Melbourne University, 12 August 2008.

    2. Royal Australian Navy, http://intranet. defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/SANP/default. asp? Page=715798oXXSEC=l&View=Intranet viewed 12 Nov 08.

    3. Singapore Armed Forces, SAF Core Values- 2007 Edition, SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore, 2007, p. 24.

    Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

    Issue 131

    Remilitarising the Australian Hydrographic Service

    (or 'Why the Droggies Need Disbanding1)

    BY LIEUTENANT CHRIS WALTER




    A



    t the conclusion of World War II, the hydrographic survey elements of the Royal Australian Navy had earned a richly decorated reputation for the conduct of tactical military geospatial data operations, especially in support of the Pacific amphibious campaigns1, and preceding the Normandy landings2.

    The honours and decorations bestowed upon those engaged in hydrographic tasking numbered higher, by branch/category than any other in the RAN during the 1939-45 period3, such was the inherent risk in collecting this data, and the subsequent tactical value of their final product.

    Information was collected in a manner that proved tactically timely, in a format that was effective in comprehension, and exploited the battle space sufficiently to permit its operational first-use and grant an element of decision superiority. Hydrographic and oceanographic data was collected by surveyors deployed ashore clandestinely, in Crafts of Opportunity (COOPs), dedicated survey vessels or deployed in corvettes, minesweepers and frigates.

    The legacy that begets today's Australian Hydrographic Service (AHS) is such that the question of comparison must be asked. The soft tasking of nautical charting that has been the raison d'etre of AHS activities since 1954, coordinated by the Australian Hydrographic Office (AHO), has virtually denuded the operational focus needed of a contemporary military surveying force from its force-assigned ships, boats and aircraft. The ability to collect data and sustain the production of'battle

    bathymetry' as a completely integrated Task Unit of a larger warfighting force has largely vanished.

    An evolved AHS with wartime antecedent would suggestively leave the extant, contemporary AHS wishing to evolve in its wake when comparing appropriateness of equipment, attitude of Officer, and maturity of doctrine, procedures and product.

    An illustrative Concept of Operations to reinvigorate the provision of military geographic information (MGI), namely littoral bathymetry and oceanography, is required to roadmap the naval units of the AHS out of military irrelevancy and into professional obsolescence. This essay intends to provoke discussion by casting an informed, but now layman's, eye across the contemporary AHS, and offer recent examples of operational military surveying in a naval context, while integrating suggestions at how the RAN might proceed in bringing

    about noticeable change to a unit monolith thus avoiding complete military hydrography bankruptcy.

    The Contemporary AHS

    Existential context. A core dysfunction of the RANTs Hydrographic Service's ability to appropriately auto-cater operational MGI is its relationship to the Australian Hydrographic Office. The preamble to the 'Roles and Responsibilities' contained in the AHS website advertising cites the AHS as

    ".. part of the Royal Australian Navy. It is responsible for the conduct of hydrographic surveys, as well as providing Australia's national charting service under the terms of the UN Safety of life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the Navigation Act. This role requires the coordination and determination of policy and standards which covers both hydrographic surveying and charting, as

    HydmSurvey vessel HMASPALUMA during ex Kakadu 08-photo by Chris Sattler

    Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

    10

    Remilitarising the Australian Hydrographic Service (or 'Why the Droggies Need Disbanding)

    well as contributing to the coordination, exchange and standards related to geospatial data in general?1

    The by-line to this statement states

    "The AHS is also responsible for providing direct support to the Australian Defence Force [.. .]for the provision of hydrographic, charting oceanographic and meteorology services/'

    While it is clear that ownership of the personnel, vessels and aircraft serving in the AHS is naval, the tasking is largely to fulfil civilian mercantile purposes, of which is coordinated by a quasi-civilian body, the Australian Hydrographic Office (AHO). The AHO's overwhelming responsibility for charting almost 10% of the earth's surface, combined with the competing asset allocation of AHS resources, will continue to commit military operational support to a lower priority in order to achieve accountable-to-Canberra measurable goals6'7, unless it is a short notice requirement8.

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