Journal of the australian naval institute



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Registered by Australian Post Publication No. NBP 0282

ISSN 0312-5807

VOLUME 16 MAY 1990 NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE

From the President 2

From the Editor 3

Guide for Authors 4

Anti-Submarine Warfare and Its Role in the Strategic Balance

by Lieutenant Commander DM Stevens, RAN 5

ANI Dinner HMAS HARMAN 11 May 1990- President's Address 13

The Future Role of the Navy in the Defence of Australia

by Rear Admiral K.A. Doolan, RAN 15

Using Military Technology for Humanitarian Ends — Part 2 by Gael M Graham 19
Organisational Structures for SLOC Security in Northeast Asia

by Young-Kyu Park 37

An Essay on Naval Presence in Support of Australia's Foreign Policy:

Importance versus Capability by LCDR V.E.B. DiPietro, RAN 47

Naval Institute Insignia, membership application, order form, advertising information 54
Protection of Sea Lines of Communications — Potential for Regional Co-operation

in the Western Pacific by Commodore HJ. Donohue, RAN 57

Security Co-operation in South East Asia and the Pacific Islands:

An Australian Perspective by Fedor Mediansky 65

Rear Admiral Farncomb by Alan Zammit 71

ANI Council Members 74

Crossbow 70 75

Articles or condensations are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permission of the Institute. Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment provided the source is acknowledged.










Cover Photos:

Seahawk Trials with HMAS DARWIN (HMAS CANBERRA Background)

Photo taken by ABPH Darren Kerrison



Journal of the Australian Naval institute. May '90 - Pago I

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Institute Inc was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The mair objects of the Institute are:

a to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,

b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and

c to publish a pumal

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publication of the Institute will stress that the authors of articles express their own views and opinions and that these are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters

The membership of the Institute is open to:

a. Regular Members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN or RANR and persons who having qualified for Regular membership, subsequently leave the Service

b Associate Members. Associate membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.

c Honorary Members Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a distinguished contribution to the Navy or the maritime profession, or by past service, to the Institute.

DISCLAIMER

Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporations listed below They are demonstrating their support for the aim of the Institute by being members of the "Friends of the Australian Naval Institute" coterie.

Australian Defence Industries

Avio Consultants

Blohm and Voss

Computer Sciences ot Australia

GEC Marconi

Pacific Dunlop Batteries

Rockwell Ship Systems

Scientific Management Associates

Stanilite Electronics

Thomson Sintra Pacific

Westinghouse Electric

Krupp Atlas Elektronik (Australia)



FROM THE PRESIDENT

The Institute Dinner at HMAS HARMAN on Friday 11 May was most successful and the Friends of the Institute remain enthusiastic about their relationship with the ANI I am grateful for the support of the Fleet Commander who has agreed to give the Friends an opportunity to sea ride Fleet units. I promised the -riends that they would be able to meet naval people both senior and |unior, and the ships of the Fleet are the best venues for this.

Australia is an island surrounded by vast oceans To defend Australia and its interests from a external threat we must be able to control the maritime approaches and seek to influence the development of stability in this region This is a maritime problem, but Australias military experiences here continue to dominate defence thinking in the Australian community

It is timely that the community was better educated and the ANI and its membership can play a role in this I am not convinced that all the membership is prepared for the task however, and I asked the Acting Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Doolan to speak at the ANI dinner, on the importance of the Navy in the defence of Australia. His address is on page of this Journal

I hope to be able to announce the Veron Parker Oration Programme for this year shortly I will attempt to obtain speakers who will add lo the reputation built up by past Orations and also contribute to our understanding of maritime defence matters.

Regards Ian Callaway

Page 'i Journal of the Anslraiian Naval nstilute. May 90

FROM THE EDITOR

This issue of the journal represents nother attempt to reduce costs of publication without reduction in quality.

With the assistance of John Filler and Pirie Printers I hope to have all future journals presented to the printer at the camera ready stage. This journal has been partly prepared on that basis and there may be some slight inconsistencies although I hope this is not noticeable.

The second part of Using Military Technology For Humanitarian Ends' by Gael M. Graham is included in this issue. I am aware that this article is heavy going. Perhaps some of the legal fraternity can assist by commenting on issues with people may find difficult to comprehend

It is encouraging that more articles are arriving across my desk these days. One thing I ask authors to do is: please include a short biography and a passport size photograph (if available) However, there is still a shortage of book reviews and letters to the editor being received

Sincerely, Don Agar

Journal ol Ihe Australian Naval Institute. May '90 - Page 3

GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

In order to achieve the stated aims of the Institute, all readers, bolh members and non-members are encouraged to submit articles tor publication The following guide outlines the major points most authors would need to know in order to publish a quality article in the Journal A more comprehensive guide is available from the Editor.

Types of article

Articles should deal with interesting recent developments in matters relating to maritime matters which directly or indirectly impinge upon the naval profession Overseas contributions are also encouraged To be eligible lor prizes, original articles must be accompanied by statements that they have been written expressly for the ANI The editor reserves the right to reiect or amend articles for publication The ANI will pay the authors of articles specially written lor the Journal and accepted lor publication, $10 per 1000 words. An annual prize ol $25 lor the besl book review will also be awarded. Payments will not be made to the authors ol articles such as staff college prize essays and Peter Mitchell competition entries.

Length ot Articles

As a broad guide, articles should range from 2500 to 6000 words This is between 9 and 21 pages of double spaced typing on A4 size sheets Short articles are also welcome.

Subdividing the Article Three major types of headings are used

  • MAJOR HEADING - Bold Capitals

  • Secondary Heading — Bold Capitals and Lower Case

  • Tertiary Heading — Capitals and Lower Case

Abstract

An abstract ol 75 words at the most is desirable when an article is proposed II should state the scope ol the article and its main features

The Text

The texl should be in an impersonal, semi-formal manner Consistency in spellirg. headings, symbols, capitalisation etc is essential

References

References should be numbered conseculively and listed at the end of the paper The preferred formal is 1 Smith, R 4 Jones. A , "Marketing Videotex", Journal

of Marketing in Australia, Vo< 20. No 3, June 1985

pp 36-40

Photographs

Black and while glossy prints and colour prints are acceptable Clearly identity photographic prints with figure number written on separate slips oi paper attached with adhesive tape to the back of the prints Captions tor the photographs must be provided

Tables, Diagrams and Graphs

Tables must be typed on separate sheets and presented so that they may be set by the printer Use diagrams, graphs and illustrations lo improve the general presentation of the article Illustrations, etc . are referred to in the text by ligure numbers, consecutively

Copyright

Authors must complete a "Copyright Declaration" (see below) and attach this with their final typescript

Clearance lo Publish

Authors should get clearance from Iheir employers if the articles contain sensitive information such as costs, unapproved policies, critical statements, etc. There is no objection to authors stating personal views on subjects where at variance with a corporate view, but their viewpoint must be put in perspective so that readers, including those overseas, do not gain a talse impression of the status of the subject

The Final Typescript

Articles should be typed on A4 paper Good near letter quality (NLO) dot-matrix print is acceptable Three copies ot the typescript should be sent to the Editor, PO Box 80. Campbell, ACT 2601 The complete package will comprise, on separate sheets

Cover sheet



  • Title of article — Author's name (or pseudonym) and qualifications

  • Present position — Telephone number — Address

Recenl photograph and biography ol the author (less
than 200 words)

Abstract — less lhan 75 words



  • The lext

  • Tables, each on a separate sheet

  • Illustrations

  • Photographs, clearly identilied

  • List of captions tor tables, photographs 4 illustrations

For More Intormation

The Editor can be contacted either via the afore­mentioned postal address or by phone on (062) 652020

COPYRIGHT DECLARATION

If your paper has not previously been published, either in whole or in part, you are asked to assign a non­exclusive licence to the Australian Naval Institute, as a condition ot publication Such assignment would not restrict you from publishing the paper elsewhere as long as acknowledgement of the original source is given If your paper has previously been published, either in whole or in part, you are reminded that it is your responsibility to bring this to the notice of the Institute so thai lull acknowledgement may be made.

  1. TITLE OF PAPER

  2. I AM WILLING. AS A CONDITION OF PUBLICATION, TO ASSIGN A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENCE TO REPRODUCE THE ABOVE PAPER. TO THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE.

. .

  1. THE ABOVE PAPER HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN PUBLISHED IN

  2. NAME OF PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE INSTITUTE

  3. ADDRESS

  4. SIGNATURE TELEPHONE NO




Page 4 Journal nf me Australian Naval nstiiute Mziy 9t)

ANTI-STJBMARINE WARFARE AND ITS ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

by Lieutenant Commander DM. Stevens, RAN

Both superpowers are planning wartime campaigns against SSBNs. However, strategic ASW has been claimed to be destabilising; the destruction or threatening ol SSBNs being hlghtly escalalory and leading lo a use them or lose them' dilemma. This contlicl is complicated both by the current Imprecise capabilities ol ASW and also by Arms Control negotiations which aim to reduce SLBM numbers. This article examines the current situation.

Introduction

Nuclear powered ballistic-missile subma­rines (SSBN) are generally considered to be the most suvivable element of current strategic forces They are mobile, concealed, and in theory, immune from pre-emptive attack Their traditional role, as perceived in the West, has been that of reserve force: providing a nation with a guaranteed retaliatory capability even after the destruction of other strategic wea­pons, thus, it is argued they are the most valuable element of the deterrent force and an essential element of stability in the strategic balance Though SSBNs are currently deployed by five nations this article will cocentrate only on the strategic anti­submarine warfare (SASW) capabilities and intentions of the USA and USSR and the likely effect of such actions upon the strategic nuclear balance.

The aim of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is to prevent a submarine from carrying out its assigned mission. SASW is simply that element of ASW carried out against subma­rines with a strategic mission; normally taken to be SSBNs but increasingly including other nuclear powered submarines (SSN) armed with nuclear capable land-attack cruise missiles ASW is not limited only to direct action against submarines, thus strikes on SSBN bases and support facilities may all contribute to the aim

Force comparison

The SSBN forces of both superpowrs are dissimilar in structure and doctrine Tables 1 and 2 provide a comparison of the opposing elements. Submarine-launched ballistic mis­siles (SLBM) account for 41.9% of the US strategic arsenal and approximately two-thirds of US SSBN strength is at sea at any time. (1) Availability is enhanced by runnig SSBNs with a two crew systesm The Soviets, through having larger numbers of SSBNs have only 28.3% of their strategic warheads embarked and the SSBN force has historically had only a 10-15% availabiliity. (2) Hitherto it has been sufficient for the larger part of the Soviet fleet to remain alongside ready to 'surge' in times of crisis. But Soviet availability and survivabilty is improving. Longer range SLBMs mean submarines need spend less time in transt to patrol areas or may even be available from port, improved technology has reduced mainte­nance downtime and for the first time the Soviets have been reported to be running a two crew system. (3) Greater operational availability and hardened shelters is a probable response to the perceived short-warning threat to SSBN bases from US forces, particularly the land-attack cruise missile

Western SSBNs, relying on stealth, use operating areas that are limited only by missile range. In contrast, the newer Soviet SSBNs have been assessed to be making use of bastions' in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk. The SSBNs are here protected and supported by friendly naval and air forces in


THE AUTHOR

LCOR STEVENS joined the RAN in 1974 and completed a Cachelor ol Arts Degree at Ihe University ol new South Wales, he specialised as a PWO (ASW) In 1984. He has served In HMA Ships BRISBANE. YARRA. TOBRUK end HOBART and on exchange In HMS HERMIONE. He is presently posled to the Directorate ot Combal Force Development (Sea) as Stall Otllcer Underwater Warfare.

J

Journal ol the Australian Naval institute. May 90 Page *<

an area which can be partially sealed against intruders. Soviet strategic forces, it has been argued, are principally designed for a swift decisive strike, but to preserve some flexibility the SSBN bastion strategy'provides protection of a reserve capability in case of an extended engagement. This fits in with the alleged shift in Soveit strategy towards a doctine of limited and controlled nuclear opticns. (4) However, not all analysts agree and it has also been argued that the Soviet SSBN force forms part of the overall first-salvo doctrine and the bastions simply provide protection during convetional hostilities before the nuclear strike is initiated (5)

Strategic ASW

The SASW intentions of the superpowers have also developed differently. The US believes that it, unlike the USSR, has the capability to conduct successful SASW and has always regarded SASW and has always regarded SASW as a primary mission. This has been reiterated in the recent US Maritime Strategy, which stated that in war the destruc­tion of Soviet SSBNs would reduce the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by tilting the strategic balance in favour of the US.(6) Somewhat optimistically the former secretary of the Navy J. F. Lehman was quoted as saying Soviet SSBNs would be attacked ". . . in the first five minutes of the war" (7) However protective deployments ard the improved capabilities of Soviet SSBNs have made ASW directed against them that much harder. Of particular concern are improvements in quietening which have reduced the probability and the range at which SSBNs may be acoustically detected.

The USN may well be losing its advantage in ASW capability. A recent US report on ASW by an advisory panel to the House. Armed Service Subcommittee on Research and Development has highlighted the growing ASW problem and concludes, "Because the consequences of failing to find a solution to the challenge presented by quiet Soviet submarines are so serious, we recommend that this work should be con­sidered as one of, if not the, highest priority activities in the DoD." (8) Soviet views on SASW have undergone several changes in emphasis. When first faced with the threat from Polaris SLBMs in the early 1960's the Soviet Navy shifted its primary mission from anti-carrier to anti-submarine warfare. However, the increasing range of US SLBMs soon made it unrealistic for the Soviets

to conduct open-ocean search with available technology and assets. The defence of friendly SSBNs then became paramount. The most recent change is still developing, but the last published writing of Admiral Gorshkov indicate that although protection of Soviet SSBNs remains vital, ASW against US SSBNs is again an important and realistic objective. Gorshkov, as editor of "The Navy: It's role. Prospects for Development and Employment" calls for SASW to come under the first national strategic mission as a mapr role during the conventional phase of a war. It is proposed that such efforts in defence of the homeland may best be directed by a sixth and additional service of the Soviet Armed Forces (9).

Today an ASW role has been attributed to

a majority of Soviet Naval assets but SASW

capability still lags behind intention. The

invulnerability of US SSBNs has often been

cited in the West and it has been claimed that

when at sea they have never been detected

by Soviet forces. Yet this will not necessarily

always be the case and Soviet ASW capability

cannot be simply discounted. A former head

of the US Strategic Air Command. General R

Ellis, stated, albeitt with his own plans for a

balanced strategic force in mind, that the US

would:

. . . have elements of the TRIDENT force

operational 40-50 years from now . . We

think that, with Soviet technology moving as

it is today, they'll have the anti-submarine

problem solved before the end of the

century."(10)

While the respective navies may regard strategic ASW as a rational aim there are elements from both sides that decry this objective, claiming that in the interests of global stability ASW directed against strategic forces should be abandoned This would be of greatest importance in a crisis or low level conflict situation. Where it is argued, the targetting of SSBNs would be highly escala-tory, leading to a use them or lose them' dilemma. Furthermore in conventional war the attrition of SSBNs might be seen as a preli­minary step towards a strategic first-strike and thus provide an incentive to immediately escalate to all out nuclear warfare. The offensive doctrine espoused by the US Mar­itime Strategy has come in for particular criticism. The planned immediate forward deployment of US SSNs is claimed to prevent adequate conflict control. (11) It has also been argued that success against SSBNs is unachievable nd therefore the assets so employed would be better used elsewhere.

In response to the criticism of increased risks to global stability the US uses four arguments

Page G Journal ol Ihe Australian Naval Inslitulf May 90

to justify strategic ASW. Firstly, it is claimed, placing a vital and the most secure element of the Soviet strategic forces at risk must limit Soviet options and cause uncertainty in planning. Hence the prospect of major SSBN loss would act as a powerful deterrent to war Secondly, in the event of conventional war, a successful campaign against SSBNs prior to full nuclear escalation would encourage the Soviets to terminate hostilities prior to losing an essential future strategic option. Thirdly, the protection of Soviet fleet thus preventing a large scale attempt to disrupt Western sea lines of communication (SLOC) Thus even the threat of a US anti-SSBN campaign will be useful. Finally it is argued that together with the Strategic Defense Initiative SASW can limit the damage caused by a Soviel strategic reserve counter-value strike after land-based ICBMs have been expended in counter-force strikes. (12)

Soviet arguments in favour of strategic ASW focus on the damage limitation aspects. The protection of the homeland being the acknowl­edged primary purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces. (13) The thrust towards SASW may also be a response to the counter-force capabilities of the soon to be deployed Trident 11 D-5 SLBM. It has been estimated that once deployed in 15 OHIO Class SSBNs the very accurate D-5 would have a 94% probability of destroying all Soviet ICBMs. (13)

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