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Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute November 89 Page 23

the United States at the time, to explain in very great detail, what it is we were on about And what I had to explain was that we were unique, and we did not present to our region the way in which the rest of the Western Alliance presented to theirs, and that we had to confront regional problems in which to be reliant upon somebody else's activity would considerably constrain the Australian political process So I think there has been, and particularly as a result of those White Papers, a development of thinking on Defence in this country that comprehends that we just don't have the same problems as the rest of the West, and the fact that there is very healthy developments between the Soviet Union and the United States doesn't say the last word about the Australian Defence requirement Now, that's a very different position from Governments that are operating in Europe and the United States I think that's a fairly commonly accepted position In a funny sort of way, the Left Wing side of the debate in this country over the years has assisted this Whether it continues to in the future, I don't know The constant argument was made that we were overly committed to Alliance relationships, and I don't happen to approve of that argument But that argument was made and it developed a considerable intellectual saliency in our media, and in our universities, schools and academic institutions, and was transmitted to a very substantial proportion of our young population, both during and after the Vietnam War Bui it wasn't a view that was expressed with an argument that what was required of Australia was for it to be a pacifist nation In fact, the strongest position was the armed neutral position In other words, nobody was arguing that Australia didn t have Defence problems People were arguing that we were addressing the wrong ones So there is as a result probably greater insulation, if you like, against an excessive attitude to prune the defence spending in this country, than there is in a lot of others But it does mean that you have to keep your arguments rational You have to be absolutely certain that when you present your Defence case -- and that's why the Kangaroo '89 exercise drew such enormous public and media support The media picked up the faults in it. picked up our faults in it or whatever, and had their disagreements, and there were the usual plethora of letters saying we shouldn't spend that sort of money But overwhelmingly the response was that whatever faults come out of this exercise the Defence Force is actually getting it right They look as though they know what they want to do with their equipment, and what they want to do is

rational, and there is not too many Defence Forces around the world now that can conduct an exercise in front of its public and have such an impression emerge I think we re in for very substantial difficulties, but this is also true tor the rest of the countries in the Western Alliance over the next few years When I was in Britain recently, at Fleet Headquarters, they pointed out a very interesting statistic to me on the question of where the NATO Alliance was going Everybody seemed to agree, large numbers of troops had to leave Europe and return to the United States This however, raised substantial force structure issues on which nobody appeared apparently prepared to address The problem is not returning the troops to the United States but what if they have to come back'' A very interesting statistic was given to me, as to why all of a sudden, a massive emphasis was likely to come onto sea transport capabilities It will raise massive issues in terms of pre-positioning, force structure issues, because in the United States, for example, the view that's put is that everybody comes down, we all get pruned The next problem for the United States is to address, something that it has not done before the continental defence of the United States, and that raises all sorts of things Space — space radars, fighter interceptors, fighter bases, and protective measures against cruis­ing submarines There 3re enormous force structure problems developing as a result of these substantial shifts in the politics of the relationships of the Western Alliance, which I don't think anybody has started to address at all I think an awful lot of people are going to develop Defence strategies that are going to be Gullivers to our Lilliput. but nevertheless with substantial similarities

Question. Nuclear capability. The French are persisting with their nuclear testing in the South Pacific There have been rumours in the press that Indonesia is getting a nuclear power station What is our (the Australian Govern­ment) attitude, or rather what should be our attitude to acquisition of nuclear capabilities by regional states9

Mr Beazley. Well I think that in respect of all weapons of mass destruction, and the delivery systems associated with them, we have to take a very strong stand and try and get regional agreements not to introduce these systems I think actually the problems of chemical weapons would be more significant in fact than nuclear weapons over the next decade or so But we really haven't sat down and done a great deal of thinking about it The most sensible

thinking we can do at this stage, where people are talking about thresholds as opposed to crossing these thresholds, is to try and set in place agreements not to cross these thre­sholds. It think everybody now has enough basic understanding of arms races to know that in the final analysis if somebody develops some system somebody else will develop a counter and that gives us a chance But my argument would be that at this point the most sensible thing for us to do is what we are in fact doing, and have achieved a considerable international reputation in so doing — as evidenced by the fact that we're hosting the chemicals weapons conference to advocate bans and limitations


CORE Callway. The Vernon Parker oration is an occasional address by an eminent speaker on a subject relevant to the principal aim of the Institute This is to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to Navies and the Maritime profession I intend that the Oration give the Institute membership,

especially the more junior membership, a chance to listen to speakers they frequently hear about but never hear I have an additional aim. It is my objective for 1989, and 1990 if that be necessary, for the Institute to improve its profile, and membership become accepted as an important element in the development of a Naval person's career I hope the Friends of the Naval Institute will help me and that the success of the Vernon Parker oration, which was launched this year, is a critical element of the campaign Minister, if I continue to receive the support of figures such as you I will achieve my aim. Your contribution to Defence thinking in Australia has been signif­icant The decisions taken during your ste­wardship of the Defence portfolio has been of major importance to the RAN, and will affect its capability to defend Australia until well into the 21st Century. You have helped me increase the profile of the Naval Institute, enhanced the reputation of the Vernon Parker oration, and you have advanced our understanding of Defence matters To signify the importance of the Vernon Parker oration, the Council has had struck a special silver medallion, for presen­tation to those who deliver the oration I ask you to please accept this silver medallion as a token of our appreciation for the effort that you have put into supporting me tonight

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Telephone (02) 772 7444 373 Horsley Road Focsimile (02)792 1360 MILPERRA NSW 2214 Telex AA120807

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Major General Subijakto Governor o( the Institute for National Defence


An appreciation of Indonesia's Archipelagic Outlook and basic doctrine of National Resilience is a sine qua non for understanding her basic attitude towards SLOC.

Hence later I will discuss these basic concepts; this will be followed by Indonesia and ASEAN commitments to ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ, a description of our appreciation of the nation's strategic environment, and finally a discussion of our role in safeguarding SLOC and possible ways of cooperation with Iriendly countries.

Here we would like to point out and emphas­ize that our Archipelagic outlook is the culmination and concrete manifestation of our historical seafaring tradition and that is based on the realities of geopolitics, whereas our doctrine of national resilience grew from our historical experiencesasa fighting nation since the proclamation of Independence to deter­mine our destiny in accordance with the principle of self-determination, without attach­ing ourselves to either bloc in the Cold War

Indonesia's Archipelagic Outlook, Doctrine of National Resilience and Regional Resilience

Archipelagic Outlook

The archipelagic outlook that is Indonesia's national outlook, considers an archipelago as a "sea studded with islands, implying that the sea element is larger than the land element" or "a group of islands and other natural configurations which are interrelated closely, so that they form intrinsically a geographic, economic and political unity". {National Resilience, issued by Indonesia's Institute for National Defence. Jakarta, November 1974)

Indonesia's archipelagic outlook is the result of a long historical process dating from pre-cnlonial days; it was officially proclaimed as

Indonesia's national outlook in 1957 and this was followed by the issuance of the Act on Indonesian Waters No 4/1960

Here we would like to point out and emphas­ize that the archipelagic outlook has been accepted as an international principle of the Law of the Sea as contained in part IV of the U N Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 This U N Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed by 119 states in the Montego Bay conference in Jamaica (December 6-10. 1982). and 35 countries have already ratified it Indonesia has also ratified it by National Act No 17/1985

Sovereignty of an Archipelagic State

The sovereignty of Indonesia as an archipe­lagic state extends over a) her group of islands and other natural configurations enclosed by the archipelagic base lines; b) her territorial seas extending to twelve nautical miles measured from the archipelagic base lines; c) the air space over above mentioned territory, and d) the sea-bed including its subsoil with all its natural resources in the above mentioned territory

The Right of Passage

In accordance with articles 51 and 52 of the U N Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Archipelagic State recognizes the right of passage for ships of all states through her archipelagic waters Unless determined other­wise — because of safety, pollution and/or other factors — the right of passage for all ships through straits in her archipelagic waters that have hitherto been used for international navigation, will be upheld.

National Resilience

The definition of national resilience that Indonesia's government has adopted as its

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national concept/doctrine in 1974, reads as


The dynamic condition ot the nations which

includes tenacity, sturdiness and endurance

enabling her to develop such a national

strength that is capable to cope with any

threat or challenge from within as well as

from without, either directly or indirectly

endangering her existence, national life and

her pursuit of national goals

This concept is based on Indonesia's basic

philosophical outlook of Pancasila and her

experience, particularly during the long

struggle for Independence. It developed

originally from the integrated ideological,

political, economic, socio-cultural and military

approach that was. subsequently enlarged into

the Asfagafra or eight aspects approach, to wit

the three natural aspects (geographical.

natural resources and potentials & capabilities

ot the people) and five social aspects (ideology,

politics, economics, socioculture, defence &

security) approach

It is clearly a defensive concept/doctrine that is inward looking in nature to build up her national strength while stressing cooperation and consultation with her neighbours

Regional Resilience

After national resilience has been adopted as Indonesia's national concept, it was dis­cussed among the ASEAN countries in order to reach a common definition for regional resilience that was later accepted by the Manila summit of December 1987

To the Indonesian definition as mentioned betore. the Thai working paper added "National resilience is basically defensive in nature, aims at developing a nation's own strength and capabilities to safeguard its interests and at the same time promote cooperation between nations and groups of nations for mutual benefit"

To this should be added Foreign Minister Adam Malik's statement of regional resilience in the 5th ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1972 as follows

"It is to enhance the capabilities and abilities of each member country and people in all fields of national endeavour, in order to withstand and overcome all kinds of outside interference and adverse influence, harmful to its sound and harmonious development" Whereas Malaysian Foreign Minister Tan Sri Gazali Sjafei added "The notion of regional resilience may be defined as the ability of each state in the region to be fully committed to their organ­izational interrelatedness and interdepend­ence as the first principle of foreign policy.

ASEAN is clearly a first step in that direction" These and other inputs have temporarily led to the following definition

"The dynamic condition of a group of nations in a region which includes tenacity, sturd­iness and endurance, enabling the develop­ment of each nation's national resilience in the spirit of regional solidarity, cooperation and loyalty, capable of coping with all threats and challenges coming from within as well as from without, that directly or indirectly, endanger the existence, the national life and the struggle of those nations and at the same time also endanger the interests of the region as a whole"

The concepts of national resilience and regional resilience that have been adopted by ASEAN, provide this regional organization with her own ideological foundation based on her own values and Weltanschauung

The meeting of the ASEAN senior officials of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace. Freedom and Neutrality), held in Bangkok on June 10. 1978. agreed that the concepts of national resilience and regional resilience contribute significantly to the philosophical basis for ASEAN co­operation and solidarity

Regional reslience is an on-going process which is already developing among ASEAN member countries by strengthening regional cooperation, alongside the effort to enhance their own national resilience Its aim. to quote Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik again is to "consciously" work towards the day when the security in their own region will be the primary responsibility of the Southeast Asian nations themselves

Indonesia and ASEAN Commitments to ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ

Since its foundation in 1967. the member-states ot ASEAN have been of the view that the countries of SEA share a primary respon­sibility to strengthen the economic and social stability of the region and thereby minimise intervention and interference by extra regional states They expressed their conviction in the Bangkok Declaration that all foreign bases were temporary in nature, and they agreed to review issues of common concern affecting the region, believing that by harmonising their views and policies, they would contribute to the peace and security of all nations in SEA

These principles were reaffirmed and further developed in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in November 1971 (ZOPFAN) Subsequently the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976 called for immediate steps

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to recognize South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

The Zone of Peace. Freedom and Neutrality constitutes the general political framework within which all the states of SEA would practice political consultation and reciprocal restraint.

An important element of the ZOPFAN idea is the concept of South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) It provides additional substance to the meaning of ZOPFAN It would commit the nations of SEA to enhance regional peace and security This aspiration has been adopted in the Manila Declaration 1987 (3rd ASEAN Summit) within the framework of political cooperation; and ASEAN should intensify its efforts to achieve the early realization of ZOPFAN and to the earliest possible establishment of a SEANWFZ For this purpose all efforts should be intensified through consideration of all aspects relating to the establishment of the Zone and consul­tations with other states in SEA as well as with outside powers for the purpose of obtaining their support for the zone

The Strategic Impact of the Asia-Pacific Environment on Southeast Asia

Following the Sino-Soviet split, the Smo-Amencan rapprochement and the emergence ol the USSR as an active player as perhaps best testified by her naval power and Gorba­chev's Wladiwostok statement of July 28, 1987, a new big power constellation has emerged in the Asia-Pacific region that can be sum­marized as follows.

US-l - R confrontation or rivalry in which the r-RC maintains a neutral-benevolent attitude towards the former has since replaced the Sino-Amencan confrontation of the 50s and 60's Interaction between these three powers and America's ally Japan — that has emerged as an economic superpower in her own right — has ever since determined (he basic pattern of developments in the region

This new big power realliance was fatal to Lon Nol's Kamboja and Thieu's South Vietnam, but proved generally beneficial to the other Southeast Asian nations who no longer had to choose between their giant neighbour and the Asia Pacific power par excellence in the region

However, Ho Chi-minh's Vietnam felt ' betrayed" by their erst-while staunch Chinese ally (like Taiwan, and the above mentioned Camboja and Vietnam that felt "betrayed" by the USA!) and felt it had no choice but turn

completely towards the Soviet Union in facing the American bombing to win the Vietnam War This provided the USSR with the unique opportunity — that she did not tail to realize — to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia so as to counter the American bases in the Philippines and threaten the Chinese from ihe south

This understandably irritated and antagon­ized the Chinese who felt their assistance to the Vietnamese cause Deng Xiaoping has mentioned the not inconsiderable amount ol US$10 billion — did not deserve this

The result was that they supported the anli-Hanoi Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge, and subse­quently carried out a "punitive expedition" against Vietnam following the latter's invasion of Camboja

With regard to Indonesia, it can be stated that the New Order that came to power in the mid-sixties, became alienated from the com­munist world in general and the PRC in particular because of their sympathy with and/or support for the Indonesian Communist Party Hence that in looking for assistance, investment, trade and cooperation, she looks towards the west and Japan without sacrificing her traditional free and active foreign policy that was inherited from her Founding Fathers '

That is to say, Indonesia should not join either the western or communist bloc, but actively work to realize her own ideals and world peace This policy still stands today Hence that Indonesia consistently refuses to take sides in the superpower rivalry since this will only aggrevate tension in the region that could never be conducive to her economic development and world peace "

Morever realizing that a harmonious environ­ment is a sine qua non to realize her national objective of economic development, Indonesia moved rapidly to end confrontation, and with her neighbours subsequently established ASEAN in 1967 And as we all know, ASEAN adopted in November 1971, the orientation of ZOPFAN that still stands today I

Even though much criticism have been levelled at ASEAN's slow progress in achieving positive results, yet here we would like to point out that this was caused because, until now. most of ASEAN's attention and efforts have been directed at laying the necessary foun­dation — like reducing mutual suspicions and misunderstandings and creating better mutual appreciation and understanding — for a sound ASEAN cooperation Much still remains to be done but ASEAN has already been acknowl­edged as one of the few successful regional organizations.

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It is consistent with this line ot thinking too. that Indonesia accepted the roleol interlocutor that is trying to bridge the differences between ASEAN and Vietnam based on the common national aspiration that the Southeast Asia nations should be master in their own region while recognizing the legitimate rights like economic, commercial, political, etc — of interested powers in the region

Moreover Indonesia realizes that the con­tinued existence ot ASEAN and the Indoch-inese bloc that are hostile to and can be played out against each other, could only prevent the realization of above mentioned aspiration and continue intervention if not rule by outside powers in the region This Indonesia is determined to resist

Besides, the various territorial claims of the coastal states on the Spratly, Paracel and Natuna islands, offshore terrorism, acts of sea-robbery and sabotage can have a strategic impact on Southeast Asia

To sum up Indonesia's perception of her strategic environment

  1. It is Indonesia's considered opinion that the USA is still the strongest force in the region, even though she no longer dominates it as before because of the emergence of the Soviet navy However, it will take the Soviet some time before she can reach qualitative parity with the American military presence In the region, whereas in other fields — like economic, scientific and technological, educational, cultural, etc — she is no match for the Americans

  2. The Japanese economic superpower's role is no longer limited to economics, but has also expanded in the other fields like politics, defence, etc Indonesia realizes the necessity of Japan's present defense role of the sea lanes radiating a thousand miles from Tokyo, but any further expansion of this role should be carefully considered

Even though her defense budget is now slightly above 1 1% of her GNP. yet is already the third largest defense budget in the world after that of the USA and the USSR

  1. Indonesia also realizes that the success of China's modernization will have a big impact on Southeast Asia that has to be taken seriously into account

  2. It can not be denied that Indonesia tries to bring ASEAN and Vietnam together through the common denominator of Southeast Asian nationalism, that rejects foreign domination or even rule that has been the case with all the Southeast Asian nations in modern time

This nationalism should be based on the spirit of cooperation and interdependence but should not be narrow or extreme since this could only be harmful if not outright dangerous to the region

  1. To prevent Southeast Asian nationalism from becoming narrow or extreme that could be a negative factor in regional and/or international affairs, the ASEAN nations are developing the concept of regional resil­ience that is stressing regional cooperation, based on the principles of mutual under­standing, mutual respect, mutual confi­dence and mutual assistance for the common good of Ihe region

  2. The ASEAN nations including Indonesia are, at present and in the foreseeable future, focussing on economic development so as to bring prosperity to their peoples Histori­cal, realistic and other factors account for the fact that ASEAN is looking towards Ihe West and Japan in trying to realize this in the shortest possible time without, however, forgetting their own identity Hence they are advocating the concept of regional resil­ience as mentioned above

  3. Obviously the above-mentioned basic change in the Asia-Pacific power constel­lation can not but vitally affect SLOC in Indonesia's archipelagic and ASEAN waters, especially considering the strategic geography of Indonesia and ASEAN between the Asian and Australian conti­nents and the Pacific and Indian Oceans

Security problems to SLOC resulting from this new power constellation evolve around the US-USSR relationship, besides the spill-over of the Camboja problem, intra and inter regional territorial claims/dis­putes, terrorism, piracy and navigation failure Hence the next chapter will focus on Indonesia's perception on her role in safeguarding SLOC in her archipelagic and ASEAN waters

Indonesia's Role in Safeguarding SLOC in Indonesian and ASEAN waters

As a responsible, independent nation - that, geographically can never seriously contem­plate a "closed country" policy — Indonesia's perception of her role in safeguarding SLOC in her archipelagic waters should be done within the framework of her national concepts of the archipelagic outlook and national resilience Likewise the security of SLOC in ASEAN waters should be based on the concept of ASEAN regional resilience

However. Indonesia realizes that her national resilience, that is a sine qua non to properly

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carry out her task in safeguarding SLOC in her archipelagic and ASEAN waters, is still far from perfect Hence, cooperation and assist­ance — primarily in economic cooperation — to strengthen her national resilience, will be welcomed Indonesia is facing, for the present and the near future, the task of stepping up her ability for the safeguarding of SLOC that is also in her own national interest Within this context, Indonesia has already started the long process of updating her maritime laws and regulations so as to conform to the UN Law of the Sea Other activities, include: a maintenance of safety of navigation of the straits that are used for international passage, b carry out surveys to update existing maps

of above mentioned straits, c upgrading her personnel in order to be able to carry out the maintenance and safeguard­ing of the above mentioned straits, carry out joint exercises with her neighbours and/or friendly countries to safeguard SLOC lhat is a common interest; d acquire the necessary equipment (like patrol craft, communications and navigation equipment, on-shore facilities, etc ) within the limits of our budget, etc Some activities that we are actively contem­plating or have already started with our neighbours and friendly countries are a assistance and cooperation in the education and training of Indonesia's personnel so as to enable them to better perform their tasks of maintenance and safeguarding the straits used for international passage.

b. joint exercises that will familiarize our
personnel with their counterparts and their
systems that is a sine qua non for smooth
cooperation and actions whenever neces­
sary to guard our common interest.

c. assistance and cooperation in carrying out
surveys and other activities to update maps
of the existing straits so as to guarantee the
safe navigation of passage,

d assist Indonesia in acquiring the modern equipment that is necessary to safeguard safe navigation

Some of the above-mentioned activities have already started on a limited scale, but have to be stepped up and intensified if we want Indonesia to be able to perform her task better in the shortest possible time.


Like the other nations of the world. Indonesia is also vitally interested in keeping open the sea lanes of communications in our interde­pendent world, and Indonesia realizes her heavy responsibility in safeguarding SLOC in her archipelagic and ASEAN waters

Hence we would like to state here emphati­cally that Indonesia is not reluctant to coop­erate with other vitally interested nations in this regard, however this cooperation and assist­ance should be based on the concepts cf her archipelagic outlook, national and regional resilience, and should not infringe on her sovereignty as an independent nation

Cooperation and assistance for specific activities within Ihe framework of safeguarding SLOC that is our common concern, should be based on agreements that have been reached by the interested parties Certainty it is not in Indonesia's national interest not to cooperate in sateguatding SLOC, since Indonesia recog­nizes that this will influence her economic development

The same basic attitude also determines Indonesia's perception of ASEAN's role in safeguarding SLOC in ASEAN waters ASEAN should be primarily responsible for safeguard­ing SLOC in ASEAN waters that should be based on the regional concept of regional resilience ASEAN also welcomes and does no! reject cooperation and assistance in helping i. i i. ; ■ in hei ability in performing this task of common concern as along as this does not infringe on the sovereignty of the ASEAN nations that have stated in the Manila summit of December 1987 that their ultimate objective is the creation of ZOPFAN and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, and where nationalism is still a decisive force

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Rear Admiral (Retired) Yasuo Ito Director, Japanese Centre for Strategic Studies


The International Steering Committee of the International SLOC Security Conference asked the SLOC Study Group, Japan to submit a paper covering the following contents:

Currently there are following questions relating to the actual execution of surveillance activities undertaken together with other operations such as sea lane patrol or escort of shipping, for the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific When related nations conduct surveillance operations, how can surveillance operations by each nation be co­ordinated'' To what extent can related nations ensure the timely exchange of information?

The Steering Committee expects that the paper covers the extent of surveillance activ­ities for the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific and the costs required to implement the above activities

It can hardly be said that the surveillance activities being currently undertaken by the Japan Self Defence Forces (mainly maritime and air) in the adjacent sea-air areas to Japan are sufficient, considering that the current geographical coverage is comparatively lim­ited Because we have not information enough for discussion on requested subjects in detail, we would simply touch some basic matters concerning surveillance and outline some conceptual matters considered necessary for promoting surveillance activities in the Western Pacific. We would also refer to surveillance works in general.

The meaning of "surveillance"

According to the US Department of Defence Dictionary of Military Terms, "surveillance" is defined as "the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means "

The following two kinds of information can be collected by means of systematic obser­vation by aircraft and vessels including submarines of opposing forces which could pose a threat to the security of the SLOCs

They are:

i Information on the capabilities of vessels and aircraft By undertaking such observa­tions, it is possible, for example, to confirm the type of vessel and aircraft in question, the equipment or weapon systems on-board and so on, and to estimate their performance

2 Information on the movements of opposing

vessels and aircraft By detecting the

locating these objects through observing

their movements, necessary information on

their movements can be collected

Some of the information on their movements

can be put to immediate practical use for own

military operations as so-called "tactical

information" Some of them can also be made

use of as "strategic information" through

analysing, evaluating and accumulating these

various data In either case, it should be a basic

principle that information collected by means

of surveillance activities be distributed only to

those who "need to know" them

Surveillance activities related to SLOC security

The following points can be mentioned as the general features of surveillance activities First, observation operations should be under­taken by various means systematically on the basis of co-operation Secondly, in general, the geographical area of surveillance activities should cover a wide scope And thirdly, in most cases, observations should be continued throughout a specific penod(s)

Because of the above-mentioned special features the following points should be taken

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into account, when surveillance activities are executed for the security of the SLOCs

  1. In order to expect the substantial effect of the surveillance activities undertaken for securing the SLOCs against opposing submarines, aircraft and surface vessels (including various kinds of anti-ship missiles and other weaponry, carried on board), surveillance capabilities of a wide scope covering air, sea and underwater areas should be provided for observation of the movements of obiects in question

  2. For the purpose of smooth co-ordination of surveillance activities as well as the timely exchange of information among operating forces and units taking part in surveillance activities, some co-ordination system including necessary telecommunication network should be established

  3. For the security of the SLOCs. it is essential to implement surveillance operations over a much wider area, not relying merely on such immediate or direct measures covering relatively limited areas, as escort of ship­ping, patrol along sea-lanes or mines counter-measures

  4. Surveillance operations lor the security of the SLOCs should be executed continu­ously throughout a necessary period and should also be started in a peacetime

Contribution to SLOC security expected of surveillance activities

When the above-mentioned surveillance operations are undertaken, the following effects could be expected for the security of the SLOCs

1 Preventing any threat from becoming a direct threat but as various attack weapons performances are developped in velocity, efficiency, complexity and so on, attacks on the ASLOCs expanding in a wide air. surface and subsurface area could be made from increasingly longer distance within a shorter time than previously It can be expected that this will be the case all the more in future Accordingly, as there are limits to the effectiveness of the above-mentioned direct measures such as shipping escort, patrol along sea lanes, mine counter measures and so on, the security of the SLOCs will become more difficult to achieve in future

Confronted with this tendency, it effective surveillance activities covering a wider sea-air area and being not limited to a sea lane zone could be accomplished, besides these direct measures, the security of the SLOCs could be achieved more easily and safely, because such surveillance operations in an

area considerably distant from the obiects to be secured would make it possible to detect and eliminate invisible threats, in advance of their becoming direct threat to the SLOCs

Surveillance activities might be said to be similar conceptually to "layered air defense" or "air defence in depth"

Wide area SLOC security concept" in the North Atlantic, developed by the US Navy, can be mentioned as a typical example of surveillance operations for the security of the SLOCs The concept includes land-based forces such as OTH radar and fighter-interceptor as well as OSIS (Naval Ocean Surveillance System) and ITSS (Integrated Tactical Surveillance System) 2 Evaluation of Opposing Forces' Capabilities and Estimate of their Intention in Advance.

Needless to say. if we fail to estimate the opposing forces' capabilities accurately, it will be very hard to cope well with an enemy's attack on our SLOCs in an emerg­ency. On the contrary, if we can detect precisely their intention in advance, effec­tive counter-measures could be taken easily Surveillance activities provide one of the means which makes this possible

Major threats to the SLOCs are subma­rines, surface vessels, aircraft and various anti-ship missiles carries on board them, mines and so forth By conducting syste­matic and continuous surveillance activities and analytical evaluation of collected information, it will become possible, at the very least, to estimate the performance and actual conditions of their weapons systems, pattern of movement, force composition and so forth of various vehicles, except details of attack weapons loaded on board

This means that surveillance activities should be executed continuously through­out peacetime and that the necessary organization or systems should be estab­lished so that evaluated information may be exchanged and utilized among the related nations

If the surveillance activities are not practiced in peacetime but only in emer­gencies, it would be difficult to prepare necessary plans tc get effective results such as provision of necessary equipments, deployment of forces, development of tactics and so forth It would also be difficult to carry out effectively such operations as escort of shipping, patrol and so forth, that is direct measures for the security of the SLOCs

It is necessary to catch timely and precisely any unusual indication, in order

P»0« M ol ""• Ai.iiraliari Naval msliiule Novwntwt W

to detect in advance and carry out effective countermeasures against attempt of oppos­ing forces This is possible by conducting continuous surveillance of the movements of opposing vessels and aircraft in and around the SLOC area and by assessing analytically various information collected through surveillance activities.

In many cases, the objects of surveillance activities should not be limited only to military vessels and aircraft of opposing forces but include also commercial vessels This is because when the opposing forces attempt to attack our SLOCs, subtle changes in the movements even of their commercial vessels can often be detected in advance

As mentioned above, surveillance activ­ities for the security of the SLOCs should be practiced systematically and continu­ously not only during emergencies but also in peacetime

Outline of equipment used for surveillance activities

Equipment used for surveillance activities in the SLOC sea area comprise mainly the following


Various radars are used for observation activities. It is considered likely that OTH radar capable of covering a far distant area ranging from 500 to 1.800 nautical miles will play the mam role in thus activity in future. To investigate a detected target, interceptors are used


For surveillance over a far distant area extending beyond the horizon, OTH radar is considered an effective means, but patrol aircraft are also effectively used for surveillance over a comparatively wide area Patrol aircraft and surface vessels are used for investigation It should be noted that good results may be obtained by using these means properly according to the features of each


In addition to fixed underwater detection equipment laid in important straits, patrol aircraft, submarines and surface vessels are used for surveillance In comparison with P-3C class patrol aircraft, surface vessels were not highly regarded in terms of their capabil­ities lor comparatively long distance under­water surveillance However, the installation of TACTAS, SURTAS and other towed sonar

system developed by the US Navy has made their underwater surveillance capabilities upgrade immensely

For underwater surveillance, anti-submarine patrol aircraft, surface vessels, submarines and fixed underwater equipment are used

Anti-Submarine patrol aircraft

Fixed-wing anti-submarine patrol aircraft (P-3C is type of this type) have excellent manoeuvrability and capabilities of long distance surface and underwater surveillance. They are used for collecting information and investigating and tracking targets in a wide area

P-3C can cover an area ranging to more than 1.000 nautical miles (or detecting surface objects with search radar installed on board They take photographs and collect electronic information of detected ob/ects

P-3C can detect underwater objects by means of sonobuoys laid on the sea surface. If the underwater condition of sound transmis­sion is good, P-3C can cover the area of several tens of nautical miles in radius by a single aircraft.

Although patrol aircraft can detect a number of objects in a wide area within a short time, their capability of staying in the air is limited. When surveillance work should be continued for a long duration, a considerable number of aircraft is required, of course

Surface vessels

Surface vessels such as destroyers and destroyer escorts are inferior to patrol aircraft in manoeuvrability but superior in cruising endurance Therefore, they are suitable to conduct surveillance continuously during a long time for detecting specific objects in a specific comparatively narrow area It is also possible to improve extremely their capabilities of underwater surveillance by using the "towed-array sonar" developed by the US Navy mentioned above


The biggest advantage of submarines for underwater surveillance is to be able to measure underwater temperature by them­selves which influences a great deal under­water sound propagation, and to stay at the desired depth for detecting sound secretly

Fixed underwater equipments

They are used usually for surveillance of submarines passing through such compara­tively narrow waters as important straits or choke points The feature of fixed underwater

.In.nnni .if thr Auntrnttan Hnval InnVU,'. N -• ■ '

equipment is that they can be used semi­permanently, regardless of any weather conditions However, co-operation by vessels or patrol aircraft is necessary for tracking detected targets.

Current Japanese surveillance activities

The outline of the current Japanese surveil­lance activities is as follows


Japan Air Self-Defence Force is in charge Their activities are limited mainly within the air defence zone above and around Japan


Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force is in charge They conduct surveillance work in the neighbouring sea areas around Japan includ­ing the three straits (Soya. Tsugaru and Tsushima) P-3Cs are used mainly in relatively wide areas, and escort vessels in a specific area or for specific objects


Fixed underwater equipment is used for surveillance in and around ma|or straits Surface vessels and aircraft are sometime used for surveillance as required

There is no authorized co-operation system with other nations

Establishment of surveillance system for SLOC security in the Western Pacific

In order to ensure the safety of the SLOCs in the vast Western Pacific, it is needed to establish in peacetime an international system suitable to co-ordinate surveillance activities by related nations.

As mentioned above, it is obviously difficult to ensure the safety of the SLOCs. if we leave SLOC security only to operations in relatively narrow coverage such as patrol along sea lanes or direct escort of shipping by aircraft and vessels

Accordingly, besides such operations, it is necessary to establish in peacetime a surveil­lance system which enables the implemen­tation of effective wide-area surveillance operations around the SLOC area "in depth", in order to ensure the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific region

As to NCS (Naval Control of Shipping) which is one of the essential measures of the security of the SLOCs. most of the main functions of NCS such as formation of convoy, selection and designation of shipping lanes, designation

of navigation schedules and so forth, will be planned based on various information acquired by surveillance activities Accordingly, it can be said that strengthening the surveillance system in the Western Pacific is also essential for effective functioning of NCS

Considering that the Soviet attack capabil­ities on our SLOCs in the Western Pacific have rapidly been increased quantitatively as well as qualitatively, the establishment of surveil­lance systems could be said to be indispens­able for the security of the SLOCs in this region At present, we depend for most of the surveillance activities in the Western Pacific upon the United States However, recent events in the Persian Gulf which is far narrower than the Western Pacific have proved that no one nation has the capability to implement single-handed surveillance tasks in vast air, surface and subsurface area

Our current dependence on the United States may not be allowed to be continued in future, considering changes in international situations as well as the fact that the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific contrib­utes to the security ot the nations concerned Accordingly, it would be reasonable that surveillance tasks be shared by the nations involved

When we study sharing of surveillance tasks among the nations concerned, the geographi­cal conditions of each country and the equipment that respective nations can hold and operate should be taken into maior consider­ation However, generally speaking, it might be proper to apportion surveillance area on the following basis

1 Surveillance tasks in coastal waters, import­ant straits and other major choke points are to be assigned to the coastal countries concerned, in principle 2. The appointment of surveillance areas in the vast ocean is to be discussed among the countries concerned.

The establishment of a co-ordination centre which may be named "Western Pacific Surveil­lance Co-Ordination Centre" is needed to ensure the safety of the SLOCs and the implementation of effective surveillance activ­ities in the Western Pacific It is also needed to co-ordinate and integrate surveillance operations conducted by the nations involved It would be proper that the United States be in charge of its administration and co­ordination of operations conducted by the nations concerned The following are con­sidered as major functions of the centre 1 Co-ordinative function to achieve smooth implementation of surveillance operations by the nations concerned

. .

2. Timely exchange of various information collected through surveillance operations by the nations concerned. In order to make the centre function effec­tively, it is necessary to organize not only a surveillance network among the countries concerned but also a requisite telecommunica­tion network to co-operate with, for example, the following systems:

  1. Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS-US)

  2. Integrated Tactical Surveillance System (ITSS-US)

  3. Naval Control of Shipping Centre (NCS-each country)

4. Ship's Reporting System (SREP-each

country) 5 Operation Headquarters of Navy and Air

Force (each country)


Essentially, effective results of surveillance activities could not be expected if surveillance activities tor the security of the SLOCCs are commenced after the international situation becomes tense Accordingly, it is necessary lo start |ointly surveillance activities in the

Western Pacific as early as possible in peacetime However, as a matter of fact, it may be politically difficult to realize.

On the other hand, it is also true that the threat posed to the SLOCs in the Western Pacific has rapidly been increasing due to the remarkable increase of the Soviet naval and air forces in the Far East, the continued expansion of their existing military bases in Vietnam, the difficulties in negotiation on continuation of the US use of the military bases in the Philippines and so forth.

Under such circumstances, it will not be easy to get an early resolution However, we would like to believe that there will be a possibility of solution to such difficulties in the not so far future, if good ideas turn up as the Steering committee pointed out We. our SLOC Security Study Groups, should continue steady studies so as to realize it in the near future.

In closing this report, we would like lo express our heartful appreciation and gratitude to the International Steering Committee members who raised such an important issue to study, to which little attention has been paid, although it is a very important basic sub|ect for the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific


The guided-missile Ingate HMAS SYDNEY berthing at HMAS Stirling on 4th November. 1989 tor a three day stopover betore returning to Sydney from a South East Asian deployment.

Photo: Vic Jeltery, Navy Public Relations (WA)

.1 the Australian Nsvni Insi.Lit.- NovantlMH en |


Sixty-three Churchill Fellows are making plans to head overseas during 1990 on their Churchill Fellowships They will visit many countries and spend an average ol about three months pursuing subjects as diverse as harvesting pollen Irom Irees. grasses and weeds, aeromedical rescue, micro manipulation ol mice embryos and rabbit (arming

The Churchill Trust is now calling for applications lor Fellowships to be taken up during 1991 Merit in any held, which must be ot value to the community, is the maior criterion in the granting ol Fellowships

Over 1400 Australians have already been given the opportunity to study overseas with their tares paid and a living allowance provided to allow them to seek out knowledge which they then bring back to Australia (or the enrichment ol our society An average Fellowship is worth about $12,000

Churchill Fellowships are available 1o all Aust­ralians regardless ol academic or other qualifica­tions Apply now tor a 1991 Fellowship Send a sell-addressed stamped envelope 24 x 12 cms to

Application Forms

The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust 218 Norlhbourne Avenue CANBERRA ACT 2601

Applications close on 28 February 1990

The Tongan patrol ooat VOEA NEIAFU (P201) alongside at Australian Shipbuilding Industries yards al South Coogee. Weslern Australia on 30 October. 1989. the day ol its handover by the Australian Government. VOEA NEIAFU is the ninth Pacific Patrol Boat 1o be handed over by the Australian Government under the Defence Co-operation Act

Photo LSPH W McBnde RAN

r.U'.i.. hUv.*' iMr.|.(nir November 89



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