Jaden Lessnick " McCarthyism is Americanism with its sleeves rolled. "



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Perm do both- inclusion of parody makes the critique more accessible, opens up spaces to challenge hegemonic knowledge production and question representations, and forwards the critique more effectively


Mack 09 (Nancy, May 2009, associate professor of English and co-director of the Summer Institute on Writing at Wright State University. She teaches undergraduate courses for preservice teachers, as well as graduate courses in composition theory, memoir, and multigenre writing, “Representations of the Field in Graduate Courses: Using Parody to Question All Positions,” http://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=english)//RTF

First, for my purposes, parody has the potential to emphasize the relationship between two discourses: the popular and the academic. Because the university plays a large role in preserving traditional knowledge, academics may hold the popular in contempt. However, parody gives some power to popular discourses—so that the students’ expertise in beer consumption or recent films can have academic usefulness and could even give them an edge in making witty commentary. Students should select something of great familiarity when they create a parody. My graduate classes have a diverse population of majors and identity groups, including many types of nontraditional students. My students do make references to popular culture; however, I would expand Hutcheon’s definition of the popular to include any culture located outside of school, especially home cultures and daily life experiences. For example, an ESL student marshaled her experience with different brands of international phone cards to call attention to the differences in theory groups. In emphasizing the relationship between the popular and the academic, the intertextuality of parody can accentuate discourse differences—if nothing more than in terminology. As they become more familiar with theoretical jargon, students can find humor in references that would previously have been undecipherable. Being able to laugh at jokes such as Jeff Reid’s Postmodern Toasties cartoon, David Gauntlett’s Theory Trading Cards, or the Virtual Academic is a powerful moment in which a student can respond as a veteran academic would. This moment of laughter does not really change the relatively low status of the newcomers, but it does offer some respite in their travails at becoming academics. Parody is based on a revisiting of the past, which unavoidably legitimizes the power that it subverts. Like most academics, I claim that a familiarity with history is crucial for future subversion. Nonetheless, students’ emerging conception of scholarship should not be so totalizing that they have no power in relation to it. A second feature of a parody-writing assignment is that it can present a way to make composition and rhetoric theories less alienating, thus making elite knowledge more accessible. In her introduction, Hutcheon cites Walter Jackson Bate as suggesting that parody is one way that a writer can deal with the “rich and intimidating legacy of the past” (4). Rather than keeping knowledge at arm’s length, I want students to get directly involved. Another literary theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin, discusses parody’s laughter as having “the remarkable power of making an object come up close, of drawing it into a zone of crude contact where one can finger it familiarly on all sides, turn it upside down, inside out, peer at it from above and below, break open its external shell, look into its center, doubt it, take it apart, dismember it, lay it bare and expose it, examine it freely and experiment with it” (Dialogic 23). Although he fears that modern parody has lost its radical function (Dialogic 71), the preceding quotation from Bakhtin concretizes the writer’s interaction with the object of the parody and is worth sharing with students when they later reflect on what they have learned from this assignment. Bakhtin’s scholarship has given us an understanding of carnival as a critique of the normalizing forces that narrow language, giving the non-elite momentary permission to disrupt hierarchies (Rabelais 10). In other contexts, a parody can be a dangerous threat for its mocking of authority. Likewise, I enjoin graduate students to ponder whether their parodies could be regarded as disrespectful by the scholars represented in their parodies. Certainly, the teacher’s respectful stance toward these scholars sets the tone and models how academics should avoid caustic condemnations of their colleagues. Writing parodies will not place students on an equal footing with senior scholars, but students report that these assignments give them a way in, an inroad to making sense of the field. Textual intimidation affects not only how students read and interpret texts but how they construct their position relative to the knowledge within those texts. It is not possible to construct knowledge without learning one’s relative power, as indicated by Peter H. Sawchuck’s research on legitimate and illegitimate learning spaces for working-class groups. Accessibility to academic knowledge occurs when assignments create spaces for students to act as academics. Altruistic motives to help students can mislead teachers into designing dumbed-down assignments, assuming students to be incapable. This assumption cheapens the language experience such that students become alienated from academic knowledge, learning their subordinate position instead. This textual intimidation makes it imperative that marginalized students be permitted to bring their senses of humor into the classroom. Mary Louise Pratt points to parody as one of the “literate arts of the contact zone” that oppressed groups can appropriate and adapt from the dominant culture (179). Of course, there are no guarantees that the students or I will fully understand one another’s jocularities. The previously mentioned student example of the international phone cards required some explanation for me to understand, just as I might have benefited from an explanation of a quip about a medieval holiday during a recent departmental meeting. Believing that students should participate in activities that are fundamentally different from those done by academics can undermine even the best assignment. In addition to the myriad of personal contradictions that students face when they make the transition to a new role within the academic community, the teacher’s pejorative beliefs about students’ relative status and capabilities can subtly affect whether students engage meaningfully with the text or assignment. As a third aspect, even a superficial parody changes the students’ role from that of a passive consumer to a more active producer of critique—unless the students are just reformatting the teacher’s views. This problem may be more likely to occur if students are constructing a parody of only one of the theory groups. A parody assignment that invites students to depict the pitfalls of all positions directs students to expose the ideology present in each. Ideology is very difficult to reveal. Like dialect, we often presume that it is the other who “speaks funny,” whereas we speak correctly. It is important to examine how academics and everyday people learn critique. To wit, reading and writing scholarship have made me cautious about the ideas that I forward. As painful as it might seem, the blind review process employed by academic journals and the open forums at conferences and on listservs help scholars anticipate critiques by others within the field. Sharing worries about the misrepresentations that are inevitable in glosses, taxonomies, and parodies can be an opening gambit for critique. However, it is never the assignment alone that accomplishes the goal, but the classroom context in which the assignment becomes a dynamic activity. If knowledge is presented to students as immutable truth, it becomes unlikely that students will do more than learn the teacher’s critiques as more knowledge to be consumed. One concern might be that these parodies are not very potent critiques, but merely authorized transgressions—that they do not move radically away from given taxonomies or that they encourage overgeneralizations about which elite academic club to join. At their worst, parody assignments might only be comic relief from the otherwise daily drudgery of coursework. Obviously, the larger culture is rife with parodies of politicians that evoke laughter, but, as some maintain, these parodies have little more than entertainment value for those who are unable to partake in political agency by voting or speaking out against policies that limit their material conditions. Fredric Jameson might caution that parodies function as simplistic stylistic devices that are devoid of a political claim in which a schizophrenic subject gains no agency. Similarly, students could just invent stereotypes for contextless scholars without any participation in the field. Critique ought to be the beginning and not the end of what academics do. As a future possibility for critique, I am incubating an assignment in which students profile a person from their lives who has developed an awareness of a dominant ideology limitation and has rejected a specific cultural metanarrative. More times than not, an assignment may function in a way that the teacher did not intend. Regretfully, innovative assignments are probably more likely to be misinterpreted by students; consequently, the burden falls on the teacher to sponsor metacognitive reflection about the learning experience, which I address in a later section. As a fourth feature, parody can question representations of knowledge. Although students may map taxonomies without doubting the way that scholars and theory groups are represented, the parody assignment problematizes the history of our field as textually mediated and constructed. Hutcheon expresses my point this way: “To parody is not to destroy the past: in fact, to parody is both to enshrine the past and to question it” (6). A problem when representing a discipline or a university is that, through reification, the discourse loses its dynamic human quality. For instance, I mentally resist whenever I am told that I must do something for the good of the university. Administrators tend to privilege the needs of the reified institution over those of the faculty or the students. Although questions lengthen the time spent in committee meetings, academics are very good at questioning knowledge. From the outset, graduate students should be involved in interrogating canonical knowledge. Otherwise, composition and rhetoric can be misconceived as an impenetrable, indisputable truth. Even the names for groups and terminology should be challenged. Recently, on the Writing Program Administrator’s listserv, I read postings in response to a query about differences among the terms “liberatory,” “transformative,” “cultural studies,” and “critical pedagogy.” The commentary from several academics about these terms reminded me how, at different moments in my career, I have read and applied ideas to my scholarship and teaching from the various groups associated with them. Sometimes the name for a group or concept emerges late in the development of ideas.4 I have been fortunate to participate in a few collaborative projects in which senior scholars took me seriously and treated me with respect. I see no reason why graduate students should not be permitted to join scholarly discussions. Listservs, wikis, blogs, and even Wikipedia can be used to share the controversies of the field as an electronic version of Gerald Graff’s disciplinary debates. If nothing else, questions about differences in terminology can present the impetus to investigate further and learn more. Parody can provide a space for questioning that which is represented as factual. From Hutcheon’s reference, I tracked down the unorthodox ideas of Raymond Federman. Federman proposes “play-giarism” in fiction, which exposes the fictionality of reality or “makes fun of what it does while doing it” (par. 35). Writing parodies can be a playful method for countering the reification of disciplinary knowledge. I want the parody assignment to help students gain a critical distance from the knowledge of the field for the purpose of questioning it. Education philosopher Nicholas C. Burbules describes parody as “[. . .] enacting a perspective while simultaneously lampooning it, or provisionally embracing multiple perspectives without actually advocating any of them. The parodist thrives on paradox, and sees in it an opportunity for humor and for critical commentary” (“Postmodern” par. 23). Building from Hayden White’s work on metahistory, Burbules advocates parody as one of three narrative tropes (in addition to irony and tragedy) for dealing with the postmodern condition of doubt—a foundational doubt, which sometimes threatens the presuppositions that we can hardly live without. I hope that, by asking students to question all positions, I will not further alienate students from the field. I want to involve them in the politics of representation, first through mapping and parody and then later through researching the context and doing close reading of a scholarly text. I want students to examine the relationship among text, language, and identity and to understand how culture becomes inscribed in all three.

Cap

No link and aff solves the K- our satirical interrogation of energy practices is the most effective means of fighting capitalism and consumption


Pehlivan et al. 13 (Ekin 1 Pierre Berthon1, Jean-Paul Berthon2 and Ian Cross1, 6/11/13, 1 Bentley University, Waltham, Massachusetts USA and 2 Southampton University, Southhampton, UK, “Viral irony: using irony to spread the questioning of questionable consumption,” Wiley Online Library, Page 173)//RTF

GREEN IRONY In the public sphere, claims of truth and fact are essentially social constructs, wherein the powerful can stipulate what is ‘legitimate’ (cf. Bourdieu, 1991). This can be keenly observed in the claims and counterclaims over the environment. In a recent review of the literature on attitudes to the environment in the USA (Daniels et al., 2011), it was found that depending on the specific question, 35–80% of consumers where concerned or very concerned about the environment. Thus, powerful organizations, keen to gain environmental credibility in the eyes of the public, are spending huge sums of money in advertising their ‘green’ credentials (Naish, 2008). Countering many of these claims is the environmental movement, which focuses on promoting awareness of, and generating solutions to, the negative impact that humans are having on the planet (Guha, 1999). It argues that many of the green claims made by firms are half-truths or entirely bogus and label much of the advertising by firms as greenwashing (e.g. Naish, 2008). Two strategies are typically employed when countering the ‘environmentally responsible’ claims of firms: direct and indirect. The directmethod is simply a public negation of the initial claim combined with a counter claim. The indirect method is to employ a rhetorical device such as irony to problematize or subvert the initial message. This latter strategy has two potential advantages. First, it eschews the claim, counter-claim problem of which side to believe, but rather subverts the original message so that the viewers question the claim themselves. Second, it, as we shall argue, helps the counter message spread. Consider the much-advertised claim of ‘clean coal’ by the coal industry. The industry argues that technology has rendered coal, the world’s number one source of CO2 emissions (e.g. Gore, 2006), as a clean energy. However, environmental groups on the web (e.g. http://www.coal-is-dirty.org/, http:// climaterealityproject.org/, and http://beyondcoal. org/) vehemently dispute this claim. As well as directly refuting the claims of the coal industry, some of these groups employ irony in their messaging to undermine the industry’s assertions. Consumer-generated content suggests that irony is popular among consumers. For example, the ‘(s)ales of the Kitsch Three wolf moon t-shirt shot up 2300% after a spate of ironic reviews went viral’ (Emery, 2009). Customers left a string of ironic reviews for the environmentally friendly t-shirt (currently a staggering 2371 http://www.amazon.com/The-Mountain- Three-Short-Sleeve/dp/B002HJ377A), making it one of the most popular products on Amazon. Clearly, consumers demanded, created, and reveled in the ironic humor in promoting the product (cf. Stern, 1990), and the phenomenon suggests that irony has the ability to help a message go viral. In the fight against the claims of clean coal, the Coen brothers created an ironic ad called ‘clean coal-air freshener’. The ad is a parody of a regular air freshener commercial. The spokesperson introduces an all-American family to ‘clean coal’ scented air freshener. The script reads Is regular clean, clean enough, for your family? Not when you can have ‘Clean coal’ clean! Clean coal harnesses the awesome power of the word ‘clean’, to make it sound like the cleanest clean there is. Clean coal is supported by the coal industry, the most trusted name in coal! and the 30 s ad ends with a low pitch buzzing sound with the words projected on a black screen ‘In reality there is no such thing as clean coal’ (http://action. thisisreality.org/page/s/coenbrothers). The message of the ad on the surface violates conventional expectations, yet the use of irony emphasizes the absurdity of the concept of clean coal; irony is used to let consumers question questionable consumption of the world’s number one source of CO2.

Perm do both- the inclusion of irony spreads the alt net better


Pehlivan et al. 13 (Ekin 1 Pierre Berthon1, Jean-Paul Berthon2 and Ian Cross1, 6/11/13, 1 Bentley University, Waltham, Massachusetts USA and 2 Southampton University, Southhampton, UK, “Viral irony: using irony to spread the questioning of questionable consumption,” Wiley Online Library, Pages 176-177)//RTF

GREEN VIRUSES: HOW IRONY CAN HELP MESSAGES SPREAD Now that we have specified how irony works and the various types that can occur in marketing communications, we can turn our attention to the relationship between irony and the probability that a consumer will spread the message via text, e-mail, social network, or word of mouth. Specifically, we ask two questions. First, what is it about the mechanism of irony that helps a message to spread? Second, why is irony especially predominant in viral videos on environmental issues? In answer to the first question, we suggest that irony can help a message go viral because it differentiates, aids memorability, and enhances the aesthetics of a message. Differentiation: With the rise of electronic communication and the increasing number of message types and media, there is an ever-increasing dissonance of voices in the marketplace (Kietzmann et al., 2011). Consumers are deluged with communications every minute of their lives, and thus marketers are increasingly employing unconventional mechanisms to attract attention. Irony is one of these tools. As Brown (2003: 81) observes, ‘Ironic advertising takes marketing-savvy consumers as a given and seeks to ironize the norms, clichés, and customercentric sanctimoniousness of the marketing industry.’ As we have seen, irony employs incongruity between levels or elements of a message, and research shows that incongruity attracts and arrests attention to a marketing message (e.g. McQuarrie and Mick 1996). Memorability: Along with delivering incongruity, irony is often used to evoke humor. Irony elicits both elements, so can enhance a message’s memorability compared with a direct advertisement (e.g. Stern, 1990, Lee and Schumann, 2004). Moreover, because additional cognitive effort needs to be expended when interpreting an indirect message (over and above the cognitive load needed to interpret the direct message), the presence of irony is likely to increase the number of associative paths stored in the memory (cf. Mitchell, 1983).


Visibility

1. This is our last stand- all other means of criticism of modern debate practices have been coopted and just turned into meaningless debate arguments- only a risk the aff can solve because invisibility empirically fails

2. There is definitively no link- the aff can’t be coopted- 1AC Phiddian says that parody is a form of deconstruction and that deconstruction solves by nesting within a structure and tearing it down from the inside- the aff is literally the same as the K- our movement is invisible- you didn’t know what we were doing until the top of the 2AC- means perm do both solves

3. (pull the second pehlivan card from cap, it says irony/viral spread is best)

Micropolitical performative challenges in debate disrupt hegemonic knowledge production by making it visible- key to participation in the movement


Kulynych 97 (Jessica, 1997, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation,” Polity (30.2), p, 37)//RTF

Participation as resistance compels us to expand the category of political participation. Whereas traditional studies of participation delimit political participation from other "social" activities, once participation is defined as resistance this distinction is no longer tenable. Bonnie Honig suggests that performative action is an event, an agonistic disruption of the ordinary sequence of things, a site of resistance of the irresistible, a challenge to the normalizing rules that seek to constitute, govern, and control various behaviors. And, [thus,] we might be in a position to identify sites of political action in a much broader array of constations, ranging from the self-evident truths of God, nature, technology and capital to those of identity, of gender, race and ethnicity. We might then be in a position to act-in the private realm."¶ A performative concept of participation as resistance explodes the distinction between public and private, between the political and the apolitical. As Foucault explains, what was formerly considered apolitical, or social rather than political, is revealed as the foundation of technologies of state control. Contests over identity and everyday social life are not merely additions to the realm of the political, but actually create the very character of those things traditionally considered political. The state itself is "superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth."72 Thus it is contestations at the micro-level, over the intricacies of everyday life, that provide the raw material for global domination, and the key to disrupting global strategies of domination. Therefore, the location of political participation extends way beyond the formal apparatus of government, or the formal organization of the workplace, to the intimacy of daily actions and iterations.¶ A performative understanding of political participation demands recognition of a broader array of actors and actions as well. Performative participation is manifest in any activity that resists the technological and bureaucratic construction of privatized client-citizens, or reveals the contingency of contemporary identities. Political action, understood in this sense, does not have to be intentional, rational, and planned; it may be accidental, impulsive, and spontaneous. It is the disruptive potential, the surprising effect, rather than the intent of an action that determines its status as participation. Consequently, studies of participation must concern themselves not just with those activities we intentionally take part in and easily recognize as political participation, but also with those accidental, unplanned, and often unrecognized instances of political participation. If resistance is a matter of bringing back into view things that have become self-evident, then we must be prepared to recognize that consciousness of the contingency of norms and identities is an achievement that happens through action and not prior to action. Performative participation is manifest in any action, conscious or unconscious, spontaneous or organized, that resists the normalizing, regularizing, and subjectifying confines of contemporary disciplinary regimesSuch a concept of political participation allows us to see action where it was previously invisible. So where Gaventa, in his famous study of Appalachian miners, sees quiescence in "anger [that is] poignantly expressed about the loss of homeplace, the contamination of streams, the drain of wealth, or the destruction from the strip mining all around ... [but is only] individually expressed and shows little apparent translation into organized protest or collective action,"" a concept of performative resistance sees tactics and strategies that resist not only the global strategies of economic domination, but also the construction of apathetic, quiescent citizens. When power is such that it can create quiescence, then the definition of political participation must include those forms of political action that disrupt and counter quiescence. A concept of political participation that recognizes participation in sporadically expressed grievances, and an "adherence to traditional values" by citizens faced with the "penetration of dominant social values," is capable of seeing not only how power precludes action but also how power relationships are "not altogether successful in shaping universal acquiescence." "

Permutation: occupy the space in between the visible and invisible- solves the K best


De Vries 2013 (Leonie Ansems, 10/23/13, Visiting Fellow @ RCIR, “The Politics of (In)visibility: Governance-­Resistance of Refugees, http://kclrcir.org/2013/10/23/the-politics-of-invisibility-governance-%C2%AD%E2%80%90resistance-of-refugees/)//RTF

Migrants and refugees are in the spotlight across the globe. To give only a snapshot of recent news coverage: Millions of people are fleeing Syria; two overcrowded boats carrying refugees capsized near Lampedusa earlier this month; the Australian government sends asylum seekers to Papua New Guinea under a new ‘offshore resettlement policy’; the UK government is under fire for its controversial ‘Go Home’ campaign, urging ‘illegal migrants’ to ‘go home or face arrest’. These events and policies bring to light the importance and urgency of responding to both the plight of refugees and the securitisation of migration in very practical ways. It also prompts the need to conceptualise these issues in ways other than through discourses of threat, (in)security and/or victimisation. I would like to throw a different light on the issue of refugees and migration by focusing on the affirmative political practices of refugees in Malaysia. What I call the politics of (in)visibility, plays out at the intersection of theory and practice as well as at the juncture of governance and resistance.¶ In Malaysia, refugees are legally non-­‐existent. The apparent simplicity of this legal invisibility hides a complex field of practices. The Malaysian state is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Only two categories of migrants exist in Malaysian law: legal and illegal. The absence of the category of the refugee means that all undocumented migrants are considered ‘illegal migrants’ and subject to the Immigration Act, which allows for the detention, deportation and (coroporal) punishment of illegal migrants. The securitisation of migration by the Malaysia authorities in combination with the absence of legal rights leaves undocumented migrants in a very vulnerable position.¶ Yet, what struck me whilst working with refugees from Myanmar in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur was the affirmative character of their practices more than the hopelessness of their situation. For instance, refugees have set up community associations, advocacy organisations, churches and schools and many have found work. This more affirmative perspective emerges with the observation that the field of governmental practices stretches beyond state authorities as well as beyond official procedures and legislation. Of significance in this respect is the role of the UNHCR as both facilitator of resistance and governmental body of regulation and management.¶ The Malaysian state does not have an asylum system in place to register and administer refugees. The UNHCR has stepped in to offer assistance and support to refugees, including registration, status determination, documentation and resettlement. Relations among government, UNHCR and refugees are ambiguous and informal, as symbolised by the UNHCR identity card. Upon registration with the UNHCR, migrants receive a UNHCR identity card, granting them a kind of unofficial official status. Unofficial insofar as the identity card does not grant a refugee an official status under Malaysian law; and unofficial insofar as the card is no guarantee against arrest and detention – although, informally, the card should give a refugee this protection. In practice, the possession of an identity card appears to help reduce violence against refugees at least to a degree. It is official insofar as undocumented migrants gain the status of refugee in the eyes of the UNHCR as well as ‘the international community’. That is to say, the UNHCR does not merely make visible the existence of refugees in Malaysia, it produces the category of the refugee by dividing the field of ‘illegal migrants’ into refugees and economic migrants. A division denied by the government.¶ Identification as a refugee thus involves the simultaneity of resistance – against the denial of legal status by the government – and governmentalisation – by the UNHCR. The example of identity cards indicates that the legal and the illegal, as well as the visible and the invisible, cannot be captured in binary terms. A large domain exists in which the legal, the illegal, the formal and the informal are at play in a more complex manner. It is in this domain that refugees produce an affirmative politics of resistance. If their official illegality and invisibility leaves refugees in a vulnerable position, their occupation of the space in-­between – between the visible and the invisible also allows them to claim an identity other than that of either passive victim or dangerous other. The community associations and schools set up by various refugee communities constitute a clear example of practices that challenge the denial of affirmative subjectivity.¶ Attention to the detail of micro-­‐practices in the case of refugees in Malaysia thus challenges prevailing discourses that frame migrants and refugees either in terms of dangerous other or passive victim. It also challenges the assumption that governance and resistance can be captured in a binary terms. Rather, governance and resistance appear as a complexity of co-­‐constitutive practices. It is on the basis of their official illegality and invisibility, yet in the in-­‐between of (il)legality, (in)visibility and (in)formality, that refugees create an informal yet active politics both enabled and compromised by practices of governance.

Visibility is critical to effective resistance

Gordon 2002 (Neve, 2002, Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University, “On Visibility and Power: An Arendtian Corrective of Foucault.” Human Studies 25: 125–145)//RTF

Plurality and natality are the conditions of possibility of Arendtian power. We¶ read that power, as that which “springs up between men when they act together¶ and vanishes the moment they disperse” is dependent on the human condition¶ of plurality (Arendt, 1958, p. 200). Seyla Benhabib traces Arendt’s notion¶ of plurality to Heidegger’s being-with-others, whereby “the world is never¶ just the world around one, it is always also the world we share with others”¶ (as quoted in Benhabib, 1996, p. 53). Whereas for Heidegger, being-with-others¶ has negative connotations of fallenness into the chatter of everyday life,¶ for Arendt “human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech,¶ has the twofold character of equality and distinction.” Arendt adds, “we are¶ all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as¶ anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live” (1958, pp. 107, 108). Plurality accordingly describes two interrelated conditions. First, it signifies the human condition of being-with-others-in-the-world. Second, it underscores the duality of human existence whereby all individuals, as humans, are the same, and yet simultaneously each one is a unique being. Plurality, one should note, is an ontological category that constitutes human existence in its most primordial sense. Put differently, insofar as one is human, plurality is an integral part of one’s existence. Moreover, plurality is essential to visibility. In Arendt’s view, the world gains meaning as a result of the human condition of plurality. As Bhikhu Parekh¶ puts it, one’s experience of the world is dependent “upon the recognition and confirmation of others” (Parekh, 1981, p. 87). Even one’s own identity, not¶ only in the sense of what one is, but also who one is, is contingent upon how¶ others interpret one’s words and deeds. Arendt goes so far as to suggest that¶ even “the great forces of intimate life – the passions of the heart, the thought¶ of the mind, the delights of the senses – lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence¶ unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized,¶ as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance” (1958, p. 50). A sense¶ of reality, even the most intimate and private reality, is, according to Arendt,¶ intersubjectively derived, while intersubjectivity is dependent on the twofold¶ character of plurality.¶ Arendt’s discussion of plurality and her claim that meaning is dependent¶ on intersubjective experience have far reaching implications for Foucault’s¶ notion of nonsubjective power. While Foucault discloses forms of control that¶ Arendt did not notice, both thinkers would agree that the diverse attributes¶ that are ascribed, for example, to sex – which are, in effect, forms of positive¶ and negative control – become meaningful and remain so only insofar as they¶ are corroborated in public, insofar as they are visible. Devoid of visibility, power becomes powerless. Thus, visibility is, as mentioned before, both an effect of power and its condition of possibility. Arendt’s writings demonstrate that visibility is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is the visibility of “the social” that make it into a form of control (Gordon, 2001). Writing about Arendt, Melissa Orlie – echoing Butler – underscores this point, describing how the on-going reiteration of social norms engenders a so-called “rule of necessity, as well as the violations and exclusions it abets” (1995, p. 340). On the other hand, any form of resistance is also dependent on visibility, on the ability of people to see and hear defiant acts. Without visibility, all confrontations are meaningless. Foucault, I believe, would have agreed that visibility is resistance’s condition of possibility, yet, to the best of my knowledge, he never says so explicitly.

Other Args

Cede the Political

Satire doesn’t cede the political – it’s actually key to motivate action


Thai, 14 – editor for The Crimson (Anthony, “Political Satire: Beyond the Humor,” The Crimson, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/2/6/harvard-political-satire/)//IS

Despite these advantages, some have argued that political satire encourages cynicism, trivializes politics, and promotes a narrow point of view (stemming from the predominantly liberal leanings of most political satirists and comedians). It is true that, when taken in isolation, political satire poses many drawbacks, and that the constant critique of political figures and media outlets can lead to skepticism. However, viewers of satire are more likely to watch and read traditional news sources as well, according to an article in the Columbia Journalism Review. In fact, satirists often refer to other news sources to provide background for their critiques, as Stewart has done numerous times with CNN and Fox News, serving the dual purpose of communicating news and criticizing the current methods of political media. The same article also references research that suggests increased viewership of political humor does not distance the audience from politics but instead “increases knowledge of current events, leads to further information-seeking on related topics, and increases viewer interest in and attention paid to politics and news.” This more informed and interested audience naturally has more opportunities to share educated opinions with others and provoke discussion. Arguments that satire actually increases narrow-mindedness because it panders to liberals also have their flaws. While there are few Republican and conservative viewers, data show that less than half of the viewers of “The Daily Show” and “The Colbert Report” are liberals; in fact, 38 percent of viewers of “The Colbert Report,” as well as 41 percent of those watching “The Daily Show,” consider themselves independents. These shows have roughly the same percentage of Democrat viewers as the New York Times and USA Today and a lower percentage than CNN, all of which claim to be non-partisan news sources. Moreover, humorists connect with their audience more effectively than news anchors do. While politics in news is often portrayed as a field separate from daily life, Stewart and Colbert easily relate their coverage to the average viewer. In contrast to Sunday talk shows such as NBC’s “Meet the Press” and ABC’s “This Week,” which host roundtables of pundits discussing the political issues of the day in non-personal terms, satirists need to be personal for their comedy to be understood and entertaining. Finally, instead of allowing experts to express their opinions as fact as some journalists do, humorists often challenge the views of experts to the audience’s benefit. For example, in October 2013, Stewart hosted Kathleen Sebelius, the US Secretary of Health and Human Services, and criticized Obamacare for delaying compliance with the bill for big businesses but not individuals. He critiqued the fact that these businesses can lobby for their interests while individuals cannot. Although some coverage of this issue made news sources, Stewart presented it at length with an authentic source and in a comedic and memorable fashion. He caught viewers’ attention and demonstrated that experts are not always correct. Taken together with traditional news sources, political humor at least molds a more informed public and at best increases political involvement and excitement. The humor provides the tools; viewers must decide whether to use them.

Satire is key to political action – empirics


Freedman, 10 – UCLA Professor of Political Science, specializing in American and British politics, and as Dean of UCLA Extension. Since his retirement he has taught a seminar on political satire in UCLA’s undergraduate Honors Collegium. His political satire presentations for university and community audiences extend an avocation begun in a common setting for political satire in Britain – the university musical review. Len’s publications include: The Offensive Art: Political Satire and its Censorship Around the World From Beerbohm to Borat (2009); Power and Policy in America, 7th edition (2000)(“Why Political Satire Matters,” http://www.strictlysatire.com/mysites/WhySatireMatters.aspx)//IS

And yet, if satire alone is unlikely to change the course of history, it often accompanies and reinforces political action. And though its impact can never be measured precisely, it seems likely that, together with other forces of dissent, political satire can make a difference. The cartoons and lascivious jokes leveled at the royal family helped to create the atmosphere of derision and fury that culminated in the French Revolution. The satirists’ rage against the Vietnam war played its part in the shift of public sentiment that at last forced its end. Colbert and Stewart make politics amusing and interesting to youthful audiences who otherwise tend to be politically uninvolved. Moreover, if some authoritarian regimes have contemptuously tolerated a limited amount of satire, most have not. And here we come to the most important argument for why political satire matters – its role as a bulwark against political oppression. Political satire, after all, is by definition aggressive, hostile, offensive. Political leaders generally don’t like being offended, and especially they don’t enjoy being made to look ridiculous.


Satire Good

Satire is a key form of public pedagogy – it’s a prerequisite to meaningful debate


McClennen, 12 – Ph.D., Duke University M.A., Duke University A.B., Harvard University, cum laude Dr. McClennen directs Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program and has ties to the departments of Comparative Literature, Spanish, and Women's Studies. She has published seven books and has three in process. Her latest single-authored volume is Colbert's America: Satire and Democracy (2012), which studies the role of Stephen Colbert in shaping political discourse after 9/11. (Sophia. A, “America According to Colbert: Satire as Public Pedagogy post 9/11,” July 3rd, http://societyforcriticalexchange.org/conferences/MLA%202011/Public%20Intellectuals/America%20According%20to%20Colbert.htm)//IS

By inquiring into the ways that Colbert has functioned as a public intellectual, this paper suggests that satire is a comedic and pedagogic form uniquely suited to provoke critical reflection. Its ability to underscore the absurdity, ignorance, and prejudice of commonly accepted behaviors by means of comedic critical reflection offers an especially potent form of public critique, one that was much needed in the post 9/11 environment. This paper argues that, in contrast to the anti-intellectualism, the sensationalism, and the punditry that tend to govern most mass media today, Colbert’s program offers his audience the opportunity to understand the context through which most news is reported and to be critical of it. In so doing Colbert’s show further offers viewers an opportunity to reflect on the limited and narrow ways that political issues tend to be framed in public debate. Colbert’s satire, then, is a form of what Henry Giroux defines as “public pedagogy” since it demonstrates the use of media as a political and educational force. Recognizing that the political opinions of most US citizens are shaped by an uncritical acceptance of the issues as provided by the mainstream media, Colbert uses the same venue to critique that process. By impersonating a right-wing pundit, Colbert differs in significant ways from other critical comedians since his form of humor embodies that which it critiques. This paper suggests that this form of parody has both the potential to be more incisive in its critique and also more dangerous, since its dependence on a cult of personality could merely mirror the same passive viewing practices common to programs like The O’Reilly Factor. This paper also contributes to the ongoing conversation about how satire and humor post 9/11 have been able to effectively encourage critical perspectives on major social issues, thereby providing an important source of public pedagogy. Focusing on one of the leading figures of “satire TV,” my paper claims that Colbert’s program incorporates a series of features that foster critical thinking and that encourage audiences to resist the status quo. By analyzing the context within which the program emerged and the specific features of the program, this book offers readers insight into the powerful ways that Colbert’s comedy challenges the cult of ignorance that has threatened meaningful public debate and social dialogue since 9/11.


Satire Works

If people don’t understand the irony at first, it’ll make an even bigger impression on them once they get it – we can always explain the joke later


Day, 8 – Ph.D. and Assistant Professor of English and Cultural Studies at Bryant University; (Amber, “Are They For Real? Activism and Ironic Identities,” 2008, http://www.cios.org/www/ejc/EJCPUBLIC/018/2/01846.html)//IS
Hutcheon warns of the potential danger inherent in the use of irony in that it can easily backfire. She explains, “those whom you oppose might attribute no irony and simply take you at your word; or they might make irony happen and thus accuse you of being self-negating, if not self-contradicting. Those with whom you agree (and who know your position) might also attribute no irony and mistake you for advocating what you are in fact criticizing” (16). The Yes Men, it seems, found themselves precisely falling prey to these traps, but have hit upon a method of using the pitfalls to their advantage, allowing audiences to read them seriously and then exposing them for being complicit with the offensive ideas put forward. In hindsight, the irony is much more obvious, meaning either that those present at the live event appear morally unscrupulous or that the media is spurred to engage in reflection about why they were taken in. Perhaps more importantly, the revealed hoaxes speak to a growing number of fans who take delight in witnessing organizations and corporations they are already critical of be publicly pranked, again providing affirmation for existing discursive communities.

Framework

We aren’t actually policymakers- they aren’t real world and destroy education by creating role confusion—there’s no benefit to policy if we can’t put it into effect


Kappeler, 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

`We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

Our Violent representations matter, and are the root cause of war and violence.


Kappeler 95

(Susanne, 1995, lecturer in English at the University of East Anglia and an Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University,[2] and now works as a freelance writer and teacher in England and Germany. Kappeler also taught 'The literary representation of women' in the Faculty of English at Cambridge while a research fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge[3] and was a part-time tutor for the Open University Course, “A History of Violence,” pg 8-9)

Violence — what we usually recognize as such — It is no misbehaviour of a minority amid good behaviour by the majority, nor the deeds of inhuman monsters amid humane humans, in a society in which there is no equality, in which people divide others according to race, class, sex and many other factors in order to rule, exploit, use, objectify, enslave, sell, torture and kill them, in which millions of animals are tortured, genetically manipulated, enslaved and slaughtered daily for 'harmless' consumption by humans. It is no error of judgement, no moral lapse and no transgression against the customs of a culture which is thoroughly steeped in the values of profit and desire, of self-realization, expansion and progress. Violence as we usually perceive it is 'simply' a specific —and to us still visible — form of violence, the consistent and logical application of the principles of our culture and everyday life. War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.`We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values — in short: us. We are the war ... And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happens 'We are the war' — and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen.

Their world of debate is bad- it causes disinterested argumentation and reinforces oppression.


Spanos 04 (William Spanos, 2004, Distinguished Professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University and kind of an asshole, “Spanos on debate,” http://the3nr.com/2010/01/17/spanos-on-debate/)//RTF

Dear Joe MIller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then –and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about “objectivity” has crept into the “philosophy of debate” — that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn’t matter which position you take on an issue — say, the United States’ unilateral wars of preemption — as long as you “score points”. The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an “exceptionalist” America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its “errand in the wilderness.” That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not “disinterested.” It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the “democratic” institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language if “truth,” far from being “disinterested” or “objective” as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of “others.” This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional “objective” debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration — judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their “disinterested” argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of “deterring democracy” (in Noam Chomsky’s ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

Their complaint is with the form rather than the content of the 1AC—translating this complaint into a rule plays into sovereign hands which turns decisionmaking and guts education


Steele 10—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas (Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 109-111)

The rules of language and speaking can themselves serve to conceal truth in world politics. I begin here with the work of Nicholas Onuf (1989), which has inspired constructivists to engage how “language is a rule-governed activity” (Wilmer 2003: 221). Rules help construct patterns and structures of language exchanges, and “without these rules, language becomes meaningless” (Gould 2003: 61). From the work of Onuf, we recognize that rules do more than set appropriate boundaries for language, as the ¶ paradigm of political society is aptly named because it links irrevocably the sine qua non of society— the availability, no, the unavoidability of rules— and of politics— the persistence of asymmetric social relations, known otherwise as the condition of rule. (1989: 22) ¶ Rules lead to rule— what Onuf (1989) titles the “rule-rules coupling.” Thus, linguistic rules demarcate relations of power and serve to perpetuate the asymmetry of social relations. The structure of language games is valued because it provides order and continuity. But because those rules are obeyed so frequently and effortlessly, they are hard to recognize as forms of authority.Where does the need for such continuity arise? As mentioned in previous chapters, Giddensian sociology suggests that the drive for ontological security, for the securing of self-identity through time, can only be satisfied by the screening out of chaotic everyday events through routines, which are a “central element of the autonomy of the developing individual” (Giddens 1991: 40). Without routines, individuals face chaos, and what Giddens calls the “protective cocoon” of basic trust evaporates (ibid.). Yet, as I have discussed in my other work (2005, 2008a) and as Jennifer Mitzen notes (2006: 364), rigid routines can constrain agents in their ability to learn new information. This is what the rhythmic strata of aesthetic power satisfies. In the context it creates for parrhesia, these routines, connected to an agent’s sense of Self, shield that agent from the truth.4 “The shallowness of our routinized daily existence,” Weber once stated, “consists indeed in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware, of this partly psychologically, part pragmatically conditioned motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values” (1974: 18). The need for such rhythmic continuity spans all social organizations, including scholarly communities (thus we refer to such communities as “disciplines”). ¶ The function of these rules creates a similar problematic faced by the parrhesiastes who is attempting to “shock” these structured rules and habits of the targeted agent. Because the parrhesiastes may find the linguistic rules or at least “styles” or language used by the targeted power to be part of the problem (the notion that one must be “tactful,” for instance), she or he must perform a balancing act between two goals. First, the parrhesiastes must challenge the conventions that serve to simplify and even conceal the truth the parrhesiastes is speaking. Second, the parrhesiastes must observe some of these speaking rules, part of which may themselves be responsible for or derivate toward the style of the Self that needs to be challenged by the parrhesiastes. Favoring the first, the parrhesiastes is prone to being ignored as irrational, as someone “on the fringe” or even unintelligible or, in the words of Harry Gould already noted, “meaningless.” Favoring the second moves the parrhesiastes away from the truth attempting to be told or at least obscures the truth with the language of nicety. As developed by Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, parrhesia existed within this spectrum: at times, it bordered on “harsh frankness” that was “not mixed with praise”; at other times, the frankness was more subdued (Glad 1996: 41). 5 As the examples of Cynic and academic-intellectual parrhesia provided later in this chapter illustrate, different manifestations of truth-telling as a form of counterpower occupy different spaces along this spectrum— balancing between abiding by these conventions of decorum and style; the need to provide forceful, decloaked truth; or, in the case of Cynic parrhesia, flauntingly contradicting the conventions altogether. ¶ The parrhesiastes will most likely face charges of the first order (ignoring convention) regardless of the manner in which parrhesia is delivered. If, indeed, “the truth hurts” and if the target of such truth cannot deny the facts being delivered, the most convenient option for the victim is to blame “the way” in which the parrhesiastes said something, knowing full well that it was the substance of what that person said that was, for the victim, inappropriate or, more to the point, inconvenient.

Resolved is to reduce by mental analysis


Random House 11 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve)

Resolved is to reduce by mental analysis,

Should indicates desirability


OED 11 (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/should?region=us)

Should indicates desirability,

USFG = the people


Howard, 5 (Adam, “Jeffersonian Democracy: Of the People, By the People, For the People,” http://www.byzantinecommunications.com/adamhoward/homework/highschool/jeffersonian.html, 5/27)

Ideally, then, under Jeffersonian Democracy, the government is the people, and people is the government. Therefore, if a particular government ceases to work for the good of the people, the people may and ought to change that government or replace it. Governments are established to protect the people's rights using the power they get from the people.


Explore means to inquire or discuss a subject or issue in detail


Oxford Dictionary no date (Oxford dictionary, no date, “explore,” http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/explore)//RTF

explore Syllabification: ex·plore Pronunciation: /ikˈsplôr / VERB [WITH OBJECT] 1Travel in or through (an unfamiliar country or area) in order to learn about or familiarize oneself with it: the best way to explore Iceland’s northwest FIGURATIVE the project encourages children to explore the world of photography MORE EXAMPLE SENTENCES SYNONYMS 1.1 [NO OBJECT] (explore for) Search for resources such as mineral deposits: the company explored for oil MORE EXAMPLE SENTENCES 1.2Inquire into or discuss (a subject or issue) in detail: he sets out to explore fundamental questions MORE EXAMPLE SENTENCES 1.3Examine or evaluate (an option or possibility): you continue to explore new ways to generate income MORE EXAMPLE SENTENCES SYNONYMS 1.4Examine by touch: her fingers explored his hair MORE EXAMPLE SENTENCES 1.5 Medicine Surgically examine (a wound or body cavity) in detail. MORE EXAMPLE SENTENCES

Exploration is consideration or thinking


Vocabulary.com, no date – (Vocabulary.com, http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/exploration)//IS

exploration 1 n to travel for the purpose of discovery Synonyms: geographic expedition Type of: expedition a journey organized for a particular purpose n a careful systematic search Types: probe an exploratory action or expedition Type of: hunt, hunting, search the activity of looking thoroughly in order to find something or someone n a systematic consideration “he called for a careful exploration of the consequences” Type of: consideration the process of giving careful thought to something
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