Thus the plan: The United States federal government should/shall/ought to substantially increase its substantial investment, leasing, developmental development, explorational development and/or developmental exploration, in/of the Earth’s oceans.
Contention #4 is Children’s Literature
Voting neg is for Dave Strauss- vote aff
Phiddian 97 (Robert, 1997, lecturer in English at Flinders University of South Australia, “Are Parody and Deconstruction Secretly the Same Thing?,” https://dspace.flinders.edu.au/jspui/bitstream/2328/1032/1/Are%20Parody%20and%20Deconstruction%20Secretly%20the%20Same%20Thing.pdf)//RTF
I'd like to go a step further, and assert that parody is a form of deconstruction. I want to assert this with all the force that metaphor can muster, with all the tropical force a ttributed to metaphor in "White Mythology."I'm not just arguing that parody is like deconstruction; I'm arguing that they are secretly the same thing. Consider this passage from Of Grammatology: "The movements of deconstruction do not destroy [sollicitent] structures from the ou tside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside , borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work." 20 It is clear that deconstruction, especially as Derrida practices it, nests in the structure of the texts and ideas it criticizes, as a cuckoo infiltrates and takes over the nests of other birds. It operates from inside the arguments of metaphysical texts and systems such as structuralism and phenomenology, showing how they cannot totalize the visions they proclaim, and precisely where they double and collapse. It is not primary thought, always secondary, always "borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure." And this is precisely what parody does too. It is preeminently a genre-bricoleur, living off the energies and inadequacies of previous writings, "borrowing them structurally" and transforming them with a critical eye. Don Quixote is in a deconstructive economy with romance, just as surely as Grammatology is in a deconstructive economy with Rousseau's theory of language; and in many similar ways. Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose inhabits the rhetorical structure of the detective story, "operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure." It does not destroy it "from the outside," and is, indeed, much more complicit with what it deconstructs than the blank idea of criticism suggests. It does not entirely repudiate the detective story, and actually "falls prey to its own work" by becoming a sort of costume detective story in turn; yet the detective story is also ironized and placed under erasure. It looks different after The Name of the Rose, and that difference looks very like a play of différance.
Seriously, Russians are assholes
Zizek 2k8 (Slavoj, 2008, Professor of Sociology at University of Ljublajana, “In Defense of Lost Causes,” http://moodle.tau.ac.il/2012/pluginfile.php/365364/mod_resource/content/1/Zizek%20-%20In%20Defense%20of%20Lost%20Causes.pdf, 342-343)//RTF
Critchley's claim that "[s]ome versions of psychoanalysis, particularly Lacans, have a problem with the superego" is thus odd: Lacan was fully aware not only of the link between humor and the superego, but also of the brutal-sadistic aspect of humor. The Mar x Brothers' Duck Soup, their masterpiece, is regarded as a work that makes fun of ridiculous totalitarian state rituals, denouncing their empty posturing, and so on: laughter is the mightiest weapon, no wonder that totalitarian regimes found it so threatening . . . This commonplace should be turned upside down: the powerful effect o£Duvk Soup does not reside in its mockery of the totalitarian state's machinery and paraphernalia, but in openly displaying the madness, the "fun," the cruel irony, which are already present in the totalitarian state. The Mar x brothers' "carnival" is the carnival of totalitarianism itself. Wha t is the superego? Recall the strange fact, regularly evoked by Primo Levi and other ffolocaust survivors, regarding how their intimate reaction to their survival wa s marked by a deep split: consciously, they were fully aware that their survival wa s just a meaningless accident, that they were not in any wa y responsible for it, that the only guilty perpetrators were their Nazi torturers; at the same time, they wer e (more than mildly) haunted by the "irrational" feeling of guilt, as if they had survived at the expense of others who had died and were thus somehow responsible for their deaths —as is well-known, this unbearable feeling of guilt drove many of the survivors to suicide. This feeling of guilt displays the agency of the superego at its purest: the obscene agency which manipulates us into a spiraling movement of self-destruction. Wha t this means is that the function of the superego is precisely to obfuscate the cause of the terror constitutive of our being human, the inhuman core of being human, the dimension of what the German Idealists called nega tivity and what Freud called the death drive. Far from being the traumatic hard core of the Real from which sublimations protect us, the superego is itself the mask screening the Real. The humorous superego is the cruel and insatiable agency which bom bards me with impossible demands and which mocks m y failed attempts to meet them, the agency in the eyes of which I am all the more guilty, the more 1 try to suppress m y "sinful" strivings and meet its demands. As I have noted, the cynical Stalinist motto about the accused at the show trials wh o professed their innocence ("the more they are innocent, the more they deserve to be shot") is the superego at its purest. Consequently, for Lacan, the superego "has nothing to do with moral conscience as far as its most obligatory demands are concerned:"''* the superego is, on the contrary, the anti-ethical agency, the stigmatization of our ethical betrayal. As such, the superego is, at its most elementary, not a prohibitive, but a productive agency: "Nothing forces anyone to enjoy except the superego. The superego is the imperative oijouL)Mnce— ^n)oy\" ' Although jouldMnce can be translated as "enjoy ment," translators of Lacan often leave it in French in order to render palpable its excessive, properly traumatic character: we are not dealing with simple pleasures, but with a violent intrusion that brings more pain than pleasure. No wonder, then, that Lacan posited an equation between jouMdance and the superego: to enjoy is not a matter of following one's spontaneous tendencies; it is rather something we do as a kind of weird and twisted ethical duty. When, following Badiou, Critchley defines the subject as something that emerges through fidelity to the Good ("A subject is the name for the w a y in which a self binds itself to some conception of the good and shapes its subjectivity in relation to that good"),'^ from a strict Lacanian perspective, he is confusing subject and subjectivization. Lacan is here to be opposed to the discourse-theory doxa about the subject as an effect of the process of subjectivization: for Lacan, the subject preceded sub jectivization, subjectivization (the constitution of the subject's "inner life" of experience) is a defense against the subject. As such, the subject is a (pre)condition of the process of subjectivization, in the same sense in which, back in the 1960s, Herbert Marcuse claimed that freedom is the condition of liberation. Insofar as, in away , the subject, in its content, "is " nothing positively but the result of the process of subjectivization, one can also say that the subject precedes ihielf—'m order to become subject, it already has to be subject, so that, in its process of becoming, it becomes what it already is. (And, incidentally, this feature distinguishes the properly Hegelian dialectical process from pseudo-Hegelian "dialectical evolution.") The obvious counter-argument to this is that we are dealing here with the archetypal case of ideological illusion: there is no subject prior to the process of subjectivization, its préexistence is precisely the inversion that bears witness to the success of the ideological constitution of the subject; once constituted, the subject necessarily experiences itself as the cause of the very process that constitutes it, that is, it perceives this process as its "expression." This, precisely, is the reasoning one should reject —but why exactly?