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Acknowledgement

This article was published originally in Ethics and Global Politics Vol. 6, No. 4,2013, pp. 245-260. The constructive and insightful comments and suggestions offered by the reviewers for that journal, and the permission to republish here are acknowledged with sincere thanks.

Notes

(Endnotes)

1 Greg Kennedy, "Drones Legitimacy and
Anti-Americanism,"
Parameters 42:4143:1
(2013), pp. 26,27.

The Australian Defence White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia: 2013) p. 20 paragraph 2.81 acknowledges the importance of policy, which must inform the operation of autonomous systems.

Philip Dorlin, "Pine Gap Drives US Drone Kills," in The Sunday Age Newspaper, 21 July 2013. Dorlin describes the involvement of the Australian signals intelligence base at Pine Gap in United States' drone operations. The article does not specify the missions that have been supported. But the article does make plain that American drone operations have received critical geolocation signals intelligence from the Australian base. Thus, Dorlin underlines the interest of nations apart from the United States in drone operations and policy.

  1. Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control, (London and New York: Verso, 2013) p. 8. Benjamin cites Jo Beclcer and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List'Proves a Test ofObama's Principles and Will, from the New York Times of May 29,2012.

  2. Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Lawful use of Combat Drones," Hearing: Rise of the Drone II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targetting from Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Washington D.C., April 28 2010. Cited in Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control, (London and New York: Verso, 2013) p.186. Benjamin also cites O'Connell at pp. 140,141: "Drones are not lawful

for use outside combat zones....Outside combat zones, police are the proper law enforcement agents and police are generally

required to warn before using lethal force'!

  1. Franz Kafka, The Trial, (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1956) pp. 59 - 60.

  2. Thomas Pogge, "Making War on Terrorists - Reflections on Harming the Innocent," The Journal of Political Philosophy 16:1 (2008), p. 11.

  3. Steven Clark, "Targeted Killings: Justified Acts of War or Too Much Power for One Government?' in Global Security Studies, 3:3, (2012), p. 28.

  4. Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun, "From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim: Recalibrating Our Understanding of the Moral Use of Force," in Ethics & International Affairs, 27:1 (2013), pp. 89-90.

  5. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Does Disarmament Mean Peace?" in Arms and Foreign Policy

in the Nuclear Age, ed. Milton L. Ralcove (New Yorly, London and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 418.

  1. Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun, "From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim, p. 90.

  2. Alex Bellamy, "Is the War on Terror Just?" in International Relations, 19:3 (2005) p. 283

  3. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2:2 (1973), p. 174.

  4. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," pp. 161 - 162.

  5. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," p. 164.

  6. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," p. 174.

  7. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," p. 174.

  8. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument, (New Yorlc Basic Boolcs, 2000) p. 253.

  9. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," pp. 175,176.

  10. Harry Mulisch, Criminal Case 40/61: The trial of AdolfEichmann, tr. Robert Naborn, (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2005), p. 141.

  11. Harry Mulisch, Criminal Case 40/61: The trial of Adolf Eichmann, p. 113.

  12. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New Yorlc Penguin, 2006) p. 287.

  13. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 287. (Emphasis in the original)

  14. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 289.

  15. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (United States:

Vintage, 1995) p. 221.

  1. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 195,196,197.

  2. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, (Indiana: Notre Dame, 1984), p. 109.

  3. R. M. Hare, "Rules of War and Moral Reasoning," Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1:2 (1972), pp. 174,175.

  4. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," p. 166.

  5. Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The C.I.A., A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, (New Yorlc Penguin Press, 2013) p. 319.

  6. Cited in Jane Mayer, "The Predator War: What are the rislcs of the C.I.A.'s covert drone program?," New Yorker, October 26, 2009, p. 44.

  7. Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, p. 319.

  8. Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, p. 319.

  9. Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, p. 319.

  10. Cited in Jane Mayer, "The Predator War: What are the risks of the C.I.A.'s covert drone program?" New Yorker, October 26, 2009. p. 40.

Also cited in Megan Braun and Daniel Brunstetter, "The implications of drones on the just war tradition," Ethics and International Affairs 25: 3 (2011), p. 354.

The original source is: Mary L. Dudziak, "To Whom Is a Drone Loyal?" Balldnization blog, September 27,2009; balldn.blogspot. com/09/to-whom-is-drone-loyal.html.

  1. Jane Mayer, "The Predator War: What are the risks of the C.I.A.'s covert drone program?," New Yorker, October 26,2009. p. 42.

  2. Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, fourteenth session, agenda item 3, United nations document A/HRC/14/24/Add.6. Introduction, paragraph 3, p. 3.

  3. Philip Alston, Report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, United nations document A/HRC/14/24/Add.6. Introduction, paragraph 3, p. 3.

  4. William E Felice, "Moral Responsibility in a Time of Waif Social Justice, 35:3, (2008-09), p. 28. Felice is citing Dennis

E Thompson, (1987) Political Ethics and Public Office.

  1. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford and New Yorlc Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 315.

  2. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 304.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

14

The Bureaucratization of War:

Moral challenges exemplified by the covert lethal drone






  1. Cesare, Marchese di. Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments: with a commentary byM. de Voltaire. (Philadelphia: William Young, No. 2 Second Street the corner of Chestnut Street 1793), p. 19.

  2. Cesare, Marchese di. Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, p. 20.

  3. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2000) Part ii, "The Second Part of Ideal Theory': Particularly at s. 7.3 p. 62 where he writes that liberal societies will not try to impose democratic principles coercively on non-liberal societies.

  4. Chris Woods, "Drone War Exposed - the complete picture of C.I.A. strikes in Pakistan," The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (August 10,2011). http://www. thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/ most-complete-picture-yet-of-cia-drone-strikes/ (accessed 04 May, 2013).

Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control, p. 105. Benjamin cites the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. She also cites the New America Foundation estimate that from 2004 - 2011, between 1717 and 2680 individuals were the victims of drone strikes, and of those between 391 - 780 were civilians.

  1. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (1795), trans, by M. Campbell Smith with a preface by Robert Latta, (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1972) Second Section, First Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace, pp. 122-123.

  2. Peter Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 319. This excerpt from discussion exploring this idea, between pp. 316-321.

  3. Thucydides, "Speech of the Corinthians" in The Landmark Thucydides, ed. Robert B. Strassler, (Free Press: New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 2008) Bk. 1.121.3 at p. 67: "The power of Athens is more mercenary than national...(our) strength lies more in men than in money':

  4. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument, (New York: Basic Books, 2000) p. 3.

  5. The United States Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: US Field Manual 3-24 also published as Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007) paragraph 7.44. The example of the French counterinsurgency in Algeria is provided as an example. In this campaign, the French condoned the use of torture against insurgents. This was seen to undermine the moral legitimacy

of the French campaign, and to empower the insurgent campaign, which became associated with ideas of just cause and seen

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute


(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992) Line 95-97.

  1. Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicld, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida (Rand Publishing, 2008) Summary, p. xiii.

  2. Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicld, How Terrorist Groups End, pp. xiii, 9,18,19,20,

27,42.

as a defensive action against oppression.

THALES

  1. Euripides, Trojan Women, in Grene, D and Lattimore, R. (eds) The Complete Greek Tragedies: Volume III, (three volumes) (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), Line 764: Andromache as she lasses and relinquishes Astyanax.

  2. Euripides, Trojan Women, in Grene, D and Lattimore, R. (eds) The Complete Greek Tragedies: Volume III, (three volumes) (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), Line 1158-59.

  3. Euripides, Trojan Women, in Grene, D and Lattimore, R. (eds) The Complete Greek Tragedies: Volume III, (three volumes)

For more information, please contact: sales@thalesgroup.com.au vwwv.thalesgroup.com.au

Photograph © Australian Department of Defence

Issue 153

ADAPTING NAVY TRAINING PROCESSES TO THE RAPID

EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION & LEARNING

TECHNOLOGIES

- a Design Pattern Approach to Training Design

BY LCDR CHRIS MCCONACHY

15





'Training innovation enhances flexible and effective training delivery options. Technology and simulation applications provide opportunities for improvement in safety, flexibility, cost, rapid development training throughput and overall standard of graduates..."

"The ADF actively seeks to exploit advances

in technologies to enhance training delivery

options. Australian Defence Doctrine

Publication 7.0 (2011, p. 51)

The learning and communication technologies revolution

The rapid evolution of learning and communication technologies is bringing greater change to the education and training sectors than most practitioners could have foreseen, even a decade ago. The design and delivery modes of education and training are coevolving with the technologies. Factors such as increasing bandwidth and storage capacity, the proliferation of mobile devices, improved affordability, and the development of Web 2.0 applications, have created a new range of possibilities for the design and delivery of education and training. It would not be overstating the case to say that a technology-driven education and training revolution is occurring. Education and training have undergone a shift from an industrial-age paradigm to an information-age paradigm.1

1 (Reigeluth & Carr-Chellman, 2009)

The Challenges for Navy training

This situation presents two interrelated challenges for the Navy training organisation. The first is to leverage the technologies to improve training safety, flexibility, cost, throughput, and outcomes.2 The second is to match the expectations and learning styles of new generations of trainees who are accustomed to learning with technology.

The Navy's training development processes, developed during the pre-digital era, are based on the Defence Training Model (DTM). The DTM is a close variant of the ADDIE model. The ADDIE model represents a generic design process used by instructional designers and training developers. It consists of five phases; analyse, design, develop, implement, and evaluate.3 Its emphasis on high upfront analysis makes it cumbersome to use and slow to apply. It provides minimal direction in the design process. ADDIE is not ideally suited to the tasks of adapting existing training, or designing new training, to leverage the rapidly evolving learning and communication technologies.

An Alexandrian design pattern-basedapproach

Design patterns and pattern languages were originally conceived by Christopher Alexander4 for application in architecture and town-planning. A design pattern is a solution to a recurrent problem in a context. Patterns describe a problem, its

  1. (Defence, 2006)

  2. (Morrison, 2010)

  3. etal. (1977)

context, and a solution to the problem. They should be written in such a way that they enable the reader to understand enough of the problem and its context to adapt a solution to their own needs. Patterns form a bridge between theory, empirical evidence and experience, and the design solution. Patterns relate to one another to create a pattern language.5

Training design based on Alexandrian design patterns may offer an approach suited to dealing with the rapid evolution of learning and communications technologies. Design patterns are modular solutions to recurring design problems. They could work in conjunction with the ADDIE model, providing the detailed guidance and direction that is currently lacking in the design phase.

5 (Goodyear, 2004)

SonarTechnician (Surface) Seaman Apprentice Joseph
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