Inequality and Corruption: The Role of Land Reform in Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines



Download 174.3 Kb.
Page4/4
Date conversion15.05.2016
Size174.3 Kb.
1   2   3   4

Figure 1. Causal mechanisms from inequality to corruption


Bribery

Capture



Illegal & legal

campaign contributions



Powerful economic elite



Inequality






Vote buying

Large

poor population






Patronage in bureaucracy

Clientelism


Figure 2. Control of Corruption scores, from 1996 through 2011
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (www.govindicators.org)

Figure 3. Real GDP per capita, 1953-2007 (in 2005 constant dollars)
Source: Penn World Table 6.3.
Figure 4. The trends of income inequality (Gini index) in the three countries, 1953-2005

Source: UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (version 2.0c), Korea National Statistical Office, Taiwan Statistical Bureau, and the Philippine National Statistical Office


Table 1. Trends of CPI Scores and Ranks (in parentheses)

Country\Period

1980-85

1988-92

1995-2000

2001-05

2005-10

Taiwan

6.0 (25)

5.1 (29)

5.2 (24)

5.7 (24)

5.7 (24)

Korea

3.9 (38)

3.5 (37)

4.3 (32)

4.5 (30)

5.3 (25)

Philippines

1.0 (49)

2.0 (46)

3.0 (39)

2.6 (43)

2.4 (46)

Source: Transparency International

Note: CPI 1980-85 and CPI 1988-92 are from TI’s historical CPI. CPI 1995-2000, CPI 2001-05, and CPI 2006-10 are averages of the annual CPI scores for the periods. The ranks in parentheses are out of 54 countries for which the historical CPI scores are available.

Table 2. Predictive Ability of Possible Causes of Corruption



Table 3. The Trends of Land Gini

 

Korea

Taiwan

Philippines

1945/50

0.73

0.58 - 0.62

0.58

c. 1960

0.38 - 0.39

0.39 - 0.46

0.52 - 0.53

c. 1990

0.37 - 0.39

 

0.55

Source: Ban, Moon, & Perkins (1980), Taylor and Jodice (1983), and Frankema (2006)

Note: When there are multiple estimates, both the lower and the higher estimates are included.

Table 4. The Trends of Income Gini

year

Korea

Taiwan

Philippines

pre-1950

High







1953

0.34

0.57




1959




0.45




1961

0.32

0.47

0.51

1964

0.33

0.33




1965







0.50

Source: UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (version 2.0c)

Table 5. Pre-Election Expectations of Election Irregularities in the Philippines

Types

Apr '92

Apr '01

Apr '04

Apr '07

May '10

Vote-buying

57%

48%

49%

69%

71%

Cheating in vote-counting

46%

30%

36%

53%

51%

Flying voters

41%

27%

29%

46%

48%

Harassment of voters

36%

17%

22%

39%

45%

Source: Social Weather Stations

Table 6. Modes of New Recruitment at the Grade III-B in Korea

Period

Haengsi

Special

1948-52

4.7

95.3

1953-59

48.3

51.7

1964

38.3

61.7

1965

35.6

64.4

1966-73

55.0

45.0

1977-79

65.2

34.8

1980-87

64.6

35.4

1988-95

70.4

29.6

Source: Ahn (1978), Ju and Kim (2006), and Ministry of Government (1977-1995)

Table 7. The Trend of Public Officials Indicted for Corruption in Korea



Source: Ministry of Interior (1954, 1957) and Supreme Prosecutors’ Office (1966-2009)

Note: Ratio A denotes the ratio of the number of public officials indicted for corruption to the total number of people indicted for any crime. Ratio B denotes the ratio of the number of public officials indicted for corruption to the number of public officials indicted for any crime.

1 One can certainly object to using the size of government as a measure of government intervention, but scholars generally agree that governments in Korea and Taiwan heavily intervened in the economy while the role of the Philippine state was not large (Wurfel 1988: 56).

2 Stauffer(1966) found that the proportion of House representatives with a very wealthy family background increased from 21.5 percent in 1946 to 49.9 percent in 1962, and the same proportion for Senators increased from 45.8 percent to 70.8 percent over the same period.

3 Patronage jobs were less crucial to Senators with a nationwide electoral district than to House representatives.

4 According to a survey conducted in 2001 in the Philippines, among the respondents who were offered money for votes, 68 percent of the moderately poor (58-73 percent of the population) and 75 percent of the very poor people (18-32 percent of the population) accepted the offer, compared to 38 percent of the middle class and the rich (7-11 percent of the population) who did so (Schaffer 2007).

5 Under Rhee, a small number of powerful politicians in his Liberal Party enjoyed the privilege of dispensing patronage jobs. During the democratic Chang administration, there was discussion of allowing each member of National Assembly to recommend two eligible candidates for his or her district to the state bureaucracy, which was criticized by the public. Under Park, patronage appointments were largely given to the military officers. The scope of patronage appointment in Korea, however, was far smaller than that in the Philippines.

6 According to Milne (1968), the index of campaign expenditure (cost per vote/industrial hourly wage) for the Philippines in 1961 was 16. The same index for Korea in 1963 was between 2.7 (lowest estimate) and 10 (highest estimate), according to Lee and Kim (1969).

7 The most salient issue in Taiwanese politics has been national identity and the cross-strait relations. Recently, socio-economic issues have been becoming salient as well.

1   2   3   4


The database is protected by copyright ©essaydocs.org 2016
send message

    Main page