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Proliferation

Nuclear Proliferation

No Chance of Nuclear arms race because of the Iran Deal


Talev and Keane, 7-14, - [Margaret Talev, award-winning journalist who specializes in writing about American politics, White House Correspondent for Bloomberg News, Angela Keane, Reporter for Bloomberg News, Iran Deal Ends Possibility of Mideast Arms Race, Obama Says, Bloomberg Politics, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-07-14/iran-deal-closes-possibility-of-mideast-arms-race-obama-says] Jeong

A historic deal with Iran will close off any possibility the country can develop nuclear weapons, President Barack Obama said, vowing to veto any congressional effort to block its implementation. The accord, which will take months to put in place, will stand as one of the chief foreign policy accomplishments of Obama’s two terms. He said the agreement will halt a potential arms race in the Middle East. “This deal demonstrates that American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change, change that makes our country safer and more secure,” Obama said Tuesday at the White House, flanked by Vice President Joe Biden. In exchange for lifting painful economic sanctions on Iran, which holds the world’s fourth-largest oil reserves and second-largest natural gas deposits, the Islamic Republic is agreeing to restrictions and inspections intended to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. Before taking effect, the agreement must survive a political battle in the U.S. Opponents will press Congress to block it, while Republicans want to weaken Democrat Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential bid by linking the former secretary of state with an agreement they say offers too many concessions to Iran, endangering the U.S. and Israel. In his remarks, Obama admonished lawmakers to “consider the alternative.” War Risk “No deal means no lasting constraints on Iran’s nuclear program,” he said. “No deal means a greater chance of war in the Middle East.” He spoke in the White House’s Cross Hall, a wide, red-carpeted hallway in the middle of the mansion. Obama has chosen the setting for several major public addresses, including the announcement of Osama bin Laden’s death in 2011. The sanctions relief is contingent on Iran complying with terms of the agreement, according to a copy of the accord obtained by Bloomberg News. Iran agreed to cut 98 percent of its enriched uranium stockpile and eliminate two thirds of its centrifuges. “That stockpile will be reduced to a fraction of what would be required for a single nuclear weapon,” Obama said. Provisions of the agreement allowing inspections of Iranian nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency are permanent, he said. Opposition Mounts Even before the deal was finalized, opposition mounted in Congress. Criticism escalated Tuesday after details were released. “I would like a diplomatic solution to Iran’s ambitions, but this is not a solution, this is pouring gas on a fire,” Senator Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican running for president, said in a phone interview. “The deal will not stand scrutiny. Anyone who votes for this deal is voting to give Iran money for their nuclear war machine.” A Graham spokeswoman didn’t respond to an e-mail asking whether he had read the agreement before drawing his conclusions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who warned against deal-making with Iran in a March address to Congress, excoriated the agreement soon after its announcement on Tuesday. “World powers have made far-reaching concessions in all areas that were supposed to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability,” he said on Twitter.

No risk of nuclear prolif – Multiple reasons


Bano, 6-12 – [Saira Bano, PhD candidate in the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, 6-12-2015, A Nuclear Iran will not Lead to an Arms Race, International Policy Digest, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/06/12/a-nuclear-iran-will-not-lead-to-an-arms-race/] Jeong

George Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State, once said, “Proliferation begets proliferation.” The possession of nuclear weapons or nuclear capability by a rival state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them. It is often argued that possession of a nuclear capability by Iran would lead to a nuclear cascade in the region. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey are likely to acquire nuclear technology if Iran is allowed to have sensitive nuclear technology – enrichment and reprocessing technology. This argument overlooks the international and domestic factors that point to the fact that the nuclear domino rarely falls. Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons failed to bring about a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and Iran’s nuclear capability is also unlikely to have a domino effect in the region. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey are often cited as likely to proliferate, but all of them either lack domestic capability or are bound by international factors that prevent them from acquiring nuclear capability. Saudi Arabia is often cited as likely to acquire nuclear capability after the Iranian nuclear deal. Of the three most frequently identified potential proliferators, Riyadh is perhaps the most likely one. Saudi Arabia and Iran have a relatively antagonistic relationship. The Shiite mullahs who came to power in Iran’s Islamic revolution and the Sunni Saudi rulers have long been antagonistic toward each other. Saudi Arabia provided substantial financial assistance to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. It opposed the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, to remove Saddam Hussian because Riyadh saw Saddam as a counter balance against Tehran and his removal would likely result in Iran’s domination of the region. Riyadh is against the Obama administration’s nuclear negotiation with Tehran because a nuclear Iran will become increasingly aggressive with its regional hegemony. Saudi King Salman did not attend the summit hosted by President Obama to build Arab support for Iran’s nuclear deal to demonstrate his displeasure. Saudi Arabia is threatening to acquire nuclear technology if Iran is allowed to have enrichment technology. These concerns were further fueled when Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former head of Saudi intelligence warned, “I’ve always said whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same” and “if Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to whatever level, it’s not just Saudi Arabia that’s going to ask for that.” In 2008 Riyadh signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States in which it agreed not to pursue enrichment technology. Now if Riyadh wants to obtain enrichment technology it either has to build it domestically or get it from the international market. Saudi Arabia has little nuclear infrastructure. For this reason, it is often suggested that were Saudi Arabia to attempt to obtain nuclear weapons, it would be more likely to obtain nuclear technology and perhaps even weapons outright from Pakistan. Saudi Arabia provided substantial funds to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Recently, Pakistan adopted a neutral position in the Yemen crisis, as aligning with Saudi Arabia would have risked sectarian conflicts within Pakistan because of its minority Shi’ite population, approximately twenty percent. Pakistan also shares a border with Iran and it is unlikely to antagonize its neighbor with a Shi’ite population at home. Pakistan is already under immense pressure to ensure the nonproliferation of its nuclear weapons after Pakistani nuclear scientist A Q Khan’s involvement in the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Pakistan’s nuclear program is India-centric and Islamabad has a strong strategic incentive not to transfer its weapons to Riyadh and avoid opening up a second front by becoming involved in the Saudi-Iranian conflict. This means either Saudi Arabia has to build its own enrichment technology or buy if from somewhere else. In the first option, Riyadh has a rudimentary nuclear infrastructure and it might take two to three decades to build this technology. In the second option, it is hard for Saudi Arabia to buy enrichment technology from the international market. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) prohibits its 49 members from selling enrichment technology to a state that might risk the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is evident that Riyadh is interested in obtaining nuclear weapons and any would-be nuclear-seller would be under intense international pressure not to sell this technology. There are four states with enrichment technology outside the NSG: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. India is bidding for NSG membership and has always been proud of its impeccable record of not transferring its nuclear technology. New Delhi is highly unlikely to jeopardize its NSG membership for Saudi Arabia. Pakistan is also demanding a NSG waiver like India and has a strong interest in improving its international image already plagued by the A Q Khan revelations. There are rumors in the media that Israel might transfer its nuclear weapons to Riyadh after Iran’s deal, but such prospects are highly unlikely. Israel maintains nuclear opacity and by transferring its technology would further deteriorate its relations with the United States. At the 2015 NPT review conference Washington again blocked the resolution for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ) that would have singled out Tele Aviv to give up its nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea there is no self-evident link between Riyadh and Pyongyang. North Korea is already under tight international scrutiny and any transfer would prompt intelligence interception and international action. Egypt is another likely proliferator after the Iranian deal. If Egypt did little in response to Israel’s nuclear weapons, especially in the 1960’s when the rivalry was particularly intense, it is not clear why it should be expected to respond more robustly to Iran now. Cairo’s main security concern is Israel’s nuclear weapons. It explored the nuclear weapons program of its own, but ultimately abandoned it. It realized that its security is better served by pursuing a MENWFZ instead of involving itself in a nuclear arms race. Relations between Tehran and Cairo gradually improved through the 1990’s and there is little question that Egypt is extremely concerned about Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology. Cairo’s main concern is Israel’s nuclear weapons and to counter that threat it is advocating for a MENWFZ. In addition to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Turkey is often cited as likely to proliferate in response to Iran. It does not have an outright antagonistic relationship with Iran and relations are presently more constructive than antagonistic. Ankara also has limited nuclear infrastructure, and a strong security relationship with Washington as a NATO member. In the near term this appears an exceptionally unlikely outcome for Ankara to acquire nuclear weapons. Turkey certainly appears to be concerned by Iran’s nuclear capability, not because of its direct security or prestige ramifications for Ankara, but because of its potential to provoke regional conflict and instability. Turkey has a close relationship with the United States, as a member of NATO, with U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil, and possessing a formal nuclear security guarantee from the United States. Given Turkey’s not outright antagonistic relationship with Iran, its limited nuclear infrastructure and still good alliance relationship with the United States, Ankara appears to be unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons in response to Iran. There are strong chances that Iran and P5+1 will conclude a comprehensive nuclear deal in which Tehran is allowed to have limited enrichment technology with intrusive IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspections. If Iran violates the negotiated agreement and develops nuclear weapons there are ample chances that it would result in a nuclear arms race in the region. Iran’s nuclear program constrained by a nuclear deal with the international community is unlikely to cause a nuclear cascade in the region.

No nuclear prolif – US and Russia check


Gelb, 6-9 – [Leslie H. Gelb, Former correspondent and columnist for The New York Times, a former senior Defense and State Department official, and is currently President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, PhD from Harvard, Russia and America: Toward a New Détente, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-america-toward-new-detente-13077?page=3] Jeong

Maintaining nuclear parity with the United States was the first and last priority of the plan. It was also relatively easy because Moscow had the nuclear missiles and technology in hand. To compensate for weakened conventional capabilities, in 1993, Moscow revoked the Soviet Union’s long-standing promise of no first use. During this time, however, Russian leaders continued to work with the West on mitigating the risk of nuclear accidents, on securing so-called loose nukes, and especially on consolidating the nuclear weapons that were spread around former Soviet republics into Russia’s hands. Significantly, Moscow and Washington continued to coordinate closely to prevent nuclear proliferation.

No prolif – NPT solves


Horovitz 14 [Liviu, PhD Candidate at the ETH Zurich, he held a research position within the nuclear-policy working group at the Center for Security Studies in Zruich, "Beyond Pessimis: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse", Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015, www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2014.917971] // SKY

*NPT = Non-Proliferation Treaty



This article has built a case against prevailing pessimistic assumptions. It argued that the NPT is unlikely to be fundamentally affected by, for example, the continuous absence of nuclear disarmament, discontent with limited sharing of nuclear technology, or political discrimination against the treaty’s members. However, nuclear proliferation, rising challengers and a deterioration of its enforcement have the potential to compromise the treaty. Nevertheless, this article argued that such developments are improbable in the foreseeable future. This in turn has a number of implications for (1) policy and (2) research. From a policy perspective, it is suggested that while current difficulties may derail the diplomatic process, they will not fundamentally impact upon the treaty itself. Unfulfilled promises do generate both genuine discontent and enable potential spoiler states to exploit NPT meetings for their own ends. For instance, the disappointing level of progress on disarmament steps following the US President’s Prague speech and Washington’s reluctance to deliver the regional disarmament meeting agreed upon in 2010 not only resulted in widespread disillusionment with the NPT process, but also allowed Egypt to use the NPT to express its own dissatisfaction with US policy in the Middle East.99 In the current context, a successful 2015 conference seems doubtful.100 Repeated failure of NPT meetings might endanger a diplomatic process useful to most treaty members. However, despite various actors fretting over the survival of the treaty in order to further their own political agendas, in practice the future of the NPT appears to be much less dependent on the diplomatic process than most observers suggest. Therefore, whether the current US-Iran negotiations succeed or fail will have little impact on the NPT’s existence. Nevertheless, when asking whether the NPT is set to ‘die’, this article set a high threshold of disaster for assessing the treaty’s failure: mere survival. Yet, while most states benefit from its mere existence, many might not be content with having the treaty solely survive. Once their diplomats concluded the treaty was here to stay, they might desire an effective instrument serving their often conflicting goals: for instance, some might want a legitimate non-proliferation tool; others a solid reassurance instrument; and again others a credible platform for advancing tertiary interests. To all these ends, this article suggests that states would be best served by a well-functioning process. Thus, they are better advised to strive for a less-ambitious agenda, populated by carefully negotiated compromises over deliverable minutiae, and not by empty declarations of intent. On the one hand, optimistic rhetoric and the promise of future action can deliver agreement at a review conference. On the other hand, the damage generated by subsequent scarce results and unfulfilled promises might outweigh the previously achieved diplomatic gains. These findings also suggest a number of avenues for future research. First, while pessimistic assessments often form the basis of most research on the NPT, this does not need to be the case. Indeed, there are few reasons for scholars to assume that a pressing need to devise new reform strategies or alternatives to the treaty exists. To the contrary, scholars concerned with the dangers posed by the continuous existence of nuclear weapons can rest assured the NPT is stable and focus on developing bolder solutions towards nuclear disarmament.101 Second, this article makes clear how limited our knowledge on the origins of past and current interactions within the NPT is. Thus, more detailed historical research into this area is long overdue, particularly when it comes to why various states joined the NPT, why they continue to adhere to the treaty, and what diverse interests they pursue within the agreement’s framework. Such work would hopefully enable international relations scholars to further refine their theories attempting to explain the complex functioning of this agreement.
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