Impact Defense African Instability



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Indo-Sino War

No Impact

No escalation – The US will intervene to deter any conflicts


Uniyal, 4-25 – [Vijeta Uniyal, Graduate from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and worked for more than 10 years in international organizations including the German Foreign Office, Goethe-Institut and Humboldt-Foundation, Contributing Editor for the UK-based Commentator and Fellow of the Lawfare Project, 4-25-2015, Don’t Worry, Obama, India’s Got Your Back, http://www.whyisrael.org/2015/04/27/dont-worry-obama-indias-got-your-back/] Jeong

India is now evacuating U.S. citizens from Yemen. Yes, Yemen, a country overrun by ans Iranian-backed militia, or as U.S. President Barack Obama likes to call it, “a counterterrorism success story.” In a statement issued on April 9, 2015, the U.S. State Department asked the remaining U.S. citizens in Yemen to contact the Indian Embassy in Sana’a or approach the Indian Navy ship in the port of Aden. According to latest figures, India helped 1,000 foreign nationals from 41 countries to escape from Yemen. Two weeks ago, Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi left the country on a boat from Aden, as the Iranian-backed Shiite Houthi militia consolidated their control of the country, bringing a fourth Arab capital under the direct influence of Iran. If India’s rescue operation is a testament to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s success in turning India around, it is also an indictment of President Obama’s foreign policy. Less than a year ago, Prime Minister Modi was elected to lead the country after a decade of a stagnant economy and rising lawlessness. Under Modi’s leadership, India has seen a rise in foreign investment; in 2014, the country’s economic growth was 7.5%, higher than that of China. The mainstream media now begrudgingly acknowledges Modi’s success — the same media that tried to smear his candidacy during the 2014 elections and, when everything else failed, dubbed him “anti-Muslim.” Prime Minister Modi is rebuilding the Indian economy by reducing government spending, deregulating industry, easing labour laws, and cutting taxes on the middle-class and businesses — quintessential American values. President Obama on the other hand inherited a country built on values in which he doesn’t believe. Only a “fundamental transformation” could reconcile him with his country. The geopolitical vacuum that President Obama is leaving behind has emboldened expansionist regimes and destructive ideologiesfrom the Mediterranean to the South China Sea. Indians of my father’s generation still fondly remember that President Kennedy had come to India’s aid to end the Chinese war of aggression in 1962. In order to deter China from escalating the conflict, he dispatched a U.S. aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal, in an apparent plan to deploy U.S. troops stationed in the Philippines. As a result, China halted the offensive and apologized for the “misunderstanding.” But those were different times and those were different presidents — presidents who would not have idly watched their envoy slaughtered, traded the enemy’s top brass for runaway soldiers, or outsourced the safety of U.S. citizens in war-ravaged foreign lands. That the Obama Administration was not going to rescue stranded U.S. citizens in Yemen should not come as a surprise. The Administration watched as Iranian-backed militias disarmed U.S. Marines and seized embassy vehicles, before the diplomatic staff was let out of the country in early February. However, the Indian government and defense forces deserve due credit for conducting a well-organized rescue operation. Prime Minister Modi faces daunting challenges as he sets about modernizing India. The economic success of his political agenda once again proves that good old capitalism and industrialization are still the only way to lift millions of people out of poverty. As President Obama refuses to lead the Free World, other world leaders are rising up to speak for it — Canada’s Stephen Harper, Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu and now India’s Narendra Modi.

India won’t go to war with China – US-Indo relations are high now


White, 3-15 – [Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, 3-15-2015, Sorry, America: India Won't Go to War with China, The National Interest, http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/sorry-america-india-wont-go-war-china-12415] Jeong

In his latest contribution to our debate, Shashank Joshi raised some excellent points against my skeptical view of the emerging India-U.S. strategic partnership. But I'm still unpersuaded. To explain why, it helps to step back and clarify the question we are debating here. It is not whether strategic relations between Delhi and Washington have grown closer in recent years, because clearly they have. It is what these closer relations mean for the geo-political contest between America and China. India's position is clearly important to this contest. Many Americans, and many of America's friends in Asia, have long believed that India's growing wealth and power will be vital in helping America counterbalance China's growing strategic weight, and resist China's challenge to U.S. regional leadership. Indeed, the belief many people have that India will play this role is central to their confidence that America can and will preserve the status quo against China's challenge. It is therefore important to decide whether the progress we have seen in U.S.-India relations justifies that confidence. I have argued that in a geopolitical contest of the kind we see unfolding between America and China today, India's relations with America will only make a difference to the extent that India is seen to be willing to support America in a U.S.-China conflict. That is because who wins the contest between the American and Chinese visions of Asia's future order ultimately depends on which is seen to be more willing to fight for their vision. Each power wants the other to believe that it will go to war to impose its vision, and hopes that, if all else fails, this will persuade the other to back off. This way of describing what is happening will surprise those who think that this kind of old-fashioned power politics disappeared after 1989, but it seems to me the only way to understand events in Asia today. In fact, power politics never went away; people simply started to think that America was the only power that was indulging in it. It has been taken for granted that America will fight to support its vision of regional order, but that no one would be willing to oppose them. Now China is proving that false. We can no longer assume that China isn’t any more determined to change the current order than America is to preserve it. That is why India's role in this contest depends on how far it appears willing and able to materially support the U.S. in a conflict with China. In a game played for these stakes, nothing less counts for much. As I read him, Shashank makes two key points about this question. One is that, while India might not be willing to send combat forces to fight alongside America's in a coalition against China, it would provide other, non-combat support such as basing and refuelling facilities. That sounds like what the diplomats call “all support short of actual help.” It would do very little either practically or symbolically to bolster America's position against China, and certainly much less than American boosters of the relationship expect. His second key point is that perhaps India would be willing to provide America with more substantial support if it saw really fundamental issues of regional order at stake in a U.S.-China conflict. He cites the example of the wide support given to America in opposing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by countries who saw basic questions of international order being tested there. I agree with Shashank that very important issues for India would be at stake in a U.S.-China clash. But deciding to support America against China would be much harder than joining the coalition against Iraq. In every way China is both a much more valuable partner and a much more dangerous adversary. The key question for India, and for America's other friends in Asia, is what would have to be at stake for them to make that decision? So it boils down to this: would India go to war with China to help America preserve the current order based on U.S. primacy? If the answer is no, then I don't think the new warmth between America and India matters much to the future of Asia, and America's position in Asia is rather weaker than most people assume.
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