Hegemony da ddi 2010 1 Hegemony Generic



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Afghanistan Aff
Withdrawal reduces opposition towards American power
Brian M. Downing is the author of several works of political and military history, including The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam, “Leaving Afghanistan

“,11/3/09, http://agonist.org/brian_downing/20091102/leaving_afghanistan//avi)



Warnings of dire consequences following a US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan are not convincing.  Indeed, the US will benefit from leaving. An Afghan pullout, along with the already mandated one from Iraq, would ease anti-western sentiment in the Islamic world and greatly weaken support for al Qaeda and kindred Islamist terrorist groups that thrive on the presence of foreign troops in the region. As paradoxical as it might appear to political leaders and to believers in the universal utility of might, a lower profile in the Islamic world would serve American interests and improve their national security. And of course Americans would benefit from suffering far fewer casualties in a distant and probably un-winnable war.

Afghanistan Aff
The US has too many different forces in Afghanistan—none of them are necessary
Carl Robichaud is a program officer at The Century Foundation, "Overstaying Our Welcome in Afghanistan?", 5/26/05, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1013

Afghan President Hamid Karzai's request to President Bush this week for greater control over American troops in his country cuts to several central questions: what foreign presence is appropriate in Afghanistan? Who should run these foreign troops, and to whom should they remain accountable? Are they there to preserve Afghan security and fight terrorism, or for other purposes as well? Karzai is not the first to voice skepticism about the U.S. military's long-term role in the region. To many allies and competitors, the U.S. force posture seems incongruent with the threat. In Afghanistan alone, the Pentagon leads a coalition of 18,000 troops (16,700 of them American), ostensibly to combat a dwindling Taliban insurgency of perhaps a thousand militants. The mandate of these troops is to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban; they do not play a role in counternarcotics operations, and are only peripherally involved in providing security for Afghan citizens. Rather than decreasing in size in the four years since the defeat of the Taliban, coalition forces almost doubled in the past year from a low of 10,000.

Iraq Aff
FIRST STEP TO REPAIR AMERICAN IMAGE AND HEGEMONY IS IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

Odom, 7(William E, Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army Adjunct Professor of Political Science Yale University, American Hegemony, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY VOL. 151, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007, http://www.amphilsoc.org/sites/default/files/1510403.pdf)



As a spectacular example of how to squander American hegemony— fiscally, militarily, politically, and morally—the war in Iraq will probably turn out to be the greatest strategic mistake in American history. Can we still save the American empire? Or is it too late? We can, but we must act soon. The first step must be withdrawal from Iraq. That invasion was never in American interests. Rather, it advanced the interests of Iran by avenging Saddam’s invasion of that country. And it advanced al Qaeda’s interests by making Iraq open for its cadres. They are killing both Americans and Iraqis there in growing numbers, and taking their newly gained skills to other countries. Many reports suggest that al Qaeda was in desperate condition by spring 2002 and that only after the U.S. invasion of Iraq did its recruiting powers recover and its funding sources replenish its coffers. Apparently, President Bush came to Osama bin Laden’s rescue in his nadir. The irony would be comical if it were not so tragic. All the debate today over the tactical mistakes we have made in Iraq is beside the point. All of the unhappy consequences were destined to occur once the invasion started. Most worrisome, the war has paralyzed the United States strategically. The precondition for regaining diplomatic and military mobility is withdrawal, no matter what kind of mess is left behind. The United States bears the blame for it, but it cannot avoid the consequences by “staying the course.” Every day we remain on that course increases the costs and makes the eventual defeat larger. Only after the United States withdraws can it possibly rally sufficient international support to prevent the spread of the damage beyond the region, and it might bring some order to the region as well. It cannot do that, however, unless it alters or abandons at least five of its present policies, policies that have become so perverse that they are generating the very things they were meant to prevent. The first is our nuclear nonproliferation policy. It was meant to maintain regional stability. Our pursuit of it has accelerated proliferation and created instability. The lesson that Iran and others must draw is that if they acquire nuclear weapons, Washington will embrace them, as it has India and Pakistan. Earlier, the United States let Israel proliferate, and that adds to the incentives for all Arab states to proliferate as well. Our nonproliferation policy in Northeast Asia has worsened our relations with South Korea to the point of pushing Seoul toward the Chinese security orbit. At the same time, it has allowed North Korea to diminish U.S. influence in the region while China has increased its own. That opens the path to a unified Korea without U.S. troops and with nuclear weapons, a sure formula for prompting Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons. The second perverse policy is the so-called “global war on terrorism.” As many critics have pointed out, terrorism is not an enemy. It is a tactic. The United States has a long record of supporting terrorists and using terrorist tactics. The slogans of the war on terrorism today merely make the United States look hypocritical to the rest of the world. A prudent American president would end the present policy of “sustained hysteria,” order the removal of most of the new safety barriers in Washington and elsewhere, treat terrorism as a serious but not a strategic problem, encourage Americans to regain their confidence, and refuse to let al Qaeda keep us in a state of fright. The third perverse policy, spreading democracy, is a very bad practice. By now, it should be clear why I say so. We should try to spread constitutional order, not democracy, which, if it is implemented before a constitution is truly accepted, is almost certain to be illiberal, allowing varying degrees of tyranny over minorities. It makes sense to support individual rights and liberties everywhere, but it is wrong-headed to assume that democratic voting procedures—easy to implement— will assure such liberties. The fourth misguided policy is the Defense Department’s military redeployment plans. They are hollowing out NATO long before new members in Eastern Europe have achieved constitutional breakthroughs and transformed their militaries. Europe may create its own unified military over time, but the European Union is nowhere near that goal today. NATO, therefore, remains critical for Europe’s internal and external security. Its influence and political capacity are directly proportional to the size of U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Finally, the energy policy of “no energy policy” ensures more shocks ahead while funneling trillions of dollars into the hands of those in the Middle East and Southwest Asia who may not wish us well. And it emboldens Russian leaders smarting with feelings of acute imperial nostalgia. A serious energy policy would include putting several dollars’ tax on every gallon of motor fuel. The resulting revenue could be put into american hegemony a Manhattan Project–like crash program to find other kinds of energy for motor transport and to invigorate the nuclear power industry with safer technology and increased efficiency. It could also be used to modernize the railways, letting high-speed trains drain off air passenger traffic from air travel, especially on the East and West Coasts and between several large midwestern and southwestern cities. As these issues reveal, the accumulating undesirable consequences of America’s unilateralist diplomacy, its war policies, and its neglect of the more important foreign and domestic challenges may have already reached a point where American hegemony is irreversibly waning. Yet I believe it is still worth trying to save it. American power has been used to achieve a remarkable amount of good in the world since World War II. We are now seeing that it can also be used to cause a lot of evil. I do not subscribe to the oft-voiced view that the only way to prevent its use for the latter end is to weaken it dramatically and thereby remove the temptation. Were that to happen, not only Americans but many others in the world would be the poorer for it.

Iraq Aff


Iraq withdrawal doesn’t decrease US legitimacy

Press 2008( Daryl G., Associate Professor of Government, Department of Government, Dartmouth College, SSP interview, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/alumni/Daryl_Press_spotlight.html)

A military withdrawal from Iraq would not be particularly damaging to U.S. credibility. When leaders face a key decision, they evaluate their adversaries' and allies' credibility by weighing the interests at stake for each party, and the capabilities each side brings to the table. Leaders usually make a simple and wise calculation: they assume that countries will defend their interests if they have the power to do so.

What this means is that if we withdraw from Iraq, we must explain very clearly what our key interests are in the region, and that we have more than enough military capability to defend those interests. America's two key interests in the Gulf are ensuring the free flow of oil and preventing the conquest of any of the region's major producers. Our naval and air forces are more than sufficient for those objectives. It would be foolhardy for any enemy to conclude that because we are bad at counter-insurgency and nation building, we are unable to protect important energy interests in the Gulf. I am confident that the United States can articulate this message in a very persuasive fashion, even if we leave Iraq .
Iraq Aff
Maintaining forces in Iraq undermines US hegemony
Paul G. Frost is a Program Officer at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, "Unintended Consequences of an Expanded U.S. Military Presence in the Muslim World", Spring 2003, http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/military.pdf//avi

A number of participants argued that expanded military presence in the Muslim world has a number of downsides for the U.S. First, several members argued that by occupying Iraq, we have taken a step down a “slippery slope” of empire, while lacking the human and political capital to sustain or even complete what we have begun in Iraq and Afghanistan. One member commented that the U.S. is acting like an “angry giant” and predicted that at some point global sentiment toward the U.S. will turn from fear and respect to resentment, dissipating our ability to influence and inspire throughout the globe. Another member countered that while the U.S. does not seek empire, it does seek the ability to confront and deal with threats wherever they appear, which is a reason for devising ways to send troops to faraway places without necessarily being stationed there permanently. Second, some members argued that the current approach is too heavily geared toward an unending, worldwide war against terror in which we will never be completely successful. Yet threats and problems other than terrorism remain. Prior to September , the administration was focused on China as an emerging threat. Worrisome trends of failing states in Africa and Latin America continue to multiply. However, we seem fixated on preparing for possible smaller wars in the “arc of instability” that runs from the Andean region in the Southern Hemisphere through North Africa to the Middle East and into Southeast Asia. As a result, our course could be in a state of continuous flux, driven by events as viewed through the single lens of countering terrorism. U.S. military deployment in Muslim nations relates to the larger debate about U.S. hegemony and a possible realignment of power. Several participants voiced concern that the reality of U.S. hegemony, when combined with a certain arrogance of tone and style, led to the trans-Atlantic dispute over Iraq, and could spawn the forming of alignments of different states opposing U.S. hegemony. One member suggested that the administration should more readily acknowledge allied cooperation — particularly from “old” Europe — in law enforcement and intelligence sharing against terrorist groups. Several members argued that NATO could play a strong role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq, in addition to being a force for stability throughout the region, if the U.S. can win over the most influential members in the Organization. Another participant argued that, despite the trans-Atlantic crisis over Iraq, the Bush team has been able to maintain fairly good relations with all of the world’s major powers. This has enabled the administration to press forward on many major issues such as North Korea and the Middle East peace process. In sum, as another participant noted, it is still possible for the U.S. to pursue both liberal internationalism and realism at the same time.



Iraq Aff
Withdrawal key to US legitimacy

Odom, 7(William E, Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army Adjunct Professor of Political Science Yale University, American Hegemony, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY VOL. 151, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007, http://www.amphilsoc.org/sites/default/files/1510403.pdf)



As a spectacular example of how to squander American hegemony— fiscally, militarily, politically, and morally—the war in Iraq will probably turn out to be the greatest strategic mistake in American history. Can we still save the American empire? Or is it too late? We can, but we must act soon. The first step must be withdrawal from Iraq. That invasion was never in American interests. Rather, it advanced the interests of Iran by avenging Saddam’s invasion of that country. And it advanced al Qaeda’s interests by making Iraq open for its cadres. They are killing both Americans and Iraqis there in growing numbers, and taking their newly gained skills to other countries. Many reports suggest that al Qaeda was in desperate condition by spring 2002 and that only after the U.S. invasion of Iraq did its recruiting powers recover and its funding sources replenish its coffers. Apparently, President Bush came to Osama bin Laden’s rescue in his nadir. The irony would be comical if it were not so tragic. All the debate today over the tactical mistakes we have made in Iraq is beside the point. All of the unhappy consequences were destined to occur once the invasion started. Most worrisome, the war has paralyzed the United States strategically. The precondition for regaining diplomatic and military mobility is withdrawal, no matter what kind of mess is left behind. The United States bears the blame for it, but it cannot avoid the consequences by “staying the course.” Every day we remain on that course increases the costs and makes the eventual defeat larger. Only after the United States withdraws can it possibly rally sufficient international support to prevent the spread of the damage beyond the region, and it might bring some order to the region as well. It cannot do that, however, unless it alters or abandons at least five of its present policies, policies that have become so perverse that they are generating the very things they were meant to prevent. The first is our nuclear nonproliferation policy. It was meant to maintain regional stability. Our pursuit of it has accelerated proliferation and created instability. The lesson that Iran and others must draw is that if they acquire nuclear weapons, Washington will embrace them, as it has India and Pakistan. Earlier, the United States let Israel proliferate, and that adds to the incentives for all Arab states to proliferate as well. Our nonproliferation policy in Northeast Asia has worsened our relations with South Korea to the point of pushing Seoul toward the Chinese security orbit. At the same time, it has allowed North Korea to diminish U.S. influence in the region while China has increased its own. That opens the path to a unified Korea without U.S. troops and with nuclear weapons, a sure formula for prompting Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons. The second perverse policy is the so-called “global war on terrorism.” As many critics have pointed out, terrorism is not an enemy. It is a tactic. The United States has a long record of supporting terrorists and using terrorist tactics. The slogans of the war on terrorism today merely make the United States look hypocritical to the rest of the world. A prudent American president would end the present policy of “sustained hysteria,” order the removal of most of the new safety barriers in Washington and elsewhere, treat terrorism as a serious but not a strategic problem, encourage Americans to regain their confidence, and refuse to let al Qaeda keep us in a state of fright. The third perverse policy, spreading democracy, is a very bad practice. By now, it should be clear why I say so. We should try to spread constitutional order, not democracy, which, if it is implemented before a constitution is truly accepted, is almost certain to be illiberal, allowing varying degrees of tyranny over minorities. It makes sense to support individual rights and liberties everywhere, but it is wrong-headed to assume that democratic voting procedures—easy to implement— will assure such liberties. The fourth misguided policy is the Defense Department’s military redeployment plans. They are hollowing out NATO long before new members in Eastern Europe have achieved constitutional breakthroughs and transformed their militaries. Europe may create its own unified military over time, but the European Union is nowhere near that goal today. NATO, therefore, remains critical for Europe’s internal and external security. Its influence and political capacity are directly proportional to the size of U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Finally, the energy policy of “no energy policy” ensures more shocks ahead while funneling trillions of dollars into the hands of those in the Middle East and Southwest Asia who may not wish us well. And it emboldens Russian leaders smarting with feelings of acute imperial nostalgia. A serious energy policy would include putting several dollars’ tax on every gallon of motor fuel. The resulting revenue could be put into american hegemony a Manhattan Project–like crash program to find other kinds of energy for motor transport and to invigorate the nuclear power industry with safer technology and increased efficiency. It could also be used to modernize the railways, letting high-speed trains drain off air passenger traffic from air travel, especially on the East and West Coasts and between several large midwestern and southwestern cities. As these issues reveal, the accumulating undesirable consequences of America’s unilateralist diplomacy, its war policies, and its neglect of the more important foreign and domestic challenges may have already reached a point where American hegemony is irreversibly waning. Yet I believe it is still worth trying to save it. American power has been used to achieve a remarkable amount of good in the world since World War II. We are now seeing that it can also be used to cause a lot of evil. I do not subscribe to the oft-voiced view that the only way to prevent its use for the latter end is to weaken it dramatically and thereby remove the temptation. Were that to happen, not only Americans but many others in the world would be the poorer for it.

Iraq aff


IRAQ WITHDRAWAL DOESN’T AFFECT U.S. LEGITIMACY

Press 2008( Daryl G., Associate Professor of Government, Department of Government, Dartmouth College, SSP interview, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/alumni/Daryl_Press_spotlight.html)

A military withdrawal from Iraq would not be particularly damaging to U.S. credibility. When leaders face a key decision, they evaluate their adversaries' and allies' credibility by weighing the interests at stake for each party, and the capabilities each side brings to the table. Leaders usually make a simple and wise calculation: they assume that countries will defend their interests if they have the power to do so.

What this means is that if we withdraw from Iraq, we must explain very clearly what our key interests are in the region, and that we have more than enough military capability to defend those interests. America's two key interests in the Gulf are ensuring the free flow of oil and preventing the conquest of any of the region's major producers. Our naval and air forces are more than sufficient for those objectives. It would be foolhardy for any enemy to conclude that because we are bad at counter-insurgency and nation building, we are unable to protect important energy interests in the Gulf. I am confident that the United States can articulate this message in a very persuasive fashion, even if we leave Iraq .

Iraq Aff – Readiness


Repeated Iraq Tours decrease Morale and Destroy Equipment

Saunders 07( Phillip C., Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, The United States and East Asia after Iraq, https://secure.www.cfr.org/content/meetings/Iraq-Impact/49-1_09_Saunders.pdf)
Washington’s commitments in Iraq may have a longer-term impact on US global military capabilities, which would indirectly affect the US ability to fulfill its security commitments in Asia. Iraq deployments have placed the greatest strains on the army and the marines. Many ground units have completed mul- tiple tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan. The resulting stress on troops and families is having some negative effects on recruitment and retention, although the services have continued to hit their recruitment quotas. Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker has called for an expansion of the size of the army, warning that the Iraq War will break the army unless the active duty force is expanded or the National Guard and reserves are remobilised.15 Over the long run, increased losses of experienced mid-level officers and non-commissioned officers could have a negative impact on US military capabilities. However, repeated tours in Iraq and Afghanistan are also providing extensive combat experience throughout the force, which may help offset the loss of some experi- enced personnel.16 The extended Iraq deployment is taking a toll on equipment as well as troops. Equipment used in Iraq faces intensified maintenance require- ments due to prolonged use in desert conditions; a higher-than-expected operational tempo also means that equipment will need to be replaced sooner than expected. The cost of equipment replacement and a potential expansion in the size of the army will place additional demands on future US military budgets and may limit the
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