Hegemony da ddi 2010 1 Hegemony Generic



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Keeping nuclear weapons in Turkey would bolster Turkey’s support of US interests in Middle East.

Alex Bell, Alexandrap roject manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow and Benjamin Loehrke, research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy.The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey. 23 November 2009. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. “The Status of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”


A prescription for withdrawal. Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior. More largely, if the United States and European Union task Turkey with a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.

Turkey Link – TNWs


Withdrawal of TNWs key to U.S.-Turko-NATO relations

Alexandra Bell et. Al, PhD in Atomic Physics, Bulletin for Atomic Science, “The Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey, November 23, 2009, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey


Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior. More largely, if the United States and European Union task Turkey with a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.

Turkey Link
U.S. military dominance and power projection in the middle East and beyond centers around Turkey.

Barkey 2003(Henri J, Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor at Lehigh University, European Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May, Turkey’s Strategic Future: US Perspective, http://www.eusec.org/barkey.htm)


U.S. interests and objectives in Turkey have steadily expanded since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War's straightjacket has given way to many new considerations. The primary U.S. foreign policy vision after the Cold War was one based on preventing regional disputes from threatening its own and its allies' interests and on expanding market reforms and democratic principles and practices. With no serious Russian threat to European security, U.S. attention shifted to mid-level powers with ambitions to acquire non-conventional weaponry and the means to deliver them, such as Iran and Iraq. This policy vision lacked the simplicity of containment, but it would impact Turkey significantly. Turkey's proximity to many regions in flux or conflict together with Ankara's long standing adherence to NATO alliance helped Washington reinterpret this country's geo-strategic importance. The Iraq War, however, is likely to alter these calculations further.

Simply put, on the eve of the Iraq War Turkey's importance for the United States could be summarized along four dimensions.

First, it served as a potential platform for the projection of U.S. power. Saddam Hussein's resilience in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War had made Ankara essential to sustain the UN sanctions regime and more importantly Washington's containment policy. From the Incirlik base in Turkey, U.S. and British airplanes as part of Operation Northern Watch, routinely patrolled the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in an effort to keep Saddam Hussein's forces away from Kurdish controlled parts of Iraq. It is difficult to see how the United States could have sustained its policy of sanctions, regime isolation, and the protection of the Kurdish population without Turkey's cooperation.

Second, Turkey was a bulwark standing in the way of revisionist regimes such as Iran's, intent on changing the regional landscape. Turkey's strong links to the United States, NATO and the West were in direct opposition to some of the Iranian regime's regional preferences if not designs. Hence even in the event of cordial relations with Ankara, no Iranian government can ignore Turkey's reaction in its regional calculations. The improving relations between Turkey and Israel throughout the 1990s has changed the strategic setting in the Middle East-although much exaggerated by Arab countries-which served to change the perception of Ankara in Washington as a more balanced regional player.

Third, what also made Turkey different and valuable is that it is a NATO ally that takes security seriously; its need for military modernization notwithstanding, Ankara has large numbers of troops under arms which are deployable and is committed to maintaining its spending on defense. Even if the economic crisis has put a dent on its modernization plans, Ankara intends to continue along this path as the April 2003 decision on purchasing AWACS aircraft demonstrates.

Finally, in Washington's perception Turkey represented an alternative and successful path for many countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is a model to be emulated as NATO's only Muslim member and candidate EU member. In addition to its historical ties to the West, Turkey had a vibrant albeit flawed democratic political system and in the 1980s embraced economic liberalization-well ahead of Latin America and save for Israel, the only one in the Middle East.



Ankara's actual contribution to Washington's challenges went well beyond the Middle East. Turks collaborated with the allies in both Bosnia and Kosovo. It steadfastly improved relations with Bulgaria and Romania, took the lead in organizing Black Sea region institutions, and thus proved to be a source of stability in the Balkans. Successive US administrations in the early 1990s encouraged Turkey's efforts to reach out to the Turkic Central Asian countries and the Caucasus to provide them with technical and economic know how not to mention political leadership, all designed to counter growing Iranian and Russian influence in the region. Turkish forces at Washington's request also took part in the ill-fated Somalia operation. Similarly, in April 2002, Washington prevailed upon Ankara to take over the leadership of the Afghan peacekeeping force in Kabul, ISAF.

Turkey Link
Incirlik Air Force Base is pivotal for U.S. power projection.

Johnson, 2009(Chalmers, May 15th, professor emeritus of the University of California, San Diego, Chalmers Johnson on the Cost of Empire, http://www.truthdig.com/arts_culture/page4/20090514_chalmers_johnson_on_the_cost_of_empire/)

The essay by Ayse Gul Altinay and Amy Holmes, “Opposition to the U.S. Military Presence in Turkey in the Context of the Iraq War,” is important for three reasons. First, there is very little published on the bases in Turkey; second, Incirlik Air Base on the outskirts of Adana, Turkey, is the largest U.S. military facility in a strategically vital NATO ally; and third, the decision on March 1, 2003, of the Turkish National Assembly not to deploy Turkish forces in Iraq nor to allow the United States to use Turkey as an invasion route into Iraq was one of the Bush administration’s greatest setbacks. Public opinion polls in January 2003 revealed that 90 percent of Turks opposed U.S. imperialism against Iraq and 83 percent opposed Turkey’s cooperating with the United States. Nonetheless, major U.S. newspapers either ignored or trivialized Turkey’s opposition to U.S. war plans.

Altinay is a professor of anthropology at Sabanci University, Turkey, and the author of “The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Holmes is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the Johns Hopkins University and has written extensively on American bases in Germany and Turkey.

Turkey is not an easy place to do research on American bases. Some 41 percent of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Turkey between 1947 and 1965 were secret. It was not known that the U.S. had stationed missiles on Turkish territory until the U.S. promised to remove them in return for the USSR’s withdrawing its missiles from Cuba. Incirlik became even more central to U.S. strategy after 1974. In that year, Turkey invaded Cyprus and the United States imposed an arms embargo on its ally. As a result, Turkey closed all 27 U.S. bases in the country except for one, Incirlik. As Altinay and Holmes write, “It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the Incirlik Air Base for U.S. power projection in the Middle East, particularly since the early 1990s; for more than a decade, the entire Iraq policy of the United States hinged on Incirlik.” 
Turkey Link
Turkey-US alliance – specifically US presence in Turkey critical to US interests in the Middle East.

Rajan Menon - Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University Fellow, New America Foundation. And S. Enders Wimbush -Director, Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute. 3/25/2007. Hudson Institute. http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf.


If Turkey, a key friend and ally, turns away from the United States, the damage to American interests will be severe and long lasting. Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably even more so than during the Cold War. Here are some of the most important reasons why this is true: • Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. It abuts, or is proximate to, countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security, whether because they are allies and friends, adversaries, or loci of instability. • Turkey’s critical location means that instability within it could spill beyond its borders, with the unpredictable ripple effects traveling across its neighborhood, particularly the Middle East. Turkey sits astride critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles) that are channels for trade and the flow of energy to global markets. • Turkey is a passageway for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and its Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, is the terminus. Turkey is therefore essential to American efforts to reduce the dependence of Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, on Russia’s energy pipelines. • Turkey’s substantial economic and political ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan contribute to the stability of these countries, whose strategic significance far exceeds their standing in commonplace measures of power. Georgia is not only a corridor for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, its stability is under threat because of its testy relationship with Russia and its conflicts with the Russian-supported secessionist statelets, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Azerbaijan is not only a major energy producer, but also a fellow Turkic country, whose territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh could boil over into war, just as it did in the 1990s, possibly igniting a wider conflagration that draws in Turkey (Azerbaijan’s ally) and Russia (Armenia’s patron) and putting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at risk. • Turkey is a democratic and secular Muslim, and its alliance with the United States helps demonstrate that the United States can maintain friendly and productive ties with an array of Muslim countries—that America’s does not oppose Islam per se, but rather the violent extremists who invoke it to justify their violence against innocents and their retrograde, intolerant agenda. This is crucial if the American campaign against terrorism is not to be seen by the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, as Islamic terrorist groups would like it to be, as a war against Islam itself. • Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any durable political settlement in Iraq, particularly because it borders Iraq’s Kurdish north and fears that the emergence there of a Kurdish state would increase the already-considerable violence and resilient separatist sentiment in its own Kurdish-populated southeast. The fragmentation of Iraq could therefore very likely prompt Turkish military intervention, which in turn could deal a death blow to the US-Turkish alliance, perhaps even culminating in Turkey’s exit from NATO. (Turkish forces intervened in northern Iraq to attack the camps of the Kurdish separatist guerillas in the aftermath of the 1991Gulf War; in March 2003 roughly 1,500 Turkish troops entered this region, and Turkish Special Forces have reportedly carried out covert operations in post-Saddam Iraq.) • Turkey’s disillusionment with the West could prompt a reorientation of its foreign policy—away from the United States, the European Union (EU), and NATO, and toward a new multi-azimuth Gaullist strategy that looks to China, India, Iran, Russia, and Syria. Such a shift is already being discussed in Turkey, and the assumption that it amounts to bluff and bluster may prove short-sighted. The new strategic landscape created by the end of the Cold War may pose new threats to Turkey, but it also provides it a choice of new partners as well. While a rethinking of Turkish grand need not in itself undermine the alliance between Turkey and the United States, it could certainly do so if the force driving it is an anti-Western nationalism. • Turkey and the United States both face the threat of terrorism, and Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any truly effective American policy against global terrorist networks. More specifically, Turkey could also serve as a corridor that militant Islamists use to infiltrate Iraq and Turkey’s other neighbors. Turkey’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a military coalition that for a time was commanded by a Turkish general, demonstrates that Ankara and Washington can cooperate in promoting stability and enabling economic development in war-torn countries. This is true even though Turkey’s military forces in Afghanistan are small and are not deployed in the south, the central theater for the anti-Taliban war. (Turkey is no different in this respect than the vast majority of ISAF’s other members.) • Turkey is a member of NATO, and the air bases in its southeast, primarily Incirlik, but also others at Batman, Diyarbakir, Malatya, and Mus remain important to the United States. The value of Turkish airfields was revealed after the 1991 Gulf War, when a no-flight zone was established over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds there from Saddam Hussein’s military machine. Moreover despite Washington’s inability to open a second front from Turkish territory against Iraqi forces in March 2003, American aircraft were permitted to use Turkish airspace for operations in Iraq, and Turkish installations are important for providing logistical support to US forces in Iraq.

Current Commitments Key
Current military commitments key to hegemony

Gates, Robert M. Secretary of Defense. Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age. Foreign Affairs, January 2009. http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2009/01/20090201_20090101_ForeignAffairs_ABalancedStrategy.pdf

The United States' ability to deal with future threats will depend on its performance in current conflicts. To be blunt, to fail -- or to be seen to fail -- in either Iraq or Afghanistan would be a disastrous blow to U.S. credibility, both among friends and allies and among potential adversaries. In Iraq, the number of U.S. combat units there will decline over time -- as it was going to do no matter who was elected president in November. Still, there will continue to be some kind of U.S. advisory and counterterrorism effort in Iraq for years to come. In Afghanistan, as President George W. Bush announced last September, U.S. troop levels are rising, with the likelihood of more increases in the year ahead. Given its terrain, poverty, neighborhood, and tragic history, Afghanistan in many ways poses an even more complex and difficult long-term challenge than Iraq -- one that, despite a large international effort, will require a significant U.S. military and economic commitment for some time. It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future, and the overwhelming majority of people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry do just that. But we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those the United States is in today.

Perception Key
Perception is key—without it enemies will attack the US and allies and destroy hegemony

Paul Craig Roberts. a former Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury and former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal, "American Hegemony Is Not Guaranteed", 4/14/08, http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts244.html)



With Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea threatened by American hegemonic belligerence, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario that would terminate all pretense of American power: For example, instead of waiting to be attacked, Iran uses its Chinese and Russian anti-ship missiles, against which the US reportedly has poor means of defense, and sinks every ship in the American carrier strike forces that have been foolishly massed in the Persian Gulf, simultaneously taking out the Saudi oil fields and the Green Zone in Baghdad, the headquarters of the US occupation. Shi’ite militias break the US supply lines from Kuwait, and Iranian troops destroy the dispersed US forces in Iraq before they can be concentrated to battle strength. Simultaneously, North Korea crosses the demilitarized zone and takes South Korea, China seizes Taiwan and dumps a trillion dollars of US Treasury bonds on the market. Russia goes on full nuclear alert and cuts off all natural gas to Europe. What would the Bush regime do? Wet its pants? Push the button and end the world? If America really had dangerous enemies, surely the enemies would collude to take advantage of a dramatically over-extended delusional regime that, blinded by its own arrogance and hubris, issues gratuitous threats and lives by Mao’s doctrine that power comes out of the barrel of a gun.

Hegemony Good – War

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