Hegemony da ddi 2010 1 Hegemony Generic



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Forward deployment key to prevent Japanese rearmament and Chinese aggression

James, Thompson et al, Senior Research Staff Member, 2002



,Robert J. Atwell, Robert Bovey, William E. Cralley, James Delaney, Michael P. Fischerkeller,

Kongdan Oh Hassig, Charles Hawkins, and Gene Porter, Institute for Defense Analysis, Paper P-3707, “Transforming US Overseas



Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD”, July, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0207thomason.pdf)

“Support for a visible, forward-deployed US force presence will remain strong, both to reassure and to deter.” [p. 53] “there will probably be pressure to reduce those aspects of the US presence especially provocative in a Japanese and South Korean domestic context.” “There will probably be greater overall acceptance of a considerably smaller forward deployed presence, as long as the security alliance with Japan remains intact and some significant US air and naval presence remains based on the Japanese islands.” “Extreme changes would be viewed as highly destabilizing; less drastic reductions will likely produce a more mixed response.” “All changes will require the United States to take a sophisticated approach that employs appropriate compensating policy and program initiatives.” [p. 51]…“The most destabilizing US force posture for Northeast Asia would be …the elimination of virtually all bases in the western Pacific. [p. 53] “…this change would likely produce a range of negative military and political responses—such as pressures in Japan for full-scale rearmament, greater Chinese emphasis on military development, closer RoK political and military association with the former USSR.” “A gradual withdrawal, over a longer period, might produce a less destabilizing set of reactions, but significant tensions would remain—most notably intense rivalry between Japan and Korea and the overall issue of Japanese remilitarization.” [p. 57] In the mid-1990s, Zakheim et al. [1996] conducted an extensive assessment. Based upon a variety of interviews with foreign representatives, they concluded that US presence, especially naval presence, provides strong assurance value to friends and allies in many parts of the world. The study team found that interviewees shared the view that US military presence is crucial to preserving stability, which in turn is crucial to regional economic growth, itself a US economic and national security interest. Many respondents were even more explicit about the linkage between military presence and the preservation, indeed enhancement, of their own and US economic interests. This feeling was said to be widespread throughout each of the regions. In 1995, Thomason et al. found two principal things: first, US allies and friends indicated very clearly that they were more assured by greater, rather than less, US military presence. Second, in some parts of the world (Western Europe and Korea) land-based presence was considered much more helpful, all things considered, than sea-based presence in providing assurance, whereas in other parts of the world (e.g., much of the Persian Gulf), just the opposite appeared to be true. Overall, friends and allies want help, presence, but on their own terms, which means, increasingly, as unobtrusively as possible in most instances; and they want to be recognized as political equals. [p. 8] As a part of the same study, Thomason et al. also conducted off-the-record interviews with approximately three dozen US security experts in the mid-1990s to assess the “assurance” and other values these experts assigned to various levels and types of US presence, power projection capability, and other factors (for a synopsis, see Thomason, 2001). Current and former Service chiefs, commanders in chief of Unified Commands, and other senior policy makers and diplomats were interviewed as to the effectiveness of various kinds of presence and other instruments of national power in promoting the principal objectives of presence. Overall, these US decision-makers saw reassurance of friends and allies as a vital part of our foreign policy and national security strategy. They viewed reassurance as a complex, ongoing process, calling for high-quality and, frequently, high-level attention. They cited continuous, face-to-face involvement and relationships—both military and civilian—as necessary in establishing the trust and understanding that underpins strong friendships, partnerships, and coalitions. Many of the interviewees noted that the establishment of an ongoing dialogue helps both parties to avoid misinterpreting one another’s intentions and contributes to an understanding of the way in which both parties think. Strong personal relationships, while necessary, were by no means viewed as sufficient for reassurance. Most respondents said that an essential part of effective reassurance is a demonstrable, credible US ability to “be there” for friends and allies when they need specific help, and the ability to provide assistance of the right kind at the right time. In short, there was virtual unanimity that some combat-credible presence forces were important to reassurance. A number of respondents mentioned various forms and levels of ground forces as most helpful for reassurance purposes. Others mentioned maritime assets as most helpful. Still others cited the importance of land-based air forces. Among these senior US decision-makers, a firm, widely shared belief was evident: strong, continuous, high-quality personal level interactions and relationships are necessary to promote the reassurance objective. But they are not sufficient. They need to be combined with some regular, credible evidence of US will and ability to be there to help when needed. On this latter point, however, no real consensus was evident regarding the essentiality of any one particular level (or type) of presence forces for effective reassurance. This finding may be explained in part by the possibility that what respondents viewed as “credible” may have been—at least broadly—a function of what they viewed as either the current or latent threat level in a particular region at the time. It may also have been due to genuine uncertainty as to what “works” to offset various perceived threat levels.
Asia Link
U.S. Forward deployment in Asia is critical to sustaining China relations and preventing a war with China

Ashton B. Carter, and William James Perry ( Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) for President Barack Obama, the United States Secretary of Defense from February 3, 1994, to January 23, 1997) 1999 “ Preventive defense: a new security strategy for America” pp102-103



The stability of the Asia-Pacific region depends on a strong forward deployment of U.S. military forces in the absence of a regional collective security institution that would parallel NATO's role in Europe. The U.S. forward deployment would not be possible without the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan. Their friendship with the United States is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the region. This combination has maintained the peace and reduced the perceived necessity for regional arms races. The principles of Preventive Defense remind us not to be complacent about this generally favorable state of affairs, but instead to look ahead and ask what the challenges to this stability might be. There are several areas of risk, including a decline in U.S. willingness to support the forward deployment and the alliances that underlie the stability, growing out of pressure to lower the U.S. defense budget. A second area of danger is the possibility that our allies might become unwilling to carry their share of the costs of sustaining the forward deployment of American forces. That issue has already arisen: in 1995, the U.S.-Japan alliance and basing came under serious criticism in Japan. The differences at that time were resolved by the security affirmation that President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto signed in April 1996. The issue could arise again, however, if the economic problems that Japan and South Korea are now facing were to reduce their ability or willingness to share the expenses of basing U.S. troops on their territory. Third, a destructive regional war would destabilize the region. Although the United States has major forces deployed in and around Korea to help the Republic of Korea deter such a war, this uneasy balance could be upset if North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, or if its regime "imploded" due to the collapse of the North Korean economy. A fourth potential source of regional instability would result if a major military power were to emerge in the region and begin to threaten its neighbors. Some in the West believe that China is headed inevitably in this direction and point to the March 1996 crisis as evidence. The more general fear is that China could go the way of Japan in the 1930s: as Japan increased its economic, political, and military power in the Pacific, this created inevitable conflicts of interest with other Pacific powers, especially the United States. This conflict was not managed well, and the result was a bloody Pacific war. Indeed, China is today increasing its economic, political, and military power in the Pacific, and this has led and will continue to lead to conflicts of interest with other powers in that region, especially the United States and Japan. We believe that this path poses special dangers for American security but that it also provides rich opportunities. A U.S. policy of Preventive Defense is needed to help manage the U.S.-China relationship so that it does not lead to military conflict, but instead serves to strengthen the present stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Asian Deterrence High
Asian Deterrence strong now

Kathleen J. Mclnnis ( coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate at CSIS) 2005 “ Extended Deterrence:The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v028/28.3mcinnis.html


A recent UN report recently warned that "[w]e are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."1 One major challenge to the nonproliferation regime appearing on the strategic horizon is the likely development of an Iranian nuclear capability, which could spark a wave of proliferation throughout the Middle Eastern region. With this in mind, can U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities help bolster the security of U.S. allies against the threats posed by Iranian nuclear proliferation? In addition to deterring its own adversaries, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has in the past played a vital but often overlooked role of reassuring U.S. allies against their adversaries. This assurance was a key tool in preventing nuclear proliferation among allies in the European and Asian theaters during the Cold War, despite the threat posed by the nuclear capabilities of their enemies. In today's security environment, assurance remains an important policy objective for the U.S. arsenal. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review states that "U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners.... This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances."2 Will this strategy work in practice? In the Asian theater, extended deterrence has been effective, and the United States possesses some decent options for ensuring its effectiveness in the future. The long-standing commitment of the United States to the survival of democratic states in the region, reinforced by security treaties with Japan and South Korea, has created a great deal of U.S. political credibility in the region. This political credibility, combined with U.S. military capabilities, [End Page 169] could be employed to deter the North Korean threat and assure U.S. allies in the region, thereby reducing the chance that they will respond to Pyongyang by building their own nuclear weapons program. The U.S. political commitment to its allies in Asia has been and remains robust, bolstered by the U.S. troop presence in Japan and South Korea for the past 50 years. This remains true despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Asian theater. Furthermore, should allies begin to doubt U.S. nuclear assurances, steps can be taken to reinforce the policy's credibility. As such, despite the major challenges presented by Pyongyang's nuclear declaration in February 2005, it is reasonably likely that East Asian allies will continue to choose to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella well into the future rather than set off a regional nuclear domino effect.

Japan Link


US forward deployment key to maintain US primacy and deter China.

Emma Chanlett-Avery - Specialist in Asian Affairs and Weston S. Konishi – Analyst in Asian Affairs. July 23, 2009. Congressional Research Service. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA504451



Although the U.S.-Japan security partnership grew out of a need to contain the Soviet Union and has endured in large part because of North Korea’s threat, many analysts see countering China as the primary driver of the campaign to enhance cooperation today. The U.S. approach to rising China is often characterized by observers as having two prongs that roughly correspond to the “engagement” and “containment” camps. The “engagement” approach includes the “responsible stakeholder” concept outlined most prominently by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, which aims to convince Beijing to contribute peacefully to the international system that has allowed its economic and political rise. The “containment” aspect of U.S. policy seeks to counter a China that could develop in ways inimical to U.S. interests. The U.S.-Japan alliance plays a role in both approaches. In the former, Japan could serve as a model of responsible multilateral engagement as well as a key economic partner for China in the region. In the latter, enhanced joint defense capabilities from neighboring Japan could deter any aggressive behavior by China’s military. U.S. forward deployment in Japan plays a particularly important role in contingency strategies for a conflict with China over Taiwan.
Japan Link
US forward deployment key to US Heg, Eas Asian Security, and to deter China.

Takashi Inoguchi - Japanese academic researcher of foreign affairs and international and global relationships of states. and Paul Bacon - Associate Professor of International Politics, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Japan. September 2005. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/117?rss=1&ssource=mfc


After the cold war, the United States clearly sought to reinforce its hegemonic strategy in East Asia, seeking a special role for itself as the principal guarantor of regional order. The United States could have withdrawn in order to let a local balance of power emerge and undertaken the role of offshore balancer. It could also have promoted multilateral regional security organizations, or sought to construct a regional balance of power that contained China. However, it did none of these things. Mastanduno argues that the United States will retain its preponderant power status in the coming years but that the task of maintaining and completing US regional hegemony will become more difficult. The two biggest challenges that the United States faces are the global war on terror and the management of the rise of China, as a result of which the longer-term prospects for East Asian order are uncertain and problematic. There are two key features of US hegemonic strategy in the region. First, the United States has cultivated a set of bilateral relationships with other key states in the region, the most important and enduring of which have been the ties with Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, the United States has reaffirmed its close partnership with Australia and sought to engage rather than contain China. This preference for a primary set of bilateral relationships is referred to as the ‘hub and spokes’ approach. The second institutional feature of US hegemony has been the US forward presence in the region, and the US intention to maintain a substantial political and military commitment to the region for an ‘indefinite duration’. US hegemonic strategy in the region has contributed to order in several ways. For China, the US presence effectively ‘contains’ Japan, and, similarly, for Japan, the US presence deters China from a bid for regional dominance. The US presence has helped to deter major powers from intensifying dangerous rivalries, and it has, in so doing, reassured smaller states whose security and autonomy would otherwise be threatened by these large states. East Asia is a dangerous neighborhood, in which smaller states must coexist with larger states that have geopolitical ambitions, territorial claims, and a history of enmity. The United States has also worked hard to manage and stabilize regional conflicts that have the potential to develop into local and possibly even systemic wars. In the 1990s, for example, the United States took initiatives in security crises between China and Taiwan, in North Korea, and in the Kashmir conflict. Finally, the United States has striven to discourage nationalist economic competition. It has pushed Japan over domestic economic reform, sought to integrate China into a globalizing world economy, and maintained access to sources of global liquidity and US markets in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. US hegemonic strategy has, therefore, made a substantial contribution to regional order in East Asia, but it also has its limitations. The United States has not sought to definitively resolve the numerous long-standing conflicts in the region, such as those between China and Taiwan, North and South Korea, Japan and China, or Japan and Korea. Rather, the United States has sought to manage relationships and crises and avoid systemic conflict. US hegemony is also incomplete, in the sense that by no means all states accept or approve of US hegemony in the region. Japan does regard the dominant regional role of the United States as constructive and legitimate, but it is also the case that Japan gains more by cooperating with rather than challenging US hegemony. The most important issue, of course, is China's long-term reaction to the US attempt to dominate the region. At present, China is grateful for the benefits of integration, but in the long run it is likely to develop its own aspirations towards and strategies for the construction of regional order.

Japan Link
U.S presence and forward deployment prevents destabilizing conflicts and promotes under-balancing which leads to peace

Dan Twining, staff writer for Foreign Policy, November 10, 2009 “A crib sheet for President Obama's upcoming Asian summitry,”http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/10/a_crib_sheet_for_president_obamas_upcoming_asian_summitry) SM

The American alliance system, and the security guarantees and forward deployment of military forces that underpin it, remain an important stabilizing force in a region experiencing the kind of dynamic shifts in relative power that so often lead to arms racing, regional polarization, and conflict.  In this context, U.S. leadership provides a stabilizing reassurance to Asian states that might otherwise need to pursue destabilizing "self-help" policies in the face of security dilemmas American security guarantees help mitigate. American alliance commitments to Japan, South Korea, and other nations promote what political scientists call "underbalancing" -- regional states enjoying U.S. protection are able to invest more of their national resources in the pursuits of peace rather than preparations for war, which in turn helps reassure their neighbors. Asians are particularly watching to see how President Obama handles conflict with Japan, Washington's most important regional ally, over troop basing rights and other issues. Many Asian states fear that a Japan unshackled from its close alliance with the U.S. would be a destabilizing force in the region -- which is why so many Asian countries applauded the deft alliance management shown by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. The inexperience of the new Japanese government makes this a real challenge for President Obama, who may have to speak past Japan's uncertain leadership and directly to the Japanese public, which overwhelmingly supports a strong U.S. alliance, to rally public support for a stronger and more capable U.S.-Japan security partnership for the 21st century.

Japan Link


US forward delployment in Japan key to maintain its military primacy over China.

Dr. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis- PhD researcher at the Japanology Section of K.U.Leuven. 05-06/2010. http://www.fusl.ac.be/fr/pdf/IEE/Brochures/atanassova_paper.pdf


Strategic mistrust also underpins US-China relations, with the two powers wary of one another’s strategic intentions in East Asia and divided by conflicting regional visions. As in Japan, the “China threat” view in the US has gradually gained ground since the 1990s. Uncertainties concerning Beijing’s both short-term and long-term goals have led to worries in Washington that China, as it becomes stronger, might seek to alter the structure of the regional order, and hence challenge US leadership position, as well as interests, in East Asia.21 In particular, US official documents have stressed that the PRC has the “greatest potential to compete militarily with the US”, expressed concerns (in a similar way as Japan) that China’s military modernisation has implications going beyond Beijing’s “immediate territorial interests” (i.e., the Taiwan issue) and repeatedly pointed out at the limited transparency in Beijing’s defence policy, which is viewed as increasing “the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation”.22 America’s post-Cold War security strategy in East Asia, especially seen in George W. Bush’s reinforcement of the “hub and spoke” system of US bilateral alliances (notably with Japan), clearly shows that Washington has remained committed to sustaining its military primacy. To be sure, the US has increasingly come to recognise China’s growing regional influence and the need for Beijing’s cooperation in tackling regional challenges (e.g., North Korea’s nuclear ambitions). Nevertheless, America has not shown willingness to share its leadership in East Asia with China, i.e. establish a kind of condominium of power, but has rather expected Beijing to be “fully cognizant”23 of US intention to preserve its regional primacy and hence a Pax Americana.

Japan Link
US-Japan Alliance keeps China in check.

Dr. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis- PhD researcher at the Japanology Section of K.U.Leuven. 05-06/2010. http://www.fusl.ac.be/fr/pdf/IEE/Brochures/atanassova_paper.pdf


For the US and Japan, as discussed earlier in this paper, the need to deter North Korea has been a major factor driving their security cooperation since the late 1990s. It is also clear that the rise of China has acted as an additional stimulus for the two allies to deepen their defence ties, as well as for Japan to seek an expansion of its military capabilities. By reinforcing the alliance in order to tackle the threat from the DRPK, Tokyo and Washington have faced a security dilemma with Beijing with regard to the Taiwan issue.33 For China, its primary focus has been to attain military superiority with regard to Taiwan, as well as to deter the US (and Japan) from helping Taipei achieve independence. While pursuing economic interdependence with the island and emphasising the benefits of economic integration, Beijing has sought a more coercive approach to the reunification issue by means of reinforcing Chinese military capabilities and becoming more serious about the use of force. In this context, PRC’s modernisation of its nuclear and missile arsenal has been particularly important. The deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties and Japan’s security normalisation, especially under Koizumi, have arguably contributed to exacerbation of Beijing’s suspicions of the alliance’s strategic intentions, as well as to the security dilemma in East Asia. Furthermore, Japan’s willingness to assume a larger security role may have added to the complexity of America’s policy towards Taiwan and hence Sino-US relations. Indeed, some Chinese analysts have argued that, for Japan, an enhanced alliance was “an excuse” for its security activism, while for the US (namely, the Bush administration), its open support for Tokyo’s more assertive foreign policy became a means to balance Beijing and hence “consolidate US preponderance” in the region.34 With the expansion of the scope of security cooperation between Tokyo and Washington, and Japan’s acquisition of new military capabilities, Beijing has come to perceive the alliance enhancement as interference in what it regards as a domestic matter. In this context, the PRC has worried that the “situational” (rather than a “geographical”) definition of the region in the Revised US-Japan Defence Guidelines could include a future Taiwan contingency within the remit of bilateral security cooperation. China has also been concerned about US-Japanese development and deployment of a BMD system in East Asia, especially a mobile and sea-based one, as it could be extended for the defence of Taiwan and hence prevent re-unification with the mainland. The 2005 Joint Statement of Tokyo and Washington, which indicated the “peaceful resolution” of the Taiwan Strait issue as one of their “common strategic objectives” in the region, was strongly criticised by Beijing.35 Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing stressed that the issue was China’s domestic affair and “should by no means be deliberated in the framework of the security alliance”.36 The Joint Statement was also interpreted by some Chinese analysts as explicitly indicating Japan’s willingness to “actively intervene in the Taiwan issue to contain China”; an involvement perceived as being accelerated by the US.37 Beijing’s response was the enactment of the Anti-Secession Law soonthereafter, which underscored PRC’s intention to employ “non-peaceful means” in order to “protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”.38 The security dilemma dynamics between the US-Japan alliance and the PRC defines the mutual hedging between these powers. Washington, while emphasising common interests and bilateral cooperation with Beijing (since the Bush administration), has reinforced in the 2000s its security alliances and partnerships in Asia, with its alliance with Japan playing a central role in this hedging strategy.39 For Tokyo, its close security relationship with America has been a major component of its own external balancing behaviour vis-a-vis Beijing.40 Finally, China has adopted a strategy of “hedged acquiescence” towards the US, motivated in part by the unprecedented expansion of US-Japan security ties under the Koizumi-Bush partnership, as well as by its recognition of the strategic advantage enjoyed by the US as a balancer (notably with Japan) in Asia’s geopolitics.41 In addition to its military modernisation efforts and active regional diplomacy, Chinese hedging has included the development of new strategic partnerships beyond East Asia (including with the EU).
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