Dobbins et al 9 (James, E Laipson, H Cobban, L Korb, Dobbins is Head of international and security policy for the RAND corporation, “U.S Withdrawal From Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?”, Middle East Policy Council, marshallarmyrotc.org )
Jim Dobbins said we're not going to have 150,000 ground troops in Iraq, but we are still going to have forces and bases in Kuwait. In the Cold War, we were sensitive about putting American forces in the Middle East, so the Saudis built bases to conform to our specifications. In the First Gulf War, when we went in, it was just like going to an American base. We had forces in Kuwait; we will also remain in the Persian Gulf with the carrier battle group and the Marine Corps expeditionary force there. Whatever happens in Iraq, if they should be invaded by a foreign country, we would be able to apply power. If conflict were to spill over into the region, we will be there to play a role.
Naval Forces positioned outside of Kuwait key to deterrence and US security
Kostic 10 (Andrew J., MD in Strategic Studies from U.S Army War College, Commanding Officer of 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Battalion Landing Team, oai.dtic.mil)
The United States can’t make every state, group, or organization agree with its policies or conform to its way of thinking, but in the contemporary strategic environment the United States can effectively shape the choices of others. The lethality, versatility, and rapid response of forward deployed Naval expeditionary forces enforce the strategic concept of deterring a wide range of potential adversaries from taking action against the United States and its vital national interests. Deterrence is the key to enhancing security and preventing conflict and is based on credibility.84
History has shown the enormous impact amphibious forces have in conflicts. During the Second World War, when the Germans began their offensive against the Russians on their eastern front, they left 35 full divisions to guard the coastal areas of Western, Northwestern, and Southwestern Europe; despite having recently destroyed nearly all of Britain’s combat capabilities during fighting in France, where only personnel were able to be hastily extracted from Dunkirk without their implements of war. The United States’ ability to project and sustain power ashore is its combat credibility. It is impossible to tell how many United States adversaries were deterred from taking action against the United States because Naval expeditionary forces were sitting off the coast of their country, but history clearly shows the strategic importance of amphibious forces and their ability to significantly influence land combat operations. 85 More than 27 percent of the German combat forces were withheld from the German army’s most ambitious endeavor to date because of the potential of amphibious forces striking somewhere along the vast stretch of European coastline.86 Similarly, in 1944 the Germans had only positioned 10 percent of their combat divisions in Northern France to fend off the allied invasion on 6 June.87 The other 25 percent of the German divisions that were not committed to the Russian front were drawn westward and southward to guard against possible invasions along those coastlines.88
In 1991 during the Gulf War, an amphibious demonstration off the coast of Kuwait by the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade effectively tied down six Iraqi Divisions—41,000 troops—to the Kuwaiti coastline and prevented their repositioning to the main battle area.89In order for the United States to deter future conflicts and adversaries, it must maintain a credible ability to project combat power ashore, which is best accomplished with a formidable amphibious forcible entry capability.
Withdrawal from Iraq depends on the ability to exit via Kuwait
(Thomas Kelly, Masters in Strategic Studies from US Army War College, 2008, “Crossroads in Iraq”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA479077, page 17)
The primary objective of the Korb, Bergman, Duggan and Juul plan is to move all required equipment and personnel out of Iraq and into Kuwait within a year. After the phased withdrawal the only troops remaining in Iraq will be two brigades, (10,000 troops, including support and command elements) temporarily deployed to the Kurdish
region, for up to an additional 12 months, to prevent any Turkish – Kurd violence, as well as a plus up of Marine personnel to secure the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
Bases in Kuwait key to any US withdrawal from Iraq and for operations in the entire region
(Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs for Congressional Reseach Service, 12-6-08, “Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA493167)
Kuwait hosts more than 50,000 U.S. military personnel rotating in or out of Iraq. The key U.S. staging facility in Kuwait is Camp Arifjan and a desert firing range facility, Camp Buehring (Udairi Range). U.S. forces vacated Camp Doha, the headquarters for U.S. forces in Kuwait during the 1990s, in December 2005. Kuwait’s facilities would be pivotal in any U.S. withdrawal, and might also host a post-withdrawal U.S. force that could assist the Iraqi government on short
notice. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials said in February 2008 they are establishing in Kuwait a permanent platform for “full spectrum operations” in 27 countries in the region. Among the objectives is to help Kuwait establish a navy. In appreciation of Kuwait’s support to OIF, on April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain).
U.S. Military presence key to overall Asian instability
Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies November 24, 2008, “Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might,” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Why-the-World-Still-Needs-Americas-Military-Might, accessed on 7-19-10) SM
And what about Japan?
American military might has been primarily responsible for Japanese security since the end of World War II. This has not only allowed Japan to prosper economically and politically--like South Korea and Germany, I might add--but has also kept Japan at peace with its neighbors.The presence of U.S. forces and the American nuclear deterrent has also kept Japan from exercising a nuclear option that many believe it might take, considering the rise of China, North Korea's nuclear breakout, its advanced scientific and technical capabilities, and indigenous nuclear power industry--a producer of a significant amount of fissile material from its reactors .Political and historical considerations aside, many believe that Japan could quickly join the once-exclusive nuclear weapons club if it chose to do so, resulting in unforetold challenges to regional security.China and TaiwanFurther to the south, what about stability across the Taiwan Strait?
We know that China is undergoing a major military buildup, especially involving its power projection forces--i.e., air force, navy, and ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing peacetime defense budget, growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years.
I would daresay that military tensions across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political status quo via military means. China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor and rival, Taiwan, a vibrant, free-market democracy. It is believed by many analysts that absent American military might, China would quickly unite Taiwan with the mainland under force of arms.In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that the United States maintains provides the basis for stability in the Pacific, since the region has failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO.
Maintaining withdrawal trends undermines US hegemony
Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at American enterprise Institute, "Three Strikes against U.S. Global Presence", 4/2/10, http://www.aei.org/article/101869
Decisions by the governments of Japan and Great Britain and the passage of the bankrupting health care bill in the US spell the coming end of America's overseas basing and ability to project power. Should these trends continue, the US military will lose its European and Asian strategic anchors, hastening America's eventual withdrawal from its global commitments and leaving the world a far more uncertain and unstable place. The first strike comes from Asia. For the past six months, the new government of Japan has sought to revise a 2006 agreement to relocate a Marine Corps Air Station from one part of Okinawa to a less populated area. The upshot of these three trends will likely be a series of decisions to slowly, but irrevocably reduce America's overseas global military presence and limit our capacity to uphold peace and intervene around the globe.
U.S. military presence in Asia key to U.S. primacy and Asian security
Jing-Dong Yuan, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Evan S. Medeiros, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation in the Washington, DC office, June 6, 2001, “A US military presence in Asia: Offshore balancer or local sheriff?”
The rationale for a continued US military presence in the region also derives much of its impetus from material and normative as well as security related considerations. Asia has become an increasingly important region for the USA in terms of: trade (US$500 billion annually affecting three million US jobs); the region’s budding yet fragile process of democratisation; US interest in maintain- ing SLOCs through which vital supplies of energytransit; and the many
unresolved ter- ritorial issues. US disengagement would threaten US access to Asian markets, limit the USA’s ability to influence economic and political trends in the region, and engender heated competition for influence among regional powers. For these reasons, US policymakers and defence planners see US national security interests as intimately tied to the security and stability of Asia. US defence officials often remind the public that in the last 50 years the USA has fought two ‘hot wars’ in Asia (Korea and Vietnam) and that five of the USA’s seven security treaties are with Asian nations.
U.S. withdrawal from Asia enables asia to counterbalance the U.S.
Walt 2009 [Stephen M., Prof. Int'l Relations @ Harvard U, "Five Big Questions," http://lalqila.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/five-big-questions-by-stephen-walt-and-my-responses/]
Balance of power (or if you prefer, balance of threat) theory predicts that weaker states will try to limit the influence of rising powers by forming defensive alliances against them. China’s rise is already provoking alarm in many of its neighbors, who look first to the United States and possibly to each other for assistance. But how strong will this tendency to balance be? If China gets really powerful, and the United States disengages entirely, some of China’s neighbors might be tempted to bandwagon with Beijing, thereby facilitating the emergence of a Chinese “sphere of influence” in Asia. But if China’s neighbors get support from each other and from the United States, then they’ll probably prefer to balance.
But here’s the question: Just how much support does the United States have to provide, given that this issue ought to matter more to the Asian states than it does to us? If you think balancing is the dominant tendency (as I do), then the United States can pass a lot of the burden to Japan, India, Vietnam, etc. It can “free-ride” to some degree on them, instead of the other way around. But if you think these states will be reluctant to balance, then the United States might have to do a lot of the heavy lifting itself.
To make matters more complicated still, both the United States and its Asian allies may be tempted to do some bluffing with each other, to try to get their allies to pay a larger share of the burden. Asian states will quietly threaten to realign or go neutral if they don’t get more backing from the United States, and U.S. leaders may drop hints about disengagement if they don’t get what they want from the allies they are helping protect. And this means figuring out just how large and iron-clad the U.S. commitment needs to be in order to sustain a future balancing coalition is a tricky business, and there will be lots of room for disagreement.
Even Perception of a reduced U.S. commitment to Asia destroys deterrence and sinks the region into chaos
Ashley J. Tellis (senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues.) 5/2k “ Smoke, Fire, and What to Do in Asia” Policy Review No. 100 The Hoover Institute http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6433
The first critical interest consists of preventing, deterring, and reducing the threat of attack on the continental United States and its extended territorial possessions. In the simplest sense, this interest has two components. The first and most important involves preserving the continental United States (conus) and its possessions from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in Asia. These weapons are important because of the extensive damage they can inflict in relatively compressed time frames. Equally important, as Bracken points out, are the challenges posed by sophisticated delivery systems, like ballistic and cruise missiles and advanced attack aircraft, currently deployed by the wmd-capable states as well as prospective delivery systems that may be acquired by other Asian states over time. This includes both spin-off technologies emerging from space and commercial aviation programs as well as other kinds of non-traditional, covert delivery systems. The other component of this national objective involves protecting the conus and its possessions from conventional attack. Because of the vast distances involved in the Asia-Pacific region, the critical variables here are battlespace denial and power-projection capabilities — both sea- and air-based — that may be acquired by one or more Asian states. Given the changes in technology, these capabilities must be expanded to include other, newer, approaches to conventional war-fighting like strategic information warfare and the technologies and operational practices associated with the "revolution in military affairs." In all instances, U.S. interests suggest the following preference ordering: preventing potential adversaries from acquiring such capabilities; if prevention is impossible, deterring their use becomes the next logical objective; and, if even deterrence is unsuccessful, attenuating their worst effects through either extended counterforce options or effective defensive measures finally becomes necessary. It is immediately obvious that disengaging from Asia in any significant way does little to minimize the threats posed by the spread of both wmd and other strategic technologies. Only if highly robust forms of strategic defense become available in the future does the disengagement option become viable, and even then it may not necessarily be preferable, if it implies the inability to influence the wmd procurement and deployment decisions of the Asian states. Disengagement, moreover, has other corrosive effects: It would certainly compel many current American allies to acquire disruptive technologies in order to compensate for American absence, and these responses would only generate a regional arms race that would lead to the further diffusion of such capabilities. It is highly doubtful that encouraging a multipolar balance of power, requiring the controlled diffusion of wmd and strategic capabilities, is the solution either. There is simply no assurance that the "grooming" of multipolarity can be successfully calibrated (either by the United States or others). Moreover, once solutions such as these are pursued, there is no guarantee that other countries in other parts of the world will want to maintain any of their current restraints. A multipolarity based on the gradual emergence of new wmd powers may become a reality over time, but it cannot represent a future that the U.S. ought to desire or encourage, at least as a general principle. There may be areas where exceptions to this rule are tolerated, but such exceptionalism requires additional tests before it is enshrined as a matter of policy. In any event, when U.S. extended deterrence is available to a state, it ought to be offered in the form of security guarantees as a strategy of diminishing the attractiveness of disruptive technologies. In the matter of defending its first critical interest in Asia, therefore, a hegemonic strategy, whereby the U.S. continues to provide local security, remains the best strategy — not because it is by any means risk-free but because it is better than all the alternatives. The second critical interest consists of preventing the rise of a hegemonic state in Asia. Any hegemonic state capable of dominating the Asian land mass and the line of communications, both internal and external, represents an unacceptable challenge to the safety, prosperity, and relative power position of the United States. For reasons well understood by geopoliticians since Sir Halford Mackinder, Asia’s great wealth and resources would privilege its possessors considerably in the struggles endemic to international politics. If the region’s wealth and resources were to be secured by any single state (or some combination of states acting in unison), it would enable this entity to threaten American assets not only in Asia but in other areas as well — Europe and Africa, for example — and finally perhaps to challenge the United States itself at a global level. This entity, using the continent’s vast resources and economic capabilities, could then effectively interdict the links that currently connect the United States with Asia and the rest of the world and, in the limiting case, menace the U.S. territory itself through a combination of both wmd and conventional instruments. Besides being a threat to American safety, a hegemonic domination of Asia by one of the region’s powers would threaten American prosperity as well, if the consequence of such domination included denying the United States access to the continent’s markets, goods, capital, and technology. In combination, this threat to American safety and prosperity would have the inevitable effect of threatening the relative power position of the United States in international politics. This interest in preventing the rise of a hegemonic state inevitably involves paying close attention to the possible power transitions currently occurring in the region, especially those relating to China in the near to medium term and to Japan, Russia, and possibly India over the long run. It requires developing an appropriate set of policy responses — which may range from prevention at one end through containment in the middle to appeasement at the other — designed to prevent the rise of any hegemony that breaks American connections with Asia. Plainly, a strategy of disengagement would be unable to assure this objective, and may actually entice the larger Asian states to contemplate mounting just such a challenge. Even if such efforts were to arouse local balancing, there is no assurance that they could be checkmated without the assistance of the United States. And, if such balancing ultimately requires U.S. military presence and assistance for its success, it is still not clear what the benefits of a multipolar solution would be since the current division of labor already accepts not only American presence but also American preeminence. This is not to say that further adjustments in the U.S. regional posture ought to be ruled out, but that any adjustments that presage a true devolution towards multipolarity — the spread of wmd capabilities to American allies and acquiescing to their acquisition of power projection capabilities — have not yet been shown to be in the U.S. interest. The third critical interest consists of ensuring the survival of American allies. The first and most obvious reason for this objective is that the United States has treaty obligations to three important Asian states — Japan, South Korea, and Australia — and political commitments to another, namely Taiwan. While meeting these obligations is certainly important to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is also consequential for directly substantive reasons that go right to the heart of Bracken’s book: controlling the leakage of disruptive technologies in Asia. In at least two of these three instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in important implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation to resurrect the nuclear option on the part of both states will increase — to the consequent detriment of America’s global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional buildup, especially of missile, maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a long-range power projection capability possessing an offensive orientation. Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas region-wide — which, in turn, would lead to an intense arms race, growing suspicions, and possibly war. Finally, even the least troublesome of these possibilities would result in the destruction of the East Asian zone of prosperity. While such an outcome would certainly affect the strategic prospects of the East Asian region, the United States would not by any means be immune to its extended consequences. Since a considerable portion of American growth is directly tied to the vitality of the international trading system in general and this region in particular, the enervation of the East Asian economic regime would eventually lead to a diminution of American growth rates and, by implication, the quality of life enjoyed by its citizenry. For all these reasons, ensuring the survival of American allies in Asia through a continuation of the current guarantees represents a vital interest to the United States grounded not in altruistic considerations but in the hard realities of self-interest.