Hegemony da ddi 2010 1 Hegemony Generic



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Hegemony DA DDI 2010

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Hegemony Generic


Hegemony Generic 1

1NC 6


1NC 7

1NC 8


Primacy Now – Comprehensive Dominance 10

Hegemony Sustainable 12

Hegemony Sustainable 13

Hegemony Sustainable – Economics 14

Heg Sustainable (Economic dominance) 15

Hegemony Sustainable – A2: Dollar Heg 16

AT: Growing International Markets 17

AT: Outsourcing 18

AT: Savings/Deficit 19

AT: Technical Education/Higher Education 20

AT: Primacy/Secondary Schools 21

AT: Britain Proves Unsustainability 22

A2: Britain Proves Unsustainability 24

AT: McDougall 25

A2: Collapse Now 26

China Challenges 27

That modernization, the 2006 QDR explained, “has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios.” The “pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.” China’s large-scale investments in offensive capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, more advanced submarines, and “strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land and sea-based systems” directly affect U.S. military force requirements and “place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas.”2 27

China War Impact 28

A2: China 29

A2: China – Economics 30

Forward Deployment Link 31

Forward Deployment Link 32

Forward Deployment Link 33

Forward Deployment Link 34

Link Booster 35

Credibility Link 36

Bases Link 38

Afghanistan Link 39

Afghanistan Link 40

Afghanistan Link 41

Afghanistan Link 42

Afghanistan Link 43

Afghanistan Link 44

Afghanistan Link 45

Afghanistan Link 46

Afghanistan Link 47

Afghanistan Link 48

Afghanistan Link 49

Afghanistan Links 50

Afghanistan Link 51

Afghanistan Link 52

Middle East Link 53

Iraq Link 54

Iraq Link 55

Iraq Link 56

Iraq Link 58

Iraq Link 59

Iraq Link 60

Iraq Link 61

Iraq Link 63

Iraq Link 64

Iraq Link 65

Iraq Link 67

Iraq Link 68

Iraq Link 69

Iraq Link 71

Iraq Link 72

Iraq Link 73

Kuwait Links 74

Kuwait Links 75

Asia Link 76

Asia Link 77

Asia Link 78

Asia Link 80

Asia Link 81

Asian Deterrence High 82

Japan Link 83

Japan Link 84

Japan Link 85

Japan Link 86

Japan Link 87

Japan Link 88

Japan Link – China 89

Japan Booster 90

Okinawa Link 91

Okinawa Link 92

Okinawa Link 94

Okinawa Link 95

South Korea Link 96

South Korea Link 98

South Korea Link 99

South Korea Link 100

South Korea Link – China 101

North Korea deterred now 102

North Korea deterred now 103

Turkey Link - TNWs 104

Turkey Link – TNWs 105

Turkey Link – TNWs 106

Turkey Link 107

Turkey Link 108

Turkey Link 109

Current Commitments Key 110

Perception Key 111

Hegemony Good – War 112

Hegemony Good – War 113

Hegemony Good – War 114

Hegemony Good – War 115

Hegemony Good – Power Vacuum 116

Hegemony Good – Global Crises 117

Heg Good – Laundry List 118

Heg Good – Economy 119

Hegemony Good – Prolif 120

Hegemony Good – Trade 121

Hegemony Good – Japan Rearm 122

Hegemony Good – Taiwan Invasion 123

A2: Offshore Balancing – Perception 124

A2: Offshore Balancing – Weakness 125

A2: Offshore Balancing 126

A2: Offshore Balancing 127

A2: Offshore Balancing 128

A2: Offshore Balancing 129

A2: Offshore Balancing 131

A2: Offshore Balancing 132

A2: Offshore Balancing 133

A2: Offshore Balancing 134

A2: Middle East balancing 135

A2: Asia Balancing 136

A2: China Balancing 137

A2: China Balancing 138

A2: EU Balancing 139

A2: Russia Balancing 140

Hegemony 2AC 141

Decline Inevitable 142

Decline Inevitable 143

Decline Inevitable 144

Decline Inevitable 145

Decline Inevitable 146

Decline inevitable 147

Decline inevitable: Deficits 148

Decline Inevitable: Dollar Heg 150

Decline Inevitable – Dollar Heg 151

Decline Inevitable: Navy 152

Decline Inevitable: Europe 154

No Primacy 155

No Primacy 156

No Primacy 157

No Primacy 158

AT: Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 159

Middle East Heg Unsustainable 162

China Challenges 163

China Challenges 164

AT: Brooks and Wohlforth 165

Afghanistan Aff – Expensive 166

Afghanistan Aff 167

Afghanistan Aff 169

Afghanistan Aff 170

Iraq Aff 171

Iraq Aff 173

Iraq Aff 174

Iraq Aff 175

Iraq aff 177

Iraq Aff – Readiness 178

Iraq Aff 179

Iraq Aff - Overstretch 180

Iraq Aff – Soft Power 181

Turkey Aff 182

Turkey Aff 183

Turkey Aff 184

Japan Aff 185

Japan Aff 186

Japan Aff 187

Japan Aff 188

South Korea Aff 189

South Korea Aff 190

South Korea Aff – China 191

South Korea Aff – North Korea 192

Soft Power/Legitimacy Key 193

Soft Power/Legitimacy Key 194

Offshore Balancing Good – Laundry List 197

Offshore Balancing Good – Maintains Hegemony 199

Offshore Balancing Good – Challengers 200

Offshore Balancing Good – Counterbalancing 201

Offshore Balancing Good – Iran 203

Offshore Balancing Good – Iraq 204

Offshore Balancing Good – Afghanistan 206

Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East 208

Offshore Balancing Good – East Asia 209

Offshore Balancing Good – China 210

210

Offshore Balancing Good – Avoids anti- American resentment 211



A2: Israeli Strikes 212

Forward Deployment Bad – Laundry List 213

Forward Deployment Bad – Hegemony 214

Forward Deployment Bad: Prolif 215

Forward Deployment Bad – Russia 216

Russia Cooperation Solves Economy 217

Russian Engagement Key 218

A2: Russia Won’t Cooperate 219

Forward Deployment Bad – ME – AT: Oil 220

Hegemony Bad – Economy 222

Hegemony Bad – Economy 223

Hegemony Bad – War 224

Hegemony Bad – Terrorism 225

Hegemony Bad – Economy 226

Hegemony Bad – Economy 227

Hegemony Bad – Proliferation – (1/2) 228

Hegemony Bad – Proliferation – (2/2) 229

Ext. Heg Causes Prolif 230

Hegemony Bad – China War 231

Ext. – China War 232

Ext. – China War 233

Hegemony Bad – Middle East and Iran War (1/2) 234

Hegemony Bad – Middle East and Iran War (2/2) 235

Hegemony Bad – Interventionism (1/2) 236

Hegemony Bad – Interventionism (2/2) 237

Ext. - Heg Causes Interventionism 238

A2 Hegemony K to Deomcracy 239


1NC


U.S. military primacy is high – an aggressive force posture makes it sustainable, and there are no challengers

Brooks and Wohlforth 2008 [Stephen G. and William C., Profs. Gov’t @ Dartmouth, World out of Balance, p. 28-9]
The United States spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make an effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting than the grit spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investments that give United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were me than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American.' And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has harvested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D.'5

These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest US forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” –that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it,



“Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the US global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had.

1NC


Withdrawal creates immediate regional power vacuums that embolden challengers.

Poffenbarger and Schaefer 2009 [John G., Dept Social Sciences @ Wheeling Jesuit U, and Mark E., Dept History, Philosophy, Poli. Sci. and Religion @ Marietta College, "Searching for Acceptance: The United States and South America," for presentation at the 2009 International Studies Assoc. Annual Conference, February 17, AllAcademic | VP]

It is our contention that a strategy of hegemony is preferable to one of offshore balancing for several reasons. First, we believe that the depth and breadth of United States’ interests may not be best served by the use of regional proxies. The utilization of regional partners is certainly a possibility for an actor such as the United States, however off-shore balancing seems to call for an over reliance on such partners that could weaken United States power and interests. Second, the realities of the recent Bush administration’s policies may not allow for such a strategic adjustment to offshore balancing. That is not to say that the United States might not seek to reduce its exposure abroad in some areas, but a move to an off-shore balancing strategy at this time may send the wrong message to allies and potential rivals. Next, a move away from a strategy of hegemony would likely trigger a power vacuum in some areas. The European Union faces problems of unity, cohesion, willingness, and a lack of structure to deal with most of the situations currently faced by the United States. Russia, while seeing a resurgence of power in recent years, does not appear to currently have global ambitions, but more likely wishes to focus on its “near-abroad. (This “near abroad” also seems to lie within United States’ security and economic purview.) China also appears to currently have limited global interests, as it seeks to finalize its development and gain global energy access, but it also may be searching for ways to alter its relative power in relation to the United States. Finally, it is our belief that such a dramatic change in strategy may actually trigger more balancing; as such a withdrawal may send a signal of vulnerability and a lack of willingness to latent balancers. We contend that the United States would be best served by maintaining its current position in the international system, and by simply taking steps to mitigate the motivations for balancing while seeking to attract bandwagoners.



1NC
Sustained unipolar hegemony prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict.

Kagan 2007 [Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, Hoover Institution - Stanford U, in Policy Review, No 144, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10]
Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe.

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.



It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.



Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.

In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore  to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.



It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.

The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the



region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.


Primacy Now – Comprehensive Dominance

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