Heg Good – Prolif
Hard power prevents nuclear acquisition
Mandelbaum, 05 Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins
[Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 46]
By contributing in this way to the global public good of nuclear nonproliferation, the United States functions as governments do within sovereign states. American nuclear guarantees help to secure something that all countries want but would probably not get without the United States. The military deployments and political commitments of the United States have reduced the demand for nuclear weapons, and the number of nuclear-armed countries, to levels considerably below what they would otherwise have reached. But American policies have not entirely eliminated the demand for these armaments, and so the ongoing effort to restrict their spread must address the supply of them as well.
Heg Good – SCS
Hegemony prevents conflict over South China Sea
Thayer 11 Professor of International Relations at University of New South Wales
Bradley, ‘South China Sea: Chinese Hegemony or Peaceful Settlement?’ Thayer Consultancy from scribd. 6/28/11.
China views the United States as its main obstacle. It knows that the United States will not take sides in specific territorial disputes. It also knows that the U.S. offer to facilitate a process to peacefully resolve the East Sea issues, while welcomed by some ASEAN members, also caused concern by other members. As long as China does not interfere with the freedom and safety of navigation through the South China Sea U.S. material interests are not directly threatened. The U.S. can only respond using diplomatic means and symbolic shows of military strength. The other major powers in the region will follow U.S. leadership rather than take on a leadership role themselves. The U.S. is most effective if its supports ASEAN, a divided ASEAN plays into China’s hands. China calculates that the major powers will respond by urging a peaceful settlement of the dispute. China will continue to insist that only the parties directly involved should negotiate – bilaterally – with China. ASEAN policy at the moment is for bilateral discussions on bilateral issues, and multilateral discussions where the interests of third parties are involved. In other words, the major powers can only intervene diplomatically. As long as the People’s Liberation Army Navy refrains from intervention, the major powers will have to exercise restraint.
Heg Good - Terrorism
Heg solves terrorism - deterrence
Thayer, 07 Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University
(Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 16)
Another critical question is not simply how much the United States spends on defense but what benefits it receives from its spending: “Is the money spent worth it?” the benefits of American military power are considerable, and I will elaborate on five of them. First, and most importantly, the American people are protected from invasion and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are—mercifully—an aberration. The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence community do an outstanding job deterring aggression against the United States.
Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America’s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it pos-sessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu’ammar Qadhai agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.”21
A2: Layne – Offshore Balancing
Offshore balancing unable to stop conflict
Kagan 11 – senior fellow at the Brookings Institution
Robert, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html, volume 17, number 16 (article for “The Weekly Standard”), date accessed: 6/29/11
Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition.
--Offshore balancing fails and ensures global violence
Schake 10 [Kori, “Limits of offshore balancing”, Oct 13, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/13/limits_of_offshore_balancing, CMR]
The policy prescriptions Pape advances are also problematic. An offshore balancing approach means that we will not be engaged with military forces on the ground, and yet what we have learned in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that we achieve our objectives most fully when indigenous forces are partnered with us and made able to take over the work of U.S. forces in the fight. They have greater legitimacy, local knowledge, and make the outcome most durable. That was the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq, and it is the purported approach of the Obama administration in Afghanistan. Pape's policies have no way to achieve that improvement in the capacity of partner forces. An offshore balancing approach is also inherently retaliatory and has been shown to increase the resistance of affected populations to supporting our objectives. We threaten to use force from the safe confines of distance; that use of force may have pinpoint accuracy but will often be less precise and cause more civilian casualties than forces on the ground, which will again feed into public attitudes about whether to support U.S. goals. Instead of working with the people most affected and helping build their capacity to protect themselves, offshore balancing does little to change the problem in positive ways. Except for the "improved" political and economic activity. How that will be undertaken in a deteriorating security environment is mysterious. Moreover, if we could do any better at the provision of political and economic engagement, we'd already be doing that. Convincing allies the U.S. will commit itself to fight unless we have troops stationed where we expect the fight to occur has always been difficult. The history of the Cold War is replete with transatlantic discussion of extended deterrence: would the United States really send the boys back over if Germany were attacked? Would the United States really use nuclear weapons when our own homeland would be at risk of retaliation? It seems unlikely those concerns would be attenuated in societies we are less politically and culturally similar to than we are to Europeans. In short, Robert Pape's "offshore balancing" approach would reduce violence by giving our enemies what they want: our disengagement, the ability to terrorize with impunity the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other places where the battle of ideas about Muslim modernity is engaged.
Counterbalancing irrelevant in the context of US primacy
Brooks and Wohlforth, 09 professor of government at Dartmouth university and Daniel Webster professor of government at Dartmouth university
Happened on 17th of april ’09, stephen g brooks and William F. wohlforth, date accessed: 6/29/2011, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-X-13.pdf
American primacy in the inter-state scales of power renders the systemic constraints featured in all the main international relations theories largely inoperative with respect to U.S. security policy. When the United States seeks to translate its power capabilities into enhanced security, the international system does not push back against it the way it did against leading powers in the past, and the way it still does against other powers today. As it ponders potential security policies, Washington does not confront the prospect that other great powers will construct a counter-balance through alliances or internal efforts. It need not fear escalating “soft balancing” measures on the part of other powers that would rein it in and eventually morph into conventional hard balancing. It does not need to worry that other states are in a strong position to use America’s links to the global economy strategically to force it to toe their line. It does not need to be apprehensive that failure to cooperate in a given international institution might spoil its general reputation for cooperation and thus deny it all the benefits it gets from the institutional order. It need not worry that if it breaks some international rule or norm its overall legitimacy will necessarily be strongly reduced and its leadership role will come crashing down. In different combinations, these constraints powerfully shaped the security policies of great powers in the bi- and multipolar systems of the past, and many continue to shape the policies of other powers in the unipolar one of today.