Gulf Cooperation Council Aff Notes

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1AC Long Util

Advantage 1 is Relations

The plan boosts relations between India and the Gulf Countries. Rising wages in India means Indian migrant workers are beginning to return to India – UAE wages must keep pace

Lay 11 [(Claire ferris, deputy editor of CEO Middle East) “UAE sees Indian workforce shrink as home salaries rise” 22 November 2011] AT

The Indian Consulate in the UAE saw a fall in new visas for Indian nationals last year for the first time, as rising salaries in the Asian state kept workers at home. The Gulf state is likely to see a steady decline in blue-collar migrants as India’s economic growth offers better opportunities to workers, the Consul General told Arabian Business. “Last year, for the first time ever, the Indian Consulate served less passports than in 2009 so that would be an indication that the number of Indians declined coming to the UAE,” Sanjay Verma said on the sidelines of the 5th Arabian Business Forum. “Passport services saw a two percent drop. “The numbers are declining because of the demand for labour in India. The civil construction sector has a shortage of civil engineers and skilled workers, plumbing and carpentry.” The Asian state has rolled out a National Rural Employment Guarantee Act which offers 100 days of work a year to rural households, giving employment to workers in villages who traditionally have looked abroad for jobs. “The advantage of that is it is offered it to you in your home town or village so that has taken away some workers who otherwise would have come abroad,” Verma said. The Gulf plays host to millions of migrants, primarily from Asia, who account for the majority of blue-collar workers in the construction, domestic work, and service industries. An estimated three million migrate each year, sending back an estimated $175bn in remittances annually, according to Human Rights Watch data. The UAE alone is home to an estimated 1.75 million Indian expatriates, the largest group of foreign workers in the Gulf country. But experts have warned the country may struggle to attract and retain migrants if it fails to keep pace with rising salaries in India. Minimum wages for unskilled foreign workers in the UAE are as low as AED600 a month, with skilled workers receiving AED1,200 a month, according to the Indian Embassy, Abu Dhabi. By comparison, wages in India, the world’s fastest-growing economy after China, surged by 11.1 percent last year, said recruitment firm GulfTalent in February. The Indian Ambassador to the UAE said earlier this year the government planned to enforce a minimum wage for Indian nationals hoping to work in the UAE. If approved, the ruling will mean workers only receive immigration clearance from India if their employment contract meets with a set minimum salary. Verma said the professional sectors were likely to feel the pinch first as India strives to hold on to homegrown talent and keep pace with its fast-growing economy. “It will be more expensive getting Indian workers. It’s already happening in the professional sector, it’s not as easy as it used to be to attract Indian doctors or accountants to come here.” In 2011, the number of new visas issued by the consulate will be flat, he added. “I think it’s going to be closer to 2010, probably the same as 2010 but not a drastic increase.”

Expatriate laborers are the key internal link to relations and India’s role in the GCC as a peacekeeper

GRC 9 [(Gulf Research Center (GRC) is an independent research institute located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

The major countries of Asia are looming as important regional players in the Middle East. A primary reason for the growing Asian footprint is economics, but it is more than simply the need for petroleum and natural gas that draws in the Asian states. They are attracted by opportunities for consumer sales and, in the case of South Asia, the export of millions of laborers to build the emerging city-states of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the paradox is that despite the threat of new conflicts, billions of dollars have been invested in the region and vast wealth accumulated and spent only a few hundred miles from ongoing military conflict. The financial crisis, which began in earnest in September 2008, has raised the prospects for a prolonged global recession, which will have a negative impact in most economic activities, including the value of energy exports, investments, tourism and consumer sales. Nevertheless, many observers believe that, in the long run, the global economy will recover and the economic trend lines that were in effect before September 2008, which showed growing economic activity between Asia and the Middle East, will be resumed. A number of traumatic events could upset this assumption including a new major Middle East war, severe social and political chaos in the region, Asia or even Europe and the US, or a total re-evaluation of the models of economic growth that are predicated on transparency, open markets and relatively free trade. The depth of Asia’s involvement in the Middle East can be measured in a number of ways, including the projected increase in the amounts of energy flowing east to Asian markets over the coming decades, the value of Asian exports to the Middle East, financial investment by Asian and Middle East countries in each others’ development, including construction and infrastructure, the number of tourists in both directions and the number of Middle Easterners enrolling for higher education in key Asian countries. Perhaps the most visible element of the growing Asian-Middle East partnership concerns expatriate workers in the GCC countries. Over 4 million Indians are to be found at every level of occupation on the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to Indian workers, millions of others come from South Asian countries. Without Asian labor, the oil rich economies of the Gulf would be in deep trouble, and without the all- powerful military presence of the US in the Gulf, they would be easy prey to regional predators, of whom Saddam Hussein was the classic example. It is the emergence of China and India as regional superpowers with an increasingly global outreach that has had the greatest impact on the region. In different ways, India and China will pose challenges and opportunities for the current regional hegemon, the United States. Questions about energy access, the security of the Arab Gulf, military cooperation, arms sales, oil and gas pipelines and energy security all need to be considered. These issues must be analyzed against the historical background of past Indian and Chinese influence in the region. India’s direct involvement in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf, is more extensive than China’s, due to proximity. But for the future, as China expands its geo-economic reach westward into Central Asia and Pakistan with new infrastructure projects, as well as increasing trade relations, it too will become a more important player. India and China have achieved a remarkable diplomatic presence in the Middle East, and unlike the United States or the former colonial powers (Britain, France, and Italy), they have made very few enemies and have managed to build good working relationships with all countries including close ties with Israel. Both countries are engaged in Mid-East peacekeeping operations. China’s participation in Lebanon within the framework of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) began officially on April 9, 2006. India has a much longer record of post World War II Mid-East peacekeeping, beginning with its participation in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) established in 1956 to monitor the Sinai desert. India has peacekeeping forces in UNIFIL, numbering 672 troops and staff officers and provided two of the last four commanding officers, but has not added any forces recently. Although India has historically had a more visible presence in the Gulf than China, it is only recently that is has begun to demonstrate power and influence. India has so far not had a major arms supply relationship with the Middle East countries, except Israel, but has been cooperating on a military-to-military basis with all of the small countries in the Gulf in recent years.

Shifting security commitments in the Gulf means India must fill in. Economic relations from migrant laborers provide ground for strengthened relations that solves war

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

By all accounts, the world is moving rapidly towards multipolarity. The post- Cold War era geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic imperatives underwent substantial changes in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 forced regime change in Iraq. Simultaneously, the growth of emerging economic powers also considerably influenced the process. What one sees now is a hexagonal power polarity with three nodes; Russia, China, and India on the one side and the United States, Japan and the European Union forming the other three points. Moreover, with increasing global interdependence, it appears that the various nodes are striving for greater accommodation of interests and better management of contradictions, despite having divergent security and strategic cultures. With such changes in the global power architecture, reverberations are strikingly evident in the power configurations at the bilateral as well as regional level. Importantly, nation states are increasingly managing their bilateral relations on the basis of a realpolitik assessment rather than ideology alone. A case in point is the contemporary strategic environment in the Gulf region, which is increasingly becoming unpredictable, having local, regional and global implications. With windfall capital and vibrant economic growth, the region is witnessing unprecedented transformation in the social, political, economic, cultural and strategic realms. Importantly, certain favorable and adverse domestic, regional and international factors pervasively influence their security and strategic perceptions and increase their anxiety about the imminent future. Coincidentally, being a neighbor and an emerging global power, India becomes a reference point for the Gulf countries as a partner in their quest for managing the evolving security equations. The change of perception in the Gulf region is based on a ‘new constellation’ in which India is increasingly viewed as a credible non-partisan global player who can play a constructive role in managing conflicts and restoring peace and tranquility in the region. Thanks to the Gulf ’s eastward shifting economic engagements, burgeoning trade and investment linkages, and the civilizational affinities between India and the Gulf region there is the promise of a new era of deepening ties. The strategic importance of the Gulf region dates to the 19th century when three great empires –British India,Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey – confronted each other for power projection. Since then, the region has a tradition of overwhelming security dependence on external powers. With the discovery of oil, the Gulf region became intrinsically enmeshed with the nuances of great power politics. This process continued until the whole region came under pervasive control of the security cordon provided by the US. Given the small population size of the countries, the regional governments continued to rely upon outside powers to maintain a crude balance of power in order to maintain sovereignty, domestic identity and regime security. This balance of power was maintained with the direct and extensive contributions from the external powers, either through providing military technology and weapons (Russian sales of missile and arms to Iran) or deploying military personnel in the region (US providing armaments and maintaining military bases in some member countries of the GCC). Today the strategic environment in the region is in a state of flux. This is due to the crystallization of several conflicting factors. Iran’s increasing military posture and Israel’s policy in the East Mediterranean region constitute the twin strategic faultlines surrounding the Gulf region. The turmoil in Iraq, which used to be the countervailing power to Iran, further adds to the security risks for the Gulf regimes. Above all, the perception of an Israel-centric foreign policy by the United States only increases tensions in the region. It is noteworthy to point out the central role played by the United States as the security lynchpin of the Gulf region (Koch 2008). The role and extent of US involvement in the Gulf region has expanded tremendously since it filled the power vacuum following the British withdrawal from the region in 1968.The overarching presence of the US has considerably changed the region’s strategic dynamics. From the initial ‘dual containment policy’ of orchestrating regional countervailing powers against each other, the US has become in a sense the sole superpower in the region as reflected in the forced regime change in Iraq in 2003. At present, nearly 200,000 American troops are stationed in the Gulf region, the majority of course in Iraq but with significant numbers in the GCC, thereby firmly entrenching the US in the Gulf security scenario. Further, given the Gulf region’s real security concerns, the regimes cannot afford to suddenly change the status quo and seek an alternate security arrangement. But while the US is an indispensable security ally and would continue to play a formidable role in the Gulf region’s emerging strategic paradigm, it is increasingly apparent that such an exclusive role in its present scope is neither sustainable nor unanimously acceptable to the Gulf regimes. In a sense, the unilateral strategic dominance of the US in the Gulf region is coming to an end, albeit slowly. Thus, a clear strategic shift is in motion which is primarily due to the increasing internationalization of the Gulf with other powers from Europe and Asia on the fringe, but also due to a reorientation and self introspection by the Gulf countries about their place in the international system and the role played by the US within that system. Given the multidimensional security environment in the Gulf region – from the threat posed by Islamic radicalism and Iranian nuclear ambitions, to concerns about the stalemate in Iraq, tensions surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, securing supply lines of oil exports and the role of Gulf finance in world economics – the regimes no longer feel safe in the comfort zone of the American security umbrella. The ambiguity about the US role, either as a source of regional stability or greater instability, entices the Gulf regimes to rethink their national interests amidst volatile regional events. The region is in the throes of a transition which evolves from patterns of interaction that are characterized by power politics and geopolitical concerns to new ones that are marked by the politics of geoeconomics. Adding to the complexity is the sheer pace of post modernism and its structural spill over as reflected in domestic discontentment and the region’s search of an identity in the increasingly interdependent globalized world in which the parochial projection of the Gulf (especially in the Western world) is not only hampering their commercial pursuits, but also questioning the region’s integrity. As a result, there is a growing sense of confidence in the region that has led the GCC states to play an increasing regional political and diplomatic role. Especially in the security domain, the Gulf countries are increasingly re-shifting their strategies from bilateral dependence to multilateral interdependence, sensing that bilateralism will no longer meet the requirements of a multi-polar world in geo-economic terms. Furthermore, the GCC leaderships are anticipating the shifting circumstances surrounding the declining role of the US. Bahrain’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Abdul Ghaffar, has, for example, called for a new security order in the Gulf with the GCC states as the main pillar of defense while Qatar’s Amir Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani told the General Debate of the United National General Assembly in September 2007 that: “The major conflicts in the world have become too big for one single power to handle them on its own” (Koch 2008). Nevertheless, it is certain that complete removal of external powers from the region is not at all a possibility in the absence of a regional architecture and the existence of glaring distrust among the states in the region (consider, for example, the continuing problem of border disputes). Besides, given the global strategic importance of the region, outside powers would not simply keep themselves away from developments in the region as formidable stakes are involved. Thus, in the current circumstances, a viable security framework is simply unthinkable at this stage and it is certain that neither a regional solution nor an outside power can counter the wide variety of threats to the region. Thus, the key before the Gulf countries is to multilateralize the regional security space with the involvement of other powers, especially an emerging global power like India with whom the future stakes of the region are formidable. Therefore, India can become a natural security ally for the Gulf. Transforming Strategic Overlap into Partnership The strategic horizon comprising the Gulf region and India shows the growing interconnectedness in the security space extending from Afghanistan to the Middle East. India’s location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a strategic location in Eurasia as well as among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean from East Africa to Indonesia. India's peninsular projection in the ocean gives it a stake in the security and stability of these waters which is crucial for oil trade – the lifeblood of Gulf economies. While the overall strategic environment involving India and the Gulf region is in a state of flux evincing uncertainties and dilemmas, there is no doubt that the stakes are formidable. It may be noted that the connection between security and stability in the two regions was first propounded in 1981 by the former Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and former UAE President Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. From a strategic point of view, the Gulf countries and India share a desire for political stability and security in the region. The emerging common security perceptions create further opportunities for Gulf-India cooperation in the future. In the recent past, several Gulf countries, especially Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE have concluded a number of bilateral strategic pacts with India. The UAE and India entered into a strategic pact, signed on July 1, 2003 when a high-level delegation led by the then Chief of Staff and now Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Shaikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, visited India. That agreement envisages cooperation in security, defense policy, development of defense cooperation, training for the UAE military and military medical personnel, exchange of cultural and sports activities between the friendly forces of the two countries and joint efforts to tackle environmental issues, particularly pollution in the seas. Saudi Arabia and India have entered into a similar pact. Such pacts confirm the increasing recognition of India as an emerging power by the Gulf countries and simultaneously the common strategic outlook of both. As aptly stated by the UAE Foreign Minister, Shaikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, at the opening of the ministerial session of the Indo-UAE Joint Commission, “At a regional level, we also look forward to an increased involvement by India in issues affecting the Gulf and neighboring countries” and that “it is in both of our interests to work together more and more closely.” The process of mutual recognition got a major boost with the landmark visit of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to India and consequent ratification of the New Delhi Declaration. This inclination of a major Gulf power like Saudi Arabia to deepen and broaden ties with India points to the changing geopolitical dynamics in both regions. Moreover, Gulf countries are increasingly cooperating with India for military training. Since India’s dependence on Gulf energy and the Gulf ’s dependence on India and Asia as a future major market for oil exports will remain significant, the security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) has become a critical component within the ambit of strategic matters. It is not just oil, but the increasing movement of merchandise imports and exports on the sea route spanning the vast arc of Indian Ocean has also become a critical security concern for India and the Gulf countries. The sheer number of Indian expatriates in the Gulf region’s workforce makes a strong case for deepening ties with India to manage domestic security. Countries like Saudi Arabia have the potential to support India in her efforts for the educational and social transformation of India’s vast Muslim population that constantly look towards the Gulf region for moral and religious guidance. India as a ‘Bridging Power’ India’s credibility and role as a “neutral” player in Asia may serve Gulf interests in managing their emerging security and strategic objectives. Two crucial factors that can possibly give the Gulf countries policy flexibility are India’s growing ties with the US and stable ties with Iran and Israel. India’s strategic objectives attest to the fact that the Gulf, South Asia and Central Asia are now strategically interactive and interrelated regions. The objectives of India's quest for greater influence throughout the Gulf are to prevent proliferation as well as terrorism. As a bridging power, India could possibly leverage its links with both US and Iran to the benefit of the Gulf countries. Unlike the US and other European powers that tie security cooperation with sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy and regime change, Gulf countries view India as a non-interfering partner to align with. India maintains a substantial economic presence in the Gulf and is set to create a significant political presence as well. Despite civilizational propinquities, historical commercial linkages, and geographical proximity, the Gulf and India have failed to capitalize on commonalities, which has prevented their association from truly becoming the “unbroken relation of cordiality.” Nevertheless, the growing economic presence of India in the Gulf and the Gulf ’s new geo-economic realities provide the platform to synergize complementarities into multipronged stable relations. The trend of mutual ignorance of the two regions is slowly reversing due to the growing economic importance of India in the world and the Gulf's increased interest in building its relations with its immediate neighbor, against the backdrop of faltering bonhomie with the West. The relationship between the two regions has been in focus in the evolving interdependence centering on energy-economy dynamics and changed geopolitical environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The ‘Look East’ strategy of the Gulf provides an impetus for closer relations. It is therefore necessary that since a sustainable relationship entails multifaceted cooperation, India and the GCC countries should broaden relations on the strategic and political levels. It is in the interests of both the GCC and India to recognize the other’s potential as a serious trading partner, and further strengthen their external relations. Both parties could nurture their relations in a constructive way by finding the right balance between regionalism and multilateralism to excel in today’s fast paced economic arena. To sum up, geopolitical and geoeconomic complementarities drive security and strategic aspects of the Gulf region’s Look East Policy towards India. While India's ambitions, capabilities, experience and interests all suggest that it is capable of playing a major role in the Gulf, the Gulf countries see India as a bridging power to shift their status quo security and strategic imperatives to better align with the changed dynamics. The stakes are formidable, challenges are mutual, potentials are huge and, hence, cooperation becomes imperative. This calls for greater political will.

And an Indian shift to the Gulf means they’ll engage the UAE specifically – sustained economic relations are key

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

In the last couple of years India has been trying to regain international clout in West Asia and this has resulted in an increasing number of visits of the Foreign Minister to Egypt, Jordan, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Israel and also Palestine.i Likewise, the Indian Defence Minister also undertook visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar.ii This clearly shows that India’s strategic orientation is being redefined in the Gulf region. While India has engaged a number of countries in the region, it has nurtured special relations with the UAE because it has been the largest trading partner as well as a strategically important country. Indian expatriate workers also list the UAE as a relatively labour friendly country in terms of wages, facilities, freedom and the annual leave. UAE had assumed the chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) immediately after India and, therefore, greater understanding was developed on the maritime issues also. With shrinking markets in Europe and the US, UAE is increasingly looking towards India for exports and investment. In less than six months, India and the UAE have exchanged four high level bilateral visits and almost all visits underpinned the significance of economic and strategic engagements between the two countries. A host of factors such as deep historical links, culture, economy, polity, security and changing geo- strategic and maritime environment helped bring the two nations closer. On his visit to India on 15-16 May this year, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abduallah Zayed bin Al Nayahan, described India as an ‘ally and cherished neighbour’ and said that UAE would like to have a ‘strong presence’ in the Indian market in the future. Besides this, he also acknowledged the need for working together with India on some of the pressing regional issues such as stabilising Afghanistan, combating maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden as well as stabilising Somalia and religious and sectarian faultlines emerging in the West Asian countries.

UAE-India relations solve piracy-terror networks between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

Although both countries have signed defence cooperation agreements in 2006, it needs fine-tuning, particularly on two policy-dimensions: one, a real time assistance and cooperation by sharing information and providing necessary support to the Indian Navy to check the growing and expanding menace of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which is equally fatal to the oil- exporting Gulf rentier economies.xxvi Besides, the presence of the Indian Navy can also effectively handle the growing nexus between pirates and the terror outfits, particularly between the Somali-based al Shabab and the al Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) of Yemen. UAE could consider giving the Indian Navy logistic supports such as refuelling, deployment, providing bases during emergency as well as enabling Indian Navy to evacuate its large diaspora community during crisis period.xxvii India can assist and train the UAE crew in counter-terrorism, disaster relief management, rescue and search operations, etc.

Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda network causes an attack on the US

Zarif 11—(Maseh Zarif, deputy director and Iran research Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project July, 2, 2011, Terror Partnership: AQAP and Shabaab

The terrorist threat to America from the Gulf of Aden is metastasizing as the most dangerous al Qaeda affiliate, Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), appears to be partnering with Somalia-based militant Islamist group al Shabaab in attacking the West. On June 23, an American drone strike targeted two senior al Shabaab leaders in Qandal, outside the al Shabaab-controlled southern port city of Kismayo.[1] Somalia’s defense minister said on July 1 that U.S. military forces retrieved the two men; it is unclear whether they were killed in the strike.[2] The identities of the militants have not been released, but a senior American military official said that they had “direct ties” to Anwar al Awlaki, the Yemeni-American radical cleric who has been operational within AQAP.[3] The official added, “They were planning operations outside of Somalia.”[4] The reported links between Awlaki—whose primary focus has been on attacking the American homeland—and the al Shabaab leaders targeted in the strike suggest that AQAP and al Shabaab have established operational ties. Such an alliance would enable the two groups to leverage their joint resources, including AQAP’s bomb-making expertise and al Shabaab’s recruitment and hosting of militants from the West, to conduct spectacular attacks in the West. Both AQAP and al Shabaab have demonstrated the ability to plan and launch terrorist attacks outside their safe havens. AQAP has launched two significant operations against the United States—the 2009 Christmas Day attack and the October 2010 parcel plot. AQAP continues to target America and has benefited from Yemen’s recent unrest and state fragmentation.[5] Al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab is waging an insurgency in Somalia against the United Nations-backed Transitional Federal Government and African Union troops in a bid to expand its operating space. It currently controls large regions in the country and operates in the capital, Mogadishu. The organization has demonstrated the desire and the ability to export terror beyond Somalia’s borders. It has in the past threatened the United States and embraced al Qaeda’s global ideology.[6] The group executed its first attack outside of Somalia in July 2010 when it bombed a restaurant and rugby club in Kampala, Uganda, killing 76 people.[7] Al Shabaab may also have been involved in the June 2011 suicide bombing in Abuja, Nigeria.[8] It continues to explore targets outside Somalia.[9]

Gulf of Aden piracy allows terrorists to go nuclear and independently causes regional war and commerce shutdown

Sterio 10 [Melena, Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School, magna cum laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master’s degree), Private International Law, Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2003; B.A., Rutgers University, French Literature and Political Science, summa cum laude, 1998, THE SOMALI PIRACY PROBLEM: A GLOBAL PUZZLE NECESSITATING A GLOBAL SOLUTION]

According to Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the Gulf of Aden is out of control.”20 In 2008, Somali pirates took nearly 600 crewmembers hostage; several hundred of these crewmembers, as well as a dozen ships, are still being held by the pirates, who may demand millions of dollars in ransom for their release.21 Somali pirates have become more aggressive in their operations, recently beginning to attack larger ships. In 2008, they seized the Faina, which was carrying Russian tanks and ammunition, as well as the supertanker Sirius Star, which was carrying two million barrels of oil.22 Section I.A will discuss how, if left unchecked, Somali piracy, in the long-term, could eventually lead to the decline of commercial activity and commercial centers in East Africa.23 Section I.B will show how Somali piracy imposes significant costs on shipping companies that are already financially stressed, deterring maritime commerce, endangering sea lines of transportation and communication, and undermining regional stability.24 In 2008, the United Nations Security Council, recognizing the seriousness of the threat posed by Somali piracy, passed Resolution 1816, which states that piracy “exacerbate[s] the situation in Somalia[,] which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.”25 Section I.C will discuss how piracy can both contribute to the formation of maritime terrorism and provide funding and other assistance to terrorist causes, aiding groups such as al-Qaida. This section will also demonstrate how allowing pirates to pursue their activities without resistance sends a strong lack-of-deterrence message to other potential sea and land- based terrorists, who may infer that their efforts will remain unchecked for many years as well. A. Piracy and the Failed Somali State: A Threat to Global Peace Somalia is a failed state.26 Since the early 1990s, Somalia has not had a stable government, and its fragile government is currently battling warlords and militant Islamic groups for control of the country.2 The country does not have a functional economy, and its official law enforcement operations are slim, with gangs of paramilitary groups and rebel forces controlling the streets of Mogadishu and other towns.28Piracy has thrived in this cowboy culture of inefficient government, and everyday life is ruled by violence.29 A functional Somali government is so absent that some Somali coastal towns have established pirate-centric societies where piracy not only enjoys local support, but local governments rely on it.30 If nothing is done to thwart the rise of piracy in Somalia, piracy will not only continue to prosper in Somalia, undermining efforts to stabilize the country, but also seriously threaten regional and international peace and stability.31 Piracy can spread elsewhere from Somalia. Other African states, whether Somali neighbors or located farther away, could fall prey to powerful pirate operations, especially if such operations become firmly rooted in Somalia and ruled by powerful warlords enjoying Somali government support. Regional pirate networks could be created, posing a significant threat to global commerce and human safety.32 Moreover, piracy can endanger commercial and tourist routes, undermining the regional economy and exposing neighboring states to all sorts of potential problems.33 Potential problems include economic non-viability, political and civil unrest caused by poverty, and border instability provoked by the need to expend vast resources on the fight against piracy. In addition, Somali piracy can threaten global peace and security if pirates start collaborating with other maritime trafficking groups, such as those who smuggle narcotics or weapons of mass destruction, either for a financial or political cause. Thus, the development of Somali piracy could contribute to the spread of maritime violence, endangering sea routes everywhere and supporting dangerous factions across the globe.34 As discussed below, the Somali pirates could become linked to powerful terrorist organizations and could significantly contribute to the development and growth of such groups. These global implications, highlighted below, show why a present-day global response is needed to curb and eventually eliminate this menace.

Safe shipping routes key to global economy and food security

Mitropoulos 5 [(Efthimios, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations) World Maritime Day Parallel Event, 11/15, International Maritime Organization]

We hoped to kick-start moves towards creating a far broader awareness that a healthy and successful shipping industry has ramifications that reach far beyond the industry itself. Global economic prosperity is dependent on trade and trade, in turn, is dependent on a safe and secure transport network. Shipping is the most important part of that global network, although it is rarely acknowledged as such, and seldom given the credit it deserves. Indeed, I have long come to the sad conclusion that the contribution made by the shipping industry - and, in particular, by those who work hard, both on board ships and ashore, to make it safer and more environmentally friendly - is greatly undervalued by the public at large. You may have noticed that I used the word "sad" to brand my conclusion. I am sorry to say that there is another word I might suggest as more fitting to characterize the situation and that is the word "unfair" - in capital letters! I think it is worth pausing for a moment to consider just how vital the contribution of ships and shipping actually is. More than 90 per cent of global trade is reportedly carried by sea; over the last four decades, total seaborne trade estimates have nearly quadrupled, from less than 6 thousand billion tonne-miles in 1965 to 25 thousand billion tonne-miles in 2003; and, according to UN figures, the operation of merchant ships in the same year contributed about US$380 billion in freight rates within the global economy, equivalent to about 5 per cent of total world trade. This year, the shipping industry is expected to transport 6.6 billion tonnes of cargo. If you consider this figure vis-a-vis the 6.4 billion population of the world, you will realize that this works out at more than one tonne of cargo for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet - even more for the richer nations. As seaborne trade continues to expand, it also brings benefits for consumers throughout the world. The transport cost element in the price of consumer goods varies from product to product and is estimated to account for around 2 per cent of the shelf price of a television set and only around 1.2 per cent of a kilo of coffee. Thanks to the growing efficiency of shipping as a mode of transport and to increased economic liberalization, the prospects for the industry's further growth continue to be strong. Shipping is truly the lynchpin of the global economy. Without shipping, intercontinental trade, the bulk transport of raw materials and the import and export of affordable food and manufactured goods would simply not be possible. Shipping makes the world go round and, so, let us be in no doubt about its broader significance. To put it in simple terms, as I have done before on a number of occasions during the campaign initiated at IMO to encourage all those involved in shipping to pay more attention to its public perception, without international shipping half the world would starve and the other half would freeze.

Terrorism causes extinction – defense mechanisms don’t check and a nuclear response is automated

Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction independent of retaliation

Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online:

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

The 6 governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council ought to require employers to pay a living wage to all workers, regardless of nationality, and ensure the enforcement of the minimum wage standards.

The plan is enforceable and avoids labor exploitation by equalizing bargaining power

HRW 14 [Human Rights Watch “Gulf Countries: Increase Migrant Worker Protection” NOVEMBER 23, 2014] AT

The proposals made by GCC countries fall far short of the changes needed to protect domestic workers’ rights, safety, and dignity,” said Elizabeth Tang, general secretary of the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). “GCC countries should join the growing number of countries worldwide that are extending full protection of their labor laws to domestic workers, including a minimum wage, a weekly rest day, the right to organize, and social benefits.” The GCC has discussed a potential region-wide standard employment contract for domestic workers. Recent media reports suggest that the GCC is also considering establishing a body to coordinate policies on hiring domestic workers that would consist of recruitment agency and government representatives. These developments have lacked transparency and have suffered from inadequate consultation with migrant domestic workers, trade unions, and migrants’ rights organizations. Migrants’ countries of origin are also discussing their own standard contract through a separate process. “Standard contracts are not a substitute for labor law reform, and taken alone do not meet the standards in the ILO Domestic Workers Convention,” said Sharan Burrow, general secretary of the ITUC. “The GCC should work in closer coordination with – not separately from – countries of origin to develop labor migration policies that fully respect the human and labor rights of migrants.Migrants in the Gulf make an important contribution both to the economies of their own countries and those of the countries where they work. In 2011, migrant workers in GCC countries sent home more than US$60 billion in remittances. Competition for jobs among the workers’ countries of origin, combined with their relative lack of bargaining power in relation to the labor-destination countries, means that the pressure they exert for better labor protections is weak. “The meetings over the next few days provide a key opportunity to promote regional minimum standards that would avoid a counterproductive race to the bottom in labor conditions,” said William Gois of Migrant Forum Asia. “The governments should develop a concrete action plan, in consultation with migrant workers themselves and the organizations that represent them, with benchmarks to monitor its progress.” Kuwait University Law School will host an event on November 23, 2014, at which panelists from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, IDWF, the ITUC, and Migrant Forum Asia will discuss the rights of migrant domestic workers. The groups recommend that the governments: Establish and enforce comprehensive labor law protections for migrant workers, including domestic workers; Reform the kafala (sponsorship) visa system to ensure that workers can change employers without being required to first obtain their consent; Remove the “exit permit” requirement in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Strengthen regulation and monitoring of labor recruitment agencies, including eliminating recruitment fees for workers; Ensure that migrants have access to justice and support services; and Expand the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to include labor-origin countries from Africa, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and participation by nongovernmental groups. Governments should ratify and implement international labor and human rights standards, the groups said. These include the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, the ILO Forced Labor Protocol, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.
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