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and organizations empirically, on the basis

of facts and techniques, rather than experience,

privilege, or an arbitrary position. Functions and

responsibilities would be aligned in a scientifically

proven manner by engineers trained in the management

of things and the governance of people

working with and on them.

Taylorism did not die with Taylor – it became

sedimented deep inside organizations, wherein,

eventually, many people would be replaced by

robots, in which scientific management would

find far better raw material: there were no sources

of uncertainty in designing and calibrating pure

machines, as compared to the person/machine

interface. Of course, one does not have to go to a

factory to find Taylorism: check out the system for

manufacturing fast food in any burger restaurant

such as McDonald’s (see McDonaldization).

Another engineer, Henri Fayol (1841–1925), is

often regarded as the most significant European

founder of modern management, because he

provided a basis for systematic authority in the

fledgling occupation. In 1916, he published Administration

industrielle et ge´ne´rale, in which he argued

that better management not only is concerned

with improving output and disciplining subordinates

but also must address the training of the

people at the top. Although other early management

theorists (such as Elton Mayo [1880–1949]

and Mary Parker Follett [1868–1933]) and many

subsequent ones (such as James March and

Karl Weick) were to take a less systematic and

mechanical view, these early foundations for

management thinking have proven remarkably

resilient – especially as the thrust towards the

rationalization of the world has been carried forward

by the managerial project. STEWART CLEGG

managerial revolution

James Burnham wrote The Managerial Revolution in

1941. Aware that economies based on capitalism

had inherent structural flaws, he – as a former

adherent of Trotskyism – was nonetheless disenchanted

by the Soviet state. The post-World War I

years had seen the decline of many of the huge

corporations that had dominated United States

economic life, particularly as effective anti-trust

legislation took shape from 1932. A concern with

the concentration of power and the dispersion of

share ownership was to become allied with the

view that a “managerial revolution” had occurred

in United States corporate life. Real power was no

longer to be found concentrated in the hands of

the robber barons. Power had shifted to the stewards

of capital – the managers – and the major

concentrations of capital held by the dominant


With limited liability, the shareholders of a

corporation elect a board of directors who then

choose the top management officers to run the

business. Burnham suggested that, with this split

between ownership and control, a new society,

neither capitalist nor communist, would develop:

a managerial society. Burnham’s central argument

was that ownership means control. Without

control there is no ownership. If ownership and

control are separated, the separated ownership

becomes purely a legal fiction and real control

will reside in the day-to-day stewards of capital,

the managers. Senior executives, however, generally

hold major consolidated blocks of shares, so

potential conflicts between the interests of the

principals, the shareholders, and the interests of

the agents, the hired managers, may not be as

extreme as one might expect. Shareholders – often

professional and institutional investors – frequently

have little interest in influencing the

way business is run; they use the share price as a

proxy of quality management. Managers typically

dominate boards of directors as well as being significant


More recently, Alfred Chandler in The Visible

Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business

(1977) has revised the managerial revolution thesis.

He argues that modern organizations arose because

administrative coordination was better than

the market at enhancing productivity and lowering

costs. Administrative coordination created a managerial

hierarchy, one that became increasingly

management managerial revolution


technical and professional, with a preference for

long-term stability and growth over short-term

gains (although themarkets would sometimes favor

these). The move to a rational managerial system

encourages growing professionalization, which increasingly

saw personal and family-owned enterprises

replaced by professionally managed firms.

There has been a managerial revolution – but it

has not seen family firms disappear: indeed, some

of the world’s largest companies remain family

firms. However, those that do not employ professional

managers are unlikely to be sustainable.

A new and significant stratum of professional

managers has been created as the custodians

of capital and the driving forces behind an

increasing rationalization and globalization.


Mann, Michael (1942–)

Professor of Sociology at the University of California,

Los Angeles, Mann has been particularly influential

in historical sociology and macrosociology.

His analytical framework is a theory of power that

is in part derived from Max Weber. Mann argues

that there are four types of power: military, political,

economic, and ideological. He has examined

the historical development of these four types of

power in The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A

History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760

(1986) and The Sources of Social Power, Volume II: The

Rise of Classes and Nation-states 1760–1914 (1993).

Volume III will examine globalization. He has applied

this framework to the contemporary United

States and its foreign policy in Incoherent Empire

(2003), arguing that American power cannot be

coherently exercised in these four dimensions.

His earlier research in political sociology was on

politics and ideology in the western working class

in Consciousness and Action Among the western

Working Class (1973), and he has argued that citizenship

is an institution to regulate and incorporate

the working class in capitalism in his article in

Sociology on “Ruling-class Strategies and Citizenship”

(1987). In his Fascists (2004) Mann developed

a controversial interpretation of fascism, arguing

that, particularly in Germany, it was not supported

by a specific social class, was not attractive

necessarily to downwardly mobile or marginal

men, and was not initially or overwhelmingly

characterized by anti-Semitism. BRYAN S. TURNER

Mannheim, Karl (1893–1947)

Born in Hungary, Mannheim fled to Germany

in 1919 after the failure of the revolutionary

government in Budapest. With the emergence of

fascism, he moved to Britain in 1933, eventually

becoming a professor at the London School of

Economics. He made a major contribution to the

development of the sociology of knowledge in

Ideology and Utopia (1936), Essays on the Sociology

of Culture (1956), and Conservatism: A Contribution to

the Sociology of Knowledge (1986). He argued that

rising social classes embrace utopian systems of

knowledge, whereas declining social classes will

embrace romantic or reactionary ideologies.

Against cultural relativism, he defended the idea

that the “free-floating intelligentsia” can be relatively

independent of social determination. Against

the Marxist emphasis on social class, Mannheim

developed the concept of generation as representing

the life chances and experiences of age cohorts

passing through time. Members of a generation

are held together by experiencing events from

the same vantage point. This phenomenon of a

common experience he referred to as the “stratification

of experience” and he conceived of this

experience as the dynamic aspect of generational


Mannheim also wrote extensively on education,

social reform, and social policy in Man and Society

in an Age of Reconstruction (1940), Diagnosis of Our

Time (1943), and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning

(1951). In this work, he argued that sociology

can make an important contribution to social

planning. BRYAN S. TURNER

Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979)

A philosopher by training who studied with

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Marcuse joined

the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in

1934 and worked with Max Horkheimer, Theodor

Wiesengrund Adorno, Erich Fromm, and others in

developing a critical theory of contemporary society.

During the 1960s, Marcuse ascended to the

unlikely role of guru of the New Left. His book

on Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl

Marx, Reason and Revolution (1941), introduced a

younger generation to critical and dialectical

social theory, and he provided an excellent philosophical

interpretation of Sigmund Freud in his

1955 Eros and Civilization.

In 1964, Marcuse published a wide-ranging critique

of both advanced capitalist and communist

societies in One-Dimensional Man. This book theorized

the decline of revolutionary potential in capitalist

societies and the development of new forms

of social control. Marcuse argued that “advanced

industrial society” created false needs that integrated

individuals into the existing system of

Mann, Michael (1942–) Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979)


production and consumption. Mass media and

culture, advertising, industrial management, and

contemporary modes of thought all reproduced

the existing system and attempted to eliminate

negativity, critique, and opposition. The result

was a “one-dimensional” universe of thought and

behavior in which the very aptitude and ability for

critical thinking and oppositional behavior were

withering away.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Marcuse had

worldwide influence on the student and anti-war

movement. Later works include his 1969 Essay on

Liberation, Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972) and

The Aesthetic Dimension (1979), while the collections

Technology, War and Fascism (1998), Toward a Critical

Theory of Society (2001), and The New Left and the 1960s

(2005) collect some of his most important work.


manual and mental labor

– see labor.


In classical economic theory, the market not only

establishes the price of commodities, but the economic

exchanges it coordinates are also seen as

a means of social integration. Specialization

and the division of labor require the exchange

of goods and services which replaces the selfsufficiency

of traditional societies with the

mutual advantage of economic interdependence.

For economic liberalism, market exchange produces

the wealth of nations and simultaneously

reconciles self-interest and individualism with

social integration. In Bernard de Mandeville’s

(1670–1733) aphorism in The Fable of the Bees

(1714), “private vices” bring “public benefits,”

later more famously described by Adam Smith

(1723–90) as the mechanism of the “invisible


Sociology developed to a large extent as the

result of a critical dialogue with this liberal economic

theory, as in Talcott Parsons’s Structure

of Social Action (1937). From Auguste Comte’s

early nineteenth-century critique of the “invisible

hand” to today’s concern with the social and political

consequences of globalization, sociologists

have pursued two related lines of attack. First,

the market was not a viable basis for social

order; indeed, impersonal calculative exchange relations

inhibit the formation of social bonds based

on trust and cooperation, as F. To¨nnies argued

in his analysis of the transition from community

(Gemeinschaft) to association (Gesellschaft). Second,

Adam Smith’s explanation of the existence of

markets as the natural outcome of a universal

and primitive predisposition to “truck, barter,

and exchange” was rejected as being inconsistent

with the wide historical and cultural variability in

the existence of markets. Karl Polanyi observed

that the allocation of goods according to norms

of either reciprocity and/or redistribution has

been more prevalent throughout human history

than allocation by the mechanism of market

price. Thus, the existence of markets as social

institutions required a historical and sociological

explanation – that is, how they came into being

and how they worked.

Until recently, however, sociology gave more

attention to the socially and politically corrosive

impact of market exchange. A classic exposition is

contained in Karl Marx’s analysis of alienation and

the “cash nexus.” Market exchange mediated by

money involves the estrangement of individuals

from their products and from the social relations

into which they enter in the process of production.

Most importantly, labor becomes a commodity

to be bought and sold and, consequently,

people become alienated from their essential humanity,

or “species being.” Modern society is

based on the fragile “cash nexus” rather than the

more robust norms of traditional society. The

same general theme is pursued from somewhat

different perspectives in E´mile Durkheim’s analysis

of anomie; Polanyi’s discussion of land, labor,

and money capital as “fictitious commodities”;

and, more recently, for example, in Amitai Etzioni’s

communitarian critique of the “free market.”

In The Architecture of Markets (2001), Neil Fligstein

systematizes the literature on the macrosociological

structure and historical development

of modern markets. Markets are social institutions

comprising four kinds of rules: (1) property

rights; (2) governance structures; (3) rules of exchange;

and (4) conceptions of control. (Note also

that the existence of stable money, in the formof a

stable “money of account,” is necessary to enable

the calculations thatmake large-scale impersonal

exchange a possibility.) First, property rights

define who has claims, or not, over the profits or

surplus of economic enterprise – that is, shareholders,

patent holders, creditors, and workers.

Property rights are continuously contested in a

political process that produces different legal

forms of enterprise structure – for example,

family firm, corporation, partnership, cooperative.

Second, governance structures consist of

the rules that define the cooperative and competitive

relations within the market. These are

either laws, such as monopoly legislation, or

manual and mental labor market(s)


informal norms that define unfair practices such

as “cutthroat competition.” Third, rules of exchange

specify the transacting parties and the

conditions under which the transactions are

carried out – for example, contract law, accounting

standards, product standards, and health and

safety legislation. Without such rules, exchange

will remain fragmented. For example, the harmonization

of exchange rules is seen clearly in

the creation of the European Union’s single

market. The continued absence of harmonized

accountancy standards across the world inhibits

globalization. Fourth, and finally, conceptions of

control are the largely informal normative and

cognitive definitions of the situation held by

the participants in a particular market. These

shared understandings concern, for example,

competitive and cooperative tactics, the internal

structure of firms, and their status ranking.

They create a “social field” that enables firms to

reproduce themselves routinely, and a stable

market order.

Max Weber was one of the first to see that the

development of extensive markets in capitalism

required an explanation. Quite different in scale

and scope from the limited exchanges in traditional

communities, large impersonal markets

became one of the axial bases of society as the

result of changes in the social and political structures

of early modern western Europe. In his economic

lectures (Wirtschaftgeschichte) which were

published as General Economic History (1923 [trans.

1927]), he showed that rules for establishing

markets as institutions for regularizing the exchange

of particular goods, as opposed to relatively

disorganized “truck and barter,” were

established through political struggle and state

power. Capitalist property rights were the result

of struggles which produced a balance of power

between multiple political elites, economic interests,

and classes. With such a dispersion of power,

the various interests agreed to rules that established

routine competition that prevented any one group

from monopolizing power and economic advantage.

For a similar analysis, see Douglass North, Institutions,

Institutional Change and Economic Performance

(1990). The competition that, for Weber, ensured

social and economic dynamism also applied to

economic competition between nations. So long

as these did not give way to a world empire,

capitalism would endure.

Weber also noted that traditional society’s

economic transactions contained an “ethical dualism.”

On the one hand, within the communal

in-group, transactions were governed by an ethic

of charity, comprising norms of fairness defined

by tradition, ritual exchange, customary

consumption, and prohibition on usury. On the

other hand, outsiders were treated according to

the opposite ethic, and routinely cheated and

charged exorbitant interest and prices. Both dimensions

of the ethic were inimical to large

mass markets and a commercialization of economic

life in which strangers are treated with an

impersonal ethic of fairness. The breakdown of

the dualism was the unintended result of modern

bureaucratic state administration and the concomitant

institution of formally equal citizenship.

Citizenship eroded the social closure of traditional

status groups, with their substantive

sumptuary restrictions, and enabled the mass consumption

that made mass production viable and,

in turn, made mechanization profitable (note that

this analysis reverses the conventional account

in economic history in which the sequence of

changes is driven by technological developments).

Weber’s account may be compared with Polanyi’s

analysis of the state’s role in creating markets in

land, capital, and labor.

On a micro-level, recent economic sociology has

criticized economic theory’s “perfect competition,”

or “general equilibrium,” models of how

markets actually operate. In formal economic

models, originally developed in the late nineteenth

century by economists such as Alfred Marshall

(1842–1924, England) and Leon Walras

(1834–1910, Switzerland), the forces of supply

and demand interact to produce an equilibrium

price for a good at which all demand is satisfied

and all supply is exhausted. That is to say, the

market “clears.” In order to model this outcome,

a number of assumptions are made concerning

the structure of the market. It comprises: (1) a

myriad of rational, utility-maximizing individuals

making independent decisions on the basis of “exogenously”

given preferences and tastes; (2) individuals

possessing perfect information about the

quality and quantity of a uniform good; (3) there is

market equality – that is, all participants are

“price-takers,” not monopolistic “price-makers”;

and (4) there are frequent and regular exchanges.

Paradoxically, however, there is no competition

in the perfect competition model. Perfect information

and foresight would render any competitive

bargaining process redundant. In fact, the

model describes an end state of equilibrium, but

cannot satisfactorily explain how this comes

about as a result of the utility-maximizing decisions

of independent, isolated individuals. To

solve this problem, the early proponents of the

market(s) market(s)


supply and demand model had to add further

components in order to make it function. Walras

introduced the “auctioneer” to initiate and coordinate

the competitive bidding. (Note that real auctions

have estimated and reserve prices to “frame”

the market interaction.) Marshall realized that

myriad uncoordinated actions of producers and

buyers with less-than-perfect information and rationality

would result in price volatility. He introduced

the middleman, or wholesaler, into his

example of the corn market to hold buffer stocks

in order to balance supply with demand and

thereby maintain a stable price and an orderly

market. In other words, Walras and Marshall

were giving the market a social structure that

would enable it to operate, as opposed to

the instability that they recognized in the model

of the interaction of the subjective preferences of

myriad atomized individuals.

Alternatively, “Austrian” economic theory advocates

markets as the most efficient means of

economic decisionmaking and coordination on

the grounds of the contrary assumption of imperfect

information. According to Ludwig von Mises

(1881–1973), for example, it was precisely because

we could never have adequate information to plan

an economy centrally that decentralized markets

were necessary. Competitive market struggle

was the best means of establishing the relative

scarcity of goods and of ensuring dynamic change.

Weber’s incorporation of these ideas into his

ideal type of capitalism as a “struggle for economic

existence” and the “economic battle of

man against man” led him to reject socialism as

a viable form of economy.

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