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two countervailing trends: while new labor processes

and products may be more knowledge- and

skill-intensive, the pressure to rationalize such

processes and products may lead to deskilling.

These contradictory tendencies were both emphasized

in the work of Harry Braverman, the foremost

proponent of the deskilling thesis in

monopoly capitalism, in Labor and Monopoly Capital:

The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century

(1974). Some commentators also suggest that deskilling

leads to worker alienation, disempowerment,

and dehumanization, and may prompt

resistance from manual and mental labor. Others

emphasize that it can lead to cleaner and less

physically demanding work. BOB JESSOP

determinism

This is the view that, given certain prior conditions,

there is an inevitability about the social

processes, events, and happenings that will subsequently

be brought about. These subsequent happenings

are said to be entirely determined by the

given prior conditions. Determinism can take

many forms but perhaps the Marxist variant is

the most well-known sociological example. Determinism

here is associated with those interpretations

of Karl Marx’s work in which the economic

base is said to determine what happens at the

level of law, politics, and ideology. The determining

conditions here are the economic and class

relations structured around the mode of production,

whether this be feudal, capitalist, or some

other. Politics, law, and ideology, the so-called

superstructures, would be seen as merely the

surface manifestations, the epiphenomena, of

the deeper economic and class structures that

provide the real force and energy driving all of

social reality. Determinism can also take a range

of other forms in which, instead of the economic

taking the role of the determining force, this role

is given to the genetic, cultural, discursive, demographic,

or militaristic dimensions of social life, to

name but some. Thus, many racist and sexist arguments

are based on forms of genetic determinism

in which allegedly inferior genetic inheritances

determine lower levels of capability. Or, in a military

version, it may be assumed that the nation

with the greatest firepower will inevitably come to

dominate the world economy. It is the economy

this time that plays the role of epiphenomenon.

While there can sometimes be some truth in

deterministic arguments – such that the economic

level does clearly have effects on other aspects of

life, and that genetic inheritance will make some

things broadly possible and other things impossible

– the truths are often partial and overly simplified,

and at other times they are simply wrong.

Two salient weaknesses can typically be found in

deterministic arguments. The first entails a crude

view of the nature of the object or set of relations

that are said to be doing the determining. Thus, to

take the Marxist example, the economic level

itself does in fact require certain legal, political,

and ideological preconditions for it to exist in the

first place, something stressed by many twentiethcentury

neo-Marxists. The economic level is itself

a more complex and plural entity than a crude

account suggests.

The second weakness is closely related, and

entails an overly simple, or reductionist, view of

the causal process by which the determining

object is said to bring about the things it determines.

In contrast to a laboratory experiment in

which strict controls ensure that object X produces

certain effects on object Y without any

unwanted factors intervening, causality in social

life is freighted with a plurality of complicating

factors. Any effect that an object such as the economy

has on another entity such as politics – even

if it were possible to draw a ring around the two so

neatly – would typically be mediated, tempered,

and complicated by many other factors. These

factors could include anything from constitutional

statutes and party doctrines to media representations

and nationalistic ideologies, not to

mention the uncertainties and creativities of

human agency within each of these spheres.

The typical stance of determinism has been a

view that social events are pre-determined, and

determinism determinism

132


that they are pre-determined by a particular kind

of entity to the exclusion of other entities. A more

adequate view is that social happenings do have

causal determinants which bring them about, but

that these determinants tend to be both internally

complex and plural, and that they combine to

produce social events but without having been

bound to do so. ROB STONES

detraditionalization

– see tradition.

development theory

Coming to prominence in the context of United

States hegemony and attendant Cold War superpower

rivalry, development or modernization theory

assumed the existence of national societies

developing in parallel with each other in a natural

and universal evolutionary process. There were

strains, to be sure. The Russian Revolution, as

Theodor Shanin argued in Russia 1905–07. Revolution

as a moment of Truth (1986), can be seen as the

outcome of some of the contradictions of “developing

societies,” and rapid industrialization (see

industrial society) thereafter – though brutal –

was held up as a model for Third World states

seeking to overcome economic backwardness.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union

aimed to convince other states to ally with them

in the Cold War in exchange for military and

economic aid, each arguing for the superiority of

their model of economic development.

Structural-functionalist theorists, notably

Talcott Parsons, held up those industrialized capitalist

societies that had achieved high levels of

wealth and democratic political forms, notably

western Europe, its settler offshoots – the United

States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – and

states such as Japan, as models of successful development.

Poverty and underdevelopment were

conceived of as reflecting the prevalence of

traditional cultural values thwarting moves

towards greater economic development and

differentiation.

In the context of the wave of decolonization

after World War II, and new international bodies

like the United Nations (UN), new voices challenged

this consensus. One early important critique

was that developed by the UN Economic

Commission on Latin America (ECLA), based in

Santiago, Chile, and formed in 1948 despite the

strong objections of the United States, and led by

the Argentine Rau´l Prebisch (1901–86). While

Latin America had been independent since the

Hispanic American revolutions of the 1800s, the

ECLA’s economists emphasized the continued

structural dependence of the region on advanced

countries such as the United States. The ECLA

analyzed how the formation of peripheral export

economies served the needs of the powerful states

at the center of the global capitalist economy

throughout the colonial period and thereafter.

The ECLA’s studies had a major impact on the

emergence of a distinct Latin American perspective

on development and underdevelopment, thus

playing an important role in the emergence of

dependency theory. The career of Celso Furtado

(1920–2004), widely regarded as the most influential

Brazilian economist of the twentieth century

and a leader of the structural economists of the

region, exemplifies this connection. Prebisch saw

Furtado’s ability early on and chose him as the

first head of the newly created economic development

division. In a 1956 book, Furtado became

one of the earliest social scientists to use the

term dependency, and went on to serve as Brazil’s

Minister of Planning in the populist government

of Joa˜o Goulart (1918–76), until the United States

overthrew the democratically elected government

in 1964.


The structural economists of ECLA advocated

the importation and development of infant industries

through import substitution industrialization

(ISI) and Keynesian (see John Maynard

Keynes) techniques of economic demand stimulus.

Yet, aside from the relatively unique experience

of East Asia, for all the gains made in

economic growth and development, ISI failed to

overcome economic dependency on foreign actors

and thus gave way to the emergence of a radicalized

dependency theory. In the context of the

Cuban Revolution and the United States response

to this in the region, including through support

for the emergence of military regimes, many of

the dependency theorists advocated anti-imperialist

revolutions, often as part of a broader socialist

or Marxist-inspired strategy for Third World

development.

Marxist economist Paul Baran (1910–64) was an

early precursor of the dependentistas, who included

left-wing social scientists such as Samir Amin,

Frederick Clairmonte, Alain de Janvry, Anibal Quijano,

Cheryl Payer, Dudley Seers, Walter Rodney,

and Theotonio dos Santos. Among the most prominent

were Fernando Henrique Cardoso (later

President of Brazil) and Andre´ Gunder Frank,

both of them associated to varying degrees with

ECLA. Frank coined the term “the development of

underdevelopment,” arguing the two dimensions

were dialectically related. In contrast to the

detraditionalization development theory

133


modernization school, dependency theorists

argued that the poverty of the periphery and

wealth of the core were a structural outcome of

unequal power relations between different states

and peoples, not cultural differences or tradition.

Such so-called feudal remnants – the domination

of landed classes and so forth – were seen instead

as products of capitalist development in the Third

World dictated by the center. While inspired by

the arguments of Karl Marx, dependency theorists

differed in that they argued capitalism brought

not modernization but instead subordination

and polarization through surplus extraction.

The institutional structure of domination here

included what Peter Evans, in Dependent Development

(1979), called the “triple alliance” of multinational,

state, and local capital. Associated

critical actors, which Robin Broad, David Pion-

Berlin, Michael McClintock, and others have analyzed,

included the core states, US-dominated

Bretton Woods institutions – the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) –

and associated core military intervention and

support for repressive regimes.

Despite all the frustrations of postwar development,

it is now seen by many as the golden age of

postwar capitalism. Governance of market forces

and related social programs led to high growth

rates and a growing advantage in the 1960s and

1970s for Third World states in the area of trade

and development. The 1980s, in contrast, saw such

dramatic reversals in social gains that it was

called “the lost decade of the South.” The generalized

economic crisis hit both the Second and

Third Worlds, eventually leading to the collapse

of the Soviet Empire in eastern Europe and the

breakup of the Soviet Union, and the return of

much of the region to its original Third World

role. These epochal shifts of the 1980s were part

of the “counterrevolution in development policy”

associated with the hegemony of neoliberalism,

globalization, and finance capital, propelled by

the United States’ move towards high interest

rates and massive borrowing on the global capital

markets. Yet among radical critics, such as those

of world-systems analysis, what was signaled here

was actually not the victory but instead the crisis

of developmentalism, the shared belief among

self-declared capitalist or communist states that

the gains and benefits of the world economy were

open to all those who put in the requisite effort.

Here, the rise of liberation theology, Islamic fundamentalism,

and other social movements were

seen as part of the resistance to developmentalism

and its failures.

The US economic boom of the 1990s, coming in

the wake of the communist collapse, added to the

revival of modernization ideologies and the neoliberal

Washington Consensus, seen as the endpoint

of history by scholars such as Francis

Fukuyama in his The End of History and the Last

Man (1989). For a time, the Asian economic crisis

of 1997 and concomitant dramatic plummeting of

incomes in the region led to renewed discussion

about the superiority of the United States model

of capitalism. Yet soon afterwards mainstream

intellectuals such as Jagdish Bhagwati, along

with radical critics such as Walden Bello, and

Peter Gowan in his The Global Gamble (1999),

pointed towards the unleashing of speculative

capital – from hedge funds to derivatives – called

for by neo-liberal policymakers, as causing the

crisis. In the wake of the collapse of the US speculative

boom, the bursting of the bubble, the ensuing

corporate scandals and economic meltdown of

Argentina – the former darling of the IMF – more

sober assessments, questioning both the modernization

and neo-liberal approaches, thus gained

ground.

Authors such as Alice Amsden, Bruce Cumings,



Chalmers Johnson, Robert Wade, and former chief

World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz, highlighted

the structural conditions allowing for East Asia’s

economic advance and the role of neoliberalism in

the crisis. Particular attention was paid to the

developmental state, as Meredith Woo-Cumings

explores in her edited volume (The Developmental

State, 1999), and Alexander Gershenkron’s advantages

of backwardness or late development, along

with a host of unique conditions – land reform,

US military aid for export-oriented industrialization

in a productivist mold, limitations on foreign

direct investment, and capital controls – that

allowed for East Asia’s ascent, now joined by

China. In essence, contrary to ideologies of neoliberalism,

in East Asia’s export-oriented industrialization

the state played a pronounced role in

guiding market forces. More recently, Ha-Joon

Chang in Kicking Away the Ladder (2002) has shown

that virtually all the developed countries used

infant industry promotion and protectionism

before opening their markets to free competition,

as Frederich List predicted, by telling the rest of

the world – through organizations ranging from

the IMF to the World Trade Organization – that

they were not allowed to use such mechanisms.

Indeed, advanced countries still interfere with

market forces in numerous ways, from agricultural

subsidies to military spending serving to

prop up high-technology industry.

development theory development theory

134


Development theory is today being radically

reformulated by a host of iconoclastic scholars,

from Mike Davis in Late Victorian Holocausts: El

Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World

(2001) to the efforts of the Nobel-prize-winning

economist Amartya Sen. Though Sen generally

stays away from the question of power in the

global economy as a whole, his works nevertheless

complement these perspectives. In books such as

India: Development and Participation (2002), Jean

Dreze and Amartya Sen redefined development

as the process of enhancing human freedom,

focusing on the quality of life and related social

opportunities, seen as both the means and ends of

development. By shifting focus from the question

of income to human capabilities – with poverty

redefined as capability deprivation – Sen and his

colleagues redirected attention towards inequalities

within states and regions. Though not denying

the potentially positive relationship between

economic growth, rising incomes, and livelihood,

Sen demonstrates that various countries with a

high Gross National Product have abysmal indicators

in terms of the quality of life, while, through

political action and public policy other societies

have made tremendous achievements in terms of

quality of life, even in the absence of significant

economic performance. Moreover, in books such

as Development and Freedom (1999), drawing on a

wealth of empirical studies, Sen demonstrated

the positive relationship between the improvement

of people’s freedom and capabilities – notably

basic education, health, rights to information,

and democratic participation, especially for

women – for economic growth, development,

and fertility reduction. Sen has furthermore highlighted

success stories, from the Kerala region in

India to East Asia, the latter of which, for all its

problems, can be seen in relative terms as what

Fernado Fajyzylber, in his important Unavoidable

Industrial Restructuring in Latin America (1990),

called the “Growth-with-equity-industrializing

countries.”

World-systems analysts have drawn on the work

of Roy F. Harrod (1900–78) who, in a series of

famous articles, created the modern theory of

growth. In particular, Giovanni Arrighi in The

Long Twentieth Century (1994) and Fred Hirsch in

The Social Limits of Growth (1976) have shown that,

while options for upward mobility are open to

some, ultimately they rest on relational processes

of exploitation and exclusion that reproduce

the oligarchic structures of the world economy,

within which income and resources are used

disproportionately by the few at the expense of

the many. Though many states of the South

internalized aspects of the social structures of

the core through industrialization, this failed to

close the widening development gap. Recent United

Nations Human Development Reports (1998, 1999)

note that (1) the wealthiest 20 percent of the

world’s population accounts for some 86 percent

of private consumption expenditures; and (2)

income inequality between the world’s poor and

rich states has increased from roughly 3:1 in 1820,

to 11:1 in 1913, before rising from 35:1 to 70:1

from 1950 to 1992. The Forbes (2004) most recent

annual report on the nearly 600 billionaires in the

world reveals their wealth to be close to US$1.9

trillion; this at a time when over a billion persons

across the globe live on under a dollar a day,

according to World Bank statistics, while the gap

between high-, middle-, and low-income states

continues to widen. In recent years these increasing

inequalities have given rise to a global social

justice and peace movement, replete with its own

annual World Social Forum, bringing together

concerned citizens and activists in non-governmental

organizations, to build a better world.

Thus, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the

questions of economic development and what

model(s) might allow for truly universal values of

greater global democracy, prosperity, and sustainable

development remain one of the great unresolved

questions of the present. THOMAS R E I FER

deviance


In simple terms, this can be defined as (real or

purported) non-normative behavior that, if detected,

can be subject to informal or formal sanctions.

Deviant behavior is norm-violating conduct

that is subject to social control. In their textbook

Social Deviance and Crime: An Organizational and

Theoretical Approach (2000), Charles Tittle and Raymond

Paternoster summarize the predominant

ways in which sociologists have defined deviance

and offer their own definition: any type of behavior

that the majority of a given group regards as

unacceptable or that evokes a collective response

of a negative type (13). Deviants are those who

engage in behavior that deviates from norms in a

disapproved direction in sufficient degree to

exceed the tolerance limits of a discernible social

group, such that the behavior is likely to elicit a

negative sanction if detected.

Howard S. Becker, an influential scholar of

deviance, pointed out in Outsiders: Studies in the

Sociology of Deviance (1963) that deviance is not a

quality of the act one commits, but rather a consequence

of the application by others of rules and

development theory deviance

135

sanctions to an “offender.” Whether an act is deviant



depends on how others who have social power

and influence define the act. One could commit

any act, but it is not deviant in its social consequence

if no elements of society react to it. Becker

called social acts “rule-breaking behavior,” and

actors violating norms of society “rule-breakers.”

As John I. Kitsuse (1923–2003), a well-known scholar

of deviance best-known for furthering a “labeling

approach” to understanding rule violation,

made clear in his body of work spanning over

three decades, forms of behavior per se do not

differentiate deviants from nondeviants; conventional

and conforming members of the society

identify and interpret behavior as deviant, and

then transform rule-breaking behavior into deviance

and persons who break rules or norms into

deviants.

Many theoretical frameworks, including strain,

subculture, learning, and labeling, have been

developed by sociologists to explain the occurrences,

forms, consequences, and labeling of

deviance. One way to make sense of these various

frameworks is to organize them according to the

degree to which they are designed to address one

of two central questions in the study of deviance.

First, normative theories ask “who violates norms

and why?” Second, reactivist theories ask “why are

certain types of norm violations by certain types

of individuals (and not others) reacted to as deviant

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