Global nuclear expansion now – dozens of countries

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China Exports DA

Not zero-sum – benefits accrue to international firms

Yurman 10 [“China’s ambitious nuclear energy program”, Dec 2, 2010, ANS Nuclear Café, “Capacity planning targets keep going up”, By Dan Yurman]
The Financial Times reported that at least 30 percent of the new reactors built in China in the next 10 years will be based on the AP1000 design. It will take years, however, for China to absorb the technology as well as train thousands of new engineers to master it. During this time, Westinghouse can expect to continue to be deeply involved in China’s massive nuclear program. From a safety perspective, China will need Westinghouse know-how to ensure accidents don’t derail its ambitious expansion plans. As a result, Westinghouse remains bullish that it will get more orders for new reactors from China.

Other countries will beat China in the exports game – South Korea

Blank 10 [Steven, professor at the strategic studies institute, Army War College, 6/16/10

“China puts down marker in nuclear power race”, Asia Times Online]

However, since then there has been a veritable explosion of competition among Asian and European providers (including the United States) to sell nuclear technology abroad, not least to India. South Korea's shocking victory over France in the competition to sell to the United Arab Emirates has had major effects abroad in this context. South Korea clearly aims to be a major nuclear power exporter. Its firms like Korea Electric Power Co are active in India, China, Jordan, and Turkey [5]. South Korea aims to capture 20% of the global market by 2030 and export 80 nuclear reactors [6]. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has publicly expressed his belief that this deal with the United Arab Emirates will facilitate other exports abroad.

Alt causes solve and hurt soft power

Lagerkvist 11 [“The coming collapse of China’s soft power”, March 23, 2011, Johan Lagerkvist, Senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs]
It has begun¶ This post is not arguing that the Chinese state is crumbling, that an economic collapse is imminent, or that China’s rise is over. To the contrary, the Chinese Party-state is very much in the driver’s seat. It is diligently monitoring developments in Chinese economy and society, intent at not overlooking any rocking of the state ship. This, however, comes at great costs to the internal security budget and China’s image abroad. I am purely looking at China’s attractiveness as a world power, model, and shaper of values and goodwill. ¶ You may recall how many journalists and analysts hailed Chinese President Hu Jintao’s state visit to the United States in January — full of the trappings worthy of a wannabe world leader - as the most important Sino-US meeting in years. During the visit a state-orchestrated Chinese campaign designed to persuade Americans that China’s rise will be beneficial and peaceful was also launched. The “China experience” advertisement was displayed in New York City’s Times Square. It showcased Chinese achievements in sports, the business world and space research. Yet, it seems hard to convince Americans that China’s rise is a non-threatening enterprise. A January 2011 poll conducted by the Pew Institute puts China as the greatest threat to the United States—followed by North Korea and Iran.

Soft power is impossible to quantify and Chinese export assertiveness undermines it

Lagerkvist 11 [“The coming collapse of China’s soft power”, March 23, 2011, Johan Lagerkvist, Senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs]
Soft power is a quite amorphous and scientifically somewhat vague concept. It’s become popular and easy to use by one and all. Basically it seems to be anything that’s is not military hard power. The inventor of the successful concept of soft power, Joseph Nye, thinks that China is doing the right thing for a rapidly rising power. It has to convince the outside world that it need to fear China’s rise, and direct the attention of others away from its growing hard power. However, it’s hard to build and difficult to implement as a policy within a system consisting of such diverse and contradictory interests as Chinese officialdom. How do you craft an entertainment industry like Hollywood and Bollywood , and a message industry such as Madison Avenue to serve your country and – your state — in a short time? Arguably, these cultural institutions take time to build, and they are usually more solid if they are organically constructed by the market, rather than by power hungry politicians. Cultural institutes such as the British Council, the Spanish Cervantes Institute, and China’s booming venture of Confucius institutes have, comparatively speaking, a marginal impact. Yet, policymakers and not so few analysts love the term – as it may lend some analytical credence and inspiration to their daily work. And as colleagues at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Linus Hagstrom, Johan Eriksson, Ludvig Norman have argued, soft power is both a political and a scientific concept. Nowadays, perhaps even more a political and popular culture concept. (1) It goes without saying that some policymakers, such as former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a true believer in hard power, don’t like it. Many Chinese analysts and policy-makers have embraced the concept wholeheartedly, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Chinese international relations experts are realists at heart. In recent years, Chinese academic journals have been flooded with articles analyzing China’s soft power. It fits just too well with building the image of China’s “peaceful rise” and China’s purported desire to build a “harmonious world.” In his speech to the 17th Communist Party Congress in 2007, President Hu Jintao mentioned that China needs to strengthen its soft power. One of China’s most renowned political scientists, Professor Yan Xuetong of Qinghua University, confidently wrote in an article in Contemporary International Relations (No.1, 2008) that China would surpass the United States in terms of its soft power in 3 to 5 years. It may seem ridiculous now, but it’s important to note that his argument was made during the US led “war on terror,” before the Lhasa riots in Tibet in 2008, the subsequent hard-line turn in Chinese domestic politics, and a more assertive posture in international relations. ¶ The reasons for the collapse of Chinese soft power¶ What are the reasons undergirding the decline of Chinese soft power? I would like to suggest five fundamental reasons. There are quite a few sub-reasons. I am sure you can come up with a few of your own.¶ * A new Chinese assertiveness vis-à-vis neighbors Japan, South Korea, India, and ASEAN countries in its foreign policy behavior during 2010 indicated a new posture, or rather an older Chinese stance predating the previously skillful regional diplomacy of “good neighborliness. With the statement that the South China Sea was a “core interest” area of China on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the good neighbor atmosphere deteriorated fast, prompting ASEAN countries so seek US support for their security arrangements – in the light of China’s potentially ”unpeaceful rise.” Needless to say, this new assertiveness of China has not gone unnoticed in other parts of the world.

No warrant for why nuclear is key – other energy or economic sectors can fill in for Chinese economic influence abroad

They’ll develop thorium

Martin 11 [Richard Martin, “China Takes Lead in Race for Clean Nuclear Power”, 2/1/11, Wired]

China has officially announced it will launch a program to develop a thorium-fueled molten-salt nuclear reactor, taking a crucial step towards shifting to nuclear power as a primary energy source.¶ The project was unveiled at the annual Chinese Academy of Sciences conference in Shanghai last week, and reported in the Wen Hui Bao newspaper (Google English translation here).

That can be weaponized

FEA no date *Friends of the Earth Australia is a group that campaigns for environmental sustainability [, “thorium and wmd proliferation risks”]

Thorium fuel cycles are promoted on the grounds that they pose less of a proliferation risk compared to conventional reactors. However, whether there is any significant non-proliferation advantage depends on the design of the various thorium-based systems. No thorium system would negate proliferation risks altogether.Neutron bombardment of thorium (indirectly) produces uranium-233, a fissile material which can be used in nuclear weapons (1 Significant Quantity of U-233 = 8kg).¶ The USA has successfully tested weapon/s using uranium-233 cores.

Can’t be sold competitively – so China will abandon and push current-gen tech

Katusa, ’12 [Marin, Chief Energy Investment Strategist, Casey Research, Market Oracle, 2-14, “Why Not Thorium Fueled Nuclear Reactors Instead of Uranium?”]

Well, maybe quite a bit of support. One of the biggest challenges in developing a thorium reactor is finding a way to fabricate the fuel economically. Making thorium dioxide is expensive, in part because its melting point is the highest of all oxides, at 3,300° C. The options for generating the barrage of neutrons needed to kick-start the reaction regularly come down to uranium or plutonium, bringing at least part of the problem full circle. And while India is certainly working on thorium, not all of its eggs are in that basket. India has 20 uranium-based nuclear reactors producing 4,385 MW of electricity already in operation and has another six under construction, 17 planned, and 40 proposed. The country gets props for its interest in thorium as a homegrown energy solution, but the majority of its nuclear money is still going toward traditional uranium. China is in exactly the same situation – while it promotes its efforts in the LFTR race, its big bucks are behind uranium reactors. China has only 15 reactors in operation but has 26 under construction, 51 planned, and 120 proposed.

No impact to soft power

Ford, 10 (4/29, Peter, Christian Science Monitor, “On eve of Shanghai Expo 2010, China finds 'soft power' an elusive goal; Chinese authorities have seized on the Shanghai Expo 2010 - the largest in history - as another chance to enhance 'soft power' that is generated by the spread of cultures, values, diplomacy, and trade. The expo opens this weekend” Lexis)
At the heart of the Shanghai World Expo stands the host nation's pavilion, a giant latticed crown painted crimson. Packed with exhibits portraying daily Chinese life, China's ethnic diversity, and the standard bearers of Chinese philosophy, the display shows China's friendliest face to the world. Hard on the heels of the Beijing Olympics, the authorities here have seized on the Expo - the largest in history - as another chance to improve the rising giant's international image. Learning how to win friends and influence people is a task to which the government has attached the highest priority in recent years.

It appears, however, to be failing. A BBC poll released in April found that only one-third of respondents in 14 countries believe China is a positive influence, down from one-half just five years ago. IN PICTURES: Shanghai World Expo 2010 "The government is putting a lot of resources and a lot of attention into boosting China's 'soft power,' but they've got a lot of problems with the message," says David Shambaugh, head of the China Policy Program at George Washington University in Washington. "The core aspects of their system" - such as one-party rule, media censorship, and suppression of critics - "are just not appealing to outsiders." Chinese policymakers and academics are increasingly fascinated by "soft power," whereby nations coopt foreign governments and citizens through the spread of their cultures, values, diplomacy, and trade, rather than coerce them by military might. Frustrated by Western domination of global media, from entertainment to news, and by what it sees as unfair coverage, China has launched a $6.6 billion campaign to tell its own story to the world by building its own media empires. Li Changchun, the ruling Communist Party's top ideology official, was blunt in a 2008 speech: "Whichever nation's communications capacity is the strongest, it is that nation whose culture and core values spread far and wide ... that has the most power to influence the world," he said. Is the message convincing? But this is not enough, says Li Xiguang, head of the International Center for Communications Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

A. American exports

Reuters, 12 [April 19th, “U.S. coal exports to China may double in 2012: Xcoal”,]

(Reuters) - U.S. coal exports to China could more than double to over 12 million tonnes in 2012 thanks to depressed freight rates and a fall in domestic demand in the United States, the chief of top U.S. coal exporter Xcoal Energy & Resources said.¶ The expected increase in coal shipments could further push down coal prices in Asia where a supply glut following a deluge from the United States and Colombia has forced prices to slump recently.¶ Australian Newcastle-grade coal has dropped $10 a tonne since end-February, the Indonesian coal reference price is down to its lowest in 16 months and South African coal has shed $5.¶ "Exports to China could reach over 12 million tonnes this year based on the annualized numbers," Chief Executive Ernie Thrasher told Reuters in an interview on Wednesday.¶ "We only have data for January and February now, but all anecdotal evidence so far suggests that there are no signs of that diminishing as the year goes on," he said.¶ "I think there is enough demand in Asia to absorb enough U.S. cargoes to stem a decline in prices."¶ Many U.S. coal sellers have set their eyes on Asia as a shrinking domestic market and tepid demand in Europe have pushed them to look for new customers outside of their traditional markets.

B. Demand

Summer, 9/17/12 [ Dave, What is the Future for China's Coal Industry”, ]‘

In 2007 Chinese coal production contained more energy than total Middle Eastern oil production. The rapid growth of coal demand after 2001 created supply strains and bottlenecks that raise questions about sustainability. In 2010 China produced almost half of the world’s coal tonnage. China produced some 4.52 billion tonnes in 2011 and some 45% of that was shipped from the mine to the customer by rail. As demand continues to grow those volumes will also increase.

C. Global suppliers

Summer, 9/17/12 [ Dave, What is the Future for China's Coal Industry”, ]‘
China has, of course, not only its own coal reserves but has been willing to venture into the global market to find additional supplies, and I would suspect that, in the years to come, those additional supplies may well come from southern Africa. But for now they seem to have the situation reasonably in hand.

Chinese leadership risks unsafe tech transfer – and US export controls will block

Schoenberg 12 [“Chinese Company Admits U.S. Charges Over Nuclear Exports”, Tom Schoenberg, Dec 3, 2012]
A Chinese company agreed to pay $2 million in fines after admitting it helped to export nuclear reactor paint from the U.S. to Pakistan without a license.¶ China Nuclear Industry Huaxing Construction Co., which is operated by the Chinese government, pleaded guilty in federal court in Washington today to conspiring to defraud the U.S. and violating U.S. export laws.¶ The Nanjing City, China-based company, known as Huaxing, admitted that, without Commerce Department approval, it bought a paint system from PPG Industries Inc. in 2006 used to coat the inside of a nuclear reactor being built near Chashma, Punjab.¶ U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan fined the company $1 million and said it must pay another $1 million if it violates terms of its five-year probation. Assistant U.S. Attorney G. Michael Harvey told Sullivan the company was also fined $1 million by the Commerce Department.¶ “The lesson here is clear: We will pursue violations of U.S. export controls wherever they occur in the world,” U.S. Attorney Ronald Machen said in an e-mailed statement. “We will prosecute both individuals and corporate wrongdoers, and a corporation’s status as foreign-owned, or even state-owned, will not bar enforcement of those laws in U.S. courts,”¶ Pittsburgh-based PPG Industries and its Shanghai-based unit agreed in December 2010 to pay $3.75 million in fines for selling hundreds of gallons of an epoxy coating to Huaxing for use in Pakistan after the company’s application for the license was rejected in June 2006.¶

Unsafe tech transfer causes nuclear war

Sokolski 9 [Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 6/1/2009, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd,]

Finally, several new nuclear weapons contenders are also likely to emerge in the next two to three decades. Among these might be Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Algeria, Brazil (which is developing a nuclear submarine and the uranium to fuel it), Argentina, and possibly Saudi Arabia (courtesy of weapons leased to it by Pakistan or China), Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. All of these states have either voiced a desire to acquire nuclear weapons or tried to do so previously and have one or more of the following: A nuclear power program, a large research reactor, or plans to build a large power reactor by 2030. With a large reactor program inevitably comes a large number of foreign nuclear experts (who are exceedingly difficult to track and identify) and extensive training, which is certain to include nuclear fuel making.19 Thus, it will be much more difficult to know when and if a state is acquiring nuclear weapons (covertly or overtly) and far more dangerous nuclear technology and materials will be available to terrorists than would otherwise. Bottom line: As more states bring large reactors on line more will become nuclear-weapons-ready — i.e., they could come within months of acquiring nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.20 As for nuclear safeguards keeping apace, neither the iaea’s nuclear inspection system (even under the most optimal conditions) nor technical trends in nuclear fuel making (e.g., silex laser enrichment, centrifuges, new South African aps enrichment techniques, filtering technology, and crude radiochemistry plants, which are making successful, small, affordable, covert fuel manufacturing even more likely)21 afford much cause for optimism. This brave new nuclear world will stir existing security alliance relations more than it will settle them: In the case of states such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, it could prompt key allies to go ballistic or nuclear on their own. Nuclear 1914 At a minimum, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), “non-nato allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want. None of this, however, is inevitable.

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