our participation key to safeguard int’l transition and create standardized
Blees et al 11 (Tom Blees1, Yoon Chang2, Robert Serafin3, Jerry Peterson4, Joe Shuster1, Charles Archambeau5, Randolph Ware3, 6, Tom Wigley3,7, Barry W. Brook7, 1Science Council for Global Initiatives, 2Argonne National Laboratory, 3National Center for Atmospheric Research, 4University of Colorado, 5Technology Research Associates, 6Cooperative Institute for Research in the Environmental Sciences, 7(climate professor) University of Adelaide, "Advanced nuclear power systems to mitigate climate change (Part III)," 2/24/11) http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/-http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/
Many countries are now beginning to pursue fast reactor technology without the cooperation of the United States, laboriously (and expensively) re-learning the lessons of what does and doesn’t work. If this continues, we will see a variety of different fast reactor designs, some of which will be less safe than others. Why are we forcing other nations to reinvent the wheel? Since the USA invested years of effort and billions of dollars to develop what is arguably the world’s safest and most efficient fast reactor system in the IFR, and since several nations have asked us to share this technology with them (Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, India), there is a golden opportunity here to develop a common goal—a standardized design, and a framework for international control of fast reactor technology and the fissile material that fuels them. This opportunity should be a top priority in the coming decade, if we are serious about replacing fossil fuels worldwide with sufficient pace to effectively mitigate climate change and other environmental and geopolitical crises of the 21st century.
Obama will exert nuke leadership – and it’ll work
McManus 10 [“Obama Exerts Nuclear Leadership”, Mike McManus, Duke graduate, syndicated journalist for over forty years, including Time Magazine and dozens of other publications, VO, April 14, 2010]
Obama Exerts Nuclear Leadership (title)
"Two decades after the end of the Cold War, we face a cruel irony of history - the risk of a nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up," said President Obama at a Nuclear Security Summit of 47 nations this week.¶ "Nuclear materials that could be sold or stolen and fashioned into a nuclear weapon exist in dozens of nations. Just the smallest amount of plutonium - about the size of an apple - could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have tried to acquire the material for a nuclear weapon, and if they succeeded they would surely use it. Were they to do so, it would be a catastrophe for the world."¶ What's encouraging is that Obama was persuasive with a number of countries. ¶ For example, Canada, Mexico, and Ukraine committed to eliminating their surplus weapons-grade materials or to give them to the United States. Russia closed a plutonium reactor it had used to make weapons-grade fuel. Other countries agreed to convert research reactors to a fuel that could not be used for weapons.
No hypocrisy argument – every other country has violated the NPT more
Ford 9 [“Nuclear Disarmament, ¶ Nonproliferation, ¶ and the “Credibility ¶ Thesis”, Christopher Ford, September 2009, senior fellow and director of the Center for Technology and ¶ Global Security at Hudson Institute¶ U.S. special representative for ¶ nuclear nonproliferation¶ principal deputy assistant ¶ secretary of state for verification, compliance]
Inconveniently for proponents of the credibility thesis, the truth seems to be that ¶ the United States has, for some time, been arguably the most serious about disarmament ¶ of the five NPT nuclear weapons states—or at least, perhaps more accurately, the least¶ serious of the five about its nuclear weaponry. After all, the United States today is the ¶ only NWS that is not building new and more modern strategic nuclear delivery systems ¶ or new nuclear weapons. The British, French, Russians, and Chinese are all building new ¶ ballistic missile submarines, while the Russians and Chinese are also building new landbased mobile missiles. The Russians are working hard on new warhead designs, ¶ apparently in part through the use of secret low-yield nuclear testing, in violation of their ¶ own proclaimed testing moratorium, and have developed a chillingly nuclear-friendly ¶ strategic doctrine that envisions the early and liberal use of nuclear weaponry (including 19 so-called “tactical” devices) in a range of warfighting scenarios, by no means limited to ¶ situations of nuclear threat or attack. China, for its part, despite decades of disarmament ¶ rhetoric, may also be conducting such secret low-yield tests, and is certainly—and ¶ uniquely, among the five—increasing the overall size of its nuclear arsenal. Even the ¶ ostentatiously disarmament-friendly British, in addition to building their new class of ¶ ballistic missile submarines, will likely soon need to build new warheads to tip the ¶ missiles they will deploy aboard these new vessels. ¶ ¶ 6¶ The alternative, after all, might be fatal to the cause of disarmament: it would be perverse indeed ¶ to insist that in order to achieve “real” disarmament, countries must relinquish nuclear weapons ¶ only when doing so would be against their national interests. Who would agree to such terms? ¶ Page 5 of ¶ Yet Washington has now abandoned its plans even to study the possibility of ¶ replacing existing warheads with a new model designed not to need underground nuclear ¶ testing, and has stopped its program to build a follow-on to the B-2 Spirit (a.k.a. ¶ “Stealth”) bomber. The United States is also the only power in the world to have a ¶ credible chance of replacing with sophisticated long-range conventional capabilities ¶ many missions that could previously only be accomplished with the relatively crude ¶ hammer blow of a nuclear weapon. Washington has for some years gradually been ¶ reducing, rather than increasing, the salience of nuclear weapons in its strategic posture.¶ 7¶ The United States’ continued possession of a sizeable (if shrinking) arsenal should not ¶ blind observers to the remarkable degree to which nuclear weaponry is no longer ¶ particularly relevant in U.S. thinking, and to which the United States seems ever more ¶ uninterested in its own nuclear capabilities.
No CCP collapse
Yuan, 12/20/2011 – associate professor and acting director of the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney (Jingdong, “The Arab Spring and China's Evolving Middle East Policy,” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10992/the-arab-spring-and-chinas-evolving-middle-east-policy?page=1)
While Beijing has its concerns over the Arab Spring and its potentially infectious impacts on social and economic stability in China, there are strong reasons to believe that any imminent threat to Communist Party rule remains minimal and manageable. First, in most Middle Eastern countries, the autocratic ruler has personally reigned for decades and has instilled a political order that is typically repressive and nonrepresentative. The lack of any meaningful political participation provides ample frustration and is one of the principal reasons behind the various uprisings. By contrast, although China remains under one-party rule, managed term limits and an institutionalized leadership succession have been put in place. Second, there is a major difference between the Chinese economy and those of the Arab world. Chinese reforms over the past three decades have opened the country’s economy to the world, lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty and creating a sizable middle class that is more interested in gains in personal welfare than in politics. By contrast, the stagnation in many Middle Eastern economies, despite plentiful resources and oil revenues, has infuriated ordinary citizens, especially the restless young, who find employment elusive. However, perhaps the most critical difference is that Beijing retains total control over the military, the paramilitary and the police forces, on whose loyalty it can count. Having learned the lessons of the 1989 Tiananmen student uprising, the Chinese authorities quickly introduced and enforced censorship of social media after the initial Arab unrest and were resolute in stopping any organized protests from growing into massive social movements. These actions contrast sharply with the militaries and security forces in countries such as Egypt and Libya, which either split or abandoned the regimes they were supposed to protect, leading to the fall of Mubarak and Gadhafi.
No Asia war—multiple safeguards and reversible tensions
Feng 10 – professor at the Peking University International Studies [Zhu, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact”, http://www.fpif.org/articles/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia?utm_source=feed]
As such, the surge of defense expenditures in East Asia does not add up to an arms race. No country in East Asia wants to see a new geopolitical divide and spiraling tensions in the region. The growing defense expenditures powerfully illuminate the deepening of a regional “security dilemma,” whereby the “defensive” actions taken by one country are perceived as “offensive” by another country, which in turn takes its own “defensive” actions that the first country deems “offensive.” As long as the region doesn’t split into rival blocs, however, an arms race will not ensue. What is happening in East Asia is the extension of what Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job call “competitive arms processes.” The history of the cold war is telling in this regard. Arm races occur between great-power rivals only if the rivalry is doomed to intensify. The perceived tensions in the region do not automatically translate into consistent and lasting increases in military spending. Even declared budget increases are reversible. Taiwan’s defense budget for fiscal year 2010, for instance, will fall 9 percent. This is a convincing case of how domestic constraints can reverse a government decision to increase the defense budget. Australia’s twenty-year plan to increase the defense budget could change with a domestic economic contraction or if a new party comes to power. China’s two-digit increase in its military budget might vanish one day if the type of regime changes or the high rate of economic growth slows. Without a geopolitical split or a significant great-power rivalry, military budget increases will not likely evolve into “arms races.” The security dilemma alone is not a leading variable in determining the curve of military expenditures. Nor will trends in weapon development and procurement inevitably induce “risk-taking” behavior. Given the stability of the regional security architecture—the combination of U.S.-centered alliance politics and regional, cooperation-based security networking—any power shift in East Asia will hardly upset the overall status quo. China’s military modernization, its determination to “prepare for the worst and hope for the best,” hasn’t yet led to a regional response in military budget increases. In contrast, countries in the region continue to emphasize political and economic engagement with China, though “balancing China” strategies can be found in almost every corner of the region as part of an overall balance-of-power logic. In the last few years, China has taken big strides toward building up asymmetric war capabilities against Taiwan. Beijing also holds to the formula of a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue except in the case of the island’s de jure declaration of independence. Despite its nascent capability of power projection, China shows no sign that it would coerce Taiwan or become militarily assertive over contentious territorial claims ranging from the Senkaku Islands to the Spratly Islands to the India-China border dispute.
Menon 2003 (Rajan, Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, The National Interest, Fall)
By contrast, China's military, which was quite recently a giant horde of foot soldiers, is modernizing steadily-chiefly with Russian weaponry, much of it supplied from cash-starved military industries in Khabarovsk, Komsomol'sk and Vladivostok. It may lag far behind the United States, but in force projection, speed, accuracy and lethality it is a wholly different force than it was a decade ago, thanks to Russian fighter jets, submarines, tanks and missiles, many of them built in the Russian Far East. Yet the chances that China will attempt to conquer Russia's Far East are slim. Such a brazen power play would damage China's wider interests. Taiwan might recoil in terror and treat Beijing's proposals for a negotiated reunification with even greater skepticism and wariness. The prevailing Western rationale for economic engagement with China-that commerce will transform and co-opt that country-would be shredded. China would likely face a counterbalancing, encircling coalition of the United States, India, Japan, Russia and Vietnam. Would such setbacks justify the burdens of ruling the vast, problem-infested Russian Far East? The Chinese leaders know their Sun Tzu: what they seek from the Russian Far East (access to resources and a benign northern front) can be had by means of silk-gloved hegemony. Chinese interests can be served without its formal occupation of the territory. Indeed, what may emerge could be a "reverse Manchurian" scenario, where the Russian Far East remains a titular part of Russia but is increasingly integrated into Beijing's sphere of influence. That is precisely what the conspiracy among geography, demography, power and time may create in Russia's Far East.
1AR Nuke Exports UQ
Other countries will win the export race:
Blank 10 [Steven, professor at the strategic studies institute, Army War College, 6/16/10
“China puts down marker in nuclear power race”, Asia Times Online]
Yet South Korea's stunning example has not been lost on its competitors, Japan and China. For instance, in Japan, ¶ A new company should be formed later this year to support Japanese exports of nuclear power technology and knowledge. The Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (Meti) has agreed to set up the firm with involvement from utilities the Tokyo, Chubu and Kansai electric power companies as well as with reactor vendors Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The Innovation Network of Japan - a joint venture of government and industry - may also join. The move is seen as a reaction to South Korea's success in exporting to the United Arab Emirates and directed towards winning new nuclear contracts with the emerging nuclear countries of South-East Asia . Not to be undone, Japan is now considering relaxing its restrictions on the export of nuclear technology, specifically to India (part of the larger dawning Indo-Japanese partnership due to the rise of China). These discussions reflect the forces driving the nuclear export and import in Asia. Since getting its waiver from the NSG India has concluded civil nuclear deals with the United States, France, Russia, and Kazakhstan. India clearly wants to cement ties with Japan in this and other domains, and Japan, likewise, wants stronger ties with India and not to be left out of one of the biggest nuclear markets in the world .
--France and Russia
Blank 10 [Steven, professor at the strategic studies institute, Army War College, 6/16/10
“China puts down marker in nuclear power race”, Asia Times Online]
South Korea and Japan are hardly the only rivals in this field. France and the United States are long-standing purveyors of peaceful nuclear technology. Russia, since 2006 has been competing on a global scale for uranium sources and to see nuclear reactors across the globe. Moscow's efforts in this field merit a separate analysis but it is a vigorous rival for these other Asian and Western exporters.