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18 U.S.C.A. § 875




Effective: [See Text Amendments]
United States Code Annotated Currentness

Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos)



Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 41. Extortion and Threats (Refs & Annos)
§ 875. Interstate communications
(a) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any demand or request for a ransom or reward for the release of any kidnapped person, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(c) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(d) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
CREDIT(S)
(June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 741; Nov. 10, 1986, Pub.L. 99-646, § 63, 100 Stat. 3614; Sept. 13, 1994, Pub.L. 103-322, Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(G), (H), (K), 108 Stat. 2147.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1948 Acts. Based on Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 408d (May 18, 1934, c. 300, 48 Stat. 781; May 15, 1939, c. 133, § 2, 53 Stat. 743).
Provisions as to district of trial were omitted as covered by § § 3237 and 3239 of this title.
Definition of "interstate commerce" was omitted in conformity with definitive § 10 of this title.
Changes were made in phraseology and arrangement.
1986 Acts. House Report No. 99-797, see 1986 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 6138.
1994 Acts. House Report Nos. 103-324 and 103-489, and House Conference Report No. 103-711, see 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1801.
Amendments
1994 Amendments. Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub.L. 103-322, § 330016(1)(K), substituted "under this title" for "not more than $5000".
Subsec. (c). Pub.L. 103-322, § 330016(1)(H), substituted "under this title" for "not more than $1000".
Subsec. (d) Pub.L. 103-322, § 330016(1)(G), substituted "under this title" for "not more than $500".
1986 Amendments. Pub.L. 99-646 inserted "or foreign" after "interstate" wherever appearing.
CROSS REFERENCES

"Aggravated felony" defined as in this section for purposes of immigration, see 8 USCA § 1101.


Venue of prosecutions under this section, see 18 USCA § 3237.
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
See Federal Sentencing Guidelines § § 2B3.2, 2B3.3, 18 USCA.
LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES
Criminalization of employer fraud against alien employees? A national priority. Roshani M. Gunewardene, 25 New Eng.L.Rev. 795 (1991).
LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Extortion and Threats 3.
Corpus Juris Secundum
CJS Threats and Unlawful Communications § 20, Other Offenses.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
198 ALR, Fed. 575, When Has Federal Prosecutor Breached Plea Agreement-- Promises Related to Upward Adjustment of Sentence in Fraud and Threat Cases.
185 ALR, Fed. 1, Construction and Application of Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(B).
2002 ALR, Fed. 9, Construction and Effect of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1 (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, 18 U.S.C.A.) Pertaining to Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition and to Prohibited...
148 ALR, Fed. 501, Construction and Application of § 2A6.1 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1), Pertaining to Sentence to be Imposed for Making Threatening Communications.
132 ALR, Fed. 525, Test of "Dual Criminality" Where Extradition to or from Foreign Nation is Sought.
128 ALR, Fed. 593, Downward Departure Under § 5K2.13 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) Permitting Downward Departure for Defendants With Significantly Reduced Mental CAPacity Convicted of Nonviolent...
50 ALR, Fed. 541, Prohibition of Obscene or Harassing Telephone Calls in Interstate or Foreign Communications Under 47 U.S.C.A. § 223.
34 ALR, Fed. 785, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 875(C), Prohibiting Transmission in Interstate Commerce of Any Communication Containing Any Threat to Kidnap Any Person or Any Threat to Injure the Person Of...
30 ALR, Fed. 874, Elements of Offense, and Sufficiency of Proof Thereof, in Prosecution for Mailing Threatening Communications Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 876.
4 ALR, Fed. 881, Elements of Offense Proscribed by the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1951) Against Racketeering in Interstate or Foreign Commerce.
87 ALR 5th 715, Injury to Reputation or Mental Well-Being as Within Penal Extortion Statutes Requiring Threat of "Injury to the Person".
45 ALR 4th 949, Validity and Construction of Terroristic Threat Statutes.
37 ALR 4th 852, Forum State's Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendant in Action Based on Obscene or Threatening Telephone Call from Out of State.
95 ALR 3rd 411, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Criminal Statute Forbidding Use of Telephone to Annoy or Harass.
32 ALR 2nd 434, Validity and Construction of Statutes Providing for Psychiatric Examination of Accused to Determine Mental Condition.
169 ALR 315, Comment Note.--Duty in Instructing Jury in Criminal Prosecution to Explain and Define Offense Charged.
138 ALR 811, Constitutionality, Construction, and Application of Federal Act Relating to Extortion in Connection With Trade or Commerce Anti-Racketeering Act.
131 ALR 917, Right to Severance Where Two or More Persons Are Jointly Accused.
135 ALR 728, Extortion Predicated Upon Statements or Intimations Regarding Criminal Liability, in Connection With Attempt to Collect or Settle a Claim Which Defendant Believed to be Valid.
Encyclopedias
53 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249, Proof of Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel.
Am. Jur. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 2309, Conviction of Aggravated Felony.
Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 18, Federal Offenses.
Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 21, Intent.
Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 40, Defenses.
Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 51, Intent.
Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 52, Ability to Carry Out Threat.
Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 55, Federal Offenses.
Am. Jur. 2d Telecommunications § 194, Threats, Harassment, and Use of Obscene Language.
Treatises and Practice Aids
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:35, What Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Offenses Against Laws of United States, Generally -- What Are Offenses Against Laws of United States.
Handbook of Federal Evidence (3d Ed.) § 404:5, Rule 404(B): Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts.
Immigration Law and Business § 6:66, Criminal-Based Grounds.
Immigration Law and Crimes § 7:22, Definition of Aggravated Felony.
Immigration Law Service 2d § 13:35, Definition Under IIRIRA.
Immigration Law Service 2d PSD INA § 101, Definitions.
U.S. Citizenship and Naturalization Handbook § 8:12, Aggravated Felonies -- Current Statutory Definition.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Admissibility of evidence 14

Arrest 11

Communication of threat 3

Constitutionality 1

Defenses 13

Deviant statements, threat 7

Discussion of criminal method, threat 9

Expressions of desire, threat 8


Extortion 2

Findings 18

Indictment or information 12

Instructions 16

Interstate commerce 4

Judgment 19

Knowledge or intent 5

Questions for jury 15

Statements constituting threats 10

Threat 6-9

Threat - Generally 6

Threat - Deviant statements 7

Threat - Discussion of criminal method 9

Threat - Expressions of desire 8

Weight and sufficiency of evidence 17

1. Constitutionality
Federal and New York statutes that proscribe communication of threats made with intent to injure reputation are not unconstitutionally overbroad; statutes are confined to threats to injure the reputation of another, that are made with intent to extort money or things of value. U.S. v. Jackson, S.D.N.Y.1997, 986 F.Supp. 829, vacated 180 F.3d 55, on rehearing 196 F.3d 383, certiorari denied 120 S.Ct. 2731, 530 U.S. 1267, 147 L.Ed.2d 993. Constitutional Law 90.1(1); Extortion And Threats 25.1
2. Extortion
"Extortion" is the obtaining of property by the use of serious threats. U. S. v. Heller, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1978, 579 F.2d 990. Extortion And Threats 25.1
In a kidnapping case, it is the threat to the kidnapped person that makes a demand for ransom an "extortion". U. S. v. Heller, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1978, 579 F.2d 990. Kidnapping 19
Deactivation of computer software by computer systems supplier did not constitute "extortion" violative of Minnesota and federal statutes, and thus did not support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) civil claims, where software was suspended at one client's request for deactivation, and software was deactivated for second client when that client stopped paying license fees due under software license agreement, thus providing computer systems supplier with legal right to deactivate software; Minnesota and federal statutes require unlawful activities to find extortion. American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., D.Minn.1991, 763 F.Supp. 1473, affirmed and remanded 967 F.2d 1208, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 414, 506 U.S. 956, 121 L.Ed.2d 338. Extortion And Threats 25.1
3. Communication of threat
Under this section, threat need not have reached person threatened or be of such nature as to have induced fear in mind of that person. U. S. v. Holder, D.C.Mont.1969, 302 F.Supp. 296, affirmed 427 F.2d 715. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Essential element of crime of making, for purpose of extortion, an interstate telephone threat to injure person is that there be a communication by defendant containing a threat to injure the person of another. U. S. v. Feudale, D.C.Conn.1967, 271 F.Supp. 115. Extortion And Threats 25.1
4. Interstate commerce
Defendant's transmission of threatening communication from his computer via "instant message," to recipient's computer in same state, was sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional element of offense of transmission of threatening communication in interstate commerce, where message was transmitted over interstate telephone lines, and traveled to server out of state during transmission, regardless of whether only recipient in same state could have viewed the message. U.S. v. Kammersell, C.A.10 (Utah) 1999, 196 F.3d 1137, certiorari denied 120 S.Ct. 2664, 530 U.S. 1231, 147 L.Ed.2d 277. Telecommunications 1348
Neither telephone call from defendant's accomplice to victim with instructions for making payment, telephone call between accomplice and victim after the extortion was complete which was intended to maintain the silence of the victim, nor telephone calls between defendant and accomplices to solicit and plan the extortion could satisfy the interstate communication requirement for making threatening interstate communications. U.S. v. Korab, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1989, 893 F.2d 212. Telecommunications 1013
Defendant could not be convicted of interstate communication of threats absent proof of transmission in interstate commerce. U. S. v. Oxendine, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1976, 531 F.2d 957. Extortion And Threats 32
Term, "transmits in interstate commerce," as it applied to offense of making threatening communication, encompassed alleged conduct of sending threatening message via the Internet, though defendant and victim were both residents of same state, where message was sent from defendant's computer in Utah, was processed through Internet service provider's message server in Virginia, and was then transferred to victim's computer in Utah. U.S. v. Kammersell, D.Utah 1998, 7 F.Supp.2d 1196, affirmed 196 F.3d 1137, certiorari denied 120 S.Ct. 2664, 530 U.S. 1231, 147 L.Ed.2d 277. Telecommunications 1348
In prosecution for transmitting threats in interstate communications, fact that call-forwarding service was intervening cause of interstate transmission of defendant's telephone messages was irrelevant to issue of federal jurisdiction. U.S. v. Francis, S.D.N.Y.1997, 975 F.Supp. 288, reversed 164 F.3d 120. Telecommunications 1016
This section makes it offense to "transmit" threat "in" interstate commerce, and it is not necessary that threatening telephone call "constitute" interstate commerce. U. S. v. Holder, D.C.Mont.1969, 302 F.Supp. 296, affirmed 427 F.2d 715. Telecommunications 1013
5. Knowledge or intent
Federal defendant convicted of transmitting threat in interstate commerce had waived, not forfeited, his right to contact district court pro se, by affirmatively agreeing at sentencing hearing to special condition of supervised release prohibiting pro se contact, and thus was foreclosed from appellate relief as to special condition; defense counsel had proposed special condition, limited right in question was waivable, and waiver was obviously voluntary and knowing. U.S. v. Teague, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2006, 443 F.3d 1310. Criminal Law 1137(1)
General-intent requirement of federal statute governing interstate threatening communications was satisfied where defendant admitted to sending electronic message threatening to kill fellow high school students in order to see how recipient would react. U.S. v. Morales, C.A.5 (Tex.) 2001, 272 F.3d 284, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 2624, 536 U.S. 941, 153 L.Ed.2d 807. Extortion And Threats 25.1
To establish a violation of statute proscribing transmission of threat to kidnap or injure in interstate commerce, government bore only burden of proving that defendant acted knowingly and willfully when he placed threatening telephone calls and that calls were reasonably perceived as threatening bodily injury, and government bore no burden of proving that defendant intended his calls to be threatening or that he had ability at the time to carry out the threats. U.S. v. Himelwright, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1994, 42 F.3d 777. Extortion And Threats 32
Government was not required to prove that defendant knew his threatening phone call crossed a state line in prosecution for transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce; proof that phone call was in interstate commerce was sufficient for conviction. U.S. v. Darby, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1994, 37 F.3d 1059, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1826, 514 U.S. 1097, 131 L.Ed.2d 747, leave to file for rehearing denied 115 S.Ct. 2636, 515 U.S. 1170, 132 L.Ed.2d 875. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Proof of crime of transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce required only general intent to threaten, that is, that reasonable person would understand communication as threat, not specific intent, which would require proof that defendant subjectively intended communication to be understood as threat and, thus, indictment which charged defendant with transmitting threatening communication in interstate commerce was not defective for failing to charge specific intent to threaten. U.S. v. Darby, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1994, 37 F.3d 1059, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1826, 514 U.S. 1097, 131 L.Ed.2d 747, leave to file for rehearing denied 115 S.Ct. 2636, 515 U.S. 1170, 132 L.Ed.2d 875. Extortion And Threats 25.1
"Communication containing a threat" element of offense of knowingly and willfully transmitting in interstate commerce communication containing threat to injure required general intent rather than specific intent; thus, indictment was required to state knowing intent to transmit communication containing threat, but was not required to indicate specific intent to threaten in order to charge that offense. U.S. v. DeAndino, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1992, 958 F.2d 146, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 2997, 505 U.S. 1206, 120 L.Ed.2d 874. Extortion And Threats 25.1; Extortion And Threats 30
To convict defendant for knowingly transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat, prosecution need not prove subjective intent, as threat is not in state of mind of speaker, but in appearance to victim, and, thus, if parties receiving threatening call took threat seriously, intent element is satisfied by undisputed evidence that defendant knowingly made telephone call which transmitted threat. U.S. v. Cox, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1992, 957 F.2d 264. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Review of legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended not only that the crime of transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a demand and request for a ransom and reward for the release of a kidnapped person contain a criminal intent element but also that the intent element be specifically the intent to extort. U. S. v. Heller, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1978, 579 F.2d 990. Kidnapping 19
Purpose of this section is to prohibit extortion through interstate communications, not merely to protect persons or property; gravamen of crime is threat itself and intent which is required is specific intent to extort, so that it is not necessary to prove specific intent to injure or present ability to carry out threat. U. S. v. Cooper, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1975, 523 F.2d 8. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Defendant who made interstate telephone calls to radio station, threatening to kill hostage unless radio station provided free air time for defendant's political views, could be held liable for transmitting communication containing threats with intent to extort, although defendant in fact held no hostage. U. S. v. Cooper, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1975, 523 F.2d 8. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Conviction for transmitting threat in interstate commerce requires proof that threat was made knowingly and intentionally. U. S. v. Bozeman, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974, 495 F.2d 508, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2660, 422 U.S. 1044, 45 L.Ed.2d 696. Extortion And Threats 32
General intent to threaten is essential element of crimes of making, by interstate telephone communication or by use of United States mail, threats to injure person. U. S. v. Levison, C.A.9 (Alaska) 1969, 418 F.2d 624. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Conviction under this section prohibiting interstate communication of threats required showing that threat was intended. U. S. v. Dutsch, C.A.4 (Va.) 1966, 357 F.2d 331. Extortion And Threats 25.1
In prosecution for transmitting threats in interstate communications, whether defendant knew his telephone calls were being forwarded across state lines was irrelevant to federal jurisdiction. U.S. v. Francis, S.D.N.Y.1997, 975 F.Supp. 288, reversed 164 F.3d 120. Telecommunications 1016
Under this section it is sufficient to establish specific intent to communicate threat to injure, and it is not necessary to prove specific intent to injure or present ability to carry out threat. U. S. v. Holder, D.C.Mont.1969, 302 F.Supp. 296, affirmed 427 F.2d 715. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Under this section, threat must be communicated "knowingly" and not because of mistake or inadvertence or other innocent reason. U. S. v. Holder, D.C.Mont.1969, 302 F.Supp. 296, affirmed 427 F.2d 715. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Transmitting in interstate commerce a communication threatening to injure the person of another is in itself a violation of this section, without being coupled with intent to extort money or other thing of value. U. S. v. Pennell, N.D.Cal.1956, 144 F.Supp. 317. Extortion And Threats 26
6. Threat--Generally
Federal district court did not plainly err, in prosecution for transmitting threat in interstate commerce, by instructing jury that element of offense was "knowing" transmission of threat, without instructing, as defendant advocated after the fact, that intent for recipient to feel threatened was required rather than simple intent to send message; there was split of judicial authority on whether governing statute required specific vs. general intent, and United States Supreme Court had not ruled on issue. U.S. v. Teague, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2006, 443 F.3d 1310. Criminal Law 1038.1(4)
To constitute "communication containing a threat" within meaning of statute proscribing transmission of communications containing threats to kidnap or injure another person, communication must be such that reasonable person would take statement as serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm, and would perceive such expression as being communicated to effect some change or achieve some goal through intimidation. U.S. v. Alkhabaz, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1997, 104 F.3d 1492, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Extortion And Threats 25.1
For purposes of supporting conviction for knowingly transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat, threat is not to be construed as conditional if it has reasonable tendency to create apprehension that person making threat will act in accordance with that threat. U.S. v. Cox, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1992, 957 F.2d 264. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Although defendant's objective in seeking a loan may have been to facilitate the purchase of a large ranch, a legal enterprise, when the objective was accompanied by the threat of blowing up the home office of an insurance company if the loan was not extended, there was an illegal purpose and defendant could be convicted of extorting money by interstate telephone calls. U.S. v. Cohen, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1984, 738 F.2d 287. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Judgment of acquittal was not warranted, when defendant was indicted for making interstate telephone call from Oregon to Nebraska during which he threatened that he would sexually abuse little girl if recipient did not continue conversation, even though no little girl was involved; intent or ability to carry out threat was not element of crime. U.S. v. Coverstone, D.Or.2001, 152 F.Supp.2d 1231. Criminal Law 753.2(2)
In prosecution for communicating interstate or foreign commerce threat to kidnap or injure another, to pass constitutional muster government must initially prove "true threat"; factors which bear on whether specific statement can be taken as "true threat" include context of statement, including whether statement has political dimension, whether statement was conditional, and reaction of listeners. U.S. v. Baker, E.D.Mich.1995, 890 F.Supp. 1375, affirmed 104 F.3d 1492, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Constitutional Law 90.1(1); Extortion And Threats 25.1
There is an offense when language or expression used carries a reasonable connotation of a threat to injure a person. U. S. v. Pennell, N.D.Cal.1956, 144 F.Supp. 317. Extortion And Threats 25.1
7. ---- Deviant statements, threat
First Amendment "true threat" test for prosecution for communicating in interstate or foreign commerce threat to kidnap or injure another is not satisfied by finding that desires expressed in statement are so deviant that person making statement must be unstable and therefore likely to act in accordance with his desires at any moment; unless something in statement itself indicates some intention to act imminently, statement may be unsettling to alarming, but is not "true threat" for purposes of First Amendment. U.S. v. Baker, E.D.Mich.1995, 890 F.Supp. 1375, affirmed 104 F.3d 1492, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Constitutional Law 90.1(1)
8. ---- Expressions of desire, threat
Electronic mail messages between defendant and another, expressing sexual interest in violence against women and girls, did not constitute "communication containing a threat" within meaning of statute proscribing transmission of communications containing threats to kidnap or injure another person; even if reasonable person would take the communications as serious expressions of intention to inflict bodily harm, no reasonable person would perceive such communications as being conveyed to effect some change or achieve some goal through intimidation, rather, defendant and the other individual apparently sent e-mail messages to each other in attempt to foster friendship based on shared sexual fantasies. U.S. v. Alkhabaz, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1997, 104 F.3d 1492, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Extortion And Threats 26
Defendant's private electronic mail, or e-mail, messages to unidentified recipient did not meet First Amendment "true threat" requirement for prosecution for communicating in interstate or foreign commerce threat to kidnap or injure another; messages merely expressed defendant's desire to injure or kidnap "young girls," rather than intention to act on those desires. U.S. v. Baker, E.D.Mich.1995, 890 F.Supp. 1375, affirmed 104 F.3d 1492, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Constitutional Law 90.1(9); Extortion And Threats 26

9. ---- Discussion of criminal method, threat
Defendant's private electronic mail, or e-mail, message to unidentified recipient did not meet First Amendment "true threat" requirement for prosecution for communicating in interstate or foreign commerce threat to kidnap or injure another, even though message detailed "method to abduct" a female student in defendant's college dormitory; message lacked any expression of intention to act and concluded with request for recipient's reaction. U.S. v. Baker, E.D.Mich.1995, 890 F.Supp. 1375, affirmed 104 F.3d 1492, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Constitutional Law 90.1(9); Extortion And Threats 26
10. Statements constituting threats
Evidence established that defendant should reasonably have foreseen that statements he uttered to insurance and collection agents would be taken as threats, as required for conviction for transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce; statements suggested that defendant would blow up agencies' buildings, collection agent warned supervisors and person responsible for incoming mail, collection agents testified that statements were only bomb threats they had ever received, and insurance office hired security guard and did not pursue claim against defendant. U.S. v. Whiffen, C.A.1 (N.H.) 1997, 121 F.3d 18. Extortion And Threats 32
The case of a nonextortionate threat is simply not relevant to a "demand or request for a ransom or reward" within meaning of the statute which provides severe penalties for transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a "demand and request for a ransom and reward" for the release of a kidnapped person; implicit in the words "demand for a ransom or reward" is the attempt to obtain money or things of value and, thus, a threat to blow up a Governor's home if certain defendants were not released from custody would not amount to a "demand for a ransom or reward" within the meaning of the statute. U. S. v. Heller, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1978, 579 F.2d 990. Kidnapping 19
Where express and unequivocal statement, "I will kill him", in context had a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator would act according to its tenor, it was a "threat" proscribed by this section. U. S. v. Bozeman, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974, 495 F.2d 508, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2660, 422 U.S. 1044, 45 L.Ed.2d 696. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Where statement which defendant delivered to newspaper did not, as a matter of law, negative an intention by defendant to injure persons in a certain building during defendant's proposed aerial activities in the vicinity of the building and where defendant in fact threatened to fly into the "top man's office window in an attempt at a short field landing on his desk," such alleged threats fully supported indictment charging defendant with transportation in interstate commerce of threats to injure other persons. U. S. v. Baudin, S.D.N.Y.1980, 486 F.Supp. 403. Extortion And Threats 32
11. Arrest
Arrest of suspect accused of assaulting federal prosecutor was supported by probable cause, even though police mistakenly believed that suspect rather than bystander made remark, at time suspect threw recently severed head of horse on federal courthouse steps, that gesture was meant to show prosecutor that "we mean business," when in fact suspect meant to throw head on steps of state courthouse; it was reasonable for officials on hand to believe that suspect had committed assault against federal prosecutor. U.S. v. Philibert, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1991, 947 F.2d 1467. Arrest 63.4(15); Arrest 63.4(17)

12. Indictment or information
Where indictment charged that defendant "wilfully and knowingly did transmit and caused to be transmitted in interstate commerce" a telephone communication which contained a demand and request for $50,000 as ransom and reward for the release of a kidnapped individual, indictment was fatally defective in that it did not charge defendant with having had an intent to extort; if word "wilfully" or some form thereof had been used in juxtaposition with word "demand" it could have been argued that defendant was implicitly charged with an intent to extort but where adverbs "wilfully and knowingly" were in juxtaposition with verbs "transmit and caused to be transmitted," indictment failed to charge an essential element of the crime. U. S. v. Heller, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1978, 579 F.2d 990. Kidnapping 32
Indictment charging in several counts conspiracy to commit offenses under three sections of this title and charging substantive offense of kidnapping and three separate offenses of transmitting communications in interstate commerce demanding ransom money and charging receiving, possessing and disposing of ransom money charged separate offenses and was not duplicitous. Amsler v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1967, 381 F.2d 37. Indictment And Information 125(2)
Indictment charging interstate transmission of threats was not insufficient for failure to contain any allegation determining venue. Carbo v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1963, 314 F.2d 718, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1625, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 1902, 377 U.S. 1010, 12 L.Ed.2d 1058, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1626, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 1903, 377 U.S. 1010, 12 L.Ed.2d 1058, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1627, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498. Indictment And Information 86(1)
Defendant accused of conspiring to commit extortion and to transmit threats by means of interstate communications was not prejudiced by allegations in indictment that conspiracy contemplated use of persons known to victim to have underworld reputations and to possess necessary power to execute conspirator's demands by force and violence and that defendant was enlisted for that purpose. Carbo v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1963, 314 F.2d 718, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1625, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 1902, 377 U.S. 1010, 12 L.Ed.2d 1058, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1626, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 1903, 377 U.S. 1010, 12 L.Ed.2d 1058, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1627, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498. Criminal Law 1167(1)
Where indictment charged that thing of value attempted to be extorted was 100,000 shares of stock, whereas testimony referred to stock certificate for 120,000 shares, and made no reference to 100,000 shares, and gist of offense was that defendant had sought to extort stock by means of threats sent over telephone lines, variance was immaterial and in no way tended to prejudice defendant in preparation of his defense, and would, accordingly, be disregarded. Rathbun v. U.S., C.A.10 (Colo.) 1956, 236 F.2d 514, certiorari granted 77 S.Ct. 354, 352 U.S. 965, 1 L.Ed.2d 320, affirmed 78 S.Ct. 161, 355 U.S. 107, 2 L.Ed.2d 134, rehearing denied 78 S.Ct. 363, 355 U.S. 925, 2 L.Ed.2d 355. Indictment And Information 181
In prosecution for attempted extortion by sending letter in interstate commerce, indictment which gave date on which letter was sent, name of addressee, and reference to contents of letter, was sufficient identification thereof to protect accused against "double jeopardy" for same offense, even though indictment did not state date on which letter was written, place where it was written, or name of person who signed it, since these were not essentials of offense charged. Keys v. U.S., C.C.A.8 (Mo.) 1942, 126 F.2d 181, certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1296, 316 U.S. 694, 86 L.Ed. 1764. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)
An indictment alleging that accused, with felonious intent to extort money from addressee, a manufacturer and distributor of aluminum cooking utensils, transmitted in interstate commerce a communication threatening to injure addressee's reputation unless money should be paid to accused, the injury to reputation being a contemplated distribution of pamphlet to public to effect that use of aluminum cooking utensils is harmful and causative factor of diabetes and other diseases, sufficiently charged statutory offense on attack made after verdict. Keys v. U.S., C.C.A.8 (Mo.) 1942, 126 F.2d 181, certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1296, 316 U.S. 694, 86 L.Ed. 1764. Indictment And Information 202(5)
An indictment for sending letter in interstate commerce with intent to extort money by threatening to injure property or reputation of addressee by distributing a pamphlet was sufficient after verdict, as against contention that statements in letter and pamphlet were true, that accused had right to distribute pamphlet, and that threat to do something which one has right to do is not a "threat" in a legal sense. Keys v. U.S., C.C.A.8 (Mo.) 1942, 126 F.2d 181, certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1296, 316 U.S. 694, 86 L.Ed. 1764. Indictment And Information 202(5)
In prosecution for mailing letter in interstate commerce with intent to extort money or other thing of value by threatening to distribute pamphlet, objection to indictment as failing to charge that pamphlet contained false representations and that accused knew them to be false related to matters which were not elements of offense defined in former § 408d of this title [now this section] charged to have been violated and which were, therefore, immaterial. Keys v. U.S., C.C.A.8 (Mo.) 1942, 126 F.2d 181, certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1296, 316 U.S. 694, 86 L.Ed. 1764. Extortion And Threats 30
At common law, an indictment for sending a threatening letter or for forgery or libel was required to set out the letter or instrument in haec verba. Keys v. U.S., C.C.A.8 (Mo.) 1942, 126 F.2d 181, certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1296, 316 U.S. 694, 86 L.Ed. 1764. Extortion And Threats 30; Forgery 28(2); Libel And Slander 152(1)
Indictment alleging that defendant participated with others in transmission in foreign commerce from Mexico to Texas certain telephone communications demanding sum of $12,000 as ransom and reward for release of a kidnapped person failed to state an offense in that the alleged transmission was in "foreign commerce" and the indictment failed to allege any transmission in "interstate commerce." U.S. v. Lopez-Flores, W.D.Tex.1984, 592 F.Supp. 1302. Commerce 82.6; Extortion And Threats 25.1

13. Defenses
Provocation was not justification or excuse constituting legal defense to crime of making interstate threats. U.S. v. Sovie, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1997, 122 F.3d 122. Extortion And Threats 27
Generally, truth of damaging allegations underlying threat to injure reputation of another is not defense to charge of extortion. U. S. v. Von der Linden, C.A.9 (Or.) 1977, 561 F.2d 1340, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1621, 435 U.S. 974, 56 L.Ed.2d 68. Extortion And Threats 27
Defendant's alleged threat to assassinate foreign political leader, who was in United States in same city, made in a videotape interview which was broadcast on television news program fell within proscription of this section notwithstanding claim that alleged threat related to "free trade in ideas" and was thus protected under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1. U. S. v. Kelner, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1976, 534 F.2d 1020, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 639, 429 U.S. 1022, 50 L.Ed.2d 623. Constitutional Law 90.1(8); Extortion And Threats 25.1

14. Admissibility of evidence
In prosecution for transmitting wire communication with intent to injure another and for interstate threats and extortionate demands, evidence as to defendant's purchase of revolver prior to the threats was not admissible under the "plan" or "preparation" exceptions to rule concerning other crimes or acts, as the events were too far attenuated where purchase of handgun occurred over a month before defendant was unsuccessful in obtaining transfer within the post office, which led to his telephone calls containing alleged threats. U.S. v. Himelwright, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1994, 42 F.3d 777. Criminal Law 372(14)
Evidence that defendant had purchased cache of weapons and ammunition two months before he allegedly made threatening telephone call was not relevant and was inadmissible evidence of other wrongs. U.S. v. Philibert, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1991, 947 F.2d 1467. Criminal Law 369.1
Showing of intent to threaten required by statutes proscribing transmission of threatening communications via telephone or mail was showing of specific intent, so that defendant was entitled to have mental defect evidence considered on issue of whether he possessed mental capacity to form specific intent to threaten member of group home and to transmit his threats under diminished capacity defense. U.S. v. Twine, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1988, 853 F.2d 676. Postal Service 33; Telecommunications 1018(3)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting extrinsic offense evidence of defendant's prior threatening telephone calls in prosecution for making communication in interstate commerce to kidnap or threaten to injure another, in regard to a subsequent telephone call, in view of numerous similarities between the prior and subsequent calls and similarities between the earlier calls and threatening letters written by defendant, which were also admissible as extrinsic offense evidence. U.S. v. Ingraham, C.A.1 (Me.) 1987, 832 F.2d 229, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1738, 486 U.S. 1009, 100 L.Ed.2d 202. Criminal Law 372(14)
Where other witnesses had testified to defendant's use of name "Louise" and where his attorney's proffered testimony that defendant had phoned him and claimed to be a person named "Louise" did not directly related to defendant's mental condition at time of offense, trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to allow defendant's attorney to testify at trial. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.5 (La.) 1975, 519 F.2d 48, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 796, 423 U.S. 1059, 46 L.Ed.2d 650. Witnesses 67
Admission, at joint trial, of incriminating pretrial statements by two codefendants, who did not testify, was error as violating defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where properly admitted evidence establishing a three-part conspiracy to extort was close to irrefutable. Stone v. U. S., C.A.2 (Vt.) 1970, 435 F.2d 1402, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1681, 402 U.S. 977, 29 L.Ed.2d 143. Criminal Law 662.60; Criminal Law 1169.7; Witnesses 266
Evidence regarding other threatening telephone calls to victim in the two-year period preceding indictment of defendant for making a threatening telephone call was admissible as tending to establish intent to commit offense under indictment and a criminal scheme to threaten the victim by telephone. U. S. v. Smith, C.A.5 (La.) 1970, 433 F.2d 1266, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1206, 401 U.S. 977, 28 L.Ed.2d 328. Criminal Law 371(1); Criminal Law 372(14)
In prosecution for interstate communication by telephone of threat to injure person, in which it was alleged that defendant, in telephone call to former wife, had threatened to throw acid in face of wife's mother unless defendant's daughter wrote to him, proof of defendant's subsequent telephone threat to the mother was properly admitted to establish defendant's intent at time of the threat made to his former wife. U. S. v. Levison, C.A.9 (Alaska) 1969, 418 F.2d 624. Criminal Law 371(1)
Admission in prosecution for conspiracy and for extortion, without limiting instruction, of testimony as to declarations of a coconspirator which incriminated both defendants was erroneous, but such did not constitute prejudicial error where evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and district judge, in his final instructions, properly advised jury as to restricted manner in which the declarations, which were hearsay except as to particular declarant, should be applied. Calhoun v. U. S., C.A.9 (Nev.) 1966, 368 F.2d 59. Criminal Law 673(4); Criminal Law 1169.5(5)
Rule of Escobedo v. Illinois was inapplicable to prosecutions for conspiracy and extortion where officers carefully alerted defendants to their rights to remain silent and to procure counsel. Calhoun v. U. S., C.A.9 (Nev.) 1966, 368 F.2d 59. Criminal Law 412.2(3)
Evidence that defendant had five years before harmed his mother after she had refused to buy him automobile was relevant in prosecution for interstate communication of threats wherein mother testified that, after similar occurrence, defendant had told her that he would be back, would get her this time, and would not miss, and was admissible under instruction that it was admitted only to show whether defendant intended threat and whether call was of such nature as reasonably to have induced fear in mother. U. S. v. Dutsch, C.A.4 (Va.) 1966, 357 F.2d 331. Extortion And Threats 32
Notes which were found in defendant's home by officers during search incident to arrest and on which were penciled name of victim of alleged threats were admissible in prosecution for violation of subsec. (c) of this section without further foundation. Seeber v. U. S., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1964, 329 F.2d 572. Criminal Law 394.4(9)
Telephone toll slips which were employed by telephone company to record fact that long distance calls were made and which reflected that calls had been made from defendant's home to home of victim of alleged threats were admissible in prosecution for violation of subsec. (c) of this section in view of other proof affording foundation for such admission. Seeber v. U. S., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1964, 329 F.2d 572. Criminal Law 435
Officer who, while in home of victims of telephone threats, answered telephone and indicated he was person against whom earlier threats were made, did not "intercept" call, within § 605 of Title 47, and officer was thus not precluded from testifying as to call in subsequent prosecution of defendant for violation of subsec. (c) of this section. Seeber v. U. S., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1964, 329 F.2d 572. Criminal Law 394.3; Telecommunications 1440
Testimony that witnesses by reputation knew of defendant as an "underworld" man and a "strong-arm" man was admissible to prove charge that conspiracy to commit extortion and to transmit threats by means of interstate communications contemplated use of persons known to victim to have underworld reputations and to possess necessary power to execute conspirators' demands by force and violence and that one of the defendants was enlisted for that purpose. Carbo v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1963, 314 F.2d 718, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1625, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 1902, 377 U.S. 1010, 12 L.Ed.2d 1058, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1626, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 1903, 377 U.S. 1010, 12 L.Ed.2d 1058, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1627, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498. Criminal Law 379
Admission of testimony of police officers, who listened in on extension at invitation of party receiving prearranged, out-of-state telephone call from defendant, in reference to what officers had heard defendant say during conversation, in prosecution of defendant for offense of knowingly transmitting an interstate communication containing a threat with the intent to extort a thing of value, and of knowingly transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of a certain person, was not violative of § 605 of Title 47, providing that no person not authorized by sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. Rathbun v. U.S., C.A.10 (Colo.) 1956, 236 F.2d 514, certiorari granted 77 S.Ct. 354, 352 U.S. 965, 1 L.Ed.2d 320, affirmed 78 S.Ct. 161, 355 U.S. 107, 2 L.Ed.2d 134, rehearing denied 78 S.Ct. 363, 355 U.S. 925, 2 L.Ed.2d 355. Criminal Law 394.3; Telecommunications 1440
Where defendant, accused of offense of knowingly transmitting an interstate communication containing a threat with the intent to extort a thing of value, and of knowingly transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of a certain person, initiated telephone conversation which was overheard by police on extension at other end of line, defendant was "sender", within § 605 of Title 47, and what defendant said could not be intercepted in transit and thereafter testified to by one intercepting it without his consent, under such section. Rathbun v. U.S., C.A.10 (Colo.) 1956, 236 F.2d 514, certiorari granted 77 S.Ct. 354, 352 U.S. 965, 1 L.Ed.2d 320, affirmed 78 S.Ct. 161, 355 U.S. 107, 2 L.Ed.2d 134, rehearing denied 78 S.Ct. 363, 355 U.S. 925, 2 L.Ed.2d 355. Criminal Law 394.3; Telecommunications 1440
In prosecution for transmitting threat by telephone in interstate commerce in 1951 with intent to extort money, evidence that defendant in 1953 attempted to "blackmail" the same victim was properly admitted to show probative effect on defendant's intent in taking money, where trial judge gave cautionary instructions on difference of offenses and instructed that unless the 1953 blackmail transaction referred to extortion as defined with respect to main transaction in 1951 the evidence must be disregarded. United States v. Blount, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1956, 229 F.2d 669. Criminal Law 673(5)
In prosecution for transmitting threat by telephone in interstate commerce in 1951 with intent to extort money, determination that testimony that defendant in 1953 attempted to "blackmail" same victim was admissible on ground it was similar offense relevant to show defendant's intent on taking money on prior occasion, rather than inadmissible as being too remote to evidence state of mind at time of prior act, was within discretion of trial judge. United States v. Blount, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1956, 229 F.2d 669. Criminal Law 371(1)

15. Questions for jury
Lay testimony about defendant's penchant for unusual behavior and expert testimony about possibility of transient psychotic episodes was sufficient to eliminate presumption of sanity and require government to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was sane at time of making interstate ransom demand, but expert opinion that defendant was not in midst of transient psychotic episode at time of offense and extensive lay testimony about defendant's actions at time of offense were sufficient to present issue for jury and sustain conviction. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.5 (La.) 1975, 519 F.2d 48, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 796, 423 U.S. 1059, 46 L.Ed.2d 650. Criminal Law 570(2); Criminal Law 740
Whether letter to woman, referring to reports of her immoral conduct and stating that writer would "deal with you and your cohorts", constituted a threat was a question of fact, not to be determined on motion to dismiss indictment. U. S. v. Pennell, N.D.Cal.1956, 144 F.Supp. 317. Indictment And Information 144.2
16. Instructions
Instructions which failed to mention criminal intent as essential element of charges of violating subsec. (c) of this section were not reversibly erroneous in view of charge as whole. Seeber v. U. S., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1964, 329 F.2d 572. Criminal Law 822(7)
Where defense to charge of transmitting threat by telephone with intent to extort money was scheme to bribe and did not constitute confession and avoidance, the court's charge defining crime of extortion, and posing question as to whether transaction was loan, bribe or extortion sufficiently covered defendant's theory of defense without defining bribery. United States v. Blount, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1956, 229 F.2d 669. Extortion And Threats 33
Defendant charged with transmitting threat by telephone in interstate commerce with intent to extort money was entitled, upon request, to charge as to his factual theory of the defense. United States v. Blount, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1956, 229 F.2d 669. Criminal Law 770(2)
17. Weight and sufficiency of evidence
Finding that threats by defendant with history of psychological problems and mental illness were voluntary for purposes of conviction for transmission of threatening communications was supported by testimony of two experts that defendant voluntarily discontinued medication to treat psychological problems and knew that doing so might lead to such behavior. U.S. v. Myers, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1997, 104 F.3d 76, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1709, 520 U.S. 1218, 137 L.Ed.2d 834. Criminal Law 494
Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant's phone call was threatening in prosecution for transmitting threatening communication in interstate commerce; in interstate phone call to Internal Revenue Service (IRS), defendant stated that he killed his victims by "blowing them up," that IRS could be "the next Somalia," that IRS would need a flower fund for "the funerals," and that people in IRS "would be dead" if they did not respond to his inquiry and IRS employee who received phone call said she believed defendant's statements to be serious threats. U.S. v. Darby, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1994, 37 F.3d 1059, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1826, 514 U.S. 1097, 131 L.Ed.2d 747, leave to file for rehearing denied 115 S.Ct. 2636, 515 U.S. 1170, 132 L.Ed.2d 875. Extortion And Threats 32
Defendant's statement over telephone to bank employee that "you all better have my personal items to me by five o'clock today or its going to be a lot of hurt people there," supported conviction for knowingly transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing threat, despite defendant's contention that threat was conditional and equivocal, as there was no way that personal property could have been delivered by deadline. U.S. v. Cox, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1992, 957 F.2d 264. Extortion And Threats 32
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of chief inspector for United States Marshal's Service for threat to reputation; tone of defendant's voice in recorded tape conversation with victim and other nuances indicated that defendant was implicitly threatening victim to accede to his demands or defendant would deliver embarrassing materials to victim's employer. U.S. v. Pascucci, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1991, 943 F.2d 1032. Extortion And Threats 15
Testimony by individual who threatened witness that defendant had repeatedly expressed concern about what witness might say and that defendant was willing to pay $20,000 for a no show, testimony as to that individual's actions and conversations with witness, and testimony of witness' daughter that she feared for her father's life, as well as her mother's and her own, linked defendant to individual who made threats so that rational finder of fact would reasonably determine that defendant had made known to that individual defendant's willingness to pay $20,000 to anyone who would cause witness not to testify, whether by violence or threats of violence or bribery, that defendant had solicited assistance in effectuating this "open offer" and that defendant was in contact with this individual as individual began his course of threats of violence against witness, and thus supported defendant's conviction of witness intimidation and transmitting threat in interstate commerce. U.S. v. Fagan, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1987, 821 F.2d 1002, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 697, 484 U.S. 1005, 98 L.Ed.2d 649. Extortion And Threats 32; Obstructing Justice 16
Voice identification and proof of defendant's physical presence near phone booth to which call is traced at about the time of the call are relevant considerations in establishing identity of person transmitting threat in interstate commerce, but are not essential ones. U. S. v. Bozeman, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974, 495 F.2d 508, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2660, 422 U.S. 1044, 45 L.Ed.2d 696. Criminal Law 339.6; Criminal Law 566
Evidence that caller who made threat claimed to be defendant, that telephone company records indicated call from defendant's mother's house to the place where the threat was received, that subsequently someone at defendant's mother's house identifying himself as defendant admitted that he made the threatening call, and that defendant thereafter, in the presence of witnesses, repeated the threat, though in conditional terms, was sufficient to warrant finding that defendant was person who made threat. U. S. v. Bozeman, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974, 495 F.2d 508, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2660, 422 U.S. 1044, 45 L.Ed.2d 696. Criminal Law 566
Evidence was sufficient to warrant finding that threat was made knowingly and intentionally, despite fact that witness who had received telephone threat once used the adjective "irrational" in testifying as to his evaluation of the threat. U. S. v. Bozeman, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974, 495 F.2d 508, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2660, 422 U.S. 1044, 45 L.Ed.2d 696. Extortion And Threats 32
Evidence in prosecution for willfully and knowingly transmitting a threatening communication by telephone in interstate commerce was sufficient to support finding that defendant was the individual who made the threatening telephone call from a coin-operated telephone. U. S. v. Smith, C.A.5 (La.) 1970, 433 F.2d 1266, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1206, 401 U.S. 977, 28 L.Ed.2d 328. Extortion And Threats 32
Evidence warranted conviction of three defendants, but not two other defendants, for conspiring to transmit threats by means of interstate communications with aim of securing managerial control of welterweight professional boxer. Carbo v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1963, 314 F.2d 718, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1625, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 1902, 377 U.S. 1010, 12 L.Ed.2d 1058, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1626, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 1903, 377 U.S. 1010, 12 L.Ed.2d 1058, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1627, 377 U.S. 953, 12 L.Ed.2d 498. Conspiracy 47(3.1)
Identification of telephone caller may be made by circumstantial evidence. U. S. v. Holder, D.C.Mont.1969, 302 F.Supp. 296, affirmed 427 F.2d 715. Criminal Law 339.11(6)
Government failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that telephone conversations at issue contained any threat of injury to person, in prosecution for making, for purpose of extortion, an interstate telephone threat to injure the person of named person. U. S. v. Feudale, D.C.Conn.1967, 271 F.Supp. 115. Extortion And Threats 32
Government proved beyond reasonable doubt that defendant made interstate telephone call for purpose of promoting extortion in violation of § 1952 of this title. U. S. v. Feudale, D.C.Conn.1967, 271 F.Supp. 115. Extortion And Threats 32
Government proved beyond reasonable doubt that defendant made for purpose of extortion an interstate threat to injure reputation of recipient of call. U. S. v. Feudale, D.C.Conn.1967, 271 F.Supp. 115. Extortion And Threats 32
18. Findings
On record adduced, in prosecution for transmitting in interstate commerce a telephone communication, containing threat to injure person of another, jurors, as reasonable men, could properly find that defendant was author of telephone call. U. S. v. Holder, D.C.Mont.1969, 302 F.Supp. 296, affirmed 427 F.2d 715. Extortion And Threats 32
19. Judgment
There was no power under former § 408d of this title [now this section] permitting judgment to be passed in one district and state upon an indictment found in another. U.S. v. Bink, D.C.Or.1947, 74 F.Supp. 603. Criminal Law 113
18 U.S.C.A. § 875, 18 USCA § 875

Current through P.L. 110-17 approved 04-09-07

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