This right isn’t recognized in the status quo, even among countries that have a right to be forgotten
Kang 14 [(Andy Kang, Trans Issues Intern) “UK trans woman calls for government to no longer retain information about her assigned sex at birth” GLAAD may 29] AT
DWP lawyers argue its policies are not discriminatory and carefully balance the need to give effect to C's legal rights while carrying out the department's functions. They also argue that there is no requirement to delete information that records a person's previously held gender. The National Center for Transgender Equality in the United States recognizes a few of the innumerable needs for identification documents, such as travelling, opening bank accounts, starting new jobs, purchasing alcohol, etc. While legal progress has been made to remove burdensome requirements, historically, state and federal governments have imposed intrusive requirements, such as proof of surgery and court orders, that have made it impossible for many trans people to obtain consistent and accurate ID. And inconsistencies in gender data between records can cause various governmental agencies and administrations, such as the Social Security Administration, to out individuals. The Telegraph reporter Ava Vidal says: Transgender people often face enough humiliation living in a society that does not always understand them. Trans people do not consider the sex they were born with to be the correct one. So why must they be forced to retain an identity that was never theirs to start with?
No objectivity now—a) search engines/Internet companies accountability low and b) collective memory outweighed by individual identity
Andrade 12 [Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Scientific Officer in the Information Society Unit of the European Commission’s Institute for Prospective Technological Studies – Joint Research Center. “Oblivion: The Right to Be Different … from Oneself Reproposing the Right to Be Forgotten,” International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics.] AZ
Another argument used by preservationists is the one of objectivity. In the judicial dispute between the Spanish Data Protection Authority and Google, as described previously, the search engine refused to remove the links claiming that, if done systematically, this would compromise the objectivity of the Internet and the transparency of the search engine. Internet users would be able to remove factual information from the Internet, thereby altering the list of results provided by search engines, rendering them imprecise and incomplete. The right to be forgotten as an attempt to manipulate some kind of Internet objectivity or collective society memory is a somewhat unconvincing argument, if not unfounded. First, the notion of objectivity is rather controversial coming from a search engine that organizes its search listings through enigmatic and non-transparent algorithms. Second, it seems unbalanced to deny the individual the right to erase personal information that is, among other criteria discussed below, not newsworthy or of historical relevance, only for the sake of sustaining a supposedly collective memory.38 In view of this, I believe there is an overstretched emphasis on an unsounded collective interest to the detriment of a needed individual interest, such as the right to be different from who one was before.
I question the possibility of objectivity anyway—personal identity is a fluid process
A2 Difference is static
Sexual difference is a not foundational—most species and human cells are intersex
Hird 4 [Myra J. Hird Queen’s University, Belfast, Feminist Theory, 2004, vol. 5(1): 85–89, 1464–7001]
Non-linear biology provides a wealth of evidence to confound static notions of sexual difference.1 Human bodies, like those of other living organisms, are only ‘sexed’ from a particularly narrow perspective. The vast majority of cells in human bodies are intersex (and this category itself is only possible by maintaining a division between ‘female’ and ‘male’ chromosomes), with only egg and sperm cells counting as sexually dimorphic. Most of the reproduction that we undertake in our lifetimes has nothing to do with ‘sex’. The cells in our bodies engage in constant, energetic reproduction in the form of recombination (cutting and patching of DNA strands), merging (fertilization of cells), meiosis (cell division by halving chromosome number, for instance in making sperm and eggs), and mitosis (cell division with maintenance of cell number). Nor does reproduction take place between discrete ‘selves’, as many cultural analyses would have it. Indeed, only by taking our skin as a definitive impenetrable boundary are we able to see our bodies as discrete selves.2 Our human bodies are more accurately ‘built from a mass of interacting selves . . . the self is not only corporeal but corporate’ (Sagan, 1992: 370). Our cells also provide asylum for a variety of bacteria, viruses and countless genetic fragments. And none of this reproduction requires any bodily contact with another human being. Moreover, there is no linear relationship between sexual dimorphism and sexual reproduction. Male sea horses, pipe fish and hares get pregnant. Many species are male and female simultaneously, or sequentially. Many types of fish change sex back and forth depending on environmental conditions (see Rothblatt, 1995).
Fluid Identity > outing
Regardless of its effect on others’ perceptions of privacy, the right still endorses a fluid conception of identity, allowing individuals to shape their online selves in an act of identity creation, challenging social conceptions of static identity.
Challenging social norms outweighs individuals discovering transgender identity:
1. Ideologies come first – they insulate the system from efforts to resist it – the overarching structure of fixed gender identity is more important than individual actions.
Reid-Brinkley 08 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance And Style,” 2008]
To begin an investigation of these questions of race, representation and performance, I utilize ideological criticism as a rhetorical method. This project is interested in the ideological discourses and representations of race, class, gender, and sexuality within the public conversation about race and education. The dominant narratives, bred within institutional structures, must be interrogated for processes of normalization implicated in the success and achievement of black students in American society. In other words, an ideological analysis provides us with an opportunity to critically analyze the networks of power through which ideologies flow and gain discursive and representative dominance. The Marxist conception of ideology, reformulated and popularized by Louis Althusser, revolves around the assumption that social bodies are trapped within a “false consciousness” that blinds them to the truth. Althusser argues that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” 66 Such a conception of ideology was necessary to explain why the working class did not rise up against the ruling class. Such ideologies were theorized as part of the superstructure resulting in the limited ability of subjects to exercise agency. For Althusser, dominant ideologies allowed the social structure to reproduce itself without ensuing conflict. Ideology functioned to naturalize the dominant structure encouraging individuals to participate by engaging in practices and behaviors designed to maintain that system. More importantly, ideologies were thought to construct an imaginary reality by which social beings became dependent on the structure as it functions, in order to make sense of their very lives. In essence, ideology was considered to be deterministic, binding individuals to the imaginary reality. However, current scholarship has been expressly critical of such a conceptualization of ideology, particularly, within the field of cultural studies, as it made the critical turn away from the study of dominant ideology and toward the cultural and everyday practices by which subjects engage ideological domination. Noted theorists, including Michel Foucault, Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall have offered significant critiques of such a view of the relations of power in social system. One criticism of this version of ideology is that it assumes there is a truth, somewhere out there, that we are unable to ascertain because of the false consciousness produced through ideological discourses. 67 Second, as Foucault argues, “ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc.” 68 In other words, ideology is defined as a result of economic structures. Thus, the economic structures are pre-existent and thus, uninfluenced by ideology, but simply productive of it. And, third, if the individual or the subject is not critical to the development of such ideological structures, but are instead determined by them, then social subjects become agent-less. They become simply social beings produced by the superstructure. Despite significant criticism of the concept of ideology, it remains significantly useful in the study of social domination. We can agree that there is not some true expression of reality out there that we are somehow blinded from seeing. We can agree that ideology is both produced by and produces economic and social structures. And, we can agree that social actors and their actions are not determined by ideology as much as social actors are strongly influenced toward accepting those ideologies as within their best interest, an internalization of ideological discourse as inscribed through various apparatuses of power. Yet, as media and communications scholar Nicolas Garnham cautions, the focus on resistance in cultural studies can prevent us from studying the manner in which dominance is maintained, both through structure and discourse. 69 He notes that it is the responsibility of intellectuals to map out structural and social dominance. Social actors participate in the production and maintenance of culture, both dominant and subordinate. In any given situation, both dominance and resistance are likely to be active in varying degrees. Thus, this project is not simply interested in the study of the production and maintenance of dominant ideologies; simultaneously, we must look to the manner in which social actors engage in resistance efforts within and through such dominant ideologies. Contemporary racism is reproduced and maintained through discursive constructions that are circulated through ideologies. Ideologies help to make stereotypical representations intelligible to an audience. As long as racism remains a social phenomenon in our society, racial ideologies will likely remain a critical tool by which racial difference is signified. All racial ideologies do not function the same way; they are often complicated by intersections of class, gender, sexuality and context. And, as ideologies often function to dominate, they also create circumstances for resistance. This project seeks to engage both dominance and resistance; how racial ideologies reproduce social dominance, and how those affected by that dominance attempt to resist it. The rhetoric surrounding race and education offers one space from which to analyze the social reproduction of racial dominance. Looking to specific contexts through which we analyze the significance of racial ideologies allows us as scholars to map out the forces of power active through racial difference. Specifically, a rhetorical focus can map the public discursive maneuvers that (re)produce and resist these social ideologies. The rhetoric surrounding race, culture, and performance within educational discourse is of critical importance to the future course of educational opportunity in American society. We must understand the strategies of signification that are most persuasive and powerful to the general public audience. What representations of racial others are most intelligible to the public and how might racial others respond to that intelligibility? As our previous discussion of the “acting white” thesis and the rise of cultural explanations of racial difference indicate, contemporary ideological representations of race have changed and in some ways remained the same. We must interrogate the use of ideological representations of race, gender, class, and sexuality as rhetorical strategy in public deliberations. And, it is important to read the social actors involved and watching as embodied.
2. Scope – this necessarily affects all transgender people, who by definition are affected by the existence of fixed ideas of gender; whereas violence only occurs for relatively few individuals
3. affirming fluid identity legitimizes transgender experience, which fosters greater social inclusion across all of society – that allows violence to be lessened in the long-term on a much larger scale, so I control the stronger link to the violence impact
4. Fluid gender allows for self-creation, affirming freedom from constricting social norms that improves overall quality of life, preventing powerful feelings of exclusion – this psychic violence is just as harmful as physical violence and I solve it on a larger scale.
Their solvency turns are non-unique – the information already is available now, which causes forced outing – publicizing that information wouldn’t increase the amount of forced outings since more publicity doesn’t mean more individuals outed.
A2 Streisand Effect
1. Extend Hoboken – the idea that the internet always remembers is false – the Streisand effect is rare and only applies to a few individuals.
2. Obviously, news media can’t publish an article on every single takedown request – the overwhelming majority of requests won’t have attention to them.
3. Reject their evidence – it’s just speculation by random unqualified authors based on only a few instances of actual Streisand effects – lack of empirical study means this is much less likely than the right actually working
4. Empirical evidence confirms
Cowls 14 [(Josh, Researcher at the Oxford Internet Institute studying the transformative impact of new data sources and tools in academia, government and the third sector) “STREISANDFREUDE: HOW THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN MAY BECOME AN EXCUSE TO BE REMEMBERED” July 14] AT
Crucially, this is in no way a random or systematic sample of removals: the original seven cases com from the Hidden from Google service, which only includes instances where removal has been verified (and publicised) by the outlet affected. As posited earlier, it is more likely the tip of an iceberg: many removals have probably proceeded un-remarked-upon; the volume of ‘unknown unknowns’ is probably much greater than that of ‘known unknowns’ (or strictly speaking ‘known unseens’.) This analysis only posits the existence of a Streisand effect, not the generalisability of one.
5. Their evidence no longer applies.
Finley 14 [(Klint, covers current and future trends in technology, and how they are shaping business, entertainment, communications, science) “EU Rules That Google Must Honor Your ‘Right to be Forgotten’” Wired 05.13] AT
This interpretation of the law could create serious issues when it comes to enforcing the new ruling. First of all, there’s the “Streisand Effect”–the idea that trying to have information removed from the internet backfires by drawing attention to that content. In suing Google, González drew far more attention to the 1998 estate sale than it ever would have received otherwise. But this is probably the least of the case’s problems. Since the law is now settled, removal requests could be quietly submitted to Google and other companies and only publicized in cases during which there is a dispute over whether certain links actually need to be removed. And those disputes are where the real problems may lay. It may not always be straightforward to determine which data is incomplete, inaccurate, or outdated and which is simply embarrassing.
A2 Kills Online Anonymity
No impact – the aff isn’t about privacy and only anonymity has nothing to do with a person’s transgender status.
This assumes the aff would reshape the internet, which it obviously doesn’t do – the right to be forgotten by itself doesn’t reduce anonymity and doesn’t need to do so to remove Google links, which doesn’t require knowing people’s personal info online
A2 Can’t Delete Everything/Info Stays
Removing Google links is sufficient – the Hoboken evidence says search media are the key link, greatly increasing the findability of harmful information and spreading that info
Deleting links solves the harm, which come from accidentally revealing people’s transgender status due to a Google search – people wouldn’t hunt for the information since they don’t have reason to do so, so they wouldn’t find the article unless it’s attached to the persons’s name