Util/K debaters: Read Framing, read only #1 and #2 framework justification
Pure k debater: No fwk, shorten contention by 1 or 2 cards, and a ton of framing/pre-empts
Phil debater: no framing contention, whole fwk and shorter contention
Sketch debater: whole solvency contention, shorter harms contention, only Elias in framing, and whole fwk
Oppression is bad for equality
Arbitrariness – identity is morally arbitrary, so allowing discrimination undermines the foundation of a moral theory.
Inclusion is an epistemological prerequisite – oppression is the biggest impact since we can’t form moral theories until all those affected are included by it.
Any theory that condones an unequal societal order should be rejected since it would not be accepted by those at the bottom – this makes it useless as a political philosophy, which must be justifiable to the citizens who the government rules over
Neg frameworks assume a starting position of equality, grounding their framework as if everyone could engage in ethics. This starting point is flawed – if their justifications take into account unequal social orders they would require rectifying these inequalities since it’s a prerequisite to ethical justification.
Abstract liberalism has been redeployed to maintain status quo oppression – only ACTIVE resistance can solve; other ethics only serve the interests of power
Bonilla-Silva 6 explains the example of racism [(Eduardo, Professor of Sociology at Duke University) “Racism without racist: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States” 2006] AT
If Jim Crow’s racial structure has been replaced by a ‘‘new racism,’’ what happened to Jim Crow racism? What happened to beliefs about blacks’ mental, moral, and intellectual inferiority, to the idea that ‘‘it is the [black man’s] own fault that he is a lower-caste . . . a lower-class man’’ or the assertion that blacks ‘‘lack initiative, are shiftless, have no sense of time, or do not wish to better themselves’’;1 in short, what happened to the basic claim that blacks are subhuman?2 Social analysts of all stripes agree that most whites no longer subscribe to these tenets. However, this does not mean the ‘‘end of racism,’’3 as a few conservative commentators have suggested. Instead, a new powerful ideology has emerged to defend the contemporary racial order: the ideology of color-blind racism. Yet, color-blind racism is a curious racial ideology. Although it engages, as all ideologies do, in ‘‘blaming the victim,’’ it does so in a very indirect, ‘‘now you see it, now you don’t’’ style that matches the character of the new racism. Because of the slipperiness of color-blind racism, in this chapter I examine its central frames and explain how whites use them in ways that justify racial inequality. THE FRAMES OF COLOR-BLIND RACISM Ideologies are about ‘‘meaning in the service of power.’’4 They are expressions at the symbolic level of the fact of dominance. As such, the ideologies of the powerful are central in the production and reinforcement of the status quo. They comfort rulers and charm the ruled much like an Indian snake handler. Whereas rulers receive solace by believing they are not involved in the terrible ordeal of creating and maintaining inequality, the ruled are charmed by the almost magic qualities of a hegemonic ideology.5 The central component of any dominant racial ideology is its frames or set paths for interpreting information. These set paths operate as cul-de-sacs because after people filter issues through them, they explain racial phenomena following a predictable route. Although by definition dominant frames must misrepresent the world (hide the fact of dominance), this does not mean that they are totally without foundation. (For instance, it is true that people of color in the United States are much better off today than at any other time in history. However, it is also true—facts hidden by color-blind racism—that because people of color still experience systematic discrimination and remain appreciably behind whites in many important areas of life, their chances of catching up with whites are very slim.) Dominant racial frames, therefore, provide the intellectual road map used by rulers to navigate the always rocky road of domination and, as I will show in chapter 6, derail the ruled from their track to freedom and equality. Analysis of the interviews with college students and DAS respondents revealed that color-blind racism has four central frames and that these frames are used by an overwhelming majority of the white respondents. The four frames are abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and minimization of racism. Of the four frames, abstract liberalism is the most important, as it constitutes the foundation of the new racial ideology. It is also the hardest to understand (What is racial about opposing busing or affirmative action, policies that clearly interfere with our American individualism?). Thus, I dedicate more space in this chapter to its discussion and to how it plays out in the color-blind drama. In order to adequately understand the abstract liberalism frame, first we need to know what is liberalism. According to John Gray, liberalism, or ‘‘liberal humanism,’’ is at the core of modernity; of the philosophical, economic, cultural, and political challenge to the feudal order. Although he acknowledges that liberalism has no ‘‘essence,’’ he points out that it has a ‘‘set of distinctive features,’’ namely, individualism, universalism, egalitarianism, and meliorism (the idea that people and institutions can be improved).6 All these components were endorsed and placed at the core of the constitutions of emerging nation-states by a new set of actors: the bourgeoisies of early modern capitalism. When the bourgeoisie lauded freedom, they meant ‘‘free trade, free selling and buying’’; when they applauded ‘‘individualism,’’ they had in mind ‘‘the bourgeois . . . the middle-class owner of property’’; ‘‘The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.’’7 Hence, classical liberalism was the philosophy of a nascent class that as an aspiring ruling class expressed its needs (political as well as economic) as general societal goals. But the bourgeois goals were not extended to the populace in their own midst until the twentieth century.8 Moreover, the liberal project was never inclusive of the countries that Spain, Portugal, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, and later on, Germany used as outposts for raw materials and racialized workers (e.g., slaves). Although contemporary commentators debate the merits of liberal humanism as it pertains to current debates about race-based policies, muticulturalism, and ‘‘equality of results,’’9 many seem oblivious to the fact that ‘‘European humanism (and liberalism) usually meant that only Europeans were human.’’10 Philosophers such as Kant stated that the differences between blacks and whites were ‘‘to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in colour.’’ Voltaire, the great French philosopher, said on the same subject that ‘‘only a blind man is permitted to doubt that Whites, Blacks, and Albinoes . . . are totally different races.’’ Lastly, even the father of modern liberalism, John Stuart Mill, author of On Liberty, justified 19th-century colonialism and supported slavery in antiquity and in certain 19th-century colonial situations.11 To be clear, my intent here is not to vilify the founders of liberalism, but to point out that modernity, liberalism, and racial exclusion were all part of the same historical movement. The liberal tradition informed the American Revolution, the U.S. Constitution, and ‘‘the leading American liberal thinker of this period, Thomas Jefferson.’’12 And in the United States as in Europe, the exclusion of the majority of white men and all white women from the rights of citizenship and the classification of Native Americans and African Americans as subpersons accompanied the development of the new liberal nation-state.13 Specifically, racially based policies such as slavery, the removal of Native Americans from their lands and their banishment to reservations, the superexploitation and degrading utilization of Mexicans and various Asian groups as contract laborers, Jim Crow, and many other policies were part of the United States’ ‘‘liberal’’ history from 1776 until the 1960s. Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge that, in both Europe and the United States, disenfranchised groups and progressive politicians used the liberal rhetoric to advance social and legal reforms (e.g., the Civil Rights Movement, the National Organization of Women, Liberal parties in Europe).14 Thus liberalism, when extended to its seemingly logical conclusions (‘‘Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all’’) and connected to social movements, can be progressive. My point, however, is less about social-reform liberalism (although I contend many reform organizations and many white reform-minded individuals15 have adopted color-blind racism) than about how central elements of liberalism have been rearticulated in post–Civil Rights America to rationalize racially unfair situations. The frame of abstract liberalism involves using ideas associated with political liberalism (e.g., ‘‘equal opportunity,’’ the idea that force should not be used to achieve social policy) and economic liberalism (e.g., choice, individualism) in an abstract manner to explain racial matters. By framing race-related issues in the language of liberalism, whites can appear ‘‘reasonable’’ and even ‘‘moral,’’ while opposing almost all practical approaches to deal with de facto racial inequality. For instance, the principle of equal opportunity, central to the agenda of the Civil Rights Movement and whose extension to people of color was vehemently opposed by most whites, is invoked by whites today to oppose affirmative-action policies because they supposedly represent the ‘‘preferential treatment’’ of certain groups. This claim necessitates ignoring the fact that people of color are severely underrepresented in most good jobs, schools, and universities and, hence, it is an abstract utilization of the idea of ‘‘equal opportunity.’’ Another example is regarding each person as an ‘‘individual’’ with ‘‘choices’’ and using this liberal principle as a justification for whites having the right of choosing to live in segregated neighborhoods or sending their children to segregated schools. This claim requires ignoring the multiple institutional and state-sponsored practices behind segregation and being unconcerned about these practices’ negative consequences for minorities.
‘‘Nothing Should Be Forced upon People’’: Keeping Things the Way They Are A central tenet of liberal democracies is that governments should intervene in economic and social matters as little as possible because the ‘‘invisible hand of the market’’ eventually balances states of disequilibrium. A corollary of this tenet, and part of the American mythology, is the idea that social change should be the outcome of a rational and democratic process and not of the government’s coercive capacity.26 During the Jim Crow era, the belief that racial change should happen through a slow, evolutionary process in ‘‘peoples’ hearts’’ rather than through governmental actions was expressed in the phrase ‘‘you cannot legislate morality.’’27 This old standpoint has been curiously reformulated in the modern era to justify keeping racial affairs the way they are. These ideas appeared occasionally in discussions on affirmative action, but most often in discussions about school and residential integration in America. Sonny, a student at MU, explained in typical fashion her position on whether school segregation is the fault of government, whites, or blacks. As almost all the students, Sonny first stated her belief that school integration is in principle a good thing to have: ‘‘In principle, yeah, I think that’s a good idea because like with, like with people interacting, they will understand each other better in future generations.’’ But Sonny also, as most students, was not too fond of government attempts to remedy school segregation or, in her words, ‘‘I, I don’t—I mean, it should be done if people want to do it. If people volunteer for it, and they want that part of their lives, then they should do it, but the government should not force people to bus if they don’t want that.’’ When asked to clarify her stance on this matter, she added, ‘‘I don’t think the government should impose any legislation thinking that it will change people’s hearts because people have to change them on their own. You can’t force them to say ‘Well, OK, now that I have to bus my kid there, I like it.’ ’’ DAS respondents were as adamant as students in arguing that it is not the government’s business to remedy racial problems. For example, Lynn, a human resources manager in her early fifties, explained why there has The Central Frames of Color-Blind Racism 35 been so little school integration since the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision: I don’t and that’s another one. I do not believe in busing. The reason I don’t believe in busing, you know, I said I don’t. I didn’t encourage my children to play with the neighborhood kids. I still felt that going to school in your community was the key to developing a child’s sense of community and I still believe that. One of the reasons, another reason I moved from where I was [was] that I didn’t want my children to be bused. I didn’t want to have them got on a bus, especially me working. So I don’t think that is an answer. I think the answer is education and helping people learn to make a life for themselves and, you know, any type of social program that interacts, that provides interaction between races I think is excellent. But I’m just not a busing person. Lynn wants equal opportunity in education as well as community schools, a position that sounds perfectly reasonable. However, one would expect Lynn to support doing something to make sure that communities throughout America are diverse, a policy that other things being equal would guarantee school integration. Yet, Lynn took a very strong laissez- faire, antigovernment intervention stance on this matter. Lynn answered as follows the question, ‘‘America has lots of all-white and all-black neighborhoods. What do you think of this situation?’’ I don’t have a problem with all-white and all-black neighborhoods if that’s the choice of the people, the individuals. But, if it’s forced either way, if I’m a black person and I’ve come into the neighborhood and I want to live here and selectively denied that option, that’s wrong. But, again, there still has to be some type of social interaction for growth and if the social interaction takes place then, the cross-integration will take place, I think. When pressed about what she thought could be done specifically to increase the mixing of the races in neighborhoods, Lynn restated that this could only be achieved ‘‘through educating (people) and encouraging businesses.’’ Lynn was not alone in having this abstract view on school and neighborhood integration. Only one of the white respondents who opposed busing in the interviews (69.7 percent of whites opposed busing in the survey) provided a specific proposal that if implemented would increase residential as well as school integration.28 Individual Choice or an Excuse for Racial Unfairness and Racially Based Choices? Individualism 29 today has been recast as a justification for opposing policies to ameliorate racial inequality because they are ‘‘group based’’ rather 36 Chapter 2 than ‘‘case by case.’’ In addition, the idea of individual choice is used to defend whites’ right to live and associate primarily with whites (segregation) and for choosing whites exclusively as their mates. The problem with how whites apply the notion of individualism to our present racial conundrum is that a relation of domination-subordination still ordains race relations in the United States (see chapters 1 and 4 in my White Supremacy and Racism in the Post–Civil Rights Era). Thus, if minority groups face group-based discrimination and whites have group-based advantages, demanding individual treatment for all can only benefit the advantaged group.30 And behind the idea of people having the right of making their own ‘‘choices’’ lays the fallacy of racial pluralism—the false assumption that all racial groups have the same power in the American polity. Because whites have more power, their unfettered, so-called individual choices help reproduce a form of white supremacy in neighborhoods, schools, and society in general. Lynn, a human resources manager, used the notion of individualism in a very curious way. Although Lynn expressed her support for affirmative action because ‘‘there’s still a lot of discrimination,’’ she thinks that ‘‘there isn’t as much discrimination as there used to be.’’ Lynn also acknowledged white males have advantages in society and said ‘‘the white male is pretty much instilled’’ and ‘‘very much represses . . . um, people and other minorities.’’ Nevertheless, when it came to the possibility of affirmative action affecting her, Lynn said: Um, because affirmative action is based on a group as a whole, but when it comes down to the individual, like if affirmative action were against me one time, like it would anger me. I mean, because, you know, I as an individual got ripped off and, you know, getting a job. DAS respondents also used individualism to justify their racial views and race-based preferences. For example, Mandi, a registered nurse in her thirties, said she had no problems with neighborhood segregation. She justified her potentially problematic position by saying that people have the right to choose where and with whom they live. Umm, I think that people select a neighborhood to live in that they are similar to and people, you know, whatever similarities they find [louder voice], you know, it’s race, economical level, religion, or, you know, whatever. When you are looking at somebody you don’t know what, what denomination they are or what political preference they have, but you can tell right off in race. I think that they choose to live in a neighborhood that is their race.
4. The topic concerns a conflict between 2 types of violations, the question is which one is worse. Their framework must be able to weigh impacts, and oppression should be a relevant impact under their framework, or else you should reject it since it literally says inequality isn’t bad which violates the most fundamental requirements of an ethical theory. In these conflicts, default to oppression since
A) certain groups have been marginalized for a long time, so correcting that skew ensures the possibility for future change; prioritizing other violations allows that marginalization continues indefinitely
B) inequality is especially repugnant, regardless of the degree of harm caused – the fact that people are equal means one group shouldn’t be harmed for the sake of the collective
C) Marginalization spills over and impacts all other types of violations, restricting free speech, political inclusion, and democratic vitality, so it’s a stronger link to other standards than other offense
5. Traditional ideas of democracy, formal inclusion, and negative rights are exclusionary, making deliberative processes illegitimate until we transform them
Young 1 [prof of polisci @ U Chicago] “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy.” Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Oct., 2001), pp. 670-690
The activist is more suspicious even of these deliberative processes that claim to give all affected by projected policies, or at least representatives of everyone, the opportunity to express their opinions in a deliberative process. In a society structured by deep social and economic inequalities, he believes that formally inclusive deliberative processes nevertheless enact structural biases in which more powerful and socially advantaged actors have greater access to the deliberative process and therefore are able to dominate the proceedings with their interests and perspectives. Under conditions of structural inequality, normal processes of deliberation often in practice restrict access to agents with greater resources, knowledge, or connections to those with greater control over the forum. We are familiar with the many manifestations of this effective exclusion from deliberation. Where radio and television are major fora for further deliberation, for example, citizens either need the money or connections to get airtime. Even when a series of public hearings are announced for an issue, people who might wish to speak at them need to know about them, be able to arrange their work and child care schedule to be able attend, be able to get to them, and have enough understanding of the hearing process to participate. Each of these abilities is unevenly present among members of a society. Some have argued that such differential access and participation characterized both of the ostensibly inclusive public deliberative processes I cited above: the Oregon Medicaid process and the deliberations about the South African constitution. In the first case, participants in the consultative process turned out to be largely white, middle-class, able-bodied people, despite the fact that the program specifically was to serve lower income people. Many citizens of South Africa understood too little about the meaning of a constitution, or their lives were too occupied by survival, for them to become involved in that deliberative process. The activist thus argues that citizens who care about justice should continue to criticize processes of public deliberation from the outside, even when the latter have formal rules aimed at producing wide participation. To the extent that structural inequalities in the society operate effectively to restrict access to these deliberative processes, their deliberations and conclusions are not legitimate. Responsible citizens should remain at least partially outside, protesting the process, agenda, and outcome of these proceedings and demonstrating against the underlying relations of privilege and disadvantage that condition them. They should aim to speak on behalf of those de facto excluded and attempt to use tactics such as strikes, boycotts, and disruptive demonstrations to pressure these bodies to act in ways that respond to the needs and interests of those effectively excluded. If we participate in these formally inclusive processes, the activist says, we help confer undeserved legitimacy on them and fail to speak for those who remain outsiders.
Specifically, heteronormative power structures are exclusionary and problematize notions of democracy
Farrell 4 [(Kathleen, therapist with transgender people at Behavioral Health Centers at Tampa Bay) “Interrupting Heteronormativity”] AT
Although the term “heteronormativity” is gaining some currency in pedagogical theories and practices, the term is often left out of discussions about “diversity” altogether. Heteronormativity sounds complex, but is actually quite simple. As a term, heteronormativity describes the processes through which social institutions and social policies reinforce the belief that human beings fall into two distinct sex/gender categories: male/man and female/woman. This belief (or ideology) produces a correlative belief that those two sexes/genders exist in order to fulfill complementary roles, i.e., that all intimate relationships ought to exist only between males/men and females/women. To describe a social institution as heteronormative means that it has visible or hidden norms, some of which are viewed as normal only for males/men and others which are seen as normal only for females/women. As a concept, heteronormativity is used to help identify the processes through which individuals who do not appear to “fit” or individuals who refuse to “fit” these norms are made invisible and silenced. Heteronormative institutions and practices, then, block access to full legal, political, economic, educational, and social participation for millions of individuals in the U.S. This anti-democratic, exclusionary ideology undermines the fundamental mission of Syracuse University.
6. An accurate epistemology is key – otherwise a framework will be biased, making it self-defeating. A better epistemological standpoint is a pre-requisite to accurate ethical deliberation – the dominant standpoint precludes meaningful discussion of how morality is constructed because it ignores oppression – examining ethical problems from the oppressed is key
Jaggar 83 [Alison M. Jaggar, professor of philosophy and women studies at University of Colorado - Boulder, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 1983]
The standpoint of the oppressed is not just different from that of the ruling class; it is also epistemologically advantageous. It provides the basis for a view of reality that is more impartial than that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive. It is more impartial because it comes closer to representing the interests of society as a whole; whereas the standpoint of the ruling class reflects the interests only of one section of the population, the standpoint of the oppressed represents the interests of the totality in that historical period. Moreover, whereas the condition of the oppressed groups is visible only dimly to the ruling class, the oppressed are able to see more clearly the ruled as well as the rulers and the relation between them. Thus, the standpoint of the oppressed includes and is able to explain the standpoint of the ruling class.
Thus, the standard is resisting oppression
Oppression is necessarily a group harm - it constitutes harmful acts towards a group because they are a certain group.
Pierce 10 [Andrew J. Pierce. “Oppression as Group Harm.” Sacred Heart University. January 2010] AJ
Oppression then, if we are to look to classical liberals like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, can take can take the form of murder, theft, intimidation, and imprisonment, but also unjust taxation, illegitimate consignment, and other State acts. Yet, what binds the liberal conception of oppression together, despite its lack of precision, is that the harms it condemns are harms to individuals, even if the individual harms are widely shared.4 Formal legal equality within a representative system of government then, is generally sufficient to prevent this kind of oppression. Given that most modern liberal democracies fit this description, why does talk of oppression persist? My intuition, which I will now develop, is that current talk of oppression points to a very different phenomenon. Explanations that include groups as causal agents are fairly common. Consider the following example. In Seattle in 1999, massive protests virtually shut down the third ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization. By taking control of key intersections, and also by sheer number, protestors made it impossible for WTO delegates to reach the conference destination. Setting aside issues of the morality of the protestors’ tactics, the events just described cannot even be explained, let alone evaluated on an individualist model. It is true that the group was comprised of several thousand individuals. Yet this fact is inadequate at best, and irrelevant at worst to the explanation of the events. The actions of the group cannot be reduced, in this case, to the actions and/or intentions of its individual members. Paul Sheehy writes “if the joint action is broken down into its individual components, then the essential element in its effectiveness is lost – the jointness or coordination of the actions.”5 An individual, however determined, cannot by mere presence make a street inaccessible, breach a barricade, or halt factory production. Explanations of such events must include the group qua group among its causes. In such cases, the collective nature of the group is irreducible. The same can be said also for group harms. An individual can be harmed in a number of direct ways: through acts of violence, discrimination, humiliation, and so on. But groups can also be the irreducible objects of harm. Hate crimes, for example, take the form of individual harms, but are additionally, and perhaps even primarily group harms. A person attacked in virtue of her race, gender, or sexuality is obviously harmed individually. But other members of her group can also be said to be harmed, even though the attack was not aimed at them individually. The lynching of African Americans, for example, is an attack on the group as a whole, and not just the individual victims. This is part of the justification underlying harsher penalties for crimes that target individuals based upon their group memberships.6 Further, it is not just the threat of potential harm to other like individuals that justifies saying that they are harmed. A Hmong woman living in a western democracy may have no reason to fear individual mistreatment based on reports that Hmong people are being mistreated elsewhere, but she may still be harmed emotionally or otherwise by the fact that members of her group have suffered because of their group membership. Oppression must be understood as a group harm of this type. In a brief but illuminating essay, Marilyn Frye hypothesizes that “if an individual is oppressed, it is in virtue of being a member of a group or category of people that is systematically reduced, molded, immobilized. Thus, to recognize a person as oppressed, one has to see that individual as belonging to a group of a certain sort.”7 Accordingly, she makes a distinction between individual and group harm. She imagines a “rich white playboy,” who breaks a leg in a skiing accident. Clearly such a person is harmed, but he is not oppressed, she claims, even if his injury can be traced to someone’s negligence or intentional malice, since his individual misfortune is not premised upon his group membership.8 Even violations of fundamental individual rights do not automatically translate to instances of oppression. If the government seizes my property, for example, or denies my right to freedom of speech, this violation should not automatically be characterized as oppression. If, however, the government seizes the property of, or denies the right of free speech to a certain group, based solely or primarily on preexisting group membership, then the violation is properly called an instance of oppression. When oppression is used loosely to name any and all forms of humanly inflicted harm and suffering, it loses much of its critical potential. Oppression today points to a phenomenon that may include individual harm, but is nonetheless analytically distinct from it. But Frye’s definition is not yet precise enough. Must we count the mandatory registration of sex offenders, for example, as an instance of oppression? If sex offenders count as a social group, and if this restriction is placed upon them in virtue of being a member of that group, then it seems we must. If this seems intuitively problematic, it is because the idea that oppressed groups are social groups of a “certain sort” has not yet been specified clearly enough. What distinguishes sex-offenders from truly oppressed groups is that oppressed groups are paradigmatically non-intentional. That is, they do not depend upon, and generally do without the voluntary consent of their members. The existence of a racial group, for example, does not depend upon the identification of a shared purpose on the part of those it purports to classify. Instead, these groupings are often understood as somehow “natural”.9 But sex offenders, difficult questions of nature versus nurture aside, are grouped together based upon some individual criminal action(s) that they committed. So though they might not share a common purpose in any robust sense, they still count as an intentional group, given that the law has seen fit to classify their actions together in a way that defines them as a group. In other words, they share a characteristic that is deemed socially relevant in an important way. But individuals can share other socially relevant features besides individual actions and intentions. They can share external characteristics, like social disadvantage, and these also bind individuals together as social groups. In Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd focuses on these latter features in attempting to define oppressed groups. She argues against those who claim that social groups are necessarily defined by shared intentions. Many relevant social groups do not meet this qualification, particularly oppressed groups. But what, then, qualifies an oppressed group as a group? For her, the key feature is shared social constraints. She explains that constraints are social “when they come about as a result of social actions,” including “legal rights, obligations and burdens, stereotypical expectations, wealth, income, social status, conventions, norms, and practices” (41). Such constraints can and do shape intentional as much as non-intentional groups, as the sex offender example illustrates, but oppression proper occurs when these constraints are based upon non-voluntary group membership.