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AT: Russian Federalism Key to Check Disintegration

Russia can survive as a unitary state-

Alexander Domrin, former Chief Specialist of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Moscow representative of the U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2006

(“Comparative Constitutional Law at Iowa: From Fragmentation to Balance: The Shifting Model of Federalism in Post-Soviet Russia” 15 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 515)

There is no consensus among Russian scholars as to the future of Russia as a federal state. The existence and remarkable economic development of China as a unitary state negates any argument that large countries like Russia must necessarily have a federal structure. Further, it is hard to agree with authors who proclaim that historically Russia has tended toward federalism. Neither the Russian Empire nor the USSR were true federations. 13 Unlike many other federations of the world, Russia historically was not formed as a product of treaties between various regions of a political union, but rather grew by acquiring, either forcefully or voluntarily, neighboring lands. For more than one thousand years of its history Russia was a strong unitary state, flexible enough to afford autonomy to some territories, yet it was not a federation.

India Models US Federalism

India models US constitutional law

Adam M. Smith, Chayes Fellow, Harvard Law School, 2006

(“Making Itself at HomeUnderstanding Foreign Law in Domestic Jurisprudence: The Indian Case” 24 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 218)
Modern India has also been strongly influenced by many states that never ruled its territory. For instance, American influence can be found both in the state's judicial process and its constitutional text. 83 The Indian Constitution's express declaration of fundamental rights coupled with the introduction of judicial review 84 marked a radical departure from the British doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, and thoroughly "Americanized" the system. 85 In addition to judicial review, the framers of the Indian Constitution explicitly used the American Bill of Rights as a starting point in their discussions. 86 Moreover, India even adapted its constitution upon the recommendation of an American jurist. Following the terror of partition and Mahatma Gandhi's assassination, many representatives to the constitutional convention began to argue for carving out a constitutional allowance for preventive detention, placing "citizens' freedom at the disposition of a legislature for the sake of a public peace." 87 As a result, constitutional guarantees to due process were removed from the document, a change supported by (and potentially instigated by) U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who served as an unofficial - though evidently persuasive - legal consultant to the assembly. 88

Indian Federalism is modeled on the U.S.

Grandle, J.D. Washington College of Law, 2003
(Brooke B.,– American University, “Choosing to Help or to Advance Their Agenda,” 24 Women's Rights L. Rep. 83, Summer, Lexis)

One source of inspiration for the Indian Constitution was the United States, 150 although India made several key decisions that significantly distinguish the two Constitutions and resulting forms of government. India adopted the idea of a Supreme Court from the United States and also decided to create three branches of federal government like the United States. However, India incorporated a bicameral parliamentary government modeled after Great Britain. 151 An additional significant difference with the United States is the strong centrist nature of the Indian federal government. India is also a federal system with power divided between the state and national levels. 152 However, the Indian governing system is a strong centrist system where unity is considered necessary to keep all components together. 153 Unlike the United States where residuary power is vested in the states, the Indian Constitution gives residuary power to the Parliament. 154

India models U.S. constitutional policies

Grandle, J.D. Washington College of Law, 2003
(Brooke B.,– American University, “Choosing to Help or to Advance Their Agenda,” 24 Women's Rights L. Rep. 83, Summer, Lexis)

The Indian Constitution does share the enumeration of rights contained in the Constitution of the United States. The influence of the American Bill of Rights can be seen in the enumerated rights of the Indian Constitution's Part III entitled Fundamental Rights. 155 The fundamental rights described in Part III provide fully enforceable guarantees of equality and nondiscrimination for all citizens. 156 In particular, Article 14 enunciates the guarantee of equality before law and grants the equal protection of law to not simply citizens but "any person ... within the territory of India." 157 Notably, the Constitution provides protections for populations who have been historically discriminated against, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth," 158 and creating what it calls reservations to promote classes that historically experienced discrimination. 159 Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the listed grounds, 160 and Article 16(4) permits the State to create what it terms reservations, or affirmative action, for "any backward class of citizens," 161 or those classes that were historically discriminated against. Additionally, Article 15(3) specifically allows the creation of special provisions that favor women and children. 162

Indian Federalism Bad: Economy

A) Indian federalism causes inflation and boosts the deficit killing the economy
Purfield, Asia and Pacific Department at IMF, 2008
[The Decentralization Dilemma in India, http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0432.pdf]

Institutional weaknesses in the system of inter-governmental fiscal relations appear to have contributed to the deterioration in state finances depicted in Figure 1. The framework of federal fiscal relations (see Annex I) is characterized by transfer dependence, commonrevenue pools, moral hazard, and soft budget constraints. These have created adverse incentives for prudent fiscal behavior by the state sector. However, the divergence in fiscal performance across states suggests structural factors, state specific pressures, and the criteria for allocating state assistance may also play a role. Transfer dependence: Although the average level of central government transfers (grants and shared taxes) has fallen by almost 1 percent of GSP since the mid-1980s, they still comprise almost 40 percent of state revenues and cover half of states’ current outlays. States have less incentive to increase revenue effort, especially on shared taxes, because they do not derive the full benefit of the extra resources raised under a revenue pooling system. In addition, each state may also believe it can reduce the tax burden on its citizens by increasing their reliance on transfers. States’ own-revenue has fallen by 1 percent of gross state domestic product (GSDP) since the mid-1980s due to the failure to adjust user fees for utilities and government services as well as to expand state’s own tax bases (Table 1). 2 Figure 2 shows that states with a lower share of own resources in total taxes have greater deficits.3 Common-pool problems: The reliance on central government transfers also undermined the state sector’s incentives to control deficits as they might perceive they could offload additional spending costs onto higher levels of government. State expenditures have grown by over ¾ percentage points of GSDP per annum since 1998/99. Reflecting the awards granted under the Fifth Pay Commission, pension and administrative costs (the latter includes wages) have risen by more than 400 percent since the mid-1980s.4 Energy subsidies to the state electricity boards (SEBs) have doubled since the mid-1990s, although they remain below the levels of earlier periods. The states’ growing debt burden has also caused debt servicing costs to rise to 35 percent of states’ own resources. As the growth in expenditure outpaced that of revenue, the average level of state deficits have doubled from the mid- 1990s. Moral hazard: The central government has also undermined the hardening of budget constraints and promoted bailout expectations through its own lending and provision of ad hoc assistance. The official debt of states now comprises 26.7 percent of GDP, compared to 18¼ percent of GDP in the mid-1990s, and over half of this debt is owned to the central government. In addition, the central government has regularly provided assistance to states who have exceeded their overdraft limits with the central bank. This assistance undermines incentives for prudent fiscal behavior by promoting bail-out expectations as states might believe that the central government will help finance any deficit they incur. Figure 2 shows a positive relationship between fiscal deficits and the dependency on central government loans. Soft budget constraints: The official debt statistics understate the true extent of the states’ debt burden as states engaged in off-budget activity. The level of outstanding guarantees grew by over 40 percent between 1993 and 2000, outstripping the growth in official state level debt. Fiscal activities are also conducted off-budget through various state-owned financial corporations (SFCs) and utilities with adverse consequences for their financial health.5 These off-budget sources of fiscal activity are contingent liabilities that could result in future claims on states’ budgets. Structural factors: The states with the largest deficits and debt burden at the end of 2000— namely, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu—broadly correspond to those with the largest imbalances at the start of the decade (Figure 3).6 This suggests that the structural characteristics of these states may be important in explaining their higher deficits. However, the results shown in Figure 2 suggests that only the agricultural dependence has a significant negative impact on fiscal deficits presumably because agricultural income is not taxed.7 State-specific pressures: The deterioration in state finances in the late 1990s can be traced to poor performance of a few key states that can, in turn, be attributed to high expenditure pressures (Table 2). West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka account for almost 60 percent of the decline in financial indicators since 1997/98. The share of the states’ combined deficit accounted for by West Bengal and Gujarat rose from 16 percent in 1997 to over 20 percent by 2002; that of the other four states rose from 25 percent to 33 percent. Expenditure pressures in these six states ranged from a low of 14 percent to high of 132 percent far exceeding the average state-wide growth rate of 11 percent. 

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