The institutional framework for the ownership and control of SOEs is presented in the diagram on the following page. The key institutions are the ownership entities (who exercise the ownership rights) and the control bodies (state audit agencies and inspector generals).
Senegal has a “dual” ownership structure, in which Line Ministries shares the responsibility exercising ownership rights with a central administrative entity (housed in the Ministry of Economy and Finance).
Ministry of Economy and Finance.The Ministry of Economy and Finance is the most important player in among the ownership entities. As a general rule, it nominates 50 percent of State board seats in majority-owned companies, and in banks with state ownership and some other minority-owned companies. The Cellule de Gestion et de Contrôle de Portefeuille de l’Etat (CGCPE), a directorate of the Ministry, is charged by law with supervising the State-owned portfolio. It receives reports from the SOEs, drafts an annual report to the government on the SOE portfolio, and votes the State’s shares at annual meetings of shareholders. It also plays the important role of acting as the government’s secretariat for the privatization process, and overseeing liquidations.
The CGCPE’s activities are hampered by its relative lack of authority, but especially its lack of resources and small staff size (four professionals).
Line Ministries (Ministères de la Tutelle). The Line Ministry for each SOE plays a role in oversight and ownership. Its main role is to develop sectoral policy, and to appoint board members. There is a wide variation in the resources and institutional capacity available to support the oversight role.
Presidential Administration (Cabinet du Président). The Presidential Administration is not directly involved in the execution of ownership rights, but plays a key role that good practice reserves for the board of directors – the appointment of the director general (CEO). In Sociétés Nationales and EPICs, the director general is appointed by presidential decree, on the advice of the Line Minister, for three years, by a motion of the board. Although the board formally ratifies the appointment of the director, in practice it has no role in nomination, and does not reject the selection of the government. This dilutes the power of the board, and leaves the government open to the charge that directors are appointed on the basis of political loyalty, and not on the basis of their qualifications.
The Presidential Administration also directly receives reports from two of the control bodies. The Contrôle Financier (CF) issues reports to the Presidential Administration, including special reports on particularly important topics. The Presidential administration can then issue corrective decrees, to be executed by either the Line Ministry or the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Inspection Générale d’Etat (IGE) also reports to the Presidential Administration and issues an annual report to the President (which is not made publicly available). The Presidential Administration can then take action (although how much and how formally this is done in practice is unclear).
As a result of carrying out this monitoring function and assuming responsibility for taking action, the Presidential Administration is carrying out many of the responsibilities that would normally be the role of an owner.
Three bodies have somewhat overlapping missions to audit and control companies owned by the State: the Contrôle Financier, the Inspection Générale d’Etat (IGE), and the Commission de Vérification des Comptes et de Contrôle des Entreprises Publiques. In addition, each company must be audited by an external auditor (commissaire aux comptes).
Contrôle Financier (CF). The Contrôle Financier plays an important role in the system through direct participation on the board of directors. One contrôleurprovides direct oversight by sitting as a non-voting member on the board of each SOE. This control is exercised in practice through two channels:
The CF issues periodic and special reports to the Presidential Administration (see above).
Inspection Générale d’Etat (IGE). The IGE carries out inspections according to an annual program, or at the request of the President. The IGE reports to the Presidential administration and issues an annual report to the President (which is not made publicly available). Inspectors general have full investigating powers (including unlimited access to secret or confidential information. They cannot sanction, unless delegated by the President.
Commission de Vérification des Comptes et de Contrôle des Entreprises Publiques (CVCCEP). The CVCCEP was created by Law 90-07 to verify accounts and to assure proper use of capital managed by public enterprises, and is now a chamber of the government audit agency, the Cours des Comptes. The CVCCEP has the status of an independent magistrate, and is part of the judiciary. The CVCCEP prepares a report of its reviews of companies or company transactions. Companies are included in this report based on the CVCCEP’S own schedule. This report is published, and is a valuable and independent control over the activities of SOEs.
Commissaire aux Comptes (external auditor). SOEs are also subject to external audit, like other private sector companies.
The division of responsibilities over the ownership functions of the State is described in detail in the Guideline-by-Guideline review, below. The following table summarizes the role of the different institutional players:
Majority –owned SOEs
Other companies with state ownership (including banks)
Setting an explicit ownership policy
No clear policy in place.
Setting policy goals and objectives
Line Ministry / CGCPE (although many companies do not have explicit goals and objectives).