4.CaseforDiscussion:U.S. DepartmentofHomeland Security Organization Structure: Download the organization chart of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security[http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm] and describe the structure of the Department. What agencies are involved and how are they related to each other? What is the basis for the relationships among the organizations? What forms of authority are in play?
5.AlternateCaseforDiscussion:ElectronicHallway:King County Library
What structural problems are evident in the case? What other conditions exacerbate the structural problems? What structural solutions do they adopt? Do you expect these changes to address the problems facing the library? Why? What is the logic of the reorganization? What non-structural solutions are added? What contribution do these non-structural changes make to solving the library’s problems?
LESSON 3TOPIC: GETTING ORGANIZEDII:ADAPTIVEANDSELF-ORGANIZINGDESIGNS 1.Learning Goals/Objectives: Provide an introduction to alternative approaches to classic theories of organization structure that makes use of current ideas of adaptive and learning organizational designs. Learners will:
• Consider how organization structures could be designed to support the coordination need of the agency’s work processes.
• Discover how work technologies can be analyzed and matched to appropriate structural supports. Study the ways that learning from experience and from the experience of similar agencies can be used to adapt organization structures and processes to increase effectiveness.
• Recognize the ways in which adaptive learning might be used in responding to threats to infrastructure.
• Debate the relative merits of hierarchical vs. adaptive, often decentralized approaches.
2.DiscussionQuestions: • What are the ways in which work in organizations is coordinated? What are the mechanisms and structures?
• What are some structural adaptations to rapidly changing environments? How is coordination achieved?
• What are some adaptations to routine and non-routine organizational program technologies?
How do the technologies of public organizations evolve and shape the design of organizations?
• What are the ways in which adaptive learning might be used in responding to threats to infrastructure? What would adaptive designs look like on the ground?
• What are the relative merits of a hierarchical approach? What are the relative merits of an adaptive, often decentralized approach?
3.RequiredReading: Rainey, Understanding and Managing PublicOrganizations, Chapter 8, pp. 204-215 and 224-232.
Jay Galbraith, “Information Processing Model,” in Classics of OrganizationTheory.
John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, “Organizational Learning and Communities-of-Practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation,” Organization Science, 2(1), (1991), 40-57, http://www.idi.ntnu.no/grupper/su/publ/ese/brown-duguid91.pdf.
Kathleen M. Carley and John R. Harrald, “Organizational Learning under Fire: Theory and
Eric Stern, “Crisis and Learning: A Conceptual Balance Sheet,” Journal ofContingencies and
Crisis Management, 5(2), (1997), 69–86.
Louise Comfort, “Risk, Security and Disaster Management,” Annual Reviewof Political Science. 8, (2005), 335–56, http://iisis.gspia.pitt.edu/publications/Risk_Security_and_Disaster_Management-2005.pdf.
4.RecommendedAdditional Reading: William M. Snyder, Etienne Wenger, and Xavier de Sousa Briggs, “Communities of Practice in
Government: Leveraging Knowledge for Performance,” ThePublicManager, 32(4), (2004), 17-21.
David Korten, “Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process
Daniel Aldrich, “Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis Resilience,” Journal of Homeland Security6, (June 2010), 1-10, http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~daldrich/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Aldrich%20Fixing%20Recovery%20Journal%20of%20Homeland%20Security.pdf.
5.CaseforDiscussion: U.S. DepartmentofHomeland Security:National InfrastructureProtectionPlan: Download the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Executive Summary)[http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm] and describe the organizational coordination strategies underlying the Plan. What agencies are involved and how are they related to each other? What is the basis for the relationships among the organizations? What forms of authority are in play? What has the structural and procedural focus been over the past decade? What do the readings from this week and your own analysis suggest about how designs might be made more adaptable and responsive to changing conditions?
U.S. DepartmentofHomeland Security, OfficeofInfrastructureProtection, Critical Infrastructure SectorPartnerships: http://www.dhs.gov/files/partnerships/editorial_0206.shtm#ssc.
1.Learning Goals/Objectives: Offer an introduction to two contending views of the prospects for reliable, crisis-free maintenance, of the complex technologies and institutions that surround us. Learners will:
• Identify the conditions in contemporary society that create the circumstances under which accidents and disasters might be considered “normal.”
• Consider the organizational design elements that have been able to overcome the tendency for complexly interactive and tightly coupled systems to experience accidents.
• Recognize the structural and cultural characteristics of highly reliable systems.
• Discuss the application of such systems for the maintenance of critical infrastructures.
• What incident in your experience qualifies as a normal accident? How did it arise? How does the situation illustrate tightly coupled systems? Complex interactions?
• What can be done to decouple systems? What impact does redundancy have for the systems?
• How do Highly Reliable Organizations (HROs) deal with tight coupling and complexly interactive systems?
• How are HROs created? How can such systems be applied to the maintenance of critical infrastructures?
• What near misses play in the development of highly reliable systems? How specifically do organizations learn from them?
Charles Perrow, NormalAccidents, (1999), 3-100, and one other disaster scenario of your choice. Todd LaPorte and Paula Consolini, “Working in Practice but not in Theory: Theoretical
Challenges of ‘High ReliabilityOrganizations,’”Journal of PublicAdministration Research
Theory. 1(1), (January 1993), 19-48 (esp. 29-43), http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/LaPorteT/LaPorte-WorkinginPracticebutNotinTheory.pdf.
Arjen Boin and Allan McConnell, “Preparing for Critical Infrastructure Breakdowns:
The Limits of Crisis Management and the Need for Resilience,” Journal of Contingencies and
Crisis Management, 15(1), (2007), 50-59.
4.RecommendedAdditional Reading: Paul R. Schulman, “The Negotiated Order of Organizational Reliability,” Administration& Society, 25(3), (1993), 353-372.
Charles Perrow, “The Limits of Safety: The Enhancement of a Theory of Accidents,” Journal of
Contingencies and CrisisManagement, 2(4), (1994), 212. 10
Arjen Boin and Paul Schulman, “Assessing NASA’s Safety Culture: The Limits and Possibilities of High Reliability Theory,” PublicAdministration Review, 68(6), (2008), 1050-1062, http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/afgjp/PADM610/Assessing%20NASA's%20Safety%20Culture.pdf.
PowerPoint presentation on normal accident theory, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/accident/accident.pdf.
5.CaseforDiscussion: Select one of the scenarios from Perrow’s Normal Accidents and discuss how LaPorte and Consolini or Boin and McConnell would analyze the case and view the prospects for learning to avoid accidents.
5.AlternativeCaseforDiscussion: Consider your agency’s emergency plans or routines and examine the prospects for a normal accident. How tightly coupled are the critical systems? How complexly interactive are the parts of the plan or routine? How might the multi-layer response design that LaPorte and Consolini describe or Perrow’s advice about de-coupling system elements makeyouragencyplan moreresilient?
LESSON 5TOPIC: BUILDINGROBUST COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
1.Learning Goals/Objectives: Describe the elements of effective communication networks and the factors that inhibit effectiveness and recognize the importance of robust communication for coordination within and among organizations. Learners will:
• Recognize alternative forms of communication systems within and among organizations.
• Identify key roles of actors in communication networks.
• Discuss what contributes to effective communication in organizations and the role of effective communication in creating coordinated emergency response networks.
• Identify the impediments to good communication and how can they be overcome.
• Recognize the uses of current information technologies such as intranets, social networking, wikis, and blogs contribute to successful communication and coordination.
2.DiscussionQuestions: • What are the particular weaknesses associated with upward communication flows? With downward flows?
• What kinds of filtering are likely to occur in your organization? What are their effects?
• What sources of information overload are most common in your organization? How do you and your colleagues cope? What effects does this have on the pace of work? What realistically can be done to minimize this source of distortion?
• Who are the key actors in communications networks in your organization? What are their specific roles? What keeps them working well?
• How do the inter-organizational network forms apply in emergency response networks?
What is needed to maintain coordinated responses?
• How can current information technologies such as intranets, social networking, wikis, and blogs contribute to successful communication in your organization? How might they be used more effectively? What prevents this?
3.RequiredReading: Information Sharing: A Vital Resource for a Shared National Mission to Protect Critical
Hal Rainey, Understanding and Managing PublicOrganizations, Chapter 8, pp.232-240 and Chapter 12, pp. 365-370.
Annick Willems and Marc Beulens, “Knowledge Sharing in Public Sector Organizations: The Effect of Organizational Characteristics on Interdepartmental Knowledge Sharing,” Journal of PublicAdministration Research and Theory17 (4), (2007), 581-606.
Louise Comfort, Kilkon Ko, and Adam Zagoreki, “Coordination in Rapidly Evolving Disaster Response Systems: The Role of Information,” American Behavioral Scientist 48(3), (November 2004), 295-313, http://www.sis.pitt.edu/~adamz/pdf/ab.pdf.
4.RecommendedAdditional Reading: Jane Fedorowicz, Janice Gogan, and Christine Williams, TheE-government Collaboration Challenge:Lessons from FiveCaseStudies, (Arlington, VA: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2006), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/report/e-government-collaboration-challenge-lessons-five-case-studies.
Caron Chess and Lee Clarke, “Facilitation of Risk Communication during the Anthrax Attacks of 2001: The Organizational Backstory,” American Journal of PublicHealth, 97(9), (2007),
Donald Moynihan, “Learning under Uncertainty: Networks in Crisis Management,” PublicAdministration Review, 68(2), (March/April 2008), 350-365, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/facultystaff/moynihan/PAR68(2)Learning.pdf.
Marks Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology,
78(6), (1973), 1360-1380,
5.CaseforDiscussion: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Protection Partnerships and Information Sharing, http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1292347375129.shtm. Consider the information sharing prescribed in this document. What are its strengths? What assumptions does it make?
6.AlternativeCaseforDiscussion: NASA Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume 1, Chapter 6, (August, 2003), 140-154. Identify the missed opportunities for the NASA actors to uncover the information needed to recognize the problem with the Columbia. Discuss the impediments to effective communication and coordination that can be seen during the last flight of the Columbia. What prevented the actors in the case from recognizing the dangers of the assumptions they were making? What pressures limited the willingness of mission management to reexamine their assumptions?