Critics of executive power fail to recognize the security benefits of an unrestrained executive branch.
Posner and Vermeule 07 – Eric A., Kirkland and Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair at the University of Chicago; Adrian, John H. Watson Professor of Law at Harvard University and previously Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, 2007 (Terror In The Balance Security, Liberty, And The Courts, Published by Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-531025, p. 55-56)
Third, the critics of executive power in emergencies are usually unclear about their normative premises. Suppose that executive power increases during emergencies and that this results in abuses. In terms of the tradeoff thesis, however, such abuses are just a cost to be measured against the benefits of increased security, given the finding, reported above, that a constrained executive is associated with higher levels of terrorism.80 If the gains on the security margin exceed the costs, then the expansion of executive power improves social welfare overall, and no special opprobrium should attach to the executive’s behavior, although it would be nice to also prevent the abuses if possible. The critics treat executive abuses of civil liberties as something to be minimized, down to zero. But this is quixotic, and even if it were feasible, it would not be desirable. Some rate of abuse is inevitable once an executive branch is created, and an increase in abuses is inevitable when executive discretion expands during emergencies, but both shifts may be worth it; the critics fail to account for the gains side of the ledger.81 Granting the executive extensive powers during emergencies has many benefits, about which the critics are often silent.
They Say: “Bad for CMR”
The impact is non unique. Breaking deference is not the crucial internal link to CMR.
Wittkopt and McCormick 04 – Eugene, Professor emeritus of Political Science at Louisiana State; James, Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, 2004 (The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, ISBN: 0742525627, pg. 87 – 88)
Concerns about a troublesome divide between the armed forces and the society they serve are hardly new and in fact go back to the beginning of the Republic. Writing in the 1950s, Samuel Huntington argued that the divide could best be bridged by civilian society tolerating, if not embracing, the conservative values that animate military culture. Huntington also suggested that politicians allow the armed forces a substantial degree of cultural autonomy. Countering this argument, the sociologist Morris Janowitz argued that in a democracy, military culture necessarily adapts to changes in civilian society, adjusting to the needs and dictates of its civilian masters.2 The end of the Cold War and the extraordinary changes in American foreign and defense policy that resulted have revived the debate.
The contemporary heirs of Janowitz see the all volunteer military as drifting too far away from the norms of American society, thereby posing problems for civilian control. They make tour principal assertions. First, the military has grown out of step ideologically with the public, showing itself to be inordinately right-wing politically, and much more religious (and fundamentalist) than America as a whole, having a strong and almost exclusive identification with the Republican Party. Second, the military has become increasingly alienated from, disgusted with, and sometimes even explicitly hostile to, civilian culture. Third, the armed forces have resisted change, particularly the integration of women and homosexuals into their ranks, and have generally proved reluctant to carry out constabulary missions. Fourth, civilian control and military effectiveness will both suffer as the military—seeking ways to operate without effective civilian oversight and alienated from the society around it—loses the respect and support of that society.
The impact is non unique and CMR is bad. (how do I tag?)
Metz 15 – Steven, journalist for the World Politics Review, 2015 (“U.S. Civil-Military Relations’ Neglected Component: Congress,” World Politics Review, Feb. 13th, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15077/u-s-civil-military-relations-neglected-component-congress)
Yet as Mackubin Thomas Owens points out, “Those who neglect the congressional role in American civil-military relations are missing an important element.” In many ways, this is a more complicated relationship, since it lacks the clear chain of command that defines the military’s dealings with the executive. It is particularly difficult during times of shrinking defense budgets and intense partisanship. Both of these conditions exist today, creating potentially dangerous political shoals that Congress and the military are struggling to navigate.
Shrinking defense budgets intensify competition among the military services and can tempt military leaders to seek congressional help to preserve their share of the money and save the programs they favor. But declining defense dollars can also exacerbate differences between the military and Congress over how to allocate the budget. In a time of austerity, the military emphasizes what it considers to be most important for it to perform its missions. Members of Congress are naturally concerned with the impact that the decisions of the services will have in their districts. These perspectives can clash.
At times, in order to save jobs in members’ districts, Congress insists on funding equipment and programs that the military would rather do without. Today, for instance, the Army doesn’t want more main battle tanks, but Congress, with the encouragement of powerful defense industries, insists on keeping the tank production line open. Congress has forced the Navy to hold on to ships it wanted to retire and the Air Force to do the same with some aircraft. The military favors another round of base closures, but Congress, sensitive to the job losses this would cause, opposes the idea.
At the same time, the intensely partisan climate in Washington has turned up the heat on the uneasy relationship between U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration and the military. Afghanistan was the first salvo. But what pulled Congress into the fray has been America’s conflict with the so-called Islamic State (IS). Reports have swirled that many of the military’s top leaders are unhappy with the Obama administration’s handling of the situation, particularly its resistance to the use of American ground forces. As Seth Cropsy wrote in The Wall Street Journal, “The political landscape is cleared for a contest between the president’s pledge not to use combat troops and the military’s professional opinion that defeating the enemy requires the use of well-trained and -equipped and disciplined forces on the ground.”
Obama’s opponents in Congress have used this to undercut the administration. Since the military’s serving senior leaders will not openly dissent from the president’s position even in congressional testimony, Republicans have brought in well-known retired officers who can be more vocal in their opposition. A few weeks ago, Congress heard testimony from retired Marine Gen. James Mattis, who was also the former commander of the U.S. Central Command; retired Navy Adm. William Fallon, who held the same job; and retired Army Gen. John Keane, a former Army vice chief of staff who helped convince then-President George W. Bush’s administration to surge U.S. forces into Iraq in 2007. All three told Congress that the absence of a clear policy from the White House made success in Iraq and Syria unlikely. The intended message from Senate Republicans was that these retired flag officers reflected what the rest of the military thought but could not say.
The most serious instance of Congress trying to drive a partisan wedge between the military and the administration came when GOP Rep. Doug Lamborn told an audience: “A lot of us are talking to the generals behind the scenes, saying, ‘Hey, if you disagree with the policy that the White House has given you, let’s have a resignation.’” Luckily, none of the military’s senior leaders heeded Lamborn’s advice, but the fact that he would suggest this openly shows how caustic today’s political climate is.
As Owens noted, problems in civil-military relations seldom pit civilians against the military, but most often happen when elements of the military become part of a conflict between different factions of the civilian leadership. That is what is happening today, as the military is caught in the middle of an intense struggle between the Obama administration and its congressional opponents.
The best solution would be a de-escalation of the partisan struggle and the revival of a working partnership on national security. But since that is not going to happen, at least not during the Obama administration, Congress should resist the temptation to use the military to oppose the administration’s policies no matter how much it disagrees with them. If there are members of Congress encouraging senior military leaders to openly revolt against the administration, they have crossed a red line. Responsible congressional leaders should stop their less responsible colleagues. Congress also should stop forcing the military to buy things it doesn’t want and maintain bases it doesn’t need. Members of Congress should be deeply committed to the well-being of their districts, but there are times when the national interest must take precedence. This is the only way to avoid the shoals in the congressional component of American civil-military relations.
QDR non uniques the impact.
Schake 14 – Kori, Ph.D., fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, 2014 (“THIS QDR IS A BUDGET DOCUMENT, NOT A STRATEGY DOCUMENT,” War on the Rocks, platform for analysis, commentary, debate and multimedia content on foreign policy and national security issues through a realist lens, Available Online at http://warontherocks.com/2014/03/this-qdr-is-a-budget-document-not-a-strategy-document/)
Secretary Hagel claims that the fiscal year (FY) 2015 defense budget “matches our strategy to our resources…Our updated defense strategy,” that is. Updated because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorably said the defense strategy could not be executed if a single dollar was cut from the budget, right before Congress cut about $50 billion of them.
The only update in this Quadrennial Defense Review from earlier strategic guidance looks to consist of narrowing the force-sizing demand to defeat a regional adversary while “imposing unacceptable costs” on another. Otherwise it’s all the usual about the world becoming more volatile, global connectedness, building partner capacity, rebalancing to Asia without diminishing effort anywhere else, the need for “exceptional agility” in our forces and efficiencies in the defense effort. There’s lots of talk about innovation, but little evidence of it—the QDR details forces that would be cut if sequestration goes into effect, but does not explore different ways of achieving our defense objectives.
Even this updated strategy is, by Hagel’s own admission, unexecutable without $115 billion more than the top line legislated in 2010 (separate from the $26 billion “Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative” submitted as a wish list along with the budget itself). That completely negates the $113 billion in cuts that the President’s budget “imposes.” So, they’re actually cutting nothing. The Defense Department has had three budget cycles to bring its spending into line with the law, and—even with an $80 billion annual slush fund of war operations—it has not complied. Hagel says “it would have been irresponsible not to request these additional resources.” That twists the argument: it was irresponsible not to develop a strategy consistent with available resources. This QDR has failed in its fundamental purpose.
Perhaps the central issue this QDR should have addressed in detail is where to accept risk as resources become less plentiful: in what areas can we afford to reduce our margin of error, and where would unacceptable dangers be incurred? What missions ought we to stop doing and stop preparing for in order to ensure we are able to meet our highest priorities? Where do redundancies exist that can be eliminated to free up resources? The Department of Defense claimed that the QDR would initiate a serious debate about risk. While the press statements emphasize greater risk in carrying out the strategy, there’s no actual discussion in the QDR about how risk is assessed. The QDR does say we “continue to experience gaps in training and maintenance over the near term and will have a reduced margin of error in dealing with risks of uncertainty,” but does not explain how different choices might aggravate or mitigate those risks. If DOD actually wants a debate about where to accept risk—instead of simply brandishing it as a threat to budget hawks—it will need to establish a metric for evaluating risk.
Secretary Hagel claims that the QDR prioritizes America’s highest security interests by focusing on three strategic pillars: defending the homeland against all threats; building security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression; and remaining prepared to win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail.
It is difficult to discern how these three fundamental purposes of defense activity constitute priorities—they comprise the entirety of the defense effort. What program or activity could not be justified on their bases? The purpose of priorities is to allow apportionment of resources.
And where is the politicking with Congress to gain adoption of this approach? The Hagel budget has zero probability of being adopted by either authorizers or appropriators on the Hill. By neglecting his own fundamental responsibility, which is to be the Department of Defense’s interface with the political processes of governance, Secretary Hagel has set the DOD up for another year of ineffectual bleating by the service chiefs that the end is nigh. It didn’t change a single vote in the past two years of sequestration and absent a serious effort, it won’t change a single vote this year. Where is the private horse-trading and, if need be, public shaming, to get Senator Kelly Ayotte off her hobby horse about the A-10s? Where is the flinty insistence that continuing the galloping pace of military entitlements is creating a hollow force? Where is the orchestration of presidential involvement to raise the political stakes? That ought not be the uniformed military’s job; and in any event, the Obama White House has selected service chiefs who demonstrably cannot deliver that kind of political heft. If Congress is to be cajoled into doing the right things, it needs to be confronted politician-to-politician. That Secretary Hagel sent the third echelon and a press statement to announce this tells us that the administration is going to mail it in, which will result in attaining neither the top line it seeks nor the latitude to implement its priorities.
Hagel has failed in the essential work of gaining support for his strategy and his budget among the people with the constitutional responsibility for making it into law. This is not only bad politics, it is bad for civil-military relations because DOD’s civilian leadership is already busy blaming Congress rather than getting on with the business of effectively programming the world’s largest defense budget. The Obama administration is encouraging the uniformed military to attack the legislative branch for any shortfalls of funding they have no right to expect receiving.