Culture and cultural analysis as experimental systems

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Draft 3.2. Aug 24, 2006. Do not distribute without permission.

forthcoming Cultural Anthropology, January 2007.


Michael M.J. Fischer

Culture is (1) that relational (circa 1848), (2) complex whole… (1870s), (3)whose parts cannot be changed without affecting other parts (circa 1914), (4) mediated through powerful and power-laden symbolic forms (1930s), (5)whose mulitiplicities and performatively negotiated character (1960s), (6) is transformed by alternative positions, organizational forms, and leveraging of symbolic systems (1980s), (7)as well as by emergent new technosciences, media, and biotechnical relations (circa 2005).
Without a differentiated and relational notion of the cultural (the arts, media, styles, religions, value-orientations, ideologies, imaginaries, world views, soul, and the like), the social sciences would be crippled, reducing social action to notions of pure instrumentality.1 When singularized, frozen, or nominalized, “culture” can be a dangerous concept, subject to fallacies of pejorative and discriminatory hypostatizations (we have reason, they have culture) or immobilized variables (their culture is composed of x features).2 The challenge of cultural analysis is to develop translation and mediation tools for helping make visible differences of interests, access, power, needs, desires, and philosophical perspective. I draw upon the notion of experimental systems as developed in science studies (particularly Hans-Jorg Rheinberger's Towards a History of Epistemic Things) as a way of thinking about how the anthropological and social science notion of culture has evolved as an analytic tool. Where this essay ends provides the starting point, in reciprocal manner, for a companion essay to rethink the cultural genealogies of science studies (Fischer 2006).  

The modern social science use of the term “culture” is rooted in the historical milieus that arose with the dismantling of the religious and artistocratic legitimations of feudal and patrimonial regimes, and the agons of third world particularistic “cultures” against first world claims of universal “civilization. ” These agons began with the English industrial revolution, the American and French “bourgeois” revolutions, and the efforts of peripheral states in what would become Germany and Italy (and later in what would be called the second and third worlds) to “catch up” without losing their “identity.”3 The collection of folklore, epics, oral genres, ritual forms, customs, kinship terminologies, jural norms and sanctions, dispute mediation techniques, material-semiotic objects, musics, and the like, were important in nation-building ideologies, in nostalgia-based constructions of identity, and in hegemonic struggles between what was counted as future-oriented “modernity” and what was counted, reconstructed, or reinvented as past-oriented “tradition.”

Official histories of anthropology often credit Sir E.B. Tylor’s “omnibus” definition —“culture or civilization is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” — as providing the first canonic counterpoint to definitions of culture as the “best” productions in aesthetics, knowledge, and morals. 4 While such elitist “high culture” definitions of culture arose in dialectical relation to more demotic or foreign cultural forms,5 the anthropological understanding of culture that Tylor began to unpack asserts the importance of understanding the relations between all cultural forms at play, in constestation within social formations. The nineteenth century rise of Quakers such as Tylor and scholars and reformers from other Dissenting Sects in England provided a space of critique of state-established forms of religious legitimation and cultural presuppositions , in synergy with scientific and political Enlightenment ideals of the previous century (and taken up also in reform movements in India, the Islamic world, China, the U.S. and elsewhere, as is acknowledged by the fluorescence of recent work on “alternative modernities” (e.g., Gaonkar, ed. 20016). Simultaneously political economy reformers (including Chartists, abolitionists, St. Simon, Comte, Prudhon, Marx, and others) provided a space for critique and organizing political movements to reshape the material environments and infrastructures of cultural formations. These nineteenth century articulations would develop into the methods of cultural accounting of classical sociology, British social anthropology, American cultural anthropology, French structuralism, and poststructuralisms, and considerations of “alternative modernities.”

The “jeweler’s eye view” of ethnographers of the early and mid-twentieth century succeeded in putting on the comparative philosophical map the cultural logics — and their social implications, and historical circumstances — of the Trobriands , Nuer, Azande, Yoruba, Ndembu, Navaho, Kwakiutl, Shavante, Arante, Walpiri , and others. These cultural logics were used to create structural understandings of the possible cultural variabilities and their social implications in diverse domains including exchange theory and kinship , political organization and cosmology, jural roles and personhood, speech genres and interactive sociolinguistic styles, economic spheres and informal power, gender roles and psychodynamic complexes, and the structuring of knowledge and awareness by linguistic grammars and cultural frames. The “jeweler’s eye view” means not only the ability to bring out the different facets, but also a constant back and forth movement between (loup assisted) close up viewings and sitting back for a more global view of the settings. Classic ethnographies, constructed as “synchronic” snapshots of a “moment” in time (classically an annual cycle and a half or eighteen months), need and are receiving historical recontextualization (though both restudy and archival work). They have become documents of a historical horizon for the cultures and societies under analysis and as well as for those of the ethnographers.

Just as we increasingly recognize the cultures of classic ethnographies (both as they were, and as they have become) as always already reworked parts of cultures of larger national, colonial, imperial, regional, and global formations, yielding often out-of-sync alternative modernities, so too the interactions of proliferating kinds of cultures (indigenous, ethnic, occupational, expert, linguistic, local-regional) are becoming more complex and differentiated. New forms of globalization and modernization are bringing all parts of the globe into greater, but uneven, polycentric interaction. New multicultural ethics are evolving out of demands that cultures attend to one another. Within transnational and global technoscientific networks proliferating specialized vocational and class cultures must pay attention to one another in information-rich and multi-perspectival institutions lest high-hazard, mission-critical operations (chemical, aeronautical, medical industries), or even just ordinary trade ( global advertising , production, and sales operations) go awry.

Culture, defined as a methodological concept or tool of inquiry, might best be understood in terms of its historically-layered growth of specifications and differentiations, refined into a series of “experimental systems” that, in a manner akin to the “experimental systems” of the natural sciences, allow new realities to be seen and engaged as its own parameters are changed. To think of the methodological concept of culture as experimental systems is to assert that there is something both experimental and systematic: that social science accounts of culture emerge from intermediate and interactional spaces, both intersubjective and institutional, that were awkwardly or poorly handled by prior accounts.7 Objects, theories and techniques change in focus, resolution, or fidelity (to draw upon visual and sonic descriptive modalities) as we vary our cultural concepts. Historically, concepts of culture have been rhetorical as well as analytical tools in struggles over class and religion; universalistic versus particularistic claims about reason, aesthetics, morality; legitimate versus illegitimate forms of power; science, politics, public spheres, civil societies, and rights and justice. Alternative genealogies can be constructed for the word (cultura as a Latin future participle of what comes into being rather than what is), as can humanistic usages (Giambattista’s Vico’s eighteenth century notion of culture as that which is knowable because created by man). But the modern social science and anthropological construction of the term arises initially in the intergenerational reformulation between the grand comparativists of the 19th century and the in-depth fieldworkers of the twentieth century.

While science, technology, literacy, poetics, religion, and capitalism have, since Marx and Tylor, been central to discussions of culture, the focus of debate, the drawing of metaphors and epistemic analogies from the leading sciences of the day, and the refinement of methodological concepts of culture have shifted over the past century and a half, layering themselves as a set of lenses and devices of increasing generativity:

(1) Culture is that relational (circa 1848) . . .

Premonitions and proto-formulations of what later would develop into four components of relational cultural analysis or cultural accounting can be found already in various places in the mid-nineteenth century. The emergence of working class cultures in relation to bourgeois and artistocratic class cultures can be found in Friedrich Engels’ proto-ethnography of working class Manchester in 1844 (Engels 1887, S. Marcus 1974); and in the organized complaints of industrially displaced Luddites (skilled workers protesting not all machines but de-skilling machines and the introduction of prices not related to custom and skill that would destroy their control over their means of production and turn them into unskilled proletarians), Chartists (workers who felt excluded by the suffrage Reform Act of 1832 and the Poor Law of 1834 and demanded charters of universal male suffrage and other political reforms), as well as the demands for “right to labor” at one’s craft (rather than as proletarianized unskilled labor ) in the 1830 and 1848 revolutions in France. These organized complaints and political demands would develop into an explicit working class culture in the late 19th century (Thompson 1968, Sewell 1980, Nimitz 2000).8 The emergence of a bourgeois culture can be seen in the discussions of “Bildung” (culture) in Germany, institutionalized by Fichte’s new university in Berlin (Ringer 1969, Readings 1996, Lepenies 2006).9 The emergence of national cultures becomes crystallized in the standardized national languages, creation of university-taught canons of literature and history in these languages, and the print-mediated literacy required by industrialization (Anderson 1983 , Gellner 1983, Habermas 1978/1989).10 The emergence of “culture” as a dialectical agonist to “civilization” can be seen in the nationalist and nation-state building discourses, in which locality, nation-building, and universality contest. The emergence of notions of culture as hegemonic power relations becomes explicit in the sketches by Hegel, Heine, and Marx of why different groups in society might see their interests in agonistic fashion as well as why, critically, they often misrecognize their own interests in ways that benefit others (ideology, hegemony), as so memorably expressed in Marx’s 1852 essay on The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon.

Four components of relational “culture” begin to become clarified in the mid-nineteenth century by the agonistic differentation and reorganization of modern societies: (1.1) folklore and identity; (1.2) ideologies and political consciousness; (1.3) class and status cultures; (1.4) pluralized, relational cultures vs universalizing civilizational ideologies
(1.1) Folklore and National Cultural Identities. The nineteeth century novels of Sir Walter Scott (d 1832) began in English literature an exploration of looking back at fading regional cultural settings from an insider-outsider perspective. A member of the lowlander elite writing about highlander Scottish society, Scott’s novel’s became key to Scottish identity for unionist United Kingdom and English audiences, thereby helping to define an emergent British national and British imperial identity. The debates of the period over James Macpherson’s Fragments of Ancient Poetry, Collected in the Highlands of Scotland, and Translated from the Gaelic or Erse Language (1760), judged to be fraudulent and imaginatively composed, were not unlike efforts to compose national epics in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, which Ernest Gellner credits as the background to the suspicion of Bronislaw Malinowski towards explanation by historical roots and insistence instead of the ideological functionality in the present of the formulation or retelling of such cultural forms (Gellner 1988: 175). Among such functionalities were also projections or models used in colonial settings: it is often remarked that Scottish clan structures provided models for Robertson-Smith and others for understanding and characterizing tribal organization in Arabia, in the Hindu-Kush, and elsewhere. (See further, under late 19th century, below.)
(1.2) Cultural Ideologies, and Political Consciousness. Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, written in the aftermath of the failures of the 1848 revolutions, not only became a touchstone for later writers trying to puzzle out underlying structural patterns of social organization and cultural forms (Claude Levi-Strauss says he would always reread The Eighteenth Brumaire before sitting down to write a new project), but is an early locus classicus for thinking about class cultures and how they are aligned under hegemonic ideologies. His resonant phrase about the peasants being like potatoes in a sack was not contemptuous but a summary tag for the ways in which their economic, organizing and strategizing possibilities were fragmented and controlled.11 His dramatization of a revolution running backwards (propelled by each higher class abandoning the interests of the next lower one when it thought it might gain momentary advantage, but thereby in the longer term isolating and weakening itself) was a vivid way of charting the different class fractions in the revolution (class fractions resonating with petrochemical fractioning of different grades of oil, as well as with the arithmetic of voting, just as class strata and stratification resonated with slower but active geological processes of sedimentation, upheaval, intrusion, and temporary consolidation).

At issue in both examples were problems of political consciousness and ideology, not just economic interests. Key to the stabilization of ruling classes, fractions, or coalitions was the ability to make their control appear to be the natural order of things, legitimizing their society’s cultural forms, hierarchies and practices. Marx was a pragmatic organizer, trying to prevent precipitous armed labor rebellions that could only be crushed, and rethinking the failures of earlier conceptions as with the defeats of 1848. It became clear on the 1848 barricades of Paris that this would be the last of the artisanal revolts, and that an industrial proletariat would not come into political strength for many more years, and even then, as in Germany, would compete with a rapidly growing white collar class for political power. Consciousness, alienation, commodity fetishism — cultural armatures of political economy — would be central to these struggles. Indeed, in the 1869 preface to the second edition of The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx contrasts his explanatory narrative with great man in history accounts (Victor Hugo’s Napoleon les Petit) as well as with deterministic ones (Proudhon’s Coup d’estat), insisting on the theatrical, linguistic-translational, allusional nature of cultural and social forms, including a fortiori revolutions, which draw upon and are haunted by cultural forms of the past, and yet sometimes can leverage novel breakthroughs and transformations.

As Bendix and Lipset (1951) would put it in one of many meditations on why the concept of class seemed so much less politically salient in the United States than in Europe, class in Europe was always an interpretive cultural construct involving theories of social change in which class becomes salient at times of misalignment between power and interests (as when a new class begins to challenge the power of a weakening hegemonic one). In the United States, as Lloyd Warner demonstrated in his long-running Yankee City studies (1949-51), people tended to view class without any such theories of social change. Class was conceived as either objective indices (income, job type, education, church and voluntary association affiliations) or as relative subjective feeling states (in which those close to but not at the top, the lower upper class or upper middle class, had the most sharply developed sense of the pecking hierarchy) that in any case which could be gotten around by individualistic hard work or moving westward.

Distinctive working class cultures became politically salient, organized through unions, workingmen’s circles, sports clubs, and parties, sometimes fueling thinking about social change and national or international futures, but as often, as Paul Willis’s (1977). ethnography Learning to Labor described for later twentieth century working class lads in England, locking people into class position. The elucidation of various working class cultures around the world, though usually grounded in political economic analyses, take on a variety of cultural armatures, from C.L.R. James’ situating of Caribbean working class formations of “respectability” in relation both to empire and to fears of sliding back into the desperations of the poor, to the Subaltern historians12 teasing out of working class cultures in India in the context of caste and language differences.

(1.3) Class Cultures and Status Distinction . It is with Max Weber’s Verstehende Soziologie (“interpretive sociology” or sociology of understanding or meaning) that analytic tools for unpacking the cultural formations of estates, status groups, and classes began to come into sharper focus. Using a comparative approach to questions of power and legitimacy, education and bureaucracy, this-worldly ethics and inner motivations, Weber compared the mandarin examination system used to recruit bureaucratic officials in China to the use of Greek, Latin, and vernacular classics as a mode of recruiting officials from the new educational institutions (gymnasium, the new universities in Berlin and elsewhere) for the new German bureaucratic state. Greek was not of particularly instrumental use in a modern bureaucracy, but as with recruitment to the imperial cadres of the British Empire, it was one of a set of markers of status distinction. In German, the term for such cultivation (Bildung) had everything to do with the creation of the bourgeoisie as well as the civil service. Bildung involved Kultur, which in turn was part of universal civilization, but German Kultur was also distinctive, constructed around a canon of literature and philosophy. Bildung involved dress, behavior, punctuality, discipline, and various knowledge sets.

Modern capitalist class and ideological cultures come into being historically, according to Weber, through a conjunction of material and cultural causes. While feudal estates or patrimonial status groups have other motivations, values, and cultural styles, the culture of industrial capitalism comes into being through the conjuncture of five causal factors: (i) the anxiety structure of theological beliefs in predestination and need for signs of whether one is among the saved, which provided a this-worldly economic ethic of demonstrating God’s pleasure through worldly success (the Protestant ethic); (ii) an organizational structure which disciplined its members to adhere to this work ethic (the “sect”); (iii) a position in the stratification system where such an ethic could be especially effective in achieving upward mobility or stable income -- the lower-middle and upper lower classes, small businessmen (Marx’s low road to capitalism); (iv) a historical cultural change of values and life style among mercantile classes of the 17th century, who stopped using profits to buy land, positions of nobility, and luxury life styles, and began living Spartan lives and investing profits back into productive enterprises (Marx’s high road to capitalism); and (v) world-historical changes in global markets and technologies.

None of these causes is sufficient alone, Weber cautions, nor exclusive to Protestant communities: other religions have their forms of anxiety structures, organizational discipline, and finely measured religiosities that may be equally productive of this-worldly economic drive (Jains, Jews, and Parsis are among his examples), and may become part of industrial capitalist modes of production, given the proper conditions. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism — two essays written from a vivid comparison of North Carolina and Germany, part of his larger comparative sociology of religions, in turn part of his larger comparative studies of economy and society, for which motivating and legitimating cultural forms are central — Weber tries to account for the elective affinity of causes.

The multicausal analysis, as well as Weber’s attention to the varieties of Protestant forms and their changes in social locus over time, protects both against the chauvinism of attributing all progress to Christian or Protestant grounds, and against scapegoating Jews (or similar groups) for the ills of capitalism. 13 The work sparked a parallel debate over the rise of the modern sciences in seventeenth century England (Merton 1938), a debate taken up again in the 1980s with a Weberian attention to the material, literary, and social “technologies” of experimental sciences as well as the synergy or “coproduction” between a particular field of rationalization and other arenas of legitimation of authority (e.g. Shapin and Shafer 1985).

What is crucial here for the study of cultural forms is Weber’s insistence on understanding the cultural frames of reference of the motivations and intentions of actors Even a concept such as power for Weber is famously defined as the probability that an order given will be obeyed, and therefore the strongest form of power is neither force nor economic monopoly but culturally formulated legitimate domination (on the grounds of tradition or that the person giving an order is legitimately entitled to do so). Thus religion, as a central component of culture, is often analyzed by Weber not only as differentiated by social position (priestly classes and laity have different relations to the symbolic, ritual, and belief systems), but as legitimating ritual structures for state formations, especially for the ancient empires and their patrimonial successors.

Classic Weberian accounts utilizing the more detailed knowledge of twentieth century fieldwork, or utilizing the questions raised by such an ethnographic sensibility, include Clifford Geertz’s account, in Religion of Java (1960), of how class and status stratified religious and cultural formations in a decolonized, modernizing “new nation;” E.P. Thompson’s History of the English Working Class (1968) which, albeit a more self-described Marxist account, analyzes the cultural formation of work discipline and the role of the religiosity of the dissenting sects; and Joseph Gusfield’s Symbolic Crusade (1963), a study of the temperance movement in the United States that likewise illuminates the religious-class inflected antagonisms of small town elites feeling themselves losing political ground to Catholic and urban immigrants, all formulated through the language of cultural legitimacy.

(1.4) Culture(s) and Civilization(s). Nineteenth century England and France saw themselves as the vanguard of universal civilization, carriers of comparative knowledge from which education and reason could devise progressively more humane, efficient, just, and free societies (liberté, fraternité, egalité, in the French version; white man’s burden in a tutelary vision of the task of colonialism). Germany and other nations on the periphery saw cultures in dialectical relationship to the French and English metropoles rather than only singular civilization. German social theories would thus emphasize the plurality of cultures, and even more importantly the dialectical relationship between first world cultures and second or third world ones, beginning with Marx’s sensitivity to the contradictions of class positions and their “cultural” perspectives or dialectical (in)abilities to develop political consciousness, and also with his notes on the relation between labor in the colonies (Ireland, the U.S., and India) and conditions in England.

As the Moroccan historian Abdullah Laroui would put it in the 1970s, Marx was the model third world intellectual, to be followed by many others, moving to the metropole to study and strategize ways out of his homeland’s subordinate position in a globalizing world, paying particular attention to what would come to be called dual societies, underdevelopment, deskilling, and proletarianization. For colonial political leaders and social theorists (Gandhi, Ambedkar, Fanon, Memmi, Mamonni, Cesaire, C.L.R. James, W.E.B. Du Bois) the dialectical relationship between self and other, between the conditions of the colonized and the colonizer, could never be forgotten in a simple universalistic account. Laroui would emphasize a quintessential cultural dilemma in The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual (1976) in the last quarter of the twentieth century: one could adopt a Marxian ideology and, as in South Yemen, seize control of the state, but then have to impose a tutelary dictatorship until the population catches up to the cultural perspective of the vanguard (all the more oppressive the smaller the vanguard); or one could attempt to mobilize change by utilizing the cultural language of the masses, Islam, but then have to deal with a cultural language vulnerable to theocratic or fundamentalist capture.

The nineteenth century terms, culture and civilization, became pluralized in the twentieth century, and at the core of this pluralization in both cases were notions of cultural symbols and meaning structures, usually with deep histories, as in “Islamic”, “Persian,” “Indian,” or “Chinese” civilizations, which each could contain numbers of cultures within.

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