Critical Race Theory



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AT -- Solvency – Racial Profilinug

‘Racial Profiling’ doesn’t mean anything – We must put all profiling in its context to criticize fo justify it.


Gross and Livingston 02 (Samuel R. and Debra/ Gross: Thomas and Mabel Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan/ Livingston: federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “Racial Profiling under Attack” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 102, No. 5 (Jun., 2002), Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. pp. 1413-1438, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123676, cayla_)

We had just reached a consensus on racial profiling. By September 10, 2001, virtually everyone, from Jesse Jackson to Al Gore to George W. Bush to John Ashcroft, agreed that racial profiling was very bad. We also knew what racial profiling was: Police officers would stop, question, and search African American and Hispanic citizens disproportionately, because of their race or ethnicity, in order to try to catch common criminals. All this has changed in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Now racial profiling is more likely to mean security checks or federal investigations that target Muslim men from Middle Eastern countries, in order to try to catch terrorists. And now lots of people are for it. In the fall of 1999, 81% of respondents in a national poll said they disapproved of "racial profiling," which was defined as the practice by some police officers of stopping "motorists of certain racial or ethnic groups because the officers believe that these groups are more likely than others to commit certain types of crimes."' Two years later, 58% said they favored "requiring Arabs, including those who are U.S. citizens, to undergo special, more intensive security checks before boarding airplanes in the U.S."2 This new attitude has emerged across the political spectrum.3 Even as stalwart a civil libertarian as Floyd Abrams, the celebrated First Amendment lawyer, has said that under the circumstances we now face, "it seems entirely appropriate to look harder at such people. Remember, Justice [Robert] Jackson said 'the Constitution is not a suicide pact.'"4 Needless to say, racial profiling has not become a national fad. Most newfound supporters are reluctant and ambivalent, and most public officials continue to say they oppose the practice. There is certainly no new national consensus in favor of racial profiling. Quite the opposite: The antiterrorist investigations that followed September 11 have generated a fresh set of controversies over the issue. But the nature of the debate has changed. Before September 11, the disputes appeared to be factual. Critics would argue that the police acted on the basis of race, and the police would deny it. Now the differences are more likely to be definitional or frankly normative: Does it constitute racial profiling to do what the Department of Justice says it is doing? And if so, are the Department's actions nevertheless justified? To our minds, neither the pre- nor the post-September 11 debates have been very illuminating. The problem may be that before September 11 there was too much agreement on the issue, at least on the surface. Racial profiling continued to occur, as it does today, but since no public official would defend it, the game turned entirely on labeling. If a practice was successfully tagged as racial profiling, the cops lost; if not, they won. Since September 11, the debate has shifted but not deepened-at least not appreciably. The division now is between those who say that we can no longer afford to reject racial profiling out of hand, and those who insist that this is a principle that must not be compromised. In both settings, before September 11 and after, no one has stopped to analyze what racial profiling is, and what makes it stand out as a special law enforcement problem. We do not expect to change people's minds or to resolve differences of opinion about the appropriateness of programs that have been called racial profiling. We do not entirely agree with each other. Nor do we present a general normative theory of racial profiling or a detailed legal analysis. Our goal is more limited: to shed some light on the underlying issues by examining racial profiling in the context of other police practices that take race or ethnicity into account. Some of these practices are among the worst expressions of racism in modern America, while others are perfectly justified. To locate a police practice along this range we need to know in concrete detail not just who the authorities target, and why, but what they do to these people and why they do it. The label "racial profiling," however carefully applied, is not very informative.

FBI Blocks funding for civil rights groups—actions during the black rights movement proves


Davis 92 (James K. author of Assault On the Left: The FBI and the Sixties Antiwar Movement Spying on America: the FBI's domestic counterintelligence program Praeger 1992 Page 117-119, cayla_)

The FBI made a number of additional attempts to stop sources from funding targeted black nationalist organizations. The New York office learned from an undercover informant that the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee was attempting to obtain about $35,000 in fund’s from the Episcopal Church. The money would finance SNCC’s planned liberation school.” The FBI used a series of well-placed anonymous derogatory letters alleging that SNCC was really planning to use the money for a “fraudulent scheme.” The SNCC also anticipated funding from the Inter-religious Foundation for Community Organization to finance various social reform plans. Again the bureau took action. In this situation, an anonymous letter to the potential funding organization suggested that the fund would really be used by SNCC in an “illegal kickback scheme.” In Pittsburgh a black nationalist group known as Unity, Incorporated, was working to obtain a $150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation. Unity operated a black power center in Pittsburgh and planned, among other things, to build a target range in their headquarters basement. The FBI, alerted to this situation, developed a contact inside the Mellon organization. The bureau apprised the organization of the true nature of Unity, Incorporated. The funding was quickly blocked. A COINTELPROL memo dated August 28, 1968, from the Pittsburgh field office advised headquarters that “it can be stated with certainty that Unity, Inc. did not receive a grant from the Mellon Foundation because of this counterintelligence operation.” In twenty-six separate COINTELPRO actions, the bureau made information “available to friendly media representatives for the purpose of using such material in a newspaper, magazine, or radio or television program to expose and make public the objectives and activities of the Black Panther Party” and other black nationalist hate groups. In all cases, this information was supplied to the media on the basis that the source would never be revealed. The bureau’s use of news information, which was administered by the Crime Records Division, was handled in two different ways: first by placing negative information or propaganda about the Panthers and other black organizations with the news media and, second, by leaking derogatory information intended to discredit particular individuals within black organizations. Internal memoranda that dealt specifically with using the media for COINTELPRO operations were labeled within the bureau as part of the Mass Media Program. The Crime Records Division disseminated media information at the request of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

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