Critical Race Theory is a prerequisite for good political science education and trains future political leaders
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh
In recent years, CRT has played an important role in both legal and educational¶ circles and has expanded well beyond its origins in the legal arena (see¶ also Delgado Bernal, 2002; Duncan, 2002; Fernández, 2002; Ladson-Billings,¶ 1999; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Lewis, 2001; Parker & Lynn, 2002;¶ Parker et al., 1999; Smith-Maddox & Solorzano, 2002; Solorzano, 1997;¶ Solorzano & Delgado Bernal, 2001; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001, 2002; Tate,¶ 1997; Taylor, 1999; Villalpando, in press; Villalpando & Delgado-Bernal,¶ 2002). Despite this proliferation, CRT has yet to make significant inroads¶ into other important areas of study such as educational administration, politics¶ of education, policy studies, and political science. As a result, important¶ discussions surrounding the permanence of racism remain largely¶ absent in these particular fields. This absence is particularly crucial because¶ these areas collectively argue that social and racial progress cannot only be¶ advanced but can be overcome and remedied through collective good will,¶ reform-oriented visions, and strategic policies. CRT introduces the fact that¶ racial progress cannot be made by politics or policy alone—because racism¶ cannot be remedied without substantially recognizing and altering White¶ privilege.¶ Earlier in this discussion, I made reference to a story of conflict and how¶ Schattschneider failed to think about race, racism, and the historical treatment¶ of people of color in his analysis. I believe Schattschneider’s work is, in¶ many ways, representative of the field as a whole. Many times, we miss¶ opportunities to identify and name racism, largely because we do not see it in¶ the work we do and/or because our respective lenses are not attuned to recognizing¶ it in our daily lives. CRT provides us with a healthy reminder that racism¶ is alive and well in this country and functions at a level that is often invisible¶ to most individuals. It reminds us that the only way we will make¶ advances in dealing with the problem of racism is if we take the time to see¶ and understand how it operates, recognize it within ourselves, highlight it¶ within our field, and take brave steps to do something about it. Indeed, it¶ reminds us that we have a long way to go to address the intractable problem of¶ race in this society.¶ As scholars who prepare future educational leaders, we cannot continue to¶ marginalize and/or trivialize issues of race and racism within the larger discourse¶ of educational leadership and policy (Larson, 1997; Parker & Shapiro,¶ 1992; Young & Laible, 2000). Issues of race, class, gender, sexual orientation,¶ and other areas of difference—including their intersections—must take¶ a central role in our knowledge base and practices, so that the “important¶ stuff” in educational leadership is not solely rooted in technical knowledge of¶ leadership and organizational theory but rests in the nuances of creating¶ schools that truly work for all children, families, and members of the school¶ community. Perhaps the time has come to take the lessons of CRT to heart and¶ begin the process of naming and dismantling racism within our ranks as well as in the work we do.
AT – Ableism
Your ballot should consider the consequences of not implementing the 1ac - liberalism may be problematic and ableism may be endemic, but the plan is a necessary corrective to untold violence wrought by the system - liberalism is here to stay and there is clearly value in public advocacy surrounding the plans legal and moral strategy
Vehmas and Watson 13—Disability Studies at the Universities of Helsinki and Glasgow respectively (Simo and Nick, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, Disability & Society (2013), dml)
CDS does not engage with ethical issues to do with the role of impairment and disability in people’s well-being and the pragmatic and mundane issues of day-today living. Imagine, for example, a pregnant woman who has agreed, possibly with very little thought, to the routine of prenatal diagnostics, and who has been informed that the foetus she is carrying has Tay-Sachs disease. She now has to make the decision over whether to terminate the pregnancy or carry it to term. The value judgements that surround Tay-Sachs include the fact that it will cause pain and suffering to the child and he or she will probably die before the age of four. These are morally relevant considerations to the mother. Whilst CDS would probably guide her to confront ableist assumptions and challenge her beliefs about the condition, considerations having to do with pain and suffering are nevertheless morally significant. The way people see things, and the language that is used to describe certain conditions, can affect how they react to them, but freeing oneself from ableist assumptions may not in some cases be enough. There may be insurmountable realities attached to some impairments where parents feel that their personal and social circumstances would not enable them to provide the child or themselves with a satisfactory life (Vehmas 2003). Impairment sometimes produces practical, difficult ethical choices and we need more concrete viewpoints than the ideas provided through ableism, which offers very little practical moral guidance. It is questionable whether the notion of ableism would help the parents in deciding whether to have a child who has a degenerative condition that results in early death. Campbell (2009a, 39, 149 and 159), for example, discusses arguments about impairments as harmful conditions, the ethics of external bodily transplants as well as wrongful birth and life court cases (whether life with an impairment is preferable to non-existence), and how ableism impacts on discourse around these issues.Whilst her analysis of such ableist discourses suggests ethical judgements, she provides no arguments or conclusions as to whether, for example, external bodily transplants are ethically wrong or whether impairment may or may not constitute a moral harm. Under the anti-dualistic stance adopted by CDS, even the well-being/ill-being dualism becomes an arbitrary and nonsensical construct. Under ableism it can be constructed as merely maintaining the dominance of those seemingly faring well (supposedly, ‘non-disabled’ people), and labels those faring less well as having lesser value. There may not be a clear answer to what constitutes human well-being or flourishing, but in general we can and we need to agree about some necessary elements required for well-being. Also, as moral agents we have an obligation to make judgements about people’s well-being and act in ways that their well-being is enhanced (Eshleman 2009). This is why we have, for example, coronary heart disease prevention programmes because the possible death or associated health problems are seen as harms. Possibly these policies are based on ableist perspective, but if that is the case then the normative use of ableism is null; eradicating supposedly ableist enterprises such as coronary heart disease prevention would be an example of reductio ad absurdum. Denying some aspects of well-being are so clear that their denial would be absurd, and simply morally wrong. CDS raises ethical issues and insinuates normative judgements but does not provide supporting ethical arguments. This is a way of shirking from intellectual and ethical responsibility to provide sound arguments and conceptual tools for ethical decision-making that would benefit disabled people. If we are to describe disability, disablism, and oppression properly, we have to explicate the moral and political wrong related to these phenomena. Whilst CDS has produced useful analyses, for example, of the cultural reproduction of disability, it needs to engage more closely with the evaluative issues inherently related to disability. As Sayer has argued (against Foucault): while one could hardly disagree that we should seek to uncover the hidden and unconsidered ideas on which practices are based, I would argue that critique is indeed exactly about identifying what things ‘are not right as they are’, and why. (Sayer 2011, 244) By settling almost exclusively to analyses of ableism without engaging properly with the ethical issues involved, CDS analyses are deficient. The moral wrongs related to disablism or ableism are matters of great concern to disabled people, and CDS should in its own part take the responsibility of remedying current wrongs disabled people suffer from.