Cold Start From 1981-2004, India's military operated under the Sundarji doctrine. Under this system, seven of the Indian Army's 'holding crops' what does this mean



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Cold Start

From 1981-2004, India's military operated under the Sundarji doctrine. Under this system, seven of the Indian Army's 'holding crops' what does this mean it's just another term for defensive units. Their responsibility was to 'hold' the Pakistanis off until the Indian offensive units could strike. were stationed how far (haven't been able to find this) near the Pakistani border. Complete with infantry divisions, mobile mechanized divisions, and armored units, these soldiers would immediately confront and hold the Pakistanis in the case of a Pakistani offensive.
Stationed in Mathura, Ambala, and Bhopal --three cities a little further away from the border--were three offensive corps. These had mechanized infantry divisions and extensive artillery support. After the defensive corps had blunted Pakistan's offensive, the offensive corps and the Indian Air Force would strike into Rajistan and knock out Pakistan's Northern and Southern Army Reserves.
If followed to a T, this doctrine would allow India to hold the Pakistanis at the border and then strike at the country's economy core and destroy its military capabilities in the area. Because Sundarji crafted this before Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear bombs, it allowed India to ravage Pakistan until the government recalled them.
The weaknesses of this doctrine were exposed during India's military response to the siege of its Parliament building in 2001. India tried to mobilize its forces quickly to threaten Pakistan, but in the three weeks it took the offensive units to mobilize, Pakistan had already counter-mobilized how long did it take pakistan to mobilize? Couldn't find this online Certainly less than 3 weeks. Also, the Pakistanis weren't looking to invade India, so it shouldn't have taken them that long to entrench themselves--especially since they more or less knew India's moves) and the US and Pakistan had proposed their diplomatic solutions.




The Indian army's internal investigation into the failure of the Sundarji doctrine exposed several limitations: it took forever for the offensive units to fully mobilize, and during this delay, outside forces could intervene and the Indian government could lose its nerve; lack of surprise: Pakistan had its intelligence agencies focus on these strike corps, and any action on their part could be quickly noted (especially due to their lumbering composition); the holding corps lack of offensive power pretty much rendered them useless in any offensive engagement; Indian politicians had not defined a strategic objective for the mobilization, so generals weren't what policy aims to pursue (completely annihilation of Pakistan's eastern army or shallow territorial gains. Indian officials realized that this conflict could have very easily escalated above the nuclear threshold).
Hence the switch to Cold Start. While the Sundarji doctrine was set up to deliver a catastrophic blow to Pakistan (i.e. cutting it in two), the Cold Start doctrine would remain shallow territorial gains. This would allow India to extract concessions from Pakistan during subsequent diplomatic negotiations and prevent the conflict from escalating above the nuclear threshold.
The three offensive corps were divided into eight smaller division-sized integrated battle groups that combined infantry, artillery, and armor. This is very similar, by the way, to how the Soviet's organized their operational groups. With the help of the IAF and Indian naval aviation, 3-5 of these IBGs will enter Pakistan 72-96 hours after the order for mobilization is issued. Instead of deep penetration into Pakistani territory, these IBGs will make shallow territorial gains (50-80 km) to extract concessions from Islamabad after the conflict.
According to military analysts this is exponentially better than the Sundarji doctrine because: 1. Smaller units of operations are more maneuverable; 2. small units of operation are unable to 'bite and hold' any territorial gain, so Pakistan cannot use the 'regime survival' justification to nuke indi Also, it gives them more negotiation room 3. smaller units can confuse Pakistani generals (Pak army is still using large divisions); do we have the numbers to compare? no numbers yet, I'm looking. Pakistan's a lot more secretive 4. having more divisions makes it difficult for Pakistani intelligence to figure out where they are going 5. smaller targets won't be as vulnerable to nukes as bigger ones. 6.
Can India even execute Cold Start? There are disagreements whether the Pakistani's superior training and defensive positions can make up for the Indians' element of surprise and numbers. Also, cooperation b/w all three branches is more a myth than a reality.
So what does this mean for South Asia's stability? It increases the region's instability because: (1) there is always the issue that this could escalate into a full-scale war; (2) there is little room for diplomacy before the Indians' attack; (3) the Indian army's speed means that Pakistan may have a lower nuclear threshold


all from:

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17972/cold_start_for_hot_wars_the_indian_armys_new_limited_war_doctrine.html


Implications of India's move in the Arunachal border

September 30: India moved hundreds of troops along the border of A. Pradesh. According to army commanders, this is a routine winter exercise called 'Operation Alert' in which soldiers move into the inhospitable border areas of Jammu and Kashmir ahead of heavy snowballs that make roads impassable (1), but local residents say that they have not seen military activity in recent years.
The government is going to deploy 15,000 troops in the 56th division in A.Pradesh sometime in December. It will also deploy a second division in 12 - 18 months (2)
India has also upgraded six air-strikes which are approx. 40 miles from the border. The renovations will allow bigger and heavier aircrafts to land there. The IAF's official stance is that this is an 'integral part of the modernization of the AF infrastructure.' According to defense sources, these measures were taken to counter similar moves by China on the other side (3).
China, too, has increased its military presence in A. Pradesh. According to Chinese officials, the military exercises it is conducted in the region are routine (4).
Kashmir

In October, Indian army officials said that there was a real threat that the violence in Pakistan would spill over into India and that the armed forces were fully prepared to meet the challenge. They had apparently moved two battalions from Doda to the Kashmir Valley and are currently in the process of acquiring 300 lightweight tanks for deployment in NE states and in Jammu/Kashmir (2). These tanks can apparently hit targets 3 km away and are equipped with armor-piercing and anti-tank guided missiles and anti-aircraft machine guns. The Indian army apparently wants these tanks to be protected from nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare.
I could not find more specific information about India's troop movements. I'm currently talking to Jane's, but they don't seem too happy.

1. http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/indian-troops-move-to-china-border-army-says-it-is-routine_100250032.html

2. http://www.zeenews.com/news578258.html

3. http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/india/India-strengthens-border-irks-China/Article1-476128.aspx

4. http://trak.in/news/chinese-army-exercises-north-of-arunachal/20149/


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