Cndi regents Lab 2011 Weapons da

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CNDI Regents Lab 2011 Weapons DA

Weapons DA

Weapons DA 1


1NC Uniqueness- BMD 3

1NC Link- China- BMD 4

1NC BMD Impact 5

Weapons DA 1NC 6

1NC Uniqueness 7

1NC Link 8

1NC Internal Link 9

1NC Impact 10

Uniqueness 11

Uniqueness 12

Uniqueness- Brink- US/China 13

Uniqueness- Obama 14

Uniqueness- Canada 15

Uniqueness- Rus/China 16

Uniqueness- EU/US 17

Uniqueness- China 18

Uniqueness- Russia 19

Links 20

Link- Generic 1/3 21

Link- China 1/2 24

Link- Russia 27

Link- BMD 28

Link- China- BMD 29

Impacts 30

Arms Race 31

Arms Race Spills Over 1/2 32

China/Russia Arms Race 34

Accidental War 35

Impact- Turns Solvency, Heg 36

Space Debris 37

AT: 38

AT: Solvency 39

AT: Case Solves War 40

AT: Case Solves Heg 1/2 41

AT: Case Solves War-fighting 43

AT: Case Key to Deterrence 44

AT: Case Solves Heg- Air Force 45

AT: Others Militarizing Space 46


1NC Uniqueness- BMD

Obama has cut funding for missile defense programs that would threaten China and Russia; new programs would undo this and force their militarization.

Zhang 11 (Baohui, March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, Asian Survey, Pg 325-27, Vol. 51, No. 2,

NEW DIRECTION IN U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE The space security dilemma could also be moderated if the U.S. is willing to restrain its missile defense, which has been a key driver of China’s military space programs. Now, the Obama administration’s willingness to curb missile defense for both financial and diplomatic reasons offers new hope. The administration has reduced the budget for missile defense and cancelled potentially controversial weapons systems. For the 2010 budget year, the administration has asked Congress for $7.8 billion to fund missile defense, a cut of about $1.2 billion from 2009. More important, the Obama government has cancelled the development of new weapons systems, including Northrop’s Kinetic Energy (KEI) program and Lockheed Martin’s Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program. The KEI system was being designed for boost-phase interception of ballistic missiles and would have constituted a key part of a multilayered missile defense system. This multilayered approach presents a great threat to China and Russia because it improves the probability of successful interception. Moreover, the system requires forward deployment to achieve boost-phase interception, which could generate controversies with China and Russia. Although the Obama administration’s official justification for cancelling the program was its high cost and potentially limited combat effectiveness, concerns about Chinese and Russian reactions may have played a role in the decision. Chinese and Russian concerns were certainly important in the cancellation of the MKV program, which was being designed to use independently guided submunitions to intercept not only warheads but also decoys or other countermeasures during a missile attack. The system was once considered vital for countering potential actions by China or Russia to overwhelm U.S. missile defense. Indeed, the system was designed “to restore balance between offense and defense.” Chinese nuclear deterrence experts were gravely concerned by the emerging MKV program, calling it “a snake with nine heads” for its ability to intercept multiple targets. If deployed, the MKV program certainly would have triggered strong protests from both China and Russia. The official cancellation for strategic reasons was explained by Secretary Gates in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on May 13, 2009. Gates stated that MKV was cancelled because it “was designed to deal with a more complex threat that would have potentially come from either China or Russia.” 46 Thus, the message to China and Russia was that they should not overly worry about U.S. missile defense. Indeed, the Obama administration has stated that missile defense will now focus on threats from rogue states like Iran and North Korea. The Chinese military has paid keen attention to the cancellation of the MKV program. For example, one analysis called the end of MKV “truly a surprise, since for both technical and security considerations the U.S. military does not have good reasons to do so.” The analysis concluded that the decision could be understood only in the context of U.S. strategic adjustment and as “a compromise in its long-term strategic goals.” Specifically, the decision was made to “complement Obama’s new global diplomacy,” which seeks to build partnerships with other major powers such as China and Russia. 47

1NC Link- China- BMD

BMD forces china to militarize space, causing an arms race culminating in space weaponization.

Zhang 11 (Baohui, March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, Asian Survey, Pg 319, Vol. 51, No. 2,
COUNTERING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE The second factor adding to the security dilemma in the U.S.-China military space relationship involves U.S. efforts to rewrite the established rule of nuclear deterrence, i.e., mutually assured destruction (MAD), that prevailed during the Cold War era. According to Glasner and Fetter, the U.S. has been pursuing a new deterrence posture that combines offensive and defensive capabilities. 25 Chinese strategists believe that the U.S. military space program, to a significant extent, is driven by missile defense. For example, in a study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, Major General Xu Hezhen charges that the U.S. is developing space-based laser weapons for missile defense. According to him, “A total of 14–24 satellites deployed on different orbits will constitute a defensive system. Relying on data from early warning systems, it can intercept ballistic missiles launched from anywhere in the world.” 26 In another study, Major General Ling Yongshun argues that the U.S. is implementing a coherent plan to neutralize other countries’ strategic deterrence through the deployment of space-based missile defense. As he observes: Using space weapons to attack ballistic targets is a major goal of space weapon development. The U.S. believes that others’ ballistic missiles pose significant threats to its security. To be immune from this threat, the U.S. is putting major efforts into ballistic missile defense, with space-based weapons being one of the important intercepting platforms. 27 In October 2008, the U.S. Congress approved $5 million for an independent study of possible space-based missile defense. This move gravely alarmed the Chinese military, which believed that the deployment of space-based missile defense could become inevitable. In fact, some PLA experts have claimed that “Star Wars has come back.” 28 Li Daguang even charged that this decision by the U.S. Congress amounted to “declaring a new Cold War against China.” 29 Chinese military strategists believe U.S. missile defense poses a real threat to China’s nuclear deterrent. Until recently, the Chinese military tended to believe that U.S. missile defense could not effectively deter a major nuclear power like China or Russia. It was thought that a range of countermeasures, such as deploying decoys and multiple warheads, could be employed to deceive and overwhelm U.S. missile defense. Now, however, with the maturing of a multilayered missile defense system by the U.S. and its allies, Chinese nuclear experts are losing confidence in China’s offensive capabilities. This pessimism was illustrated in a 2008 interview of Wang Wenchao in a Chinese military magazine. Wang, credited with being the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles, expressed grave pessimism about China’s offensive nuclear capability against U.S. missile defense. He said, “I have done research: Facing a multi-tiered missile defense system, if any single layer can achieve a success rate of 70%, then 100 single warhead missiles could all be intercepted even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack.” 30 This is why Wu Tianfu—arguably the most important deterrence strategist of the Second Artillery of the PLA, which runs China’s strategic nuclear forces—charges that the U.S. has “forced China to engage in a space arms race.” 31 More specifically, U.S. missile defense has forced China to integrate space war with its strategic nuclear deterrence. China must possess the ability to weaken American space-based assets such as early-warning satellites, to ensure the credibility of its own offensive nuclear forces. Thus, space war and nuclear war are now intertwined in Chinese strategic thinking. Indeed, China’s official media have credited Wu with establishing the PLA’s first space war research institute. 32 Shen Dingli, a prominent Chinese nuclear expert, also states that the January 2007 ASAT test was crucial for China’s nuclear deterrence: “When an America with both superior nuclear and conventional arsenals aspires to build missile defense, China’s response is first to oppose it verbally, then counter it with action if the U.S. refuses to stop. China cannot afford to lose the effectiveness of its still-limited nuclear deterrent.” 33 The result is China pursuing an emerging integrated space-nuclear strategy. As argued by Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui, strategists at the PLA National Defense University, space warfare will aim at the eyes and ears of missile defense, which are early-warning satellites and other sensors deployed in space. China’s ability to cripple these U.S. space assets will significantly weaken the effectiveness of American missile defense, allowing less time and providing less accurate information to guide ground-based interceptors toward the incoming missiles. The strategists also point out that this strategy is more cost-effective than merely expanding China’s nuclear missiles: “Using limited resources to develop anti-satellite weapons to attack enemy space assets that are costly and easily damaged will become an important choice for weaker countries.” 34 Lieutenant General Ge Dongsheng gives the most systematic elaboration of the new integrated space-nuclear strategy: “Developing space capability and creating a new type of integrated space-nuclear strategic force is the guarantee of effective deterrence and counter-strike.” According to General Ge, this strategy is now a necessity with the emerging link between space war and nuclear deterrence: With the development and integration of space and information technologies, we must recognize that early warning, surveillance, tracking, communication and guidance, which are all critical for nuclear war, are increasingly dependent on space systems. Thus, improving nuclear capability through space capability is now an unavoidable trend. We therefore must accelerate the development of space capability to create a new type of integrated space-nuclear strategic force. . . . Through anti-satellite weapons, we can clear a pathway for nuclear missiles so that our nuclear force can survive, effectively penetrate, and accurately hit targets. 35 The Chinese effort to integrate nuclear and space warfare capabilities is an inevitable response to the security dilemma created by U.S. missile defense. As Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas Nicols point out, “It is unsurprising that other nations would logically view the same capability as a direct threat to the effectiveness of their own nuclear deterrent.” They argue that given the very limited size of the Chinese nuclear deterrent, U.S. missile defense has forced China to pursue space war capabilities as a countermeasure. 36

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