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1 Davidson 1963.
2 Anscombe 1957.
3 Turri 2010, 317.
4Notice that, corresponding to these three different ways of defeating her justification for believing that the dog is a Chinese Crested, there are also three different ways of augmenting her justification for believing that the dog is a Chinese Crested. She could have independent evidence for believing that the dog is a Chinese Crested. Or she could have independent evidence, apart from the evidence provided by her recollection, that dogs that look like that are typically Chinese Cresteds. Or, finally, and most relevantly for our purposes, she could have evidence that the particular dog in front of her looks very typical of its breed. This last sort of evidence would increase her justification for believing that the dog is a Chinese Crested, though it would not provide any independent additional reason to believe that the dog is a Chinese Crested, nor would it provide additional reason to accept her reason for this belief, viz., that dogs that look like that are typically Chinese Cresteds.
5 Some philosophers (Titelbaum 2014, Lasonen-Aarnio 2014) will deny this higher-order evidence can defeat So-Hyun’s justification for believing that the dog is a Chinese Crested. I leave it open that they are right about So-Hyun’s propositional justification for believing this. But such a view can’t be true of the doxastic justification of So-Hyun’s belief: the belief itself plainly becomes less justified when the believer has heard the testimony of the eminent mind-reading statistician.
6 What I call “side defeat” is commonly lumped together with what I call “undercutting defeat”. See, for instance, Pollock 1974, who treats both kinds of defeat as varieties of undercutting. My dispute is not with this common terminological decision, but rather with the way in which this terminological decision can obscure the different ways in which an RDC can have its RDC justification defeated, and thereby obscure the structure of the basing relation.
7 The dilemma that I present here is analogous to the one that Boghossian 2012 provides against different ways of understanding the “taking” condition on inference, but I focus on conditions of defeat, whereas Boghossian focuses on what constitutes inferring a conclusion from a premise. To the best of my knowledge, the dilemma was first set out in a fully general way in Lavin 2011.
8 Hyman 2015 and Sosa 2015 both argue that the problem of the deviant causal chain can be solved by claiming that the causal relation involved in the “reason for which” relation is the kind of causation involved in the manifestation of a disposition.
9 Valaris 2014 develops a representationalist view of inference according to which this scenario is not so much as possible. But I believe I have just made the case for its possibility, by describing an evidently possible (albeit unusual) case involving such a scenario.
10 Hyman 2015 and Sosa 2015 both argue convincingly that the problem of the deviant causal chain can be solved by claiming that the causal relation involved in the “reason for which” relation is the kind of causation involved in the manifestation of a disposition.
11 See also Lord and Sylvan, ms.
12 This is the account that I rely on (without defending it) in Neta 2013.
13 What I am here calling “conjuring” – making it the case that something exists by virtue of representing it as existing – is what Kant called “apperception”. But my use of that term in conversation on this topic has proven unhelpful to several of my interlocutors, and so I avoid use of it in the text. I mention it in this footnote in order to indicate that, following Kant, I take my account of the basing relation to provide the cornerstone of an account of rationality, agency, understanding, and perceptual consciousness.
14 Marcus 2012 also argues that one’s view of the normative relevance of R to C fixes the reason for which one C’s. On his account, however, this is not analyzed in terms of the agent’s ostending an explanatory connection. Rather, his argument proceeds from consideration of what is involved in paradigmatic cases of thinking of C as normatively supported by R. It remains to be seen how Marcus’s account could handle the scenario described above, in which we are justified in believing that our RDC’s are not sensitive to our reasons for them.
15 Thanks to Paul Boghossian, David Barnett, Matthew Boyle, Matthew Kotzen, Eric Marcus, Luis Rosa, Josh Schechter, Eric Schwitzgebel, John Schwenkler, and Alex Worsnip for helpful comments. Thanks especially to Doug Lavin, Anna-Sara Malmgren, and Kate Nolfi for extensive discussion of these topics over several years.