Appeasement Disadvantage – Negative



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Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013 Appeasement Disadvantage

Generics


Appeasement Disadvantage – Negative

Cuba

Cuba Shell – Appeasement 1NC

Cuban engagement is limited --- no major foreign policy changes coming


Associated Press, 6/21/2013 (Cuba, US Try Talking, But Face Many Obstacles, p. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=194107378)
To be sure, there is still far more that separates the long-time antagonists than unites them. The State Department has kept Cuba on a list of state sponsors of terrorism and another that calls into question Havana's commitment to fighting human trafficking. The Obama administration continues to demand democratic change on an island ruled for more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel. For its part, Cuba continues to denounce Washington's 51-year-old economic embargo. And then there is Gross, the 64-year-old Maryland native who was arrested in 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing communications equipment to the island illegally. His case has scuttled efforts at engagement in the past, and could do so again, U.S. officials say privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade Gross for four Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the United States, something Washington has said it won't consider. Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the Obama administration is too concerned with upsetting Cuban-American politicians and has missed opportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its history. "I think that a lot more would have to happen for this to amount to momentum leading to any kind of major diplomatic breakthrough," he said. "Obama should be bolder and more audacious."

Engagement with Cuba sends a signal of appeasement.


Rubin, 10/18/2011 (Jennifer, Obama’s Cuba appeasement, Washington Post, p. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html)
The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.

Appeasement causes global aggression and multiple scenarios for conflict.


Chapin and Hanson, 12/7/2009 (Bernard - interviewer and Victor Davis - Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Change, weakness, disaster, p. http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/)
BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

Iranian proliferation causes nuclear war.


Henry Sokolsky, executive director – nonproliferation policy education center, 10/1/2003, Policy Review, p. lexis
If nothing is done to shore up U.S. and allied security relations with the Gulf Coordination Council states and with Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, Iran's acquisition of even a nuclear weapons breakout capability could prompt one or more of these states to try to acquire a nuclear weapons option of their own. Similarly, if the U.S. fails to hold Pyongyang accountable for its violation of the NPT or lets Pyongyang hold on to one or more nuclear weapons while appearing to reward its violation with a new deal--one that heeds North Korea's demand for a nonaggression pact and continued construction of the two light water reactors--South Korea and Japan (and later, perhaps, Taiwan) will have powerful cause to question Washington's security commitment to them and their own pledges to stay non-nuclear. In such a world, Washington's worries would not be limited to gauging the military capabilities of a growing number of hostile, nuclear, or near-nuclear-armed nations. In addition, it would have to gauge the reliability of a growing number of nuclear or near-nuclear friends. Washington might still be able to assemble coalitions, but with more nations like France, with nuclear options of their own, it would be much, much more iffy. The amount of international intrigue such a world would generate would also easily exceed what our diplomats and leaders could manage or track. Rather than worry about using force for fear of producing another Vietnam, Washington and its very closest allies are more likely to grow weary of working closely with others and view military options through the rosy lens of their relatively quick victories in Desert Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Just Cause. This would be a world disturbingly similar to that of 1914 but with one big difference: It would be spring-loaded to go nuclear.


Cuba – Engagement Link

Engagement with Cuba signals accommodation and rewards misbehavior.


Poblete, 12/1/2008 (Jason – Poblete Tamargo LLP, The Obama Administration and U.S.-Cuba Policy, DC Dispatches, p. http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/12/01/the-obama-administration-and-us-cuba-policy/)
There was no silver lining for the Democratic Left in South Florida or for their long-time obsession of normalizing relations with Communist Cuba. From a purely partisan standpoint, I hope that Obama or his officials go meet in private with envoys for the Cuban regime (as recently proposed by Raul Castro). Such a meeting would be up there with the Bay of Pigs under Kennedy or Elian Gonzalez’s kidnapping during Easter by the federal government under Bill Clinton. Americans do not like to reward dictators and tyrants. It would help Republicans for generations with voters of Cuban and non-Cuban ancestry. Yet such a meeting between the Obama Administration and regime officials would be a serious mistake. The Castro brothers, and many of their key advisors, have nothing of value to offer the U.S. They should be convicted in U.S. federal courts, or tried by the Cuban people, for human rights abuses and other crimes. Cuba remains a state sponsor of terrorism because the Castros support the Iranians, the FARC in Colombia, among other persons and acts. The Cubans are suspected of operating a biological weapons program. The Obama Administration can try and sweep all of this under the rug, but South Florida leaders will be there to remind people of the truth. The political onus is on the future leaders of Cuba to constructively engage the U.S. based on the conditions establised under U.S. laws. The best assistance we can offer the Cuban opposition, as well as the future leaders of Cuba, is to enforce U.S. laws to the fullest extent reasonably possible. This means keeping the limits on travel and on family remittances. It also means calling on our allies in the Hemisphere and elsewhere to cooperate with our policy on Cuba or face limits on foreign assistance and cooperation in areas important to them. The U.S. needs to tell the future leaders of a free Cuba that we are not interested in cleansing the crimes of the Castro brothers or their key advisors through talks or other political legitimization efforts. Quite the opposite. We should either indict these people or advise the Cuban people how they can indict them in a free Cuba. The Cuban people need an orderly way to deal with these issues. There are many pent up frustrations that need to be addressed in a future Cuba and the courts may be the only orderly way to do so. Talking to future possible defendants is not the way to go. Rather than entertaining taking, the Obama Administration should announce in the first few months in office that it does not intend to reverse Bush Administration in any way. They should call on allies to support our efforts in Cuba. They should call on the regime to release political prisoners. They should indict Fidel and Raul Castro for crimes against Americans, including the Brothers to the Rescue incident that claimed the lives of several American citizens and one U.S. national. They should round up more of Cuba’s spies in the U.S. Be bold. Keep up the pressure from Day One. These and other action items should have been undertaken during the past eight years. Some were, some were not. Regardless, the Bush Administration leaves a foundation from which to build a solid front from which to deconstruct Cuban tyranny in a peaceful manner. Any accommodation with Fidel or Raul Castro, their key advisors, will surely do the opposite. It may not happen in the short-term, but such talks will lay the seed for future conflict on the island.

Engagement is a form of accommodation that sets a bad precedent


Poblete, 12/1/2008 (Jason – Poblete Tamargo LLP, The Obama Administration and U.S.-Cuba Policy, DC Dispatches, p. http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/12/01/the-obama-administration-and-us-cuba-policy/)
There was no silver lining for the Democratic Left in South Florida or for their long-time obsession of normalizing relations with Communist Cuba. From a purely partisan standpoint, I hope that Obama or his officials go meet in private with envoys for the Cuban regime (as recently proposed by Raul Castro). Such a meeting would be up there with the Bay of Pigs under Kennedy or Elian Gonzalez’s kidnapping during Easter by the federal government under Bill Clinton. Americans do not like to reward dictators and tyrants. It would help Republicans for generations with voters of Cuban and non-Cuban ancestry. Yet such a meeting between the Obama Administration and regime officials would be a serious mistake. The Castro brothers, and many of their key advisors, have nothing of value to offer the U.S. They should be convicted in U.S. federal courts, or tried by the Cuban people, for human rights abuses and other crimes. Cuba remains a state sponsor of terrorism because the Castros support the Iranians, the FARC in Colombia, among other persons and acts. The Cubans are suspected of operating a biological weapons program. The Obama Administration can try and sweep all of this under the rug, but South Florida leaders will be there to remind people of the truth. The political onus is on the future leaders of Cuba to constructively engage the U.S. based on the conditions establised under U.S. laws. The best assistance we can offer the Cuban opposition, as well as the future leaders of Cuba, is to enforce U.S. laws to the fullest extent reasonably possible. This means keeping the limits on travel and on family remittances. It also means calling on our allies in the Hemisphere and elsewhere to cooperate with our policy on Cuba or face limits on foreign assistance and cooperation in areas important to them. The U.S. needs to tell the future leaders of a free Cuba that we are not interested in cleansing the crimes of the Castro brothers or their key advisors through talks or other political legitimization efforts. Quite the opposite. We should either indict these people or advise the Cuban people how they can indict them in a free Cuba. The Cuban people need an orderly way to deal with these issues. There are many pent up frustrations that need to be addressed in a future Cuba and the courts may be the only orderly way to do so. Talking to future possible defendants is not the way to go. Rather than entertaining taking, the Obama Administration should announce in the first few months in office that it does not intend to reverse Bush Administration in any way. They should call on allies to support our efforts in Cuba. They should call on the regime to release political prisoners. They should indict Fidel and Raul Castro for crimes against Americans, including the Brothers to the Rescue incident that claimed the lives of several American citizens and one U.S. national. They should round up more of Cuba’s spies in the U.S. Be bold. Keep up the pressure from Day One. These and other action items should have been undertaken during the past eight years. Some were, some were not. Regardless, the Bush Administration leaves a foundation from which to build a solid front from which to deconstruct Cuban tyranny in a peaceful manner. Any accommodation with Fidel or Raul Castro, their key advisors, will surely do the opposite. It may not happen in the short-term, but such talks will lay the seed for future conflict on the island.

Appeasement with Cuba fails: makes US look weak to Iran and North Korea; strong perceptions key to peace


Sal 09(Sal, writer, Axis of Right, on Israel, politics, tyranny, and the war on terror. 2/12/09Axis of Right: Axis of Right is a conservative blog to discuss Politics, Religion, Culture, etc. http://axisofright.com/2009/02/12/appeasement-update-syria-and-cuba/)
The new era of Capitulation and Appeasement is in full force. The Obama administration plans to lift all sanctions against Syria as part of it’s unraveling of the War on Terror. Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism. They aided Al Quaida in Iraq against our armed forces, are building a nuclear reactor, and have aided Hezbollah in Lebanon in attacks against Israel. Yet now, in this new day of Capitulation and Appeasement, we are making friends with the Syrians by lifting the only (weak) leverage that we have without any preconditions. This olive branch to Syria is not in the best interests of the United States. In other news, a bill going through the Congress would lift all travel restrictions between the U.S. and Cuba, prevent a President from making any similar restrictions, all without any concessions from Cuba. Capitulating to and Appeasing terrorists, dictators, and thugs only makes us as a nation look weak. The leaders of Cuba and Syria, as well as Iran and North Korea, do not value peace as we do. When two nations have completely different objectives (peace at any cost vs. domination and power), it is impossible to come to any meaningful peace settlement. Peace through strength is the only valid foreign policy doctrine in a world populated by terrorists, dictators and thugs. The Obama administration does not understand this, and is in for a rude awakening.


Cuba – Embargo Link

Lifting the embargo will not result in change only appeasement.


Brookes, 4/16/2009 (Peter – senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at the Heritage Foundation, Let’s Take it Slow on Overtures to Cuba, Heritage Foundation, p. http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/lets-take-it-slow-on-overtures-to-cuba)

If you're hoping for major changes in Cuba following the White House's announcement Monday of the easing of some restrictions on interactions with the island -- think again. Sure, for humanitarian purposes, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more regularly than once every couple of years - even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit the United States. And, allowing remittances to American relatives in Cuba can ease some suffering due to the regime's failed policies - even though at least 20 percent of the money sent to Cuba will be siphoned off by the government. But in the end, it's still the brothers Castro, Fidel and his successor Raul, who will decide whether there is an opening to the United States -- or not. And in usual Cuban-regime style, in response to the White House announcement, Fidel Castro stood defiant, barely recognizing the change in long-standing U.S. policy. Instead, and predictably, Fidel called for an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) on Cuba - without any offer of change from the regime holding 11 million people in its iron grip. So much for Obama's magic spell on the world's bad actors. The concern among many is that liberal criticism and a lack of a positive Cuban response will lead the White House to make even more concessions in an effort to create an opening. Of course, the big empanada is the 1962 U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, which is unquestionably the thing Havana most wants ended. Lifting the embargo on Cuba won't normalize relations, but instead will legitimize - and concede defeat to - Fidel's 50-year struggle against the Yanquis. It'll also pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers, allowing Havana to repress more at home and hop-up its anti-American agenda abroad. The last thing we need to do is line the pockets of the communist regime, which they'll use to control the Cuban people. Cuban human-rights are grim enough. The totalitarian state manhandles all aspects of the Cuban people's lives - not to mention the more than 200 political prisoners, languishing in rat-infested dungeons. Freedom of speech, press, assembly or association? Forget it. Cuban security services closely monitor domestic and international journalists, restrict both Internet access and foreign news -- and censor domestic media. We also don't need a re-invigorated Cuba becoming a major menace to U.S. interests in this hemisphere. There'd be no joy in seeing Cuba team up with Venezuela in advancing their leftist, anti-American agenda down South. Indeed, the embargo has kept Cuba in its box since the loss of Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused since then? Contrast that with the 1980s. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead it labors in the yoke of a Castro-imposed dystopia. The U.S. embargo remains a matter of principle - and a leveraged response to Cuba's repression of its people. Knuckling under to evil without reciprocity is a moral hazard, only begetting more of the same.

Easing embargo undermines U.S. credibility – reinforces Cuba’s tyrannical regime


Walser 11 (Ray, a veteran Foreign Service officer, is a Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation, 1/18/2011, The Foundry, “Obama’s Ill-Timed, Confusing Concessions Leave Cuba Unimpressed,” http://blog.heritage.org/2011/01/18/obamas-ill-timed-confusing-concessions-leave-cuba-unimpressed/)
On January 14, the White House unveiled further liberalization of its Cuba policy. New changes alter rules to allow easier American citizen visits, permit non-family remittances (up to $500 per quarter), and broaden the number of U.S. airports able to send charter flights to Cuba. The measures, the White House trumpeted, “will increase people-to-people contact; support civil society in Cuba; enhance the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people; and help promote their independence from Cuban authorities.”¶ Liberals proponents of enhanced Cuba ties have applauded the measure. The decision, however, is ill-timed and confusing and fails to impress the hard-line Castro regime. It is ill-timed because it comes just as a Cuban Communist Party congress prepares to ratify an economic game plan that throws more than a million Cubans into the “private sector” while preserving the fundamentals of a command or planned economy. Cuba’s un-free economic model, Jose Azel of the University of Miami notes, reflects “the desire for control by the military and the Communist Party of every aspect of Cuban life” and an economic program that is antithetical to the individual liberty and empowerment necessary to bring about an economic renaissance. Non-family remittances will provide a modest lifeline that supports the objectives of the regime: a voiceless, powerless private sector that will not rock the Communist boat. The decision is confusing because it undercuts recent attempts to pressure the Cuban regime to release U.S. citizen Alan Gross. Speaking in Santiago, Chile on January 13, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Arturo Valenzuela said, “the United States finds it very difficult to advance on matters of common interest” with Cuba while President Raul Castro’s government continues to hold Gross, a U.S. government contractor. Gross was arrested in December 2009 and has spent a year in Cuban prison without charges. Havana claims that Gross is a spy but has made no attempt to prove the case. Before Valenzuela could return home, the White House announced the latest unilateral easing of travel restrictions, a blow to those ready to keep the Gross case at the center of the current debate on U.S.–Cuban relations. Ileana Ros-Leithen (R–FL), chair of the House Foreign Affairs committee, correctly summarized the Obama Administration’s errors:¶ Loosening these regulations will not help foster a pro-democracy environment in Cuba.They certainly will not help the Cuban people free themselves from the tyranny that engulfs them.[They] undermine U.S. foreign policy and security objectives and will bring economic benefits to the Cuban regime. The Castro regime continued to take the Obama Administration to task for its failure to lift full travel restrictions and charged it with seeking “domination” and “destabilization” of Cuba. The Cuban Foreign Ministry went into rage mode when a visiting U.S. delegation present for immigration talks met with Cuban dissidents. It charged the U.S. with advancing a “policy of subversion and intervention” and supporting “internal counterrevolution.” So much for an improved climate in relations!¶ After two years, the valiant promises of candidate Obama regarding Cuba with his call for libertad [liberty] and a “road to freedom for all Cubans” that begins “with justice for Cuba’s political prisoners, the rights of free speech, a free press and freedom of assembly” leading to “elections that are free and fair” are largely overshadowed by more unilateral concessions to the Castro regime.

Further US unilateral concessions to Cuba exacerbate human rights violations; the embargo provides the best means for movement towards democracy


Cuban Exile Quarter 12(No Author; 12/23/12. Cuban Exile Quarter: blog purposed for the discussion of US/Cuban diplomatic politics. “Embargoing Human Rights for Trade? The Sanctions Paradox.” http://cubanexilequarter.blogspot.com/2012/12/embargoing-human-rights-for-trade.html)

The Obama Administration has continued to extend a hand to the Cuban regime and has little to show for it, except increased repression, the deaths of high profile activists, and an American citizen rotting in a Cuban prison. There is no reason to suppose that further unilateral concessions will produce a different outcome. Sanctions are the last nonviolent way of seeking to change an unjust system by refusing to cooperate with tyranny. When discussing the Cuban embargo in the mass media these two aspects are rarely, if ever, touched upon. Academics and the lobbyists for big business, such as USA Engage, often claim that sanctions never work; rather, it is economic engagement that leads towards greater respect for human rights. However, recent history in China, Burma, and Vietnam indicate otherwise. This disconnect from reality stems from two factors: self-interest and a reading of power dynamics that ignores people power in favor of focusing on regime elites. In a New York Times article entitled "Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo," Carlos Saladrigas claims that “maintaining this embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hard-liners . . . what we should be doing is helping the reformers.” Essentially, Mr. Saladrigas argues that lifting sanctions would weaken and dissuade hardliners while at the same time benefiting reformers. Over the past four years the Obama Administration has loosened economic sanctions on Cuba. If Mr. Saladrigas is correct, we should observe former outsiders in the regime tackling and winning policy discussions, but that has not been the case. On the human rights front[,] the situation has actually deteriorated. One of the policy objectives of the Castro regime both internally and internationally is to portray itself as David against Goliath. Despite having normal trade relations, Hugo Chavez has undertaken the same kind of campaign in Venezuela. Often times the U.S. State Department has fallen short of explaining the sanctions policy fully or for that matter defending it in a vigorous manner at international forums. This has allowed the Cuban government a free hand in a sustained campaign to portray itself as a victim blaming all of its economic woes on the American blockade on Cuba. Nevertheless as John Adams once observed, “Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.” The facts at present demonstrate that the arguments of the regime and its apologists do not hold up under scrutiny. First, one of the problems with the sanctions debate is that words are used interchangeably which are not synonymous while others that should be are not. For example the Cuban government and many of its apologists use the terms blockade and embargo as if they were the same thing. At the same time the terms embargo and sanctions are viewed as somehow different. A blockade is specifically a military term that according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary is “for the isolation by a warring nation of an enemy area (as a harbor) by troops or warships to prevent passage of persons or supplies.” In the case of Cuba there was only one time when a blockade was put in place and that was by President John F. Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis beginning on October 22 and it was ended less than a month later on November 20, 1962. What is known as the Cuban Embargo began On January 3, 1961 when President Dwight D. Eisenhower suspended trade with Cuba, a few days after his administration broke diplomatic relations with the country. The embargo on Cuba since its inception has meant restrictions on trade and travel to the island by U.S. citizens and in practice has been a partial embargo. Over the decades these sanctions have been loosened and tightened depending on the circumstances at the time. An actual embargo would mean that there is a complete ban on or prohibition of trade by the United States with Cuba. This is not the case. What you have in Cuba is a partial embargo which is exactly the same in definition as economic sanctions. Between January 2000 and September 2012 according to the United States Census Bureau there has been $4,291,200,000.00 in U.S. trade in goods with Cuba. The ban on U.S. imports from Cuba remains but U.S. exports to Cuba have been going on since 1992 with the amounts dramatically increasing since 2002 reaching its peak in exports to Cuba under the Bush Administration in 2008. Despite loosening restrictions further under the Obama Administration trade with Cuba has dropped to 363.3 million dollars in 2011 and figures for 2012 show a slight improvement with total sales to the island at $337.5 million as of September. This is not a total embargo but a partial one in which the United States is one of Cuba’s top trading partners. At the same time Cuban exiles, many committed to maintaining economic sanctions against the dictatorship, are also a main source of remittances to their families on the island totaling hundreds of millions of dollars per year. The aim of the embargo initially, during the Cold War, was to penalize the Castro regime for seizing U.S. properties and limit its ability to fund armed guerrillas and terrorist groups in the region aimed at toppling friendly governments. With the exception of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979 this policy was a success in the Americas. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union changes were made to sanctions policies that sought in the 1992 Torricelli Bill and 1996 Helms Burton Bill to make clear that sanctions would remain in effect until all political prisoners were freed, the government tolerated a political opposition and free elections were held. Funds were also set aside by Congress to assist through development assistance independent civil society. In addition Congress in the 1980s established Radio/TV Marti to break the information monopoly of the dictatorship. Also in the late 1980s the United States led an effort at the U.N. Human Rights Commission to expose the systematic human rights abuses on the island and hold the Cuban dictatorship to greater scrutiny. The result of what amounted to a tightening of sanctions and redirecting them from Cold War considerations to a pro-democracy effort combined with diplomacy was to provide protection to Cuban dissidents on the island, along with the means to reach the populace via radio while also setting up licensing to permit the sending of humanitarian and technical assistance to dissidents by civil society groups in the United States. This led to the growth of the pro-democracy movement on the island and greater support for it internationally.

Easing the embargo creates a bad precedent globally


King, 10/19/2011 (U.S. Cubans blast Obama deal with Havana, Caribbean Life, p. http://www.caribbeanlifenews.com/stories/2011/10/2011_10_17_nk_concessions.html)

Shame on the administration for engaging with the tyrants in Havana,” said South Florida Republican Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. “This would set a dangerous precedent and encourage other dictators to take Americans as prisoners,” she added. Florida Republic Sen. Marco Rubio said Gross is “a man who was wrongfully jailed in the first place”, adding: “Rather than easing sanctions in response to hostage taking, the U.S. should put more punitive measures on the Castro regime.”


Easing restrictions only strengthens the government – Iran proves


Bustillo 5/9 (Mitchell, author for International Policy Digest, 5/9/2013, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo,” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/)

When thinking of U.S.-Cuba relations, the trade embargo, or el bloqueo, is first and foremost on people’s minds. In 2009, President Barack Obama eased the travel ban, allowing Cuban-Americans to travel freely to Cuba, and again in 2011, allowing students and religious missionaries to travel to Cuba, as recently demonstrated by American pop culture figures, Beyoncé and her husband Jay-Z. Despite a history of hostile transgressions, the U.S. is inconsistent with its implementation of the embargo, which sends mixed signals to Havana and displays our weak foreign policy regarding Cuba.¶ Undoubtedly, Cuba is capitalizing on this weakness by using the embargo as a scapegoat for all of its woes without any immediate fear of reinstated restrictions. Because the goal is to promote Cuban democracy and freedom through non-violent and non-invasive means while refraining from providing any support to the current oppressive Cuban government, the current legislation regarding the embargo and travel ban against Cuba needs to be modernized and strengthened. The need for an embargo has never been more important or potentially effective, even considering the current human rights and economic arguments against the embargo.¶ Washington’s goal in its dealings with Havana is clear: facilitate the introduction and growth of democracy while increasing personal freedoms. There are many who argue that the best way to spread democracy is by lifting the embargo and travel restrictions. U.S. Rep. Michael Honda argues that an influx of politically enlightened U.S. travelers to Cuba would put Havana in a difficult place, leading to their own people calling for change. However, this is erroneous. Due to the fractured and weakened state of the embargo, over 400,000 U.S. travelers visited Cuba in 2011, making the United States the second-largest source of foreign visitors after Canada, according to NPR’s Nick Miroff. Obviously, this influx of what has been theorized to be liberty-professing tourists has not resulted in an influx of such democratic ideals into this overwhelmingly federally controlled country.One example is the case of Alan Gross, an American citizen working for USAID. He was arrested in Cuba in 2009 under the allegations of Acts against the Independence and Territorial Integrity of the State while distributing computers and technological equipment to Jewish communities in Cuba. He is currently serving the fourth of his fifteen-year conviction, is in poor health, and receiving little to no aid from the U.S., according to the Gross Family website. In light of this, it is hard to believe that the U.S. would be able to protect a large number of tourists in a hostile nation, especially when they plan to ‘profess’ political freedom. This view is further promoted by the Ladies in White, a Cuban dissident group that supports the embargo. They fear ending it would only serve to strengthen the current dictatorial regime because the real blockade, they claim, is within Cuba. Allowing American travelers to visit Cuba does not help propel the cause of Cuban democracy; it hampers it.¶ Still there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution. From the annual throng of American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011 Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing that an estimated, “$4 billion a year flow directly to the Cuban government from remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, which is perhaps the single largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.”¶ These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban government. It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands. “After all, the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,” states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute.¶ However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.¶ No doubt, it has been a fruitless 50 years since the embargo was enacted. Little has changed as far as democracy and human rights are concerned. To maintain control, Cuba has “managed to offset much of the effects over the years in large part because the Soviets subsidized the island for three decades, because the regime welcomed Canadian, Mexican and European capital after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and because Venezuela is its new patron,” according to Llosa. However, Venezuela is now undergoing a political transition of its own with the recent death of Hugo Chávez, its president for the past 14 years, and the controversial election of Nicolás Maduro.¶ Despite being Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro only won by a narrow margin and will likely be forced to cut spending on social programs and foreign assistance in an effort to stabilize Venezuela’s dire economic problems. Therefore, now is the ideal time to take action. Without Venezuela’s support, the Cuban government will assuredly face an economic crisis. Strengthening the embargo to limit U.S. dollars flowing into Cuba would place further pressure on the Cuban government and has the potential to trigger an economic collapse. A change in the Cuban political climate is within reach.¶ According to U.S. Senator Robert Menendez, “Tourism to Cuba is a natural resource, akin to providing refined petroleum products to Iran. It’s reported that 2.5 million tourists visit Cuba – 1.5 million from North America…1 million Canadians…More than 170,000 from England…More than 400,000 from Spain, Italy, Germany, and France combined – All bringing in $1.9 billion in revenue to the Castro regime.” This behavior undermines the embargo, which is why the U.S. should urge other nations to adopt similar policies toward Cuba. A strong and unyielding embargo, supported by the U.S. and its allies, is necessary to incite political change. Furthermore, Sen. Menendez argues, “Those who lament our dependence on foreign oil because it enriches regimes in terrorist states like Iran, should not have a double standard when it comes to enriching a brutal dictatorship like Cuba right here in our own backyard.”¶ If the policy of the U.S. is to challenge these behaviors, then it must also stand up to Cuba. It would be a disservice to squander the progress of the past 50 years when opportunity is looming.


Ext – Embargo = Leverage

The embargo provides leverage and should not be removed unconditionally


Perez, Spring 2010 (David – J.D. 2010 Yale Law School, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Harvard Latino Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis)
After conducting some initial discussions, both countries can then move on to the embargo. No one argues that the embargo is an effective foreign policy, because it has clearly failed to bring about real reform on the island; the only argument for maintaining the embargo is that it can be used as a bargaining chip for more dialogue - not that in its current state it can lead to a better situation. Put differently, the embargo is only valuable to the extent that its removal can be part of a quid pro quo strategy - not that its maintenance will lead to fundamental reform on the island. n82 This reveals a bifurcated myopia that affects both sides of the debate. On the one hand those who support the embargo as a negotiating chip often gloss over the fact that its continuation will not lead to regime change. On the other hand, those who focus on the embargo's inability to topple the regime and instead support lifting the embargo unconditionally, generally give too little weight to the embargo's value during diplomatic negotiations. The Helms-Burton legislation lays out the rather onerous conditions that must be met on Cuba's end before the U.S. can begin restoring diplomatic relations. n83 The significance of Helms-Burton's restraints cannot be overstated: while a particular president's rhetoric or a particular resolution's wording might chill diplomatic relations between two countries, Helms-Burton's arduous provisions freeze relations. The onus to thaw that freeze is properly placed upon Washington, rather than Havana. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States to change its own laws before any rapprochement with Cuba can begin. Invariably the debate surrounding America's embargo revolves around its solvency: has it worked? The question should instead be reworded to ask: will current U.S. policy work from here on out to achieve certain definable interests? The United States sold the island over $ 700 million in goods in 2008, accounting for 40% of the island's agricultural imports. n84 That number seems to indicate that Cuba's trading relationship with the U.S. is not of [*217] trivial importance to the island's leadership. However, the strength of this relationship may steadily diminish relative to other trading partners in the next few years. For example, over the next five to seven years Cuba will have an increased energy productivity stemming from its coastal drilling operations that will bring it closer to Spain, Canada, Norway, Brazil, and India. n85 With these relatively stable flows of capital, Cuba will increasingly become insulated from U.S. economic pressure. The moment to decisively influence Cuba's government through economic pressure may have never existed, but if it did, it has surely passed. The notion that the U.S. can intricately craft Cuba's governmental and domestic policies by applying a combination of economic and political pressure must be rejected either as categorically false, or as an anachronism of the early 1990s. During her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said "that it is not time to lift the embargo on Cuba, especially since it provides an important source of leverage for further change on the island." n86 Secretary Clinton is correct: the embargo definitely provides a valuable bargaining chip during negotiations, and should not be lifted unconditionally. But given this evidence, the Obama Administration should be suspect of claims that the embargo gives the U.S. decisive leverage over Cuba.

Cuba – Travel Ban Link

Lifting the travel ban signals weakness and legitimizes Cuba


Suchlicki, 2/26/2013 (Jime – Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo?, Focus on Cuba, Issue 185, p. http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue185.htm)
Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of proportion to recent changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications: • Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother. • American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. Most Americans don’t speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. • While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. • Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. • The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best naïve. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. • Over the past decades hundred of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. • As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro. • Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the United States”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United States; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. • Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent.


Cuba – AT: Mail Services Non-Uniques

Mail services does not change Cuban policy or the U.S. signal


Agence France Presse, 6/17/2013 (US, Cuba seek to restore mail services, p. Lexis-Nexis)
"Representatives from the Department of State and the United States Postal Service will meet with representatives from the government of Cuba for a technical discussion on re-establishing direct transportation of mail," spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. "The reason we're doing this is because it's, of course, good for the Cuban people. This is something we feel is good for us, but it's not meant to be a signal or anything or indicate a change in policy." She stressed that the talks were technical and did not indicate any change in the US policy towards Cuba. Washington and Havana do not have official diplomatic relations, but each country has an interests section in the other.

Cuba – AT: Plan is Hardline

The nature of fiat means the plan is appeasement. The U.S. cannot backtrack if Cuba cheats.


Perez, Spring 2010 (David – J.D. 2010 Yale Law School, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Harvard Latino Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis)
Policymakers in America often emphasize that any change on America's end must be met with irreversible change on Cuba's end, based on the idea that the United States might be offering irreversible carrots for nothing. The underlying premise of that notion is simply wrong: there is no reason to believe that once the United States changes parts of its Cuba policy, it cannot reverse those changes in response to negative behavior in Havana. Concessions the United States makes on many of these issues can be reversed: targeted sanctions can be reapplied after they have been removed; [*218] travel bans can be reinstituted after they have been lifted; diplomatic relations can be re-severed after they have been re-established. If the United States normalizes relations with the Cuban government, only to witness the Cuban government imprison or execute hundreds of dissidents, there is no reason why our government could not respond strongly, and even consider reverting back to hostile relations. Establishing relations between Washington and Havana is not an end in itself, nor is it a right that has been taken away from Havana. Instead, normalized relations should properly be seen as a privilege that Cuba has to earn before it is once again offered by the United States. But even if it is offered to Cuba, by no means are any overtures on Washington's end irreversible.

Cuba – AT: Concessions

Cuba won’t make any real concessions.


Suchlicki, 3/4/2013 (Jaime, Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro, The Atlantic, p. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/)
Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid. Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba. Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies. The issue between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to change it policies.

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