American Exceptionalism Kritik 1NC



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Arctic Link




Construction of the arctic as a threat allows for America to spread itself in


Dittmer et al 11 -- Professors in the Departments of Geography at University College London, University of Oulu, University College London, and Royal Holloway, respectively (Jason Dittmer, Sami Moisi, Alan Ingrama, Klaus Dodds, Political Geography, 2011, “Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics,” http://www.uta.fi/jkk/jmc/studies/courses/reading1%20+%20arctic%20+%20moisio.pdf)

The idea of the Arctic as an open e or opening e and uncertain space also calls forth future-oriented imaginative techniques, notably scenario analysis and the booming trade in “Arctic futures” (Anderson, 2010). The rhetorical orientation of such exercises inevitably reproduces and gives free rein to divergent conceptualizations of the future. Thus, on the one hand are dystopian imaginations of the Arctic as a locus of social, political, economic, cultural and ecological disaster. While during the 1990s Arctic space was infused with political idealism and hope as the end of the Cold War seemed to open the possibility of a less explicitly territorialized governance regime (the Arctic Council), current interventions in Arctic space raise the spectres of conflict, environmental degradation and the “resource curse” (Emmerson, 2010). The notion of the Arctic as an open, ‘melting space’ is thus represented as posing a multi-faceted security risk. Scott Borgerson (2008) published a notably neo-realist intervention in Foreign Affairs which considered this kind of scenario in more detail; he argued that the decrease in sea ice cover is directly correlated to evidence of a new ‘scramble for resources’ in the region, involving the five Arctic Ocean coastal states and their national security interests. According to Borgerson (2008: 65), the Arctic “region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources”. More generally, melting ice is correlated with enhanced accessibility and hence opportunities for new actors ranging from commercial shipping to illegal migrants and terrorist groups to migrate within and beyond the Arctic. At the most extreme, neorealists have contended that Arctic installations such as pipelines or terminals might be potential targets for terrorist organizations hell-bent on undermining North American energy security (Byers, 2009). At the same time, the Arctic is also framed as a space of promise: the locus of a potential oil bonanza, new strategic trade routes and huge fishing grounds (Powell, 2008a). No wonder then that the Arctic possibilities have resulted in a number of scenarios on the relationship between Arctic resources and Arctic geopolitical order. Lawson Brigham, a well known Arctic expert, has imagined an “Arctic race”, a scenario in which “high demand and unstable governance set the stage for a ‘no holds barred’ rush for Arctic wealth and resources” (described in Bennett, 2010, n.p.). This vision, which is opposite to “Arctic saga”, can be regarded as a liberal warning message. Accordingly, without new governance structures based on new international agreements, high demand in the Arctic region could lead to political chaos which could also jeopardize Arctic ecosystems and cultures. The emphasis on the economic potential of the Arctic maritime areas further highlights the dominance of future over present in contemporary geopolitical discourses. The image of disaster (as epitomised by the Exxon Valdez sinking in 1989) thus forms a counterpoint to the image of a treasure chest (the Russian flagplanting in 2007).We suggest that these assertions of Arctic disaster are used to justify a strengthened military presence in Arctic waters in the name of national security along with a range of futuristic possibilities (Jensen & Rottem, 2009). Here neo-realism feeds off the idea of the Arctic as opening, shifting and potentially chaotic space. It thus has an affective as well as descriptive quality e invoking a mood change and associated “calls to arms” (Dodds, 2010). This theme of ‘fearing the future’ has emerged periodically within Canadian political discourse, with Stephen Harper’s famous “use it or lose it” dictum traceable through previous governments, which have emphasized the threat of incursion by the Soviets or the United States (Dodds, in press; Head, 1963; Huebert, 2003). The disaster argumentation (Berkman & Young, 2009) also underwrites liberal calls for a new multilateral Arctic legal agreement which would set out rules, for example, on how to exploit Arctic resources. In these representations, “multilateralism” denotes peace, prosperity, stability and environmental rescue whilst national control and interest denote increasing tension, environmental degradation and conflict. Arctic ‘openness’ is central to the performance of Arctic geopolitics, enabling sabre-rattling by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states. The region’s coding as a feminine space to be tamed by masculine exploits provides an arena for national magnification. The remoteness and difficulty of maintaining permanent occupation of the far north also makes it a space where overlapping territorial claims and competing understandings of access to transit passages can (at the moment) co-exist with relatively little chance of actual combat (Baev, 2007). As we shall see, this is particularly true of the US/Canadian arguments over the legal status of the NorthWest Passage. In this way the discursive formation of Arctic geopolitics is also bound up with neo-realist ideas about the inherent tendencies of ‘states’ towards ‘conflict’ over ‘resources’, ‘sovereignty’ and so on e ideas that have been subject to extensive critical deconstruction in IR and political geography, but which are being rapidly reassembled in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is thus a space in which the foundational myths of orthodox international relations are being reasserted. It might be said that it is not just the Arctic climate that is changing, with knock on effects for state politics and international relations, but rather that the region is being reconstituted within a discursive formation that renders it amenable to neo-realist understandings and practices inconceivable for other, more inhabited regions. Accepting the premises of ‘Arctic geopolitics’ risks both obscuring the liveliness of Arctic geography (Vannini, Baldacchino, Guay, Royle, & Steinberg, 2009) and enabling the sovereign fantasy that coastal states and their civilian and military representatives have previously enjoyed security via effective territorial control and may establish it once again.

China Link




The threat of China is an excuse for American counterbalancing in order to preserve hegemony


Chengxin PAN IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4 “The China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics” Alternatives 29 p. 314-315

In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo) realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^ In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"55 argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)."56

Democracy/Freedom Link




Democracy and freedom are excuses for intervention


Cuadro 11 (Mariela, PhD in IR at the National University of La Plata, BA in Sociology at the University of Buenos Aires, Master in IR at the National University of La Plata (IRI), Researcher at the Department of Middle East in International Relations Institute (IRI) at the University of La Plata, Member and researcher at the Center for International Political Reflection (CERPI), “Universalisation of liberal democracy, American exceptionalism and racism" Transcience Volume 2—Issue 2, http://www2.hu-berlin.de/transcience/Vol2_Issue2_2011_30_43.pdf)
The advent of liberalism would change this conception and postulate a game where sum is different from zero. That is to say that liberalism conceived the improvement of one state (the state-centered objective of the reason of state remained the same) as linked to the improvement of the others. Neoliberalism, for its part, adds to this the necessity of intervention. Kant’s Perpetual Peace fit in this context. Following the German author, perpetual peace would be guaranteed by the globalization of commerce. During the decade of 1990s a similar thesis took force: The so-called ‘Democratic Peace Theory’ postulated that perpetual peace could be achieved via the globalization of democracy. George W. Bush administration would take this thesis as its own and argue that imposing democracy (on Iraq) would make the world safer and more peaceful, implicitly arguing that US democracy is the best socio-political model. Finally, such voices would also be specially heard during the first weeks of the still ongoing Arab uprising. Homologated with freedom, liberal democracy appears (mainly in liberal powers’ discourses, but not just there) as a universal claim of people all over the world, thereby becoming a necessity of history (claimed once by Fukuyama), and justifying, once more, interventionist policies in its name. Democracy, Human Rights and Freedom, as we will see, have been homologated. Clearly different and Western notions have been thus mixed, confused and universalized. Freedom, as a governmental technique, is at the center of the liberal practice. Indeed, liberalism -understood not as an ideology, but rather as a technology of power- is characterized as a freedom-consuming practice. That is to say that it can only function if some liberties exist 7. In consequence, if liberalism has a need of freedom, then, it is obliged to produce it, but, at the same time, to organize it. In other words, it is not only a producer of freedom, but also an organizer of it: its administrator. This administration of freedom leads to the necessity of securing those natural phenomena (i.e.: population) and, with that objective, to interventionist practices. The fact that the police device be dismantled, Foucault asserts, does not mean that governmental intervention ceases to exist. On the contrary, this is an essential feature of liberal government.

Disease Link

Disease creates a common enemy the U.S. tries to combat in order to spread itself international


MacPhail 2009 (Theresa, medical anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley “The Politics of Bird Flu: The Battle over Viral Samples and China’s Role in Global Public Health,” Journal of language and politics, 8:3, 2009)

In fact, the health development strategies of international organizations are judged as significant in reinforcing the role of the state in relation to the production of primary products for the world market, thereby perpetuating international relations of dominance and dependency. — Soheir Morsy, Political Economy in Medical Anthropology In July of 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona appeared before a congressional committee and testified that during his term in office he had been pressured by the Bush administration to suppress or downplay any public health information that contradicted the administration’s beliefs and/or policies. Gardiner Harris of the New York Times noted that Dr. Carmona was only “one of a growing list of present and former administration officials to charge that politics often trumped science within what had previously been largely nonpartisan government health and scientific agencies” (Harris 2007). Dr. Carmona testified that he had repeatedly faced “political interference” on such varied topics as stem cell research and sex education. Two days later, an editorial in the Times bemoaned the resultant diminution of public health — both its reputation as non-biased and the general “understanding of important public health issues” — in the eyes of the same public it was meant to serve (2007). In the wake of Dr. Carmona’s testimony, it would appear that these are grave times for public health. And yet, public health concerns and international measures to thwart disease pandemics have never been more at the forefront of governmental policy, media focus and the public imagination. Dr. Carmona’s testimony on the fuzzy boundaries between science and state, health and policy, is in line with a recent spate of sensational stories on the dangers of drug-resistant tuberculosis and the recurrent threat of a bird flu outbreak — all of which belie any distinct separation of politics and medical science and highlight the ever-increasing commingling of the realms of public health and political diplomacy. Until recently, the worlds of public health and politics have generally been popularly conceptualized as separate fields. Public health, undergirded by medicine, is primarily defined as “the science and practice of protecting and improving the health of a community” (public health 2007), regardless of political borders on geographical maps. Disease prevention and care is typically regarded as neutral ground, a conceptual space where governments can work together for the direct (or indirect) benefit of all. Politics, on the other hand, is usually referred to in the largely Aristotelian sense of the word, or politika, as “the art or science of government or governing, especially the governing of a political entity, such as a nation, and the administration and control of its internal and external affairs” (politics 2007). If we take to be relevant Clausewitz’s formulation that war is merely the continuation of policy (or such politics) by other means, might we then argue that the recent ‘wars’ on disease — specifically the one being waged on the ever-present global threat of bird flu — are merely a continuation of politics by different means? In an article written for the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC), two health professionals suggest that the flow of influence works optimally when an unbiased science first informs public health, with public health then influencing governmental policy decisions. The other potential direction of influence, wherein politics directly informs public health, eventually constraining or directing scientific research, has the potential to create a situation in which “ideology clouds scientific and public health judgment, decisions go awry and politics become dangerous” (Koplan and McPheeters 2004: 2041). The authors go on to argue that: Scientists and public health professionals often offer opinions on policy and political issues, and politicians offer theirs on public health policies, sometimes with the support of evidence. This interaction is appropriate and healthy, and valuable insights can be acquired by these cross-discussions. Nevertheless the interaction provides an opportunity for inappropriate and self-serving commentary, for public grandstanding, and for promoting public anxiety for partisan political purposes. (ibid.) The authors, however, never suggest that pure science, devoid of any political consideration, is a viable alternative to an ideologically-driven disease prevention policy. What becomes important in the constant interplay of science, politics and ideology, is both an awareness of potential ideological pitfalls and a balance between official public health policy and the science that underlies it. The science/ public health/politics interaction is largely taken for granted as the foundation of any appropriate, real-world policy decisions (Tesh 1988: 132). Yet the political nature of most health policies has, until recently, been overshadowed in popular discourse by the ostensibly altruistic nature of health medicine. Yet as Michael Taussig reminds us of the doctor/patient relationship: “The issue of control and manipulation is concealed by the aura of benevolence” (Taussig 1980: 4). Might the overt goodwill of organizations such as the WHO, the CDC, and the Chinese CDC belie such an emphasis on politics? Certainly there is argumentation to support a claim that public health and medicine are inherently tied to politics. Examining the ‘hidden arguments’ underlying public health policies, Sylvia Noble Tesh argues: “disease prevention began to acquire political meaning. No longer merely ways to control diseases, prevention policies became standard-bearers for the contending political arguments about the form the new society would take” (1988: 11). Science is a ‘reason of state’ in Ashis Nandy’s Science, Hegemony and Violence (1988: 1). Echoing current battles over viral samples, Nandy suggests that in the last century science was used as “a political plank within the United States in the ideological battle against ungodly communism” (1988: 3). Scientific performance is linked to ‘political dividends’ (1988: 9), with science becoming “a substitute for politics in many societies” (1988: 10). What remains novel and of interest in all of this conflation of state and medicine is the new ‘politics of scale’ of the war on global disease, specifically its focus on reemerging disease like avian influenza. As doctor and medical anthropologist Paul Farmer notes: “… the WHO manifestly attempts to use fear of contagion to goad wealthy nations into investing in disease surveillance and control out of self-interest — an age-old public health ploy acknowledged as such in the Institute of Medicine report on emerging infections” (Farmer 2001: 56–57). What Farmer’s observation underlines is that ‘public health’ has transformed itself into a savvy, political entity. Institutions like the WHO are increasingly needed to negotiate between nations — they function as the new ‘diplomats of health’. Modern politics, then, have arguably turned into ‘health’ politics. In 2000, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on infectious diseases. The resolution came in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and was the first of its kind issued (Fidler 2001: 80). What started as a reaction to a specific disease, AIDS, has since developed into an overall concern with any disease or illness which is seen as having the potential to lay waste to global health, national security, or economic and political stability. In other words, disease and public health have gone “global”. But, as law and international disease scholar David Fidler points out, the “meeting of realpolitik and pathogens” that he terms “microbialpolitik” is anything but new (Fidler 2001: 81). Microbialpolitiks is as old as international commerce, wars, and diplomacy. Indeed, it was only the brief half-century respite provided by antibiotics, modern medicine and the hope of a disease-free future that made the coupling of politics and public health seem out-of-date. But now we have (re)entered a world in which modern public health structures have weakened, thus making a return to microbialpolitiks inevitable. As Fidler argues: “The ‘reglobalization of public health is well underway, and the international politics of infectious disease control have returned” (Fidler 2001: 81). Only three years later, Fidler would write that the predicted return of public health was triumphant, having “emerged prominently on the agendas of many policy areas in international relations, including national security, international trade, economic development, globalization, human rights, and global governance” (Fidler 2004: 2). As Nicholas King suggests, the resurgence of such ‘microbialpolitiking’ owes much to the discourse of risk so prevalent in today’s world. The current focus on ‘risk’, as it specifically pertains to disease and its relationship to national security concerns, has been constructed by the interaction of a variety of different social actors: scientists, the media, and health and security experts (King 2004:62). King argues: The emerging diseases campaign employed a strategic and historically resonant scale politics, making it attractive to journalists, biomedical researchers, activists, politicians, and public health and national security experts. Campaigners’ identification of causes and consequences at particular scales were a means of marketing risk to specific audiences and thereby securing alliances; their recommendations for intervention at particular scales were a means of ensuring that those alliances ultimately benefited specific interests. (2004: 64) King traces this development to the early 1990s, specifically to Stephen Morse’s 1989 conference on “Emerging Viruses”. Like the UN Security Council resolution on emerging infections, the conference was in the wake of HIV/AIDS. In King’s retelling, it was Morse’s descriptions of the causal links between isolated, local events and global effects that changed the politics of public health (2004: 66). The epidemiological community followed in Morse’s footsteps, with such luminaries as Morse and Joshua Lederberg calling for a global surveillance network to deal with emerging or reemerging diseases such as bird flu or SARS. However, although both the problem and the effort were ‘global’ by default, any “interventions would involve ‘passing through’ American laboratories, biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the information science experts” (King 2004: 69). Following the conference, disease became a hot topic for the media. Such high-profile authors as Laurie Garrett (The Coming Plague) and Richard Preston (The Hot Zone) stoked the ‘emerging virus’ fires, creating what amounted to a “viral panic” or “viral paranoia” (King 2004: 73). Stories of viruses gone haywire, such as Preston’s account of Ebola, helped reify the notion that localized events were of international importance. Such causal chains having been formed in the popular imagination, the timing was ripe for the emergence of bioterrorism concerns. In the aftermath of 9/11, the former cold war had been transformed, using scalar politics, into a hot war with international viruses (King 2004: 76). Of course, all of this can be tied into the Foucaultian concept that knowledge is by its very nature political. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault outlines the ways in which medicine is connected to the power of the state. For Foucault, medicine itself “becomes a task for the nation” (Foucault 1994: 19). He argues that the practice of medicine is itself political and that “the struggle against disease must begin with a war against bad government” (Foucault 1994: 33). In an article on the politics of emerging diseases, Elisabeth Prescott has echoed Foucault’s equation of disease with bad government. She suggests that a nation’s capacity to combat both old and newly emergent diseases is a marker not of just biological, but of political, health. She argues that “the ability to respond [is] a reflection of the capacity of a governing system” (2007: 1). What’s more, ruptures in health can lead to break-downs in effective government or in the ability of governments to inspire confidence. Prescott suggests: “Failures in governance in the face of infectious disease outbreaks can result in challenges to social cohesion, economic performance and political legitimacy” (ibid.). In other words, an outbreak of bird flu in China would equate to an example of Foucault’s bad government. In the end, there can be no doubt that the realms of medicine and (political) power are perpetually intertwined. Foucault writes: “There is, therefore, a spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirement of political ideology and those of medical technology” (Foucault 1994: 38). In other words, we should not be overly surprised by Richard Carmona’s testimony or by debates over bird flu samples. Politics and health have always arguably gone hand-in-hand

Energy Consumption Link




Energy consumption is an excuse for militarization


Ciuta 10 -- Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre of European Politics, School of Slavonic and East European Studies @ University College London, UK (Felix, 2010, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?" Security Dialogue 41(123), Sage)

Even casual observers will be familiar with the argument that energy is a security issue because it is either a cause or an instrument of war or conflict. Two different strands converge in this logic of energy security. The first strand focuses on energy as an instrument: energy is what states fight their current wars with. We can find here arguments regarding the use of the ‘energy weapon’ by supplier states (Belkin, 2007: 4; Lugar, 2006: 3; Winstone, Bolton & Gore, 2007: 1; Yergin, 2006a: 75); direct substitutions in which energy is viewed as the ‘equivalent of nuclear weapons’ (Morse & Richard, 2002: 2); and rhetorical associations that establish policy associations, as exemplified by the panel ‘Guns and Gas’ during the Transatlantic Conference of the Bucharest NATO Summit. The second strand comes from the literature on resource wars, defined as ‘hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources’ (Victor, 2007: 1). Energy is seen as a primary cause of greatpower conflicts over scarce energy resources (Hamon & Dupuy, 2008; Klare, 2001, 2008). Alternatively, energy is seen as a secondary cause of conflict; here, research has focused on the dynamics through which resource scarcity in general and energy scarcity in particular generate socio-economic, political and environmental conditions such as population movements, internal strife, secessionism and desertification, which cause or accelerate both interstate and intrastate conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, 2008; Solana, 2008; see also Dalby, 2004). As is immediately apparent, this logic draws on a classic formulation that states that ‘a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able . . . to maintain them by victory in such a war’ (Lippmann, 1943: 51). The underlying principle of this security logic is survival: not only surviving war, but also a generalized quasi-Darwinian logic of survival that produces wars over energy that are fought with ‘energy weapons’. At work in this framing of the energy domain is therefore a definition of security as ‘the absence of threat to acquired values’ (Wolfers, 1952: 485), more recently reformulated as ‘survival in the face of existential threats’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 27). The defining parameters of this traditional security logic are therefore: (1) an understanding of security focused on the use of force, war and conflict (Walt, 1991: 212; Freedman, 1998: 48); and (2) a focus on states as the subjects and objects of energy security. In the war logic, energy security is derivative of patterns of international politics – often captured under the label ‘geopolitics’ (Aalto & Westphal, 2007: 3) – that lend their supposedly perennial attributes to the domain of energy (Barnes, Jaffe & Morse, 2004; Jaffe & Manning, 1998). The struggle for energy is thus subsumed under the ‘normal’ competition for power, survival, land, valuable materials or markets (Leverett & Noël, 2007). A key effect of this logic is to ‘arrest’ issues usually not associated with war, and thus erase their distinctive characteristics. Even the significance of energy qua energy is abolished by the implacable grammar of conflict: energy becomes a resource like any other, which matters insofar as it affects the distribution of capabilities in the international system. As a result, a series of transpositions affect most of the issues ranked high on the energy security agenda. For example, in the European context, the problem is not necessarily energy (or, more precisely, gas, to avoid the typical reduction performed by such accounts). The problem lies in the ‘geopolitical interests’ of Russia and other supplier states, whose strength becomes inherently threatening (Burrows & Treverton, 2007; Horsley, 2006). Energy security policies become entirely euphemistic, as illustrated for example by statements that equate ‘avoiding energy isolation’ with ‘beating Russia’ (Baran, 2007). Such ‘geopolitical’ understanding of international politics also habituates a distinct vocabulary. Public documents, media reports and academic analyses of energy security are suffused with references to weapons, battles, attack, fear, ransom, blackmail, dominance, superpowers, victims and losers. It is therefore unsurprising that this logic is coterminous with the widely circulating narrative of the ‘new’ Cold War. This lexicon of conflict encourages modulations, reductions and transpositions in the meanings of both energy and security. This is evident at the most fundamental level, structuring encyclopaedic entries (Kohl, 2004) and key policy documents (White House, 2007), where energy security becomes oil security (security modulates energy into oil), which becomes oil geopolitics (oil modulates security into geopolitics). Once security is understood in the grammar of conflict, the complexity of energy is abolished and reduced to the possession of oilfields or gas pipelines. The effect of this modulation is to habituate the war logic of security, and also to create a hierarchy between the three constitutive dimensions of energy security (growth, sustenance and the environment). This hierarchy reflects and at the same time embeds the dominant effect of the war logic, which is the militarization of energy (Russell & Moran, 2008), an argument reminiscent of the debates surrounding the securitization of the environment (Deudney, 1990). It is of course debatable whether this is a new phenomenon. Talk of oil wars has been the subject of prestigious conferences and conspiracy theories alike, and makes the headlines of newspapers around the world. A significant literature has long focused on the relationship between US foreign policy, oil and war (Stokes, 2007; in contrast, see Nye, 1982). The pertinence of this argument cannot be evaluated in this short space, but it is worth noting that it too reduces energy to oil, and in/security to war. The key point is that this logic changes not only the vocabulary of energy security but also its political rationality. As Victor (2008: 9) puts it, this signals ‘the arrival of military planning to the problem of natural resources’ and inspires ‘a logic of hardening, securing and protecting’ in the entire domain of energy. There is, it must be underlined, some resistance to the pull of the logic of war, as attested for example by NATO’s insistence that its focus on energy security ‘will not trigger a classical military response’ (De Hoop Scheffer, 2008: 2). Yet, the same NATO official claims that ‘the global competition for energy and natural resources will re-define the relationship between security and economics’, which hints not only at the potential militarization of energy security policy but also at the hierarchies this will inevitably create. New geographies of insecurity will thus emerge if the relationship between the environment, sustenance and growth is structured by the militarized pursuit of energy (Campbell, 2005: 952; Christophe Paillard in Luft & Paillard, 2007).

Economy Link




Economics are the driving force in imperial conquest-distinct from domination, this force is a coercive politics that leaves populations socially immobile and marginalized


(Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy 04, managers in the Dynamics of Social Change Ouvrir and French economists, “The Economics of US Imperialism at the Turn of the 21st Century” Source: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 4, Global Regulation (Oct., 2004), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177517, DS)

At the transition between the 1970s and 1980s, capitalism entered into a new phase called neoliberalism. Indeed, it is possible to refer to a neolib- eral ideology, the apology of free markets (nationally and internationally) and the corresponding disengagement of the state from economic affairs, but neoliberalism fundamentally defines a new stage of capitalism. Some among the main components of this new phase do relate to free markets (nationally and internationally) and the corresponding disengagement of the state from economic affairs, but neoliberalism fundamentally defines a new stage of capitalism. Some among the main components of this new phase do relate to free markets, notably the imposition of global free trade, the freedom on the part of enterprises to hire and fire, and the free international circulation of capi- tal. This does not mean, however, that the intervention of the state, in the broad sense of the term,2 was diminished. In some respects, in particular monetary policy, the power of state institutions was increased. In all coun- tries, states were the agents of the imposition of the neoliberal order.3 In- ternationally, institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, play a quasi-state role in the imposition of the neoliberal order to the planet. Everywhere, a new discipline was imposed on workers and management to the benefit of shareholders; interest rates were raised to the benefit of lenders. Neoliberalism is actually a new social configuration in which the power and income of ruling classes was reestablished after a few decades of partial repression in the wake of the Great Depression and World War II. After the war, the concentration of wealth among a minority of rich families and the inequalities in the distribution of income were considerably diminished.4 The structural crisis of the 1970s, with rates of interest hardly superior to inflation rates, low dividend payout by corporations, and depressed stock markets, further encroached on the income and wealth of the wealthiest. In the early 1980s, neoliberalism reversed the pattern of comparative decline of these classes. In this sense, neoliberalism was a sweeping success, in par- ticular in the United States. The cost was huge in terms of unemployment and misery around the globe. In a system where the ownership of the means of production and man- agement are separated, capitalist ownership is expressed through the hold- ing of securities (stock shares, bonds, bills, etc.) and the power of capital- ists is largely transferred to their financial institutions (financial holdings, funds, etc.). For these two reasons, the domination of ruling classes pos- sesses a stronglyfinancial character. We denote the upper fraction of capital- ist owners and their financial institutions, as finance.5 Finance as such must be distinguished from the financial industry: The power and control of fi- nance concern all sectors of the economy, financial as well as nonfinancial. The distinction between financial capital and industrial capital conserves some relevance, but is not central, due to the large integration of economic relations under the aegis of finance in the above definition. By 'imperialism', we do not mean a particular stage of capitalism, but one of its constant features since its earliest stages (in particular, in the sphere of trade). Imperialism, itself, goes through various stages, but the common, continuous, trait that defines imperialism as such is the eco- nomic advantage taken by the most advanced and dominating countries over less developed or vulnerable regions of the world. The violence ex- erted by imperialist countries is simultaneously the expression - within combinations which would be difficult to disentangle - of straightforward economic constraint, such as the mere opening of commercial frontiers be- tween countries of very different levels of development, and all categories of immediate violence. Obviously, imperialism does not necessarily imply the outright domi- nation of other countries as in colonialism, one form of imperialism. The crucial factor is to impose, within the dominated countries, a government prone to the development of economic relations favorable to the inter- est of dominating countries. This can be achieved by all means: collab- oration with local ruling classes, subversion, or war. Such domination is compatible with what is called 'democracy'6 or dictatorship, depending on circumstances. States are, indeed, crucial, both within dominating and dominated countries.

Whether the economy is strong or not, US economic policy is imperialist


(Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy 04, managers in the Dynamics of Social Change Ouvrir and French economists, “The Economics of US Imperialism at the Turn of the 21st Century” Source: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 4, Global Regulation (Oct., 2004), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177517, DS)

It is not easy to provide a comparative assessment of the situation of the US economy at the turn of the 21st century. On the one hand, the domination of the United States on the world economy and its political and military preeminence appear even stronger in the early 2000s than in the late 1970s. On the other hand, the sudden contraction of the growth rates at the end of 2000, the ensuing recession, and the collapse of the stock market suggest a new, less favorable, course than during the second half of the 1990s. Even more importantly, the growing disequilibria of the US economy - notably the external debt, and the debt of households and of the state - raise doubts concerning the capability of this country to maintain its unrivalled leadership. To put the matter very simply, the question is whether the US economy can be deemed strong or weak in the early 2000s. This assessment is crucial in the discussion of the arrogance of the inter- national strategy of US imperialism. Is it the expression of the consolidation of the power of the United States after a quarter of a century of neolib- eralism? Not coincidentally, this phase of capitalism saw a comparative setback of Europe, stagnation in Japan, and recurrent crises in countries of the periphery in the wake of their opening to international capital. On the contrary, is it a reaction to a declining capability to rule the globe on 'mere' economic grounds? The main thesis in this paper is that such uncertainties and the corre- sponding diverging interpretations are rooted in the ambiguous situation of the US economy at the turn of the century, domestically and internation- ally, strong in some respects, weak in others: - In a sense, the global domination of the US economy is very strong. The grasp of its nonfinancial transnational corporations on other countries is tight; the power of US financial institutions is probably larger than ever; huge and growing flows of income are drawn from the world and contribute to the remuneration of capital in the country. In these respects, US imperialism is, indeed, in great shape. - The problems lie in the 'internal' trajectory asserted in the country, and their consequences on external disequilibria. The continuing and strengthening imperial hold on the world economy coincided with the constant decline of domestic savings - the expression of a grow- ing propensity to consume. This movement was a consequence of the growing income and wealth of the richest fraction of households, a fun- damental characteristic of neoliberalism. It reached such degrees that the capability to spend of the country became thoroughly dependent on the import of goods, and opened new opportunities to the financial investment of foreigners. This foreign capital must also be remunerated, drawing important income flows out of the country. The direction of causation between these two aspects of the US economy, power on and dependency on foreign countries, is obviously difficult to establish, and the relationship is, indeed, reciprocal.

Economics is inherently manifested in imperialism—contradictions of capitalism are the driving factor


Nbete 12’- PHD. In philosophy (Alubabari “Ogoni as an Internal Colony: A Critique of Imperialism” [http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_10_Special_Issue_May_2012/6.pdf]

Imperialism is a broad term; it manifests in different forms ranging from literature and culture to politics and economy, but economic drives usually constitute its most crucial initial impetus. This partly explains why much of the existing literature on the concept tends to either omit or downplay other manifestations of it, such as cultural imperialism. Our present work, in suchlike manner, acknowledges its variety of forms but dwells more on its economic and institutional aspects. It is in this context that we find much of the causal connection between it and the phenomenon of internal colonialism or domestic colonialism (or, as Ken Saro-Wiwa also calls it when it occurs within black countries, black colonialism). Claude Ake defines imperialism as “The economic control and exploitation of foreign lands arising from the necessity for counteracting the impediments to the accumulation of capital engendered by the internal contradictions of the domestic capitalist economy.”5 There are, according to Ake, about five contradictions of capitalism which tend to lead to imperialism. One of them arises as the drive for maximization of surplus value leads, necessarily, to the expansion of production. This occurs because capitalist production goes on in a context in which capitalists compete among themselves for the market. At the same time, increase in production or output tends to create excess of supply over demand, which leads to disequilibrium.

Terror Link

American exceptionalism makes terrorism into a global threat in order to extend itself


Cuadro 11 (Mariela, PhD in IR at the National University of La Plata, BA in Sociology at the University of Buenos Aires, Master in IR at the National University of La Plata (IRI), Researcher at the Department of Middle East in International Relations Institute (IRI) at the University of La Plata, Member and researcher at the Center for International Political Reflection (CERPI), “Universalisation of liberal democracy, American exceptionalism and racism" Transcience Volume 2—Issue 2, http://www2.hu-berlin.de/transcience/Vol2_Issue2_2011_30_43.pdf)

When George W. Bush campaigned for the presidency of the United States (US), he did it based on a realist platform. The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center changed this policy. The administration’s response took the form of a “Global War on Terror” (GWT) that made possible the intervention of US all over the world1. However, following Deleuze and Guattari, there is no de-territorialization without a consequent re-territorialization (2004). The GWT thus had its battlefields in the Middle East region. After invading Afghanistan to retaliate against those who had harbored the Al-Qaida suspects of the 9-11 terrorist acts, the US policy targeted Iraq. We will not analyze the reasons behind these two invasions, but we will use them as paradigms of the ultimate expression of a global liberal governance of which the US is its most steely bearer. Indeed, as Foucault argues, “American liberalism [. . . ] is not [. . . ] a mere economic and political election formed and formulated by the government or in the governmental circle. In America, liberalism is a whole way of being and thinking. It is much more a type of relationship between governors and governed than a technique of the former destined to the latter” (2007: 254). That is why we can hold that liberalism crosses the entire political spectrum of the US. Actually, we will study the questions of liberal democracy, US exceptionalism and racism, putting aside existing differences between Democrats and Republicans. Thus we intend to establish what we call cultural racism not as an ideological matter, but as a necessary mechanism of the liberal way of global government as “general framework of biopolitics” (Foucault, 2007: 40). What the Bush administration criticized about previous forms of power exercise in the Middle East region (including that of US) was the tolerance of authoritarian governments throughout history, favoring stability over freedom2. From this point of view, such a situation generated resentment and anger. Therefore, was identified as the root of terrorism, which – it was said – fed on the absence of democracy in the region. At this point, US’ interests and values coincided. Indeed, to put an end to terrorism, the expansion of freedom was a must (observe that this discourse homologated freedom and democracy). This was accompanied by a construction of the terrorist enemy not as a political enemy but instead as a danger to the population, excluding the terrorist subjects from the field of the political. The Bush administration thus established a linkage between security and freedom/democracy conflating interests and values and eliminating contradictions between the two. The US national interest would be achieved through the expansion of US values (constructed not as particular and historical, but as universal and necessary). Condoleezza Rice (National Security Advisor and Secretary of State) dubbed this the “uniquely American realism” (2008). The GWT thus appeared as a liberal war par excellence: a war based on values that were presented as universal, making them non particular, nor political; fought against absolute enemies posed as dangers for the (global) population; at the center of which were at the same time freedom and security. If, as said, liberalism is conceived as “general framework of biopolitics” and, following Foucault’s thought, in a biopolitical technology of power, sovereign power, that is to say the power of making die, exerts itself through the inscription of racism in state’s mechanisms, talking about some sort of liberal racism is actually possible. The unilateral and aggressive policy of the Bush administration -the demonstration of US absolute power- made possible its demonization. In fact, there was an attempt to construct it as an exception in the history of the US. However, we affirm that the universalisation of particular values (e.g., liberal democracy) has deep roots in the idea of American exceptionalism and can be explained as a form of racism as a characteristic mechanism of the liberal way of global government. If we have chosen the Bush administration as our empirical terrain that is because, even as we recognize its discontinuities with respect to previous administrations, it is our intention to point out regularities and return it to the history of liberal government.

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