Affirmative section consultation and cooperation through dialogue networks



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D. THE CONSULTATION COUNTERPLAN AVOIDS THIS DISADVANTAGE, MAKING IT NET BENEFITS COMPETITIVE
USA FOREIGN POLICY GOALS TOWARDS RUSSIA
WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT RUSSIA HIDES A DANGEROUS SITUATION OF VOLCANIC PROPORTIONS
JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99

These American views of both Russia's security situation and its economic prospects reflect a brand of wishful thinking that could be exceedingly dangerous. Beneath the surface of the Russian political system, the combination of an economy far weaker than most people recognize and security concerns much greater is leading to pressures of volcanic proportions. In the end, it will be our problem as well as Russia's.


OUR BEST POLICY IS TO DO WHATEVER HELPS RUSSIA DEVELOP IN A PRODUCTIVE AND POSITIVE WAY
Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99

Our purpose in working with Russia should be to fashion the right political arrangements; in other words, to weave beneficial relationships and devise incentives that will encourage Russia to continue its democratic progress and that will yield material benefits to the Russian people.


USA FOREIGN POLICY AMBITIONS FAR OUTDISTANCE ITS CAPABILITIES -- THE USA WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW ITS OWN ADVICE TO RUSSIA
Sergei Markov, director of the Institute for Policy Studies. Izvestia, Feb. 26, 1998, p. 3., Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 25, 1998; Pg. 8,HEADLINE: Iraq Accord Reached: How Big Was Russia's Role? acs-VT99

In getting involved in the present conflict, the US has failed to reckon with this fundamental distinction between 1998 and 1991. Now it will have to walk the same painful road that Russia walked before it. In recent years, American politicians and analysts have been telling the Russian elite to bring its foreign-policy ambitions into line with the real potential that Russia possesses. They have urged Russia to renounce any claims to retain its status as a superpower and instead to find a new place for Russia in a new world. This has been very difficult.

Now it is time for the Americans to listen to others' lectures calling on the US to bring its foreign-policy ambitions into line with its possibilities. The Iraqi crisis of 1998 has demonstrated that the United States cannot in fact maintain its status as the only superpower, dictating its will in world politics. For the American foreign-policy elite, giving up that status is extremely difficult psychologically. It is this, not minor errors, that has led American foreign policy into an impasse over Iraq.
USA SHOULD APPLY THE SAME STANDARDS AND ADVICE TO RUSSIA IT APPLIES TO ITSELF
Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99

For its part, the West should hold those in power in Russia accountable for undemocratic deeds, in much the same way as it is willing to criticize its allies. Western leaders should apply to Russia the same criteria for evaluating the health of its democracy and the strength of its market economy that they apply to themselves. The West should not give Russia advice it is not willing to take itself. This is especially important because, in the 21st century, competition will occur between civilizations and not countries. Although Russia and the West have different histories, they belong to the same civilization. The old rivalries need not endure -- if Russia chooses wisely.


USA WORLD LEADERSHIP WILL BE THE HALLMARK OF THE 21ST CENTURY IN FOREIGN POLICY
CLINTON’S FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES SET THE STAGE FOR USA LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Morton M. Kondracke, Roll Call, JULY 7, 1997, HEADLINE: Surprise! Clinton Is a Good Foreign Policy President acs-VT99

It's too much to say that Clinton has been a great foreign policy president - luckily, he's had no wars or grave crises to face - but his strategy and execution so far have been very good, setting up the structure for continued US global leadership in the 21st century. Clinton's success in this arena is a surprising development in view of the disasters he endured early in his first term, such as the death of US troops in Somalia, being intimidated by thugs in Haiti, and having diplomatic initiatives bluntly rebuffed in China and Bosnia.


USA LIKES BEING #1 AND WILL DO WHAT IT TAKES TO STAY #1
Stephen M. Walt, professor of political science University of Chicago, Foreign Policy, March 22, 1998; Pg. 29; HEADLINE: International relations: one world, many theories; acs-VT99

As for the United States, the past decade has shown how much it likes being "number one" and how determined it is to remain in a predominant position. The United States has taken advantage of its current superiority to impose its preferences wherever possible, even at the risk of irritating many of its long-standing allies.


USA #1 IS FIRMLY ENTRENCHED IN AMERICAN POLICY AND WILL NOT BE CHECKED
Michael Klare, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, In These Times, March 22, 1998; Pg. 10, HEADLINE: The Sole Superpower Syndrome acs-VT99

The U.S. rush to judgment in Iraq--one could say the frenzy to bomb--is the product of a deeper psychosis in American foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. leaders have been possessed by what can be described as the "sole superpower syndrome"--a sense of nearly godlike power derived from the absence of any balancing forces in the international system. With no curbs on American adventurism, U.S. leaders are undeterred from engaging in impetuous and ill-conceived actions like the impending attack on Iraq.


US MILITARY DOMINANCE WILL REMAIN AND ACTUALLY INCREASE IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION WARFARE
Lawrence Freedman, Foreign Policy, March 22, 1998; Pg. 48; HEADLINE: International security: changing targets; acs-VT99

The discretionary aspect of the West's military operations comes at a time when its conventional military superiority is beyond dispute. The United States, with or without its major allies, can take on all corners. There are reasons to suppose that this gap in capability will grow. The efficient application of conventional force is increasingly influenced by the ability to collect, transmit, and interpret information, and this is an area in which the United States excels. Hence, the proclamation of a "revolution in military affairs" that promises the elegant delivery of weapons (with just the right amount of lethality) against immaculately chosen targets, without the constraints of distance, climate, or terrain. In some quarters, there is excitement over the idea that information technology could lead to new forms of warfare that disrupt vital economic and social, as well as military, functions by attacking information flows. A vision of a victimless, virtual war is developing, suitable for a postheroic age, in which casualties on all sides, but especially our own, are kept to a minimum.


THE USA WILL DOMINATE THE WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY
JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK; NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE; A Delusional View of U.S. Dominance , acs-VT99

In an article titled "A Second American Century," Zuckerman points to the recent strength of the U.S. economy, and the weaknesses in Europe and Asia, as signs of permanent change in the world.

"Ignore the Cassandras," Zuckerman tells us. "This is not a transient prosperity, but one that derives from a series of structural advantages that today only America enjoys." He rhapsodizes over America's spirit of entrepreneurialism, its management culture; he thinks the low rate of inflation is self-perpetuating.

"If anything, American business should widen its lead over the rest of the world," he says. "France had the 17th century, Britain the 19th, and America the 20th. It will also have the 21st."


THE USA IS NOT IN ANY POSITION TO EXERCISE WORLD LEADERSHIP
USA IS NOT “ON TOP OF THE WORLD,” BUT IS JUST EXPERIENCING A GOOD PART OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE WHICH WILL SOON TURN DOWN
JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK; NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE; A Delusional View of U.S. Dominance , acs-VT99

On the economic front, the response to Zuckerman's euphoria is laid out brilliantly by Paul Krugman in the same issue of Foreign Affairs. He demonstrates that America's rapid growth over the last year reflects mostly a favorable turn of the business cycle, rather than any revolutionary change in the structure of the U.S. economy.

"The current sense that the United States is on top of the world is based on a huge exaggeration of the implications of a few good years here and a few bad years elsewhere," writes Krugman, an economics professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
USA MUST EITHER ACCEPT ITS DIMINISHED ROLE IN THE WORLD OR FIND A NEW GLOBAL ENEMY
Sergei Markov, director of the Institute for Policy Studies. Izvestia, Feb. 26, 1998, p. 3., Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 25, 1998; Pg. 8,HEADLINE: Iraq Accord Reached: How Big Was Russia's Role? acs-VT99

Either the US will have to find a new global enemy to prove the need for its status as world leader, or it will have to find a new foreign-policy strategy predicated on a de facto acknowledgment that the unipolar world is a thing of the past. . . . The world has no place for a sole superpower.

The quicker the US grasps this fact, the quicker it will be able to find itself a new place. The difficult path that Russia traveled will now have to be traversed by the American foreign-policy elite. Of course, the place of the US in world politics will be much more prestigious than Russia's, but it will not be the place of sole superpower. The Iraqi crisis of 1998 has shown that the unipolar world is receding into the past.
BLIND OPTIMISM ABOUT AMERICAN POWER AND ECONOMY IS ONLY SETTING IT UP FOR A HUGE FALL
JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK; NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE; A Delusional View of U.S. Dominance , acs-VT99

America now stands at a moment of truly remarkable self-delusion. The current prosperity, pleasing as it is, seems to have caused some of us to lose a sense of proportion.

"This is like the boosterism of the 1920s," says historian Warren B. Cohen. "Back then, people were saying that America's prosperity was going to go on forever, that it was the result of new technology and other lasting changes. Zuckerman's article is the sort of thing Calvin Coolidge or Herbert Hoover would have written in September of 1929."
THE NEW CENTURY IS NOT DESTINED TO BE ANOTHER AMERICAN CENTURY
Tad Szulc, Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1998, Part M; Page 1; HEADLINE: FOREIGN POLICY; THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY acs-VT99

This, in sum, is the challenge to the United States in the new century that is not necessarily destined to be another American century.


THE AMERICAN DECADE OF LEADERSHIP AND INFLUENCE IS OVER
Walter Russell Meadsenior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1998; Part M; Page 2; HEADLINE: THE WORLD / DIPLOMACY; SO NOW WHO'S IN CHARGE? // acs-VT99

As Europe wrestled with monetary union last week and Japan writhed in the toils of its gathering recession, most observers missed the real story: The "American Decade" is over.

In fact, U.S. policy is coming unglued around the world. In the Middle East, Israel's Likud government has stalled and may yet completely derail a peace process that U.S. presidents have been working on since the time of Richard M. Nixon. Cuba just won another vote at the United Nations, this time blocking the reappointment of a special rapporteur to monitor its human-rights violations. Neither the threats nor the promises of U.S. diplomats can do much about the escalating violence in Kosovo. Failure to pass "fast track" leaves the United States without a Latin America policy, even as Brazil works to consolidate its own trading zone in South America. Even the tiny Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has thumbed its nose at the latest U.S. attempt to mediate its long-running quarrel with its Greek neighbor.
USA LEADERSHIP ATTEMPTS ARE INADEQUATE AND TROUBLESOME
Tad Szulc, Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1998, Part M; Page 1; HEADLINE: FOREIGN POLICY; THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY acs-VT99

The United States, to be sure, plays a leadership role in the endless succession of international crises, but this is chiefly because there is nobody else to do it. In any case, . it is only a role, not true leadership. A patchwork of improvisations, the Clinton administration's foreign policy is, at best, inconsistent from issue to issue and from country to country. The result is that friends, foes and fence-sitters are often utterly confused both by what the United States proposes and how it may respond to specific emergencies.


THE PROBLEM WITH US LEADERSHIP AND ITS EXERCISE IS THAT IT CRUSHES OTHER PEOPLE IN THE PROCESS
R.C. Longworth, Tribune senior writer, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1998 SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; HEADLINE: FUMBLING GIANT; AMERICA'S AIMLESS FOREIGN POLICY , acs-VT99

The fact is that everything the United States does in the world, however absentmindedly, lands with a terrific thud on somebody else's country. Other nations view the U.S. as a benign hegemon--a friendly elephant, nice but awfully big, stumbling through the global china shop, and they're getting tired of repairing the damage that this well-meaning giant can do.


USA LEADERS USE SHOWS OF FORCE FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, DISRUPTING PRACTICAL RELATIONS GLOBALLY
Michael Klare, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, In These Times, March 22, 1998; Pg. 10, HEADLINE: The Sole Superpower Syndrome acs-VT99

This being the case, it is apparent that U.S. leaders are being driven by other, less obvious considerations. In my view, the main objective here is a show of force for its own sake--to remind the world, and potential adversaries like Saddam Hussein, that the United States has the power to destroy any military challenger (or combination of challengers), and will do so when aroused. This would explain the president's evident determination to proceed with the attacks despite a stunning lack of support by our allies.

This is hubris, pure and simple. And history teaches us that those who are possessed by hubris often fail to see the dangerous and self-destructive consequences of their acts. In this case, we can only speculate as to what those consequences might be--but we can assume that they are likely to be serious. In one scenario, the United States could so destabilize Iraq as to unleash a whirlpool of chaos throughout the Persian Gulf; in another, U.S. action could so inflame Muslim sentiment in the region that it ignites a new wave of anti-American upheavals. An attack is also certain to scuttle any short-term hopes of reviving the Arab-Israeli peace process.
CLINTON ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE FOREIGN POLICY ARE FUTILE
THE CLINTON FOREIGN POLICY IS TO CHANGE THINGS VERY LITTLE
Michael J. Mazarr, director of the New Millennium Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1998 Spring; Pg. 11, HEADLINE: Clinton Foreign Policy, R.I.P. , acs-VT99

Nonetheless, it now seems very nearly certain that history's verdict on Clinton foreign policy (and by " foreign policy" I have in mind a broad combination of foreign and defense matters) will be a harsh one. The Clinton approach was -- is -- a foreign policy of standing pat, when events and trends demanded something new. It was and is a passive approach when the times offered immense benefits for activism. And its consequence is that the United States has all but abandoned a once-in-a-generation chance to build a more stable world on the rubble of the Cold War.


FOREIGN POLICY DRIVEN BY POLITICAL DEMANDS AND CONGRESSIONAL TINKERING IS A DISASTER
R.C. Longworth, Tribune senior writer, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1998 SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; HEADLINE: FUMBLING GIANT; AMERICA'S AIMLESS FOREIGN POLICY , acs-VT99

Foreign policies dreamed up by congressmen responding to their noisiest constituents back home do more harm than good, as recent experience has shown. A constituent-driven foreign policy sounds democratic and wholesome; in fact, it is a disaster.


SUDDENLY THE PRESTIGE AND CREDABILITY OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY HAS LESSENED
ERIC ALTERMAN, The Record (Bergen County, NJ), December 14, 1997; Pg. O01, HEADLINE: CLINTON AND THE END OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY acs-VT99

Meantime, something fundamental has changed and no one seems to have noticed: Six years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and eight after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Cold War "imperial" presidency has passed into history.


PRESIDENTIAL CREDIBILITY HAS CEASED TO BE AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION
ERIC ALTERMAN, The Record (Bergen County, NJ), December 14, 1997; Pg. O01, HEADLINE: CLINTON AND THE END OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY acs-VT99

Was no one struck by the coincidence of Clinton failing to persuade his own party to pass the"fast track" trade legislation he insisted was so necessary to maintain America's position of global leader during his "eyeball to eyeball"confrontation with Hussein? Imagine, a U.S. president is smack in the middle of a showdown with an evil dictator, and his own party kicks him in the teeth.

No one appeared to give a moment's consideration to the old war-horses of the need for national unity or the protection of the president's credibility.
RUSSIA AND THE NEAR ABROAD
The Near Abroad is composed of all those nations, many previously part of the Soviet Union, which are located around Russia itself.
RUSSIA HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE NEAR ABROAD

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RUSSIA WILL NOT ACT MILITARILY AGAINST THE NEAR ABROAD

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RUSSIA WILL INTERVENE INTO THE NEAR ABROAD

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CAUCASUS AND BELARUS

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UKRAINE

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GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS

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CENTRAL ASIAN STATES WILL REMAIN STABLE

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KAZAKHSTAN

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ARMENIA

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CASPIAN BASIN OIL EXPLOITATION

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RUSSIA HAS AN EXCELLENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AROUND IT
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE SURROUNDING NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES HAS BEEN DEVELOPING POSITIVELY
Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99

That brings me to the most salient issue of Russian foreign policy for Russians and the rest of the world alike, which is how Russia relates to those new independent states that were until only 6 years ago part of the Soviet Union and, as such, subject to Russia's domination. In this regard, too, there have recently been some developments that are favorable and encouraging -- though by no means conclusive.


RUSSIA HAS A HIGH PRIORITY ON GOOD RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN AND TRANSCAUCASUS STATES
ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1998, HEADLINE: Russia seeks to consolidate relations with Caucasus, Central Asia acs-VT99

Transcaucasian and Central Asian sovereign states are an important, priority guideline in Russia's foreign policy, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov. Speaking in the State Duma during the "government hour" on Friday [22nd May], Mamedov noted that the main objective was consolidating ties with those states.


RUSSIA HAS ESTABLISHED A NETWORK OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATIES IN CENTRAL ASIA
Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 55-56 , acs-VT99

Moscow has exploited this uncertainty to bolster its position as the region's security umbrella, and to ensure that the Central Asian states do not pursue policies that may prompt an assertive Chinese response. In September 1992, Russia signed an accord with Central Asia to adopt a common approach to China, including continued adherence to Soviet treaties and negotiations and a common CIS position on talks with Beijing." Despite bilateral meetings and agreements, border and demilitarisation deals have been negotiated in the 'four-plus-one' framework, with Russia heading the CIS states. Moscow has also tied Central Asia into its security agenda. On 15 May 1992, a collective-security treaty was signed in Tashkent by Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia, giving the Russian High Command 'effective control over military activities in these states' and discouraging them from LOOKING elsewhere for strategic support-" Bilateral treaties were also concluded with KAZAKSTAN and Kyrgyzs tan in May and June 1993.

DECREASED RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE NEAR ABROAD LEADS TO WAR
RUSSIA BORDERS ON A NEW GEOPOLITICAL FAULTLINE RUNNING THROUGH EURASIA
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

Even in its present reduced state, Russia still has the world's longest frontier, bordering Europe and East Asia, neighboring on the Middle East, and even touching North America. Its capacity for exploiting instabilities along its borders is therefore undiminished. Historically, whenever it has suffered setbacks in one sector of its frontier, Russia has shifted attention to the others. The pattern seems to be repeating itself: feeling rebuffed by Europe, Moscow is turning to the Middle East and East Asia. Yeltsin declared in May that to counter the "Western alliance's expansion plans" his administration has designated the integration of the CIS and the strengthening of ties with China its principal foreign policy goals. Moscow is also cultivating Iran and the other fundamentalist Muslim states. Given the interest of Western powers in Caspian oil and the desire of former Soviet republics in that region to escape Russian pressures for dissolution in the CIS by drawing closer to Turkey, a new political alignment appears to be emerging along Russia's southern frontier. With it, a new East-West geopolitical fault line, running somewhere across Central Asia and the Caucasus, seems to be opening up.


RUSSIA HAS RESOLVED THE MAJOR CONFLICTS WITH NEIGHBOR STATES AND IS PROCEEDING WITHOUT USING MILITARY THREATS
Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99

Third, in relations between Moscow and the regions, the bellwether event was the pact signed May 12 that ended the war in Chechnya. For all the ambiguity in the terms of that agreement and for all the suspense over its implementation, it represented a recognition, however belated, that the federation cannot and should not be held together by brute force; a recognition that tanks, artillery, and bombers are not legitimate or, in the final analysis, efficacious instruments of governance.


LACK OF RUSSIAN STRENGTH IN CENTRAL ASIA CREATES A DANGEROUS SCRAMBLE FOR CENTRAL ASIA
Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99

The scramble for the spoils of the Soviet heritage could cause serious conflict between major geopolitical players and threaten the very foundations of established security systems. When a tenant in a building falls ill or dies, if the tenants in the other apartments begin knocking down walls to expand their own space, they could end up destroying the entire building. Any "world order" is stable only when everyone knows his place in it and there is sufficient collective and individual power, and the willingness to use it, to maintain the whole. The challenge for Europe and the world in the post-Soviet space is averting further disintegration and keeping disorder and conflict from spilling out of the region and setting the globe ablaze.

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