Affirmative section consultation and cooperation through dialogue networks



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David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 367 , acs-VT99

Perhaps it is a legacy of the Cold War that so man), American analysts demand so much so soon from Russia. Russia is no longer an enemy or anything resembling one, and yet we demand to know why, for example, there are no developed political parties in Russia; somehow we fail to remember that it took the United States (with all its historical advantages, including its founders) more than sixty years after independence to develop its two-party system, that in France nearly all the parties have been vehicles for the likes of Mitterrand or Chirac. The drama of 1991 so accelerated our notion of Russian history that expectations became outlandish; and now that many of those expectations have been disappointed, deferred, and even betrayed, it seems as if we have gone back to expecting I only the worst from Russia.


THE BEST POLICY IS TO LET SOCIAL ATTITUDES CATCH UP TO THE CHANGES WHICH ALREADY EXIST
THE BEST WAY TO FIGHT "CORRUPTION" AND "MAFIAS" IN RUSSIA IS TO LET SOCIAL ATTITUDES CATCH UP WITH NEW REALITIES, NOT TO TRY AND FORCE CHANGE
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, P. 119 , acs-VT99

I believe that the problem of corruption in Russia cannot be solved without settling a more profound problem, that of the reduction and ultimate extermination of "gray zones" in social behavior. When law happens to be in contradiction with universal and habitual practices, no action against corruption has any real prospects of success. It is not possible to arrest all corrupt people if the practice of corruption is commonplace. Attempts to combat corruption in Uzbekistan between 1983 and 1986, when tens of thousands were arrested for what was a norm of life there (to wit, paying a "share" of income for being appointed to this or that profitable position), and the failure of that campaign proved the impossibility of combating corruption by force and terror; the scale of repressions in this instance would have been close to that of the Stalin era.


ALLOWING ATTITUDES TO CATCH UP WITH INSTITUTIONS ALLOWS A CIVIL SOCIETY TO EMERGE, AVOIDING SOCIAL TITANISM
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 160 , acs-VT99

And this leads to a significant question, perhaps the central one for societies in transition: How is it possible to avoid social titanism with all its dark sides? The traditional response is the creation of civil society, that is, a system of independent institutions elaborated by citizens themselves and used by them to promote their own interests. The state in relation to civil society is merely an instrument for the creation of an infrastructure that makes the functioning of civil society possible; the state is a kind of hired worker. Civil society and a society in which the state acts as an independent actor (with its own goals and interests different from the interests of the citizens it dominates) differ basically in that civil society reduces the number of "gray zones" that are permanently emerging where the state bureaucracy has no desire to take the ideas and interests of the private citizen into account.


THE PROBLEM IN RUSSIA IS THAT NEW DEMOCRATIC MARKET VALUES HAVE NOT YET REPLACED OLD SOVIET VALUES
Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99

In the end the Russians dismantled their own empire with barely a shot fired. Now Russia is sick with self-doubt and has become an international loner. Nor do Russia's current "democracy" and Western-style consumerism, divorced from the Protestant ethic that sustains them in the West, constitute a value system that can unify and inspire. The problem is not that Soviet values have been jettisoned but that there is nothing to replace them.


IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME FOR RUSSIAN IMPERIALIST MOTIVATIONS TO DIE DOWN
EDWIN G. DOLAN, president of the American Institute of Business and Economics in Moscow, International Herald Tribune, April 15, 1998, Pg. 9, Russia Today , acs-VT99

One [thing I have learned] is that changing Russia into a normal, democratic country ready to live quietly within its own borders is an agenda for a century, not for a decade. American foreign policy today must deal with Russia as it is and as it will be for a long time, not with a dream- Russia that may exist several generations from now. The Russia that now exists still views itself as a big power only temporarily down on its luck. All of the former Soviet Union and much of the rest of the former Soviet empire are regions still seen as a legitimate sphere of influence.

RUSSIA NEEDS TO DEVELOP A MIDDLE CLASS BEFORE IT TRIES FULL DEMOCRACY
IT IS BETTER FOR NATIONS TO WAIT FOR DEMOCRACY UNTIL A MIDDLE CLASS HAS DEVELOPED
Matthew Miller; U.S. News & World Report, The San Diego Union-Tribune, December 30, 1997, Pg. B-7, HEADLINE: Is democracy right for every nation? acs-VT99

For nations not ready for democracy, Kaplan argues, something closer to benevolent dictatorship is the best hope, until a middle class emerges to demand broader political rights -- in effect, biting the hand that fed it.


THE BEST PATH TO DEMOCRACY IS TO DEVELOP A MIDDLE CLASS AND THEN HAVE THAT CLASS PRESSURE FOR THE MOVE TO DEMOCRACY
Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 55; HEADLINE: Was democracy just a moment? acs-VT99

Social stability results from the establishment of a middle class. Not democracies but authoritarian systems, including monarchies, create middle classes-which, having achieved a certain size and self-confidence, revolt against the very dictators who generated their prosperity. This is the pattern today in the Pacific Rim and the southern cone of South America, but not in other parts of Latin America, southern Asia, or sub-Saharan Africa. A place like the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), where the per capita gross national productis less than $ 200 a year and the average person is either a rural peasant or an urban peasant; where there is little infrastructure of roads, sewers, and so on; and where reliable bureaucratic institutions are lacking, needs a leader like Bismarck or Jerry Rawlings-the Ghanaian ruler who stabilized his country through dictatorship and then had himself elected democratically-in place for years before he is safe from an undisciplined soldiery.


HISTORY SHOWS THIS IS HOW STABLE CIVIL SOCIETIES ARE FORMED
RUSSIA IS FOLLOWING THE HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF PAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS
NIKOLAI BIRYUKOV & VICTOR SERGEYEV, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1997; RUSSIAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: Institutional conflict in a nascent democracy, p. 287 , acsVT99

This world is extremely obscure and extremely important - the danger is out of proportion to the reactions it causes; it is the reactions that are really dangerous.” -P. Valery

The above analysis of political developments in Russia in the post perestroika period is a good occasion to formulate a number of questions that appear to be of general interest to historical sociology, viz. about the ways in which regimes of representative rule come to supplant those of authoritarian power. Comparison of the great European revolutions of the last four centuries reveals a repeated pattern of development, at least in the institutional domain.
FRANCE AND GERMANY SHOW THAT IT TAKES TIME TO BUILD A DEMOCRACY
Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99

However, no such miracles have been observed in History over the past couple of thousands of years. France needed almost a century for the principles of liberty solemnly proclaimed by the revolutionaries of 1789 to reveal themselves as firmly anchored in 1871. Between these two dates, the country was aching under the burden of a military dictatorship and two empires which rose above the bones of two crushed revolutions and which massacred whole generations of young Frenchmen in pointless wars of conquest. Germany first proclaimed itself a democratic republic in 1848. A century later, in 1948, it was still building its democracy


ELECTION 2000
THESIS: The Russian presidential election is coming up in the year 2000. It is shaping up as a confrontation between Nemtsov for the Yeltsin reformers vs. Zyoganov for the Communists. The Communists will use the affirmative’s foreign policy changes to win the close election. And, of course, a new Communist government would soon find itself engaged in wars and conflicts to reconquer the former Soviet Union.
A. IN RUSSIA THE POLITICAL FUTURE IS BETWEEN REFORMISTS AND COMMUNISTS
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

The situation in today's Russia is highly volatile. There are really two Russias. One is led by the younger, better-educated, mostly urban population that is eager to break with the past and take the Western route; the new deputy prime minister, Boris Nemtsov, is a representative spokesman for this constituency. The other Russia is made up of older, often unskilled, preponderantly rural or small-town citizens, suspicious of the West and Western ways and nostalgic for the more secure Soviet past; their principal mouthpiece is the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennadi Zyuganov. At present the pro-Western contingent runs the country, but it is by no means firmly in the saddle. In the first round of the June 1996 presidential election, incumbent Boris Yeltsin received the most votes (35 percent), but had the anti-liberal opposition combined forces it would have decisively defeated him: Zyuganov won 32 percent of the vote, the extreme nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky nearly 6 percent, and the authoritarian Aleksandr Lebed over 14 percent, to produce a theoretically absolute majority of 52 percent.


B. COMMUNISTS WILL USE ANY CHANGES IN US FOREIGN POLICY TO CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. CURRENT POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA IS JUST ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO CRUSH IT
Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 14 acs-VT99

We have only begun to understand how the West, while talking about Russia's "admission to civilization," has actually been trying to remove or weaken its chief geopolitical competitor. The West has always considered historical Russia--whether the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union-to be its number one geopolitical rival. Our territory has been subjected to so many intrusions and invasions because of Russia's unique proximity to all the power centers of America, Asia, and Europe.


C. WE MUST ACT NOW TO MAKE SURE THAT THE RUSSIAN ELECTION OF THE YEAR 2000 DOESN’T LEAD TO A WORLDWIDE DISASTER
Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99

Of course, the next elections are still a long way away. Long enough to lay back? It is clear that, if we do not want to repeat in the year 2000 the same "Russian roulette with the revolver placed against the temple of Mankind," then we must immediately roll back the influence of revanchism with the influence of common sense and political sobriety. But to all appearances the liberal majority of the Russian political class is not even preparing for such a counter-attack


THE ELECTION OF 2000 IS THE CRITICAL TURNING POINT FOR RUSSIA
BRINK: RUSSIA CAN NOW TURN EITHER TO DEMOCRACY OR AUTHORITARIANISM
Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 119, acsVT99

These are strong conditions, but less so than the commonly offered theory that democracy in Russia can succeed only if a congruent cultural, social, civic and economic foundation is created first. The behavior of political elites, interacting and monitoring one another's willingness to comply with democratic rules of procedure, can itself launch Russia onto either the democratic or the autocratic path. While it is still too early to tell whether Russia in its post-Soviet, postcommunist phase will succumb to a lengthy phase of self-reinforcing demands for authoritarian rule, or whether the culture and institutions of pluralist democracy will ultimately triumph, it is fair to say that democracy remains a possible outcome.


THE NEXT ELECTION IS CRITICAL -- IF IT GOES WELL THEN THE FUTURE WILL BE MUCH SAFER
Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 118 , acs-VT99

Finally, if the opposition wins the election, assumes power peacefully, and then uses presidential power in such a way as to reinforce rather than overturn the democratic institutional fabric of Russia's postcommunist political order, this will contribute powerfully to the odds that the next, and the next, electoral turnover will also proceed by the rules.


PUBLIC ATTITUDES VERY FRAGILE ABOUT DEMOCRACY
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IS RUSSIA IS VERY BRITTLE, MANY PEOPLE LONG FOR THE COMMUNIST PAST -- THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE QUICKLY
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

Three years ago, when asked what they thought of communism, 51 percent of Russians polled said they had a positive image of it and 36 percent a negative one. (It is, however, indicative of the prevailing confused mood that fewer than half those who expressed a positive attitude toward communism wanted to see it restored.) The popular base of democracy in the country is thus thin and brittle; the political climate can change overnight. Countries like Russia, lacking in strong party organizations and loyalties, are capable of swinging wildly from one extreme to another, often in response to a demagogue who promises quick and easy solutions.


COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST FORCES ARE DEEPLY ENTRENCHED IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

YET SELF-INTEREST has to contend with a political culture based in traditions of empire-building and reliance on military power for stature rather than security. For, unfortunately, Russia has not made a clean break with its Soviet past.

The bloodless revolution of 1991 that outlawed the Communist Party, oversaw the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union, and installed democracy is in many respects incomplete. The new coexists with the old in an uneasy symbiosis. No fresh elites have emerged: the country's political, economic, military, and cultural institutions are run by ex-communists who cannot shed old mental habits. The Duma, the lower house of parliament, is dominated by communists and nationalists equally suspicious of the West and equally determined to reclaim for Russia superpower status. n1 Unlike the Bolsheviks, who on coming to power promptly obliterated all the symbols of the overthrown czarist regime, Russia's democrats have left in place the myriad memorials glorifying their predecessors without substituting pervasive symbols of their own.
THE COMMUNIST PARTY MIGHT WIN THE ELECTION IN 2000
COMMUNISTS ARE RALLYING FOR THE 2000 ELECTIONS
Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99

Another danger: Yeltsin is increasingly dependent on a small circle of top aides, including his daughter Tatiana Dyachenko, chief of staff Valentin Yumashev and spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky, keeping other advisers and views away.

"The president is isolated," says Andrannik Migranyan, a foreign policy adviser. Meanwhile opposition presidential candidates, including communist leader Gennady Zuganov and former general Alexander Lebed, a nationalist, will openly campaign for the presidential election set for the 2000, with no agreed-on reform candidate yet in place to succeed Yeltsin.
COMMUNIST ZYUGANOV IS A STRONG CHALLENGER
ARIEL COHEN, PH.D., AND EVGUENII VOLK, Heritage Foundation,, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: YELTSIN'S GAMBIT: POLITICAL CRISIS IN MOSCOW acs-VT99

Presidential politics also played a role in Yeltsin's decision. According to persistent media reports, and despite his public denials, Yeltsin is seriously considering running in 2000 for a third term. If the Constitutional Court -- and his health -- do not permit this, Yeltsin must consider possible successors. He is not ready to anoint one yet, however. Chernomyrdin officially announced on March 28 that he intends to run for the presidency in 2000. With only about 6 percent of popular support according to recent polls, however, Chernomyrdin remains a distant sixth in the field of contenders. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov leads the pack, followed by First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, retired general Aleksandr Lebed, and Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky.


ON THE ISSUES MOST IMPORTANT TO VOTERS, THE COMMUNISTS CAN CAPTURE THEIR ALLEGIANCE
Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 113-114 , acs-VT99

Popular alienation. The pathologies of the soft state described here have affected public opinion and electoral behavior in Russia. The popular wave of enthusiasm for democratic and market reform that propelled a new generation of political elites into power in 1989-91 has been spent. It has been followed by a wave of disillusionment with the initial results of change, and expressed by voter support for the communist and nationalist opposition.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party and Gennadii Ziuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation have been highly successful in appealing to popular discontent with their radical opposition platforms. The issues that helped to bring democrats into power in 1989-91 radical anti-establishment egalitarianism, political freedom, economic opportunity - no longer move voters. Instead, in 1995, on a number of issues voters cared about most, including the economy and crime, it was the communists who were best able to capture the support of Russian voters.
IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGE IS TAKING PLACE IN RUSSIA ALONG THE LINES OF MARKET VS. COMMUNISM
Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 115 , acs-VT99

Analyses of Russian electoral behavior suggest that cleavage lines are beginning to form and that party development will be strongly influenced by the social divisions, for example between those favoring and opposing Market reforms, and those favoring and opposing communist principles.'


THE OPPOSITION FACTIONS IN RUSSIA ARE UNITING,
Interfax news agency, February 19, 1998 [Moscow, 19 Feb 98. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. HEADLINE: Communists, army support movement sign cooperation pact \\ jan]VT99

Moscow, 19th February: The People's Patriotic Union, led by Gennadiy Zyuganov, and the movement for the support of the army, led by Lev Rokhlin, have signed an agreement aimed at coordinating their activity. Zyuganov, who also leads the Communist Party [of the Russian Federation], and Rokhlin, chairman of the Duma Defence Committee, signed an agreement to this effect at a meeting of the union's presidium held at the State Duma.

"Only joint action by all patriotic forces can save the country from catastrophe," the agreement reads. The two movements will coordinate their actions both in Moscow and in the regions. They will stage joint actions and extend each other support during "events aimed at confronting the antipopular policy pursued in the country"
YELTSIN WON’T CHANGE POLICIES NOW AS HE PREPARES FOR 2000
YELTSIN WILL NOT CHANGE POLICIES FROM NOW UNTIL THE ELECTION IN 2000 -- THE ISSUE IS WHAT HAPPENS THEN!
Georgi Shakhnazarov, the Soviet Academy of Political Science, The Daily Yomiuri, August 18, 1997, SECTION: Pg. 6, HEADLINE: INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD/Boris Nemtsov: Yeltsin's heir apparent? acs-VT99

It is true that Yeltsin still has three years to go until the end of his presidency and much could happen in the meantime. Yet he himself is unlikely to initiate any dramatic changes. He did what he did, and today the question is how viable his policies are going to be and whether his legacy will be preserved--or whether it will be rejected as totally wrong. This question, however, has to be answered by his successors.


YELTSIN WILL BE JUDGED ON HOW HE PREPARES HIS COUNTRY FOR THE 2000 ELECTION
Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99

In three years' time, Russia will be facing an even harsher test - the elections of 2000. There will be no Yeltsin in them who could be blamed for our common mistake. But the antagonism between the profanated democracy and the party of confrontation will remain. And in the end History will judge Yeltsin by the way he prepares his country for this exam, and the liberals by how well they learned the lessons of the 1996 elections.


EVEN IF YELTSIN STAYS HEALTH, THE FOCUS WILL BE ON THE SUCCESSION ISSUE
F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. X , acs-VT99

Moreover, even with a relatively healthy Yeltsin, Russian politicsand policy-will he increasingly influenced by the succession issue. Russian politicians and bureaucrats are already looking beyond the Yeltsin era and beginning to shape their policies and behavior accordingly. The longer Yeltsin is in office, the more the succession issue will begin to intrude on Russian politics-and the more Yeltsin's power and ability to shape Russian policies will decline.


YELTSIN IS WEAK, ON HIS LAST LEGS, AND SERIOUSLY ILL -- THE STRUGGLE TO REPLACE HIM HAS BEGUN
Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99

President Boris Yeltsin's health has declined to the point where some of his aides no longer pretend he is effectively leading Russia.

Although the exact cause of Yeltsin's condition remains secret, it has become increasingly clear at home and abroad that the Russian leader is seriously ill, that the campaign to succeed him has begun and that other governments must start adjusting for the post-Yeltsin era. For the United States, that means the potential for influencing Russia in a positive direction has just gotten more difficult.
YELTSIN CAN RUN FOR A THIRD TERM BUT PROBABLY WILL NOT
Barbara Slavin, USA TODAY, March 24, 1998, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Yeltsin housecleaning shows 'personal pattern' Experts don't see big impact on U.S.-Russian relations acs-VT99

Yeltsin acted this time after business tycoon Boris Berezovsky voiced doubt on television that Yeltsin, whose second presidential term ends in the year 2000, could be elected to a third term. Technically, Yeltsin, 67, can run again, but his health problems would make that difficult.


NEMTSOV IS THE CANDIDATE REFORMERS WILL SUPPORT TO REPLACE YELTSIN
NEMTSOV IS A POPULAR AND SUCCESSFUL GOVERNOR YELTSIN HAS CHOSEN AS HIS SUCCESSOR
Georgi Shakhnazarov, the Soviet Academy of Political Science, The Daily Yomiuri, August 18, 1997, SECTION: Pg. 6, HEADLINE: INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD/Boris Nemtsov: Yeltsin's heir apparent? acs-VT99

It seems, however, that this time the president himself, with no prompting from his family, decided that it was important to bring in someone to whom he could entrust his legacy. Enter the latest heir apparent, the governor of Nizhny Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov, whom Yeltsin had liked since he first visited that Volga city. As is his custom, the president acted quickly, creating for his protege another post of first deputy premier to whom crucial tasks are assigned. In a particularly meaningful gesture, the president had an unusual televised talk with Nemtsov in which he enthusiastically and even sentimentally lavished praise on the governor, leaving no doubt in anyone's mind that he regarded him as his successor.

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