Affirmative section consultation and cooperation through dialogue networks



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TRYING TO IMPOSE NEW ATTITUDES ON RUSSIA WILL LEAD TO DISASTER
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 168 , acs-VT99

Any attempt to regulate a particular situation or moral practice by law has certain social consequences. When moral evaluations of practices are not stable and universally shared, the consequences are highly unpredictable. Many historical figures who used violence to introduce new political relations might hardly be accused of extraordinary bloodthirstiness: bloodshed by them was just a miscalculated consequence of their social and legal innovations. The executed residents of Paris in 1793 and Petrograd in 1918, as well as the victims of Grozny or Sarajevo in 1995, were smashed by a social machine put into action without proper account of possible "excesses of execution." One should hardly ascribe a desire to "criminalize the country" to the architects of "radical economic reform" in Russia since 1991. The birth of the "Wild East" in a country that twenty or thirty years ago looked rather civilized resulted from the overlapping of several factors: the prolonged, unnatural, and forcibly imposed restriction of social activity; the political myopia and conservatism of the older elite; and the perhaps even worse myopia, as well as the ill-conceived and incompetent radicalism, of the new elite. It hardly makes sense to speak about individual faults. This is a matter of collective and historical responsibility. And it may be that the mindless application of the maxim "There is no other way" (perhaps the most alien to politics of all possible maxims) will deprive another generation (or even generations) of Russians from enjoying well-being, security, and freedom.


TRYING TO MOVE TO A "CIVIL SOCIETY" TOO QUICKLY, OLDER FORMS OF DOMINATION WILL RETURN
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 161 , acs-VT99

Does the individual's escape from the "Renaissance-type" atomization of society favor the development of a civil society and the establishment of citizens' control over the state? At first glance, yes; the state's power is undermined because of the mass disobedience of citizens and the loss of its image as something sacred and inviolable.

But if a disintegrating or atomized society is unable to provide an elementary order that would ensure the human right to life and the basic needs of the private citizen, a return to the domination of the state over its citizens becomes unavoidable. If the "liberated" part of society cannot organize properly, or has no idea how to do so, the other part, which retains the previous, statist political culture, will ensure a return to tradition sooner or later.
REFORM MUST NOT BE FASTER THAN THE CHANGE IN SOCIAL ATTITUDES OR ELSE CATASTROPHE RESULTS
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p.61 , acs-VT99

The principal lesson from this analysis is that reformers must leave enough time for the creation of new moral practices within a parallel (and initially not heavily loaded) sector of the private economy, which can later usurp basic economic responsibilities in the competition with the older sector in decline. And this development follows the course of a "pink revolution"--progress without catastrophes .


TRANSITION TO A FREE AND OPEN SOCIETY MIGHT COLLAPSE AND RUSSIA COULD RETURN TO AUTHORITARIANISM AND CONFLICT
TRANSITION OUT OF COMMUNISM DOES NOT HAVE TO BE INTO DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIANISM LOOMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE
Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 5 , acs-VT99

However, when thinking about the evolution of the post communist states it is important to maintain the distinction between transitions from communism and transitions to democracy. It may be true that liberal democracy has become the prevailing model of modem politics in much of the world." But both historical experience and a priori reasoning suggest that a spectrum of possible post communist outcomes still exists. This spectrum includes variants of democracy, variants of authoritarianism, and some hybrids in between.


RUSSIA'S FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED. DEMOCRATIC REFORMS ARE NOT CERTAIN
REPRESENTATIVE FLOYD D. SPENCE (R-SC), FEBRUARY 12,1998 [Federal News Service. HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE. SUBJECT: THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY jan]VT99

Nor has the end of the Cold War brought an end to great power- competition. China, economically backed with -- (inaudible) -- poorly armed throughout most of the Cold War is using its robust economy to modernize both its conventional and nuclear forces. China currently has more strategic missiles under development than any other nation. Beijing and Moscow claim to have buried their Cold War hostilities and formed a strategic partnership. Unfortunately this partnership entails significant transfers of advanced weapons and military technology from Russia to China. And Chinese support of Russian political goals, such as opposition to NATO enlargement and to possible US, United States military action against Iraq. Russia's future is far from certain as well as democracy is not yet firmly established. Indeed, according to a study last year headed by William Webster, former director of the CIA and the FBI, Russia's fast becoming an unstable kleptocracy, armed with nuclear weapons.


LINK: TRYING TO FORCE DEMOCRACY TOO SOON LEADS TO A DANGEROUS RETROGRESSION
REAL PROGRESS FOR DEMOCRACY MUST WAIT UNTIL A CRITICAL MASS OF DEMOCRATS EMERGES IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY
David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 358 , acs-VT99

Sergei Kovalyov, a biologist who spent many years in prison under Brezhnev and then helped lead the human rights movement:

"The quality of democracy depends heavily on the quality of the democrats," Kovalyov told me after the elections. "We have to wait for a critical mass to accumulate of people with democratic principles. It's like a nuclear explosion: the critical mass has to accrue. Without this, everything will be like it is now, always in fits and starts. Our era of romantic democracy is long over. We have finally fallen to earth."
FORCING NATIONS TO HAVE ELECTIONS WHEN THEY ARE NOT YET READY CAUSES ETHNIC VIOLENCE, AS IN BOSNIA
Barbara Slavin, USA TODAY, December 30, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Ballots don't always stop the world's bullets Democracy as strategy is hit or miss acs-VT99

Zakaria argues that elections actually can have a negative effect. In Bosnia, he says, "it has been a disaster," solidifying ethnic hatreds that produced the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II.

He criticized Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for urging elections during a recent visit to the Congo, where leader Laurent Kabila gained power by force. "So Kabila will hold relatively free and fair elections and they will mean nothing," Zakaria says.
WHEN DEMOCRACY IS ADOPTED TOO EARLY IT MERELY INSTITUTIONALIZES ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS IN A SOCIETY, RENDERING IT UNGOVERNABLE
Matthew Miller; U.S. News & World Report, The San Diego Union-Tribune, December 30, 1997, Pg. B-7, HEADLINE: Is democracy right for every nation? acs-VT99

When these conditions aren't present, democracy instead institutionalizes tribal, ethnic, religious or regional tensions, rendering nations ungovernable. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example, democracy brought nationalists to power and paved the path to war. Only a coup in Azerbaijan has brought the stability that now promises to bring economic development.


DEMOCRACY EXPOSES THE WEAKNESSES OF ANY SOCIETY, AND THUS SHOULD BE USED ONLY IN SITUATIONS OF SOCIAL STRENGTH
Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 55; HEADLINE: Was democracy just a moment? acs-VT99

HITLER and Mussolini each came to power through democracy. Democracies do not always make societies more civil-but they do always mercilessly expose the health of the societies in which they operate.


THE SOCIETY NEEDS TO HAVE DEVELOPED SOME COHESION BEFORE DEMOCRACY IS INTRODUCED FOR IT TO BE SUCCESSFUL
Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 55; HEADLINE: Was democracy just a moment? acs-VT99

The lesson to draw is not that dictatorship is good and democracy bad but that democracy emerges successfully only as a capstone to other social and economic achievements. In his "Author's Introduction" to Democracy in America, Tocqueville showed how democracy evolved in the West not through the kind of moral fiat we are trying to impose throughout the world but as an organic outgrowth of development. European society had reached a level of complexity and sophistication at which the aristocracy, so as not to overburden itself, had to confer a measure of equality upon other citizens and allocate some responsibility to them: a structured division of the population into peacefully competing interest groups was necessary if both tyranny and anarchy were to be averted.


RUSSIA IS FALLING APART BECAUSE IT TRIED TO GO DEMOCRATIC TOO SOON
Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 55; HEADLINE: Was democracy just a moment? acs-VT99

Because both a middle class and civil institutions are required for successful democracy, democratic Russia, which inherited neither from the Soviet regime, remains violent, unstable, and miserably poor despite its 99 percent literacy rate. Under its authoritarian system China has dramatically improved the quality of life for hundreds of millions of its people. My point, hard as it may be for Americans to accept, is that Russia may be failing in part because it is a democracy and China may be succeeding in part because it is not.


LINK: TRYING TO FORCE FREE MARKET TOO SOON LEADS TO A DANGEROUS RETROGRESSION
SEVERE HARDSHIPS INFLICTED BY REFORM TEND TO DISCOURAGE PEOPLE ABOUT DEMOCRACY
Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 25 , acs-VT99

On the other hand, the severe hardships inflicted on many persons by economic reform may ultimately sharpen disillusionment with democracy - especially if these hardships are accompanied by rapidly increasing disparities of income and extensive corruption.


RUSSIAN PEOPLE SUPPORT A FREE ECONOMY, BUT DISAGREE ABOUT THE SPEED OF THE TRANSITION
Matthew Wyman, Prof. of Politics at Keele University [UK], 1997, PUBLIC OPINION IN POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA, p. 233 , acs-VT99

Attitudes to the development of a market economy could be discussed with a great deal more confidence. It was shown that , from the time at which it became a political issue, a consistent majority supported the idea of creating a market economy, while a smaller number, around one in four, consistently opposed it. Among the supporters of markets, however, there were great differences about the desirable pace of reform, with a relatively small social constituency in favour of rapid transition to a market economy.


A MINORITY OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS SUPPORT A FREE MARKET
Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 129 , acs-VT99

As reform unfolded and social distress increased, Russians became increasingly disaffected and alienated from the reform process and the pain that it inflicted on the population. VTslOM, the highly respected public polling research center, has monitored this dramatic shift in the population's support for capitalism. Of those surveyed in 1993, 81 percent favored a system based on private property and market relationships. Only 7 percent thought that an economy regulated by state planning was better. By May 1995 Russians were no longer certain. Only 22 percent said they favored a capitalist economy, while the remainder were evenly divided between those who thought state planning was better (39 percent) and those who were uncertain (39 percent).


FEAR OF IMPENDING SOCIAL DISORDER CRIPPLES THE PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS
Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 132 , acs-VT99

The declining effectiveness of government and the erosion of confidence in it has another consequence. It contributes to fears of impending social disorder and moves people to be more cautious about changing the course of reform. Anxiety about looming disaster partly helps explain the surprising passivity of the intelligentsia in the face of hardships imposed by radical reform, and is another important reason for the weakness of social democracy in Russia.


LINK: BOTH UTOPIAN AND CONSERVATIVE ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE MORALITY LEAD TO CATASTROPHE FOR RUSSIA
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 167 , acs-VT99

Utopian efforts to create and legitimize social institutions not supported by moral practices may, contrary to reformers' intentions, produce an apocalyptic reality of the collapse of power. And conservatives' tough-minded and persistent reluctance to institutionalize the operative moral practices may turn the whole of society into a hierarchy of mafia-like organizations.


IMPACT: RUSHING REFORM LEADS TO AUTHORITARIANISM
RUSSIAN AUTHORITARIANISM MAY TAKE THE FORMS OF DICTATORSHIP, ONE PARTY STATE, OR MILITARY REGIME
Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 7 , acs-VT99

The main potential forms Of post communist authoritarianism are personal dictatorships, one-party states, and military regimes. The socioeconomic turmoil following the collapse of communism may make it hard to build stable versions of any of these types of authoritarianism, but oscillations among them may still preclude successful democratization. In countries where a substantial part of the population has already undergone sociopolitical mobilization, the lack of a well developed party structure makes a personal dictatorship vulnerable to sharp shifts in the public mood and to unbridled powerstruggles when the dictator is incapacitated or dies . Nonetheless, a few post communist countries are likely to come under the sway of such dictatorships. Contemporary Belarus fits this model, and Turkmenistan bears a significant resemblance to it.


SOCIAL TITANISM IS A DISASTER FOR ANY SOCIETY
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 160 , acs-VT99

Generally speaking, social titanism, the aesthetization of war, and the immoralism of crimes, prisons, and concentration camps are corollaries of the opening of the valves of social mobility, be it during the "Great Revolutions," Napoleonic wars, or Nazism.


WHILE ONE PARTY STATES ARE MORE STABLE, DICTATORSHIP IS AN EASIER AUTHORITARIAN ALTERNATIVE
Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 7 , acs-VT99

Generally speaking, authoritarian states built around a single ruling party are more stable than personal dictatorships. A ramified party organization helps harness mass political participation to the leaders' objectives, reduces elite conflict, and smooths the process of succession. For post communist leaders set on following this path, the challenge is to create a part), mechanism that can actually control mass participation and the behavior of any quasi-democratic governmental institutions that already have been set up. This stratagem is often more difficult to apply than it might seem. Once the old communist mechanisms of control have been weakened, building a stable new ruling party is a problematic undertaking, as developments in Kazakstan indicate. Success depends both on the top leader's willingness to assign high priority to building such a party and on the party's capacity to contain new socioeconomic forces within its structure. Absent these two conditions, leaders with a dictatorial bent may move toward a system of personal rule, eliminating quasi -democratic institutions and processes, such as elections, that they cannot effectively control.


AT ITS OWN PACE, RUSSIA WILL DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL SOCIETY
IN THE LONG RUN, RUSSIA WILL DEVELOP INTO A DEMOCRATIC PLURAL STATE
Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 117, acs-VT99

Therefore a gradual increase in political order through democratic pluralism is possible over the long run. Institutional change can be a powerful impetus to a self-sustaining democratic equilibrium. Where once it was assumed that social modernization tended to drive the development of political regimes, now scholars are inclined to believe that well-constructed institutions can provide elites with sufficient incentives to resolve their differences and achieve their goals by democratic mean.


SMALL CIVIC SUCCESSES WILL GROW, THROUGH A VIRTUOUS CYCLE, INTO A CIVIC SOCIETY
Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 118, acs-VT99

But where people begin to reinforce one another's expectations that they are able to cooperate in common endeavors without relying upon a harsh, dictatorial central authority, a "virtuous cycle" results in which more complex and effective organizational forms evolve."' What would set such a developmental sequence into motion in Russia? The preceding discussion has suggested that Russia stands poised between two alternative paths. The disintegrating forces of repressiveness, crime, corruption, and popular alienation may take the upper hand and lead to a new form of authoritarianism, or the integrating forces of a pluralistic and lawregulated order may gradually grow stronger. In this delicate state of equipoise, the behavior of central political elites could tip the balance: in particular, their behavior during and after the 1996 presidential election. Recall Samuel Huntington's "two-turnovers" rule in judging the degree to which democracy is consolidated in a post -authoritarian regime. "' If following the collapse of an authoritarian regime, the incumbents lose the first election and give up power peacefully, and then, following the second election, their successors do the same, we may say that democracy is well established. Although Russia's parliamentary election of 1995 was the first in which a free election was held on schedule since the October Revolution, the most important test of a peaceful transfer of state power is the presidential election: 1996 will be the first; 2000 would be the second. If incumbents lose twice and exit willingly, their behavior will be crucial in setting examples for other political leaders at all levels of government.


PRESSURES BY DEVELOPING STRUCTURES WILL MOVE RUSSIA TOWARDS BEING A CIVIL SOCIETY
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, P. 163-164 , acs-VT99

Of course, some may say that the very existence of "authorized" commercial structures is a form of corruption and, therefore, contributes to the criminalization of society. But the pressure exerted by the "authorized" structures has a civilizing impact on the state. A good example of this fact is an address in the spring of 1996 by a number of outstanding businessmen (closely connected to the state) to the principal political forces of the country. On the eve of the presidential elections, the businessmen suggested elaborating an agreement on the basic rules of the game in politics and economics that must not be violated irrespective of the outcome of the elections. This address is an episode in the prolonged, tormented birth of civil society, which, contrary to the opinion of politicians like Anatoly Chubais, could hardly be hastened by the unjustified enrichment of a handful of citizens who instantly "turned intoproprietors.


BEST POLICY IS STRATEGIC PATIENCE -- DON’T TRY TO RUSH THINGS IN RUSSIA
BEST CHOICE IS TO WAIT AND LET THE IRRATIONAL HOPES OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE TRANSFORM THE SOCIAL ATTITUDES
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 161-162 , acsVT99

Does all this mean that the present situation in Russia is absolutely hopeless and that the creation of a modem society is precluded? I do not think so. To my mind, it is exactly the irrational nature of human behavior that may save the situation now. When rational behavior induces people to revel in chaos (this is what the "social utility function" has turned out to be in Russia), irrational behavior (which is in essence collective rationality; see Chapter 3) must lead to the emergence of new and stable social institutions of modem society. They probably cannot develop quickly. But having seen so much bloodshed since the beginning of this century, the Russian people must have learned something very important that was previously lacking 'in Russian political culture, This is the insight that social institutions are indispensable for supporting contracts and must be carefully constructed. The spontaneous order, that is, norms of collective rationality, must be fixed or crystallized in legitimate social institutions transferred "from shadow into light." One can discern some evidence that this understanding is emerging in present-day Russia. Our fear is that it may once again, as at the beginning of the century, be destroyed in yet another social cataclysm.


THE BEST POLICY IS STRATEGIC PATIENCE -- LET RUSSIA DEVELOP
Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99

In other words, we need to make sure we have a policy toward Russia that contains an indispensable feature: strategic patience. That means a policy not just for coping with the issue or the crisis of the moment or the week or even of the season, or for getting through the next summit meeting; rather, it means a policy for the next century -- which, by the way, begins in 2 years, 3 months, 11 days, and 4 hours.


RUSSIA IS SLOWLY EVOLVING, AND MUST BE GIVEN TIME TO DO SO, IN ORDER TO BECOME COMPLETELY BENIGN
Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99

This must not take Americans by surprise. Seven years ago, an enormous evil empire that had poisoned everything and everyone it touched broke to pieces. Its harmful emanations, like light from a long-dead star, will continue to reach us for years to come. Russia's leaders came of age and rose under the empire. They cannot be counted on to fashion a world of which they know little. At best, in domestic politics, economics, and international relations, they will forge a hybrid. If we are lucky -- as we have been with Yeltsin -- the Russia they make will be more than half benign. It will be up to the next generation to turn the hybrid into something new and free of the malignant past.


OUR ERROR IS IN DEMANDING THAT RUSSIA MOVE TO STABLE MARKET DEMOCRACY TOO QUICKLY THEY JUST NEED SOME TIME
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